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DECISIVE BATTLES

SINCE

WATERLOO

THE MOST IMPORTANT MILITARY EVENTS FROM

1815 TO 1887

BY

THOMAS W. KNOX

AUTHOR OF

"Marco Polo for Boys and Girls," "Life of Robert Fulton and a History of Steam Navigation," "The Boy Travellers in the Far East," five vols.; "The Boy Travellers in South America," "The Boy Travellers in the Russian Empire," "The Young Nimrods," two vols.; "The Voyage of the Vivian," "Overland through Asia," "Backsheesh," "Underground," "John," "Camp-Fire and Cotton Field," "How to Travel," "The Pocket Guide around the World," etc., etc.

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
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
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PREFACE.

In 1852 Professor (afterwards Sir Edward) Creasy published a book, which is well described by its title, "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, from Marathon to Waterloo." Professor Creasy's work has passed through many editions, and has long since become a standard authority among historical students. In the belief that the decisive battles since Waterloo are worthy of record in a similar form, the author has ventured to prepare the volume, of which these lines are the preface.

Creasy justly says: "It is probable, indeed, that no two historical inquirers would entirely agree in their lists of the decisive battles of the world," and it is of course still less likely that any unanimity of opinion could be found among historical students of the present day in the selection of the decisive battles since 1815. There is a wide difference of opinion concerning the battles which assured English supremacy in India; the battles which decided the result of the civil war in America; and concerning those which have repeatedly changed the political map of the valley of the Danube and the regions contiguous to it. Several of the twenty-five battles which are described in this volume could hardly be included if the list were subjected to the crucial test of Hallam in his comments upon the victory of Charles Martel, between Tours and Poitiers, over the Saracens. In speaking of that battle Hallam says: "It may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes." Thus while the victory of the Eng-

lish at Prome in Burmah, described in the second chapter of this book, was "the beginning of the end" of the Burmese kingdom, it by no means follows that their complete defeat would have forever kept them outside the boundaries of that semi-barbarous country. It might have delayed the conquest for several, perhaps many, years, but would not have prevented it. Similar comments might be made concerning the capture of Silistria by the Russians in 1829, the battle of Gujerat twenty years later, the battle of Sedan in 1870, and the conquest of Khiva in 1873. The American Civil War will doubtless lead to criticism of the battles selected as decisive; it would be difficult to find in any group of the men who participated in that gigantic struggle perfect accord of opinion as to the relative importance of the battles that were fought between 1861 and 1865 for the preservation or destruction of the Union. The author's reasons for his selections will be found at the end of the chapter wherein each battle is described.

In the preparation of this volume the author has examined a vast amount of military and other history, and is indebted for his material to the works of many previous writers. Of some of the battles described he had personal knowledge, and he has been able to inspect certain of the battle-fields referred to in the narrative. Among the works his obligations to which he desires to acknowledge may be mentioned the following:—

"A View of South America and Mexico" (Anonymous); Soldan's "Historia del Peru Independiente"; "Journals of Lord Cochrane in South America"; Phayre's "Narrative of the Burmese War"; Histories of India by Malcolm, Mill, Kaye, Wilson, Elphinstone, and others; Alison's "History of Europe"; Lady Bourcher's "Despatches of Admiral Codrington"; Histories of Greece by Grote, Cox, and others; Count Von Moltke's "Russians in Bulgaria and Roumelia"; Chesney's "Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828-29"; Poitevin's "Prise de la Citadelle

d'Anvers"; Ripley's "History of the War with Mexico"; Bancroft's "History of the Pacific States of North America"; Malleson's "Decisive Battles of India," and "History of the Indian Mutiny"; Wright's "Northwestern Provinces of India"; M'Ghee's "How We Got to Peking"; Oliphant's "Lord Elgin's Mission to China"; Bordstaedt and Dwyer's "Franco-German War"; Markham's "War between Peru and Chili"; Gaffaret's "Histoire d'Algérie"; King's "Europe in Storm and Calm"; Delord's "Histoire du Second Empire"; Sturmer's "Der Tod des Grafen Diebitsch"; Schuyler's "Turkistan"; MacGahan's "Fall of Khiva"; Marvin's "Russians at the Gates of Herat"; Boulger's "Central Asian Questions"; and Russell's "War in the Crimea." *Harper's* and the *Century Magazines* deserve acknowledgment, and so do the files of the *New York Tribune*, *London Daily News*, *London Times*, *Illustrated London News*, *London Graphic*, *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, and other newspapers. The official records of the American Civil War have been examined, together with numerous volumes of an unofficial character. In describing the battle of Gettysburg the author has thought best to rely mainly upon "The History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de Paris. In so doing he has hoped to avoid the charge of partiality, which has been brought against nearly every other of the numerous writers on the subject.

The battles here described possess an interest for the student of military tactics and strategy. The book has, however, for its further purpose, the idea of presenting an outline survey of the history of the Nineteenth Century, considered from the point of view of its chief military events. It is the author's hope that the result of his labors may help to make clear the character and relative importance of these events, and to indicate their influence in shaping the history of our own times.

T. W. K.


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




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
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DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

CHAPTER I.

BATTLE OF AYACUCHO—1824.



THE Napoleonic wars that terminated with the battle of Waterloo reduced the nations of Europe to a state of exhaustion, and for a considerable period thereafter there was little occupation for the soldier. England, France, Spain, Germany, and Russia were engaged in repairing the ravages of war, and by common consent there was a truce to arms and a halt in the work of organized destruction. But the wings of Peace, outstretched over Europe, were folded on the other side of the Atlantic, throughout all the vast region known as Spanish America. Mexico, Peru, Chili, and the other trans-Atlantic provinces of Spain sought to sever their connection with the Old World; one by one they achieved their independence through a series of wars that deluged the land with blood and threatened to leave it an uninhabited waste.

The final battle of the South American wars of independence was fought at Ayacucho, Peru, December 9, 1824. Let us first glance at the events which led up to that sanguinary conflict, and then consider the occurrences of the day which saw the Spanish power in America broken forever.

It is a curious circumstance that the South American revolutions had their beginning in the intense loyalty of the people of the Spanish-American colonies, and particularly of the United States of Colombia, for their king. In 1808 the armies of Napoleon were overrunning Spain; Ferdinand VII. was compelled to abdicate the throne, and Joseph Bonaparte, brother of Napoleon, was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies. Agents were immediately sent, in the name of the new king, to announce to the American colonies the abdication of Ferdinand and the elevation of Joseph to the throne. Joseph shrewdly promised to the viceroys and captains-general throughout the colonies, that they should retain their places, provided they acquiesced in the new order of things and induced the people to accept it. But though the officials were resigned to the situation, the people were not; they publicly burned the proclamations of King Joseph, expelled his agents, and insulted all Frenchmen then living in the colonies, so that most of them fled for safety.

In July, 1808, a French brig arrived at La Guayra, the port of Caraccas, with intelligence of recent events in France and Spain, including the abdication of Ferdinand and the accession of Joseph Bonaparte. The captain of the brig proceeded to Caraccas with despatches to the captain-general, and soon after his arrival the news from the Old World became known among the people. An English officer who was there at the time writes as follows:

The city was immediately in arms, 10,000 of its inhabitants surrounded the residence of the captain-general and demanded the proclamation of Ferdinand the Seventh as their king, which he promised the next day. But this would not satisfy them; they proclaimed him that evening by heralds, in form, throughout the city, and placed his portrait, illuminated, in the gallery of the town-house.

The French were first publicly insulted in the coffee-house from which they were obliged to withdraw, and the French

captain left Caraccas, privately, about eight o'clock that night, escorted by a detachment of soldiers, and so saved his life; for, about ten o'clock, his person was demanded of the governor by the populace, and when they learned that he was gone, three hundred men followed him to put him to death.

About the same time a French brig arrived at Buenos Ayres with an envoy from Napoleon carrying despatches to Liniers, the viceroy, who issued a proclamation announcing the events which had occurred in Spain, and advising the people to submit to the authority of Joseph Bonaparte. The proclamation was coldly received by the people; the governor of Monte Video accused Liniers of disloyalty, disregarded his proclamation, established a *junta*¹ or governing body for his province, and withdrew it altogether from the authority of Liniers.

In spite of the efforts of the viceroys and other officials to convince the colonies that every thing was quiet in Spain, it became known among the people that the peninsula was in a state of insurrection against the authority of Joseph Bonaparte, that in some provinces he was openly defied, and provincial juntas had assumed the management of affairs. The one at Seville proclaimed itself the supreme junta of Spain and the Indies, and sent deputies to the colonies requiring an acknowledgment of its authority. In order to secure this acknowledgment it announced that it was recognized and obeyed throughout Spain, which was far from being the case. At the same time the junta of the Asturias opposed that of Seville; the regency of Ferdinand claimed to have supreme authority; and to complicate matters still further Joseph Bonaparte had been proclaimed king. There were

¹ *Junta* in Spanish means an association, and is usually applied to a body of persons combined for any civil or political object. It formerly referred more particularly to assemblies of representatives of the people meeting without authority of the sovereign, but has latterly been extended to those of the most strictly legal character.

therefore four kinds of authorities to which the colonies were required to give allegiance; they were ready to recognize any proper authority of Spanish origin, and while they differed as to their proper course between the various juntas, they were all agreed in their hatred for the French.

The efforts of the viceroys and their subordinates to secure colonial allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte led to collisions between the populace and the authorities in several cities, and finally to open warfare. Owing to the disorders in Spain there was no central power which the colonies could respect, and this circumstance led to the formation of juntas of their own. The first was in Quito in 1809, but it was suppressed by the viceroy; the second was at Santa Fé de Bogota in the same year, and many of its members were imprisoned and afterwards massacred in cold blood. Similar scenes were enacted in other parts of the colonies, and tended greatly to weaken the authority of the mother country. Naturally the colonists asked the question, "What will become of us if Spain falls completely under the domination of France?" The discussion of the question naturally led to independence, and it is easy to see how a struggle which began in extreme loyalty to Ferdinand VII. and the government he represented, could develop into a battle for complete independence. From 1808 to 1812 the French armies gained ground in Spain. There was little hope of a restoration of the Spanish power and the expulsion of the Bonapartes, and long before the disasters of Napoleon in Russia, and the consequent retreat of the French from Spain, the colonies were on the high road to absolute freedom from the yoke of their mother country.

The government of Joseph Bonaparte adopted repressive measures towards the colonies; troops were sent to awe the people into submission, the province of Caraccas was declared in blockade, and the colonial rulers were ordered to enforce obedience at whatever cost. After the

retirement of the French from Spain, the regency, which succeeded to Joseph Bonaparte, and after it the restored king, Ferdinand VII., continued the same measures, totally ignoring the loyalty which the colonies had originally displayed at the beginning of the French occupation. Nothing remained for the colonies but a war for independence, a war which terminated, as already mentioned, with the battle of Ayacucho, sixteen years after the first outbreak at Caraccas.

The story of the South American war of independence would fill many volumes. Juntas were established in Caraccas, Buenos Ayres, Santiago, and other South American cities widely separated from each other, during 1810, and the repressive measures adopted by the colonial authorities only added to the vigor of the movement. In Buenos Ayres the viceroy was deposed, and the powers of government were assumed by a junta acting in the name of the deposed and captive king, Ferdinand VII. From Buenos Ayres the disturbance extended to Chili, where another junta deposed the viceroy and assumed the reins of government; about the same time there was an insurrection in Upper Peru (now called Bolivia) and later another in Peru. From a state of tranquillity, in 1808, the whole of South America was in a condition of open or partial revolt in less than four years, with the single exception of Brazil.

Brazil was a colony of Portugal, not of Spain. In 1807, when Napoleon declared war against Portugal, its king, John VI., fled to Brazil, accompanied by many courtiers and followed by numerous emigrants. After the fall of Napoleon in 1815, Brazil was raised to the rank of a kingdom; John assumed the title of King of Portugal, Algarve, and Brazil, and on the 26th of February, 1821, he proclaimed the constitution. A revolutionary movement took place in the following April; Brazil was proclaimed an independent empire; it adopted a constitution in 1824,

and its independence was acknowledged in 1825. Its transition from a colony of a European government to an independent state was far less turbulent than that of its neighbors.

The revolution continued with varying success for more than a decade, but with the advantages decidedly in favor of the revolutionists. The progress towards independence was retarded by dissensions among the revolutionists, which frequently threatened to restore the royalist power; ambitions and jealousies too often obscured patriotism, and in many instances they led to open or secret assassination. This was the case in Buenos Ayres, Chili, and Peru to a very marked degree, and only to a minor extent in other parts of the revolted country. On several occasions assistance to beleaguered garrisons or to armies in the field was deliberately refused or withheld, for no other reason than personal ill-feeling between general and other officers who were engaged in a common cause of patriotism.

West of the Andes the progress of the revolution was less encouraging than in the countries to the eastward. The royalists were practically in full control of Peru and Chili in the early years of the insurrection, and in the latter country they had banished many of the leading patriots to the island of Juan Fernandez, and were exercising extreme tyranny over all the people. Early in 1817 General San Martin, Governor of Mendoza, and an active patriot of Buenos Ayres, conceived the design of crossing the Andes with an army of liberation to assist the Chilian patriots. Nearly a year was spent in organizing the army and collecting the necessary materials and transportation. The passage of the Andes by San Martin was a more difficult matter than that of Napoleon over the Alps; it was accomplished in thirteen days, with a loss of a few men and of five thousand horses and mules, and was followed by the battle of Chacabuco, in which the royalists were

completely defeated. A junta was immediately formed at Santiago, and the dictatorship was offered to San Martín, who declined it.

The royalist army of Chili fled to Talcahuano, and after receiving reinforcements from the viceroy at Lima, resumed the offensive. It encountered the patriot army on the plains of Maypu, April 5, 1818, and the encounter resulted in one of the most sanguinary battles on record, when the number of men engaged is considered. Out of eight thousand men comprising the Spanish army, two thousand were killed or wounded, and three thousand captured. The general escaped with a portion of his cavalry, but all the baggage, artillery, military chests, and supplies fell into the hands of the patriots. The loss of the latter was one thousand killed and wounded, out of an aggregate of about seven thousand. The victory gave independence to Chili, and turned attention towards Peru. Steps were immediately taken to aid the Peruvians to gain their independence, and for this purpose an army and a naval force was organized.

Lord Cochrane, an English naval officer, arrived in Chili in November, 1818, and was immediately appointed to the command of the Chilian squadron. Great exertions were made, and in the course of a year many captures were effected, though not without some losses by the Chilian squadron. On the 20th of August, 1820, a combined land and naval expedition left Valparaiso for Pisco, about one hundred miles south of Peru, where the land forces were disembarked. The squadron proceeded to Callao, where a Spanish frigate of forty guns with two sloops-of-war and fourteen gun-boats were lying under the protection of the batteries. On the night of November 5th, Lord Cochrane succeeded in capturing the frigate, and this exploit was practically the termination of the Spanish naval power in the Pacific, so far as offensive measures were concerned.

An armistice of the land forces was made by request of

the viceroy, but nothing came of it. The independent army moved leisurely to the north of Lima, remaining for weeks and sometimes months in camp engaged in recruiting and in the dissemination of liberal ideas, and also in cutting off the supplies of the royalists in Lima. Later there was another abortive armistice, and early in July, 1821, San Martin threatened to move against Lima. Thereupon the viceroy abandoned it, and on the 12th of the month San Martin entered and was joyously received. The independence of Peru was solemnly proclaimed on the 28th of July, and on the 3d of August San Martin assumed the title of Protector of Peru and issued a proclamation.

The liberating army remained inactive till the following May, but the work of recruiting and making ready for the field was actively continued. In July, 1822, San Martin went to Guayaquil for an interview with Simon Bolivar, the liberator of Colombia, and returned in August with a contingent of Colombian troops.

On the 20th of September, 1822, the constitutional congress of Peru was assembled and San Martin surrendered his dictatorship which he had held for little more than a year. The congress unanimously named him general and commander-in-chief of the armies of Peru; he accepted the title, but declined the appointment on the ground that such a position would be inconsistent with the authority of congress. Shortly afterward he returned to Chili, and the affairs of Peru were placed in the hands of a junta of three prominent citizens. In November, 1822, an expedition left Lima for the southern coast but it was defeated and dispersed by the royalists in the following January. Thereupon the royalist army reoccupied Lima and the patriot cause was in great danger.

About this time the United States of Colombia achieved independence, after a long and devastating war which was brought to a triumphal end by the genius and patriotism of Simon Bolivar. Foreseeing that if the royalists obtained

control in Peru the independence of Colombia would be endangered, and being invited by the Peruvians, Bolivar proceeded to Lima at the head of a considerable force ; he was joyfully welcomed and appointed dictator of Peru, until such time as the Spaniards should be conquered or driven out. The royalist army retired to the interior at the approach of Bolivar and his army.

The royalists were in such numbers that Bolivar did not dare to risk a battle until the arrival of reinforcements from Colombia, and when threatened with an attack he retired to Truxillo. In February, 1824, the royalists again occupied Lima and Callao ; by the following June Bolivar's forces were sufficiently strong to enable him to resume the offensive, which resulted in a battle on the plains of Junin, on the 6th of August, where the royalists were defeated with heavy loss, especially in cavalry, on which great reliance was placed. From this time until the 9th of December no important action was fought but there was much skilful manœuvring on both sides. The liberating army, consisting of the united forces of Peru and Colombia, was under the command of General Anton Jose de Sucre, who had previously distinguished himself on the battlefield and especially at Pichincha in 1822, where he defeated the Spaniards in a fiercely fought conflict.

Early in December General Sucre took a position at Ayacucho in sight of the royalist army, which was posted on a height. General Bolivar was not present ; he had given full power to Sucre to do as he thought best, either to give battle to the royalists or refuse it. In a letter written a short time before the battle of Ayacucho Bolivar cautioned Sucre in the following words :

“ Remember, that on your army corps depends the fate of Peru, perhaps forever ; and with it, that of the whole of America, perhaps for years. Considering the terrible consequences which a battle lost may entail upon us, every means of foresight and strategy is to be exerted so

as not to make a move without gaining a decided and absolute success."

Acting on this advice Sucre had advanced with great caution. Several times the enemy offered battle, which Sucre declined, as he was waiting the arrival of reinforcements which were hurrying forward. There were several skirmishes in which no decided advantage was gained by either side, but the movements of the patriots frustrated some of the plans of the viceroy and compelled him to make many changes of position.


On the 4th of December, Lieutenant Colonel Medina, adjutant of the liberator, Bolivar, came into Sucre's camp with a final order that a decisive battle was to be ventured. It was offered on that very day in the plain of Tambo, but the Spaniards declined.

On December 8th both armies stood face to face. Every thing told that they were on the eve of a great battle, which neither could avoid by means of a retreat without the risk of destruction. Sucre's position was at a considerable distance from the friendly villages, and he was opposed by an army accustomed to quick marches; the roads were rough, and his supplies were giving out. Scarcely could he muster 5,780 men, and he had only one small piece of artillery.

On the other hand the Spaniards were obliged to force the fight. A retreat would have been tantamount to a rout, and their rations were alarmingly short. But they were superior in numbers, as they counted 9,310 men of all arms, with fourteen pieces of artillery.

The Spanish army was on the hills round about Condorcanqui; its right and left wings were protected by a deep ravine, its rear-guard stood against the steep mountain range, and its front was towards a plain half a mile in width and a mile in length.

General Miller of the liberating army thus describes the battle-field:



Quinua, an Indian village, is located on the farther side, to the west of Ayacucho, almost square in shape and about a mile in circuit, bordered right and left by deep and rugged ravines. Back of the plain, or towards the east, it slopes off gradually for two miles towards the high road from Guamanga to Ananta, which runs right up to a perpendicular rock and ends there. On the eastern side of the plain is Condorcanqui, on a huge ledge of rock which runs from north to south. On this ledge the royalist army was encamped.

The army of liberation formed in the plain, in front of the Spaniards, about a half a mile away. They were drawn up in close columns and awaited the onset of the royalists. The corps of the independents were stationed in the following manner:

Cordova's Division, (on the right wing)

Consisting of the regiment of Bogota,

" " " " " Pichincha,

" " " " " Skirmishers.

Miller's Division (in the centre)

Consisted of the Hussars of Junin,

" " " Grenadiers of Colombia,

" " " Hussars of "

" " " Mounted Grenadiers of Buenos Ayres.

In La Mar's Division (on the left)

Was the Peruvian Legion,
Battalion No. 1.

" " 2.

" " 3.

Lara's Division, (reserve)

Was made up of Camp-followers,

" " " " " Deserters,

" " " " " Riflemen,

Artillery one four-pounder.

The following account of the battle is abridged from
"Historia del Peru Independiente."

On the memorable day, Thursday December 9, 1824, the morning was clear and the sun brilliantly lighted the scene. The trumpets and drums sounded. The officers moved in all directions to take their orders : on the right, the young and brave general of division, Cordova, a general of division at twenty-five ; on the left the Peruvian body, sent by brave and honest old La Mar ; the centre the gallant Lara commanded, together with the remaining Colombian section. The cavalry formed in the rear about the centre of the division ; it had been moved up by orders of the famous Miller. Sucre, the head of all, went to inspect the troops with a coolness that never forsook him, leaving nothing undone that his genius and experience suggested. Down the whole line he rode, exhorting the men with stirring words. Halting near the centre, he said with deep emotion :

"By you, soldiers, present here, the fate of South America is to be decided" ; and noticing the hostile forces descending to meet them he added : *"This day will crown your prowess."*

On the royalist side General Canterac, chief in command, called up the generals and commanders of divisions and gave out the orders of the day. General Valdez held the right of the line, Monet the left, and Villalobos the centre, while the cavalry was formed in the rear.

It was ten in the morning when the fire opened, and the action fairly began. At first the advantage was on the side of the Spaniards, but General Cordova brought up his division within a hundred yards of the enemy, where he ordered a volley and followed it with a bayonet charge. The attack was successful, and the enemy fled in disorder. Charge followed charge, and by one o'clock in the afternoon, victory was practically assured to the patriots.

The enemy rallied again on the heights of Condorcanqui, and owing to the exertions of Canterac, Valdez, and other officers, somewhere near a thousand men were collected. A council of war was called for by Canterac, who stated that Peru was irretrievably lost since Olaneta, their only hope, had gone over to the enemy, and was making terms for capitulation. This fact was accepted by nearly all the royalist officers, and then

Canterac asked for a truce of arms. Very soon General La Mar came over, and assured them that Sucre would accept an honorable capitulation.

The time was precious ; the sun had just gone down after having shone upon the grandest day of America, and the routed Spaniards would have had to perish in their flight or starve for want of food. Canterac explained the straits in which they were, and assured the Spanish commanders that there was no other means of safety. It was decided that General Canterac should convey the resolution, and settle the conditions of capitulation.

Sucre's greatness and generosity were shown in the conditions of surrender. He might have imposed harsh or humiliating terms, but his way was not to crush his brave opponents. Canterac handed over the minutes, consisting of eighteen articles, and they were ratified with slight modifications. According to the terms of capitulation, all troops, baggage, and ammunition in Peru were handed over to the patriots ; all the men of the Spanish army could freely go home at the expense of Peru, and while they marched along with the Peruvians, they would receive their pay ; those preferring the Peruvian service might enter it. No one should be molested in person or property for his former opinions, and all were free to leave the country whenever they chose. Peru would take up the national debt contracted by the Spanish government in the country. The fortresses of Callao were to surrender within twenty days, handing over formally their public parks, warehouses, archives, etc. Vessels of war and tenders belonging to Spain might remain for six months, to ship their provisions and get ready for quitting the Pacific.

The prisoners taken in the battle included the Viceroy La Serna, General Canterac, chief in command, fourteen other generals, with numbers of subordinate officers, in addition to the soldiers ; in short, those that were not killed on the battlefield were captured. There were 1,400 dead, and 700 wounded, on the Spanish side ; of the patriots, 300 were killed, and 609 wounded ; in all, about 3,016 *hors de combat*, almost the fourth part of those engaged, which shows how fiercely the battle was contested.

After burying the dead, the victorious army moved southward from Ayacucho. Cuzco, Arequipa, and other points were surrendered, but General Rodel, commanding the fortress of Callao, refused to accept the terms of capitulation. The fortress was immediately invested by the Colombian and Peruvian troops, and blockaded by a naval force which was lent to Bolivar by Chili. The fortress held out for more than a year, and was not surrendered until the garrison of five hundred men was at the point of starvation. General Rodel embarked for Europe with the soldiers that chose to accompany him, and the fall of Callao was the final event of the war.

As soon as the news of the victory at Ayacucho reached Lima, Bolivar issued the following proclamation :

To the Soldiers of the Conquering Army at Ayacucho :

SOLDIERS—You have carried liberty to South America, and a quarter of the globe bears witness to your glory. Who could have beaten you off ?

South America is full of the marks of your valor, but Ayacucho, Chimborazo-like, rises above all.

Soldiers—Colombia owes you the laurels you have won, and Peru its life, liberty, and peace, not to forget what La Pensa and Chili owe you. The good cause, the cause of the rights of men, has been vindicated by you, in a terrible battle against the oppressors. See, then, the benefit you have conferred upon the human race by your heroic sacrifices.

Soldiers—Accept the undying gratitude which I pronounce in the name of Peru. You shall be rewarded before you return to your beautiful home. No, no, never could an adequate reward be found ; your services are beyond any price.

Peruvian soldiers—Your country will ever hold you among the chief saviors of Peru.


Colombian soldiers—Hundreds of victories immortalize you.


BOLIVAR.


Head-quarters at Lima, Dec. 25, 1824.


Honors and rewards were showered upon the liberator's

army. Each corps carried the adjunct of "*Glorious Libcrators of Peru*," with the further addition of "*Well Deserved in the Highest Degree*." Commanders, officers, and men received medals, the widows and families of those fallen in the field were amply provided for; the wounded continued to receive full pay for life, and Sucre became Grand Marshal of Ayacucho. Many generals and other officers were promoted, and a monument on the field of Ayacucho reminds the visitor of the battle that terminated the Spanish rule in South America.









CHAPTER II.

BATTLE OF PROME—1825.

FROM America we will pass nearly half way around the globe in our search for the next decisive battle after that of Ayacucho.

All students of history are well aware that the British power in India in the first half of the present century was represented by the East India Company. From an association of merchants trading to the East Indies in A. D. 1600, the Honorable East India Company grew to a colony of national importance. It possessed an army and a navy, it had the right of eminent domain, it had a commercial monopoly the greatest ever known, and the people under its control numbered many millions. It possessed the powers of a state and likewise its ambitions; it conquered territories neighboring to its own and then looked for more territories to conquer. Kingdoms and principalities of India were brought under its sway, and there was hardly a decade in the two hundred and fifty years of its existence in which it was not at war with neighboring powers. It generally came off victorious, thanks to the splendid fighting qualities which British soldiers have displayed through many ages, backed by the well-known British policy of never submitting to temporary defeat at the hands of Asiatics.

While the British in the early part of the present century were extending their boundaries in the northwest provinces of India, the kingdom of Burmah displayed a

desire to aggrandize some of the region lying to the south of the company's territories. About 1798 some 30,000 Mugs, inhabitants of Arracan, in Burmah, fled from the oppression of their Burmese masters and sought refuge in Chittagong, a possession of the British. Several attempts were made by the Burmese to secure the return of these fugitives, but without avail; between 1800 and 1813 five or six embassies were sent by the Burmese government to that of India with this object in view, but all failed of their purpose. Then all was quiet for a time, save that there were occasional raids of very little consequence along the frontier. In 1822 the Burmese adopted bellicose measures; they seized the island of Shahporee, at the entrance of the arm of the sea dividing Chittagong from Arracan, overpowering the British by a night attack and taking possession in the name of the Burmese government. When asked to explain his action, the governor of Arracan announced that his government had annexed the island, and unless the right of the Burmese to its possessions were admitted, the king of Burmah would send an army to invade the British territory. This plan of proceeding was not unlike that of more civilized countries, Great Britain among them, in carrying on the work of annexation, but when tried against the British it was certain to be resented.

The governor-general of India was not ready to assume the offensive at once; the Burmese mistook delay for timidity and proceeded to invade British territory. Large bodies of Burmese troops crossed the frontier from Assam and Munnipore and established themselves in bamboo stockades; they were driven out by the British, but not without considerable loss to the latter. These operations took place in 1823 and '24; while the British were preparing to send a considerable force against the invaders, news came to Calcutta that Maha Bandula, the favorite general of the king of Ava, had penetrated the British territories bordering Arracan with a large army, and was so confident

of success that he carried with him a set of golden fetters in which the governor-general of India was to be carried captive to Burmah. As soon as this news was known to be authentic, Lord Amherst, the governor-general, proclaimed war and set his troops in motion.

Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands was named as a point of rendezvous; a division from Bengal was sent there in April, and followed a month later by a division from Madras. Sir Archibald Campbell was named the commander-in-chief; he had served with distinction in the Spanish campaigns, but knew little about Oriental modes of warfare. Commodore Grant commanded the naval part of the expedition, which consisted of the *Liffey*, *Larne*, *Sophia*, *Slaney*, and several smaller vessels. There was one small steamboat, the *Snake*, and it is worthy of remark that this boat, built at Bombay in 1820, had an honorable career of sixty years, and was broken up in 1880.

The land forces comprised about 11,500 men of all arms, the great majority being native troops of India. It was the plan of the commander to move upon Rangoon, near the mouth of the Irrawaddy, and by prompt action capture the city, and thus frighten the king into asking for peace.

Detachments were sent to occupy Cheduba and Ne-grais; the rest of the command arrived off Rangoon accompanied by the whole fleet. The city, which was built on the bank of the river, was found to be surrounded by a stockade about twelve feet in height. The stockade was built of teak timber in the form of a square, and defended by batteries on the water front. These batteries opened fire on the nearest ships, and the *Liffey* answered it immediately. The guns at the landing were speedily dismounted, and the soldiers occupied the town, no enemy being in sight. The governor of Pegu, the province in which Rangoon is situated, had been commanded to come to

the capital; he died there, and his successor had not arrived when the fleet appeared. The rêwan, or commander of the flotilla, was acting-governor; he knew nothing of the proposed attack and was therefore taken by surprise. In order to render the prize of the English of little value he forced the native inhabitants to leave the town, allowing none of them to remain in or near it. The guards who had been placed in charge of the few Europeans and foreign residents soon fled, thus permitting them to escape. The rainy season was approaching, and, as the inhabitants had taken with them their boats, cattle, and carts, the English general found himself unable to secure, either by land or water, the necessary transportation facilities for carrying on operations.

Immediately on landing in Rangoon General Campbell occupied the Shoay Dagon or Golden Pagoda. The pagoda is situated about a mile and a half from the river and stands on high ground. General Campbell found it impossible to learn any thing of the movements of the enemy, his force being entirely isolated. He sent a number of row-boats, well armed, to Kymyindaing to reconnoitre. This town is distant by river about six miles from Rangoon. Some shots were fired from several breastworks which lined the shore. These breastworks were attacked the next day, and carried by a small detachment of soldiers and marines.

Within a few days the general, in person, made a survey of the country to the north of Shoay Dagon, taking with him two guns, some native infantry, and about three hundred European soldiers. There was no road, and the guns were soon abandoned because of the heavy rains which prevailed, rendering an advance extremely difficult. The troops, however, moved forward, leaving the artillery, which could not be dragged through the mud. At a distance of five or six miles from the great pagoda they saw two stockades, four feet in height, with an interior trench

and a well-placed abatis. An attack was made, and the stockades were carried at the point of the bayonet, the muskets being useless on account of the rain. The Burmese lost about three hundred men.

This was the first time the Burmese had ever fought against European soldiers; they were astonished at the savage attack of the white soldiers, who carried the stockades without firing a gun. Although the levies of the country were near the forts, the rêwan did not use them. The British now held Kymyindaing as an outpost, and for some weeks there were few hostile movements. During these weeks the British army suffered terribly from sickness. The climate and the constant exposure to the rain brought fever and dysentery, which crowded the hospitals and carried many victims to their graves. It was feared at one time that it would be necessary to retire altogether from Rangoon, as there threatened to be not a single soldier able to defend it. Strong efforts were made by the Burmese to oppose the British army during the occupation of Rangoon. The plan was simply to cut off all communication with the inhabitants of Pegu who might be friendly to the invading forces, and by overpowering numbers to capture the troops, or drive them into the sea. They formed a complete cordon about the British, who could learn very little through their scouts, and as all the natives had been removed from the neighborhood, there were no means of communication. It had been expected that the inhabitants of Pegu would rise against their Burmese oppressors, but not a word came to indicate that they contemplated any insurrection. Large levies of troops were made throughout Burmah, and the numbers of the army surrounding Rangoon increased daily. The river was covered with boats bringing men and provisions to the besieging army, and by the end of May the Burmese considered themselves strong enough to defy their enemies.

Always on halting a Burmese army entrenches itself or throws up a stockade, according to the condition of the ground or the abundance of stockading material. In the operations against the British not more than half the Burmese soldiers were armed with muskets, the rest carrying swords or spears and acting as pioneers. Within a day's march of Rangoon, both on the river bank and in the interior, there were several miles of strong stockades, which the Burmese erected in their effort to isolate the British in the city. General Campbell captured many of these stockades, and at each capture there was a heavy slaughter of Burmese. The king recalled Maha Bandula, the ablest of the Burmese generals, from the threatened invasion of Bengal, and ordered him to expel the invaders from Rangoon.

By the end of November Maha Bandula had an army of sixty thousand men, and appeared in force in front of the Shoay Dagon, or Golden Pagoda. The British had established a station at Kymyindaing, about seven miles up the river, where they had captured a strong stockade, and the first effort of the Burmese general was to capture this stockade, in which he was unsuccessful. For three or four days General Campbell allowed the Burmese to advance their outposts until they were within fifty yards of his lines and out of the protection of the jungle which had concealed their movements. As soon as he ascertained that they had brought all their ammunition and provisions out of the jungle and into their entrenchments he ordered an attack; there was severe fighting all along the line, resulting in the defeat and flight of the Burmese, and the loss of all the war material which they had brought to the front of their lines. From the first to the fifteenth of December it was estimated that six thousand Burmese were killed, while the English loss in killed and wounded was about six hundred.

Success being hopeless Maha Bandula retreated rapidly

to Donoobu, about sixty miles from Rangoon, taking with him about one thousand of his men. The soldiers of the investing army dispersed, and the force was broken up. The British now occupied the southern districts of the province without any opposition, including the ancient port of Martaban, and all the coast of Tenasserim to the south as far as Mergui. Sir Archibald Campbell was now at liberty to continue operations by marching up the Irrawaddy. The end of the year being at hand, and reinforcements having arrived from India, plans were formed for marching on Prome, where it was hoped the Burmese government would be ready to make terms of peace.

The British forces, finding themselves free to march up the valley, were divided into two columns. General Willoughby Cotton commanded one division, which was to advance by the river. The other division was led by the commander-in-chief in person. The former command consisted of eight hundred Europeans, a small fleet of gunboats, a battalion of native infantry, and the steamer *Snake*. No doubts of success were entertained, although the number of men seemed small for the undertaking. The rainy season was over; the surface of the land was dry, and the land force moved north to Hlaing and thence to Sarawa on the Irrawaddy. It reached Donoobu about March 25th, and found that Bandula was entrenched in a stockaded enclosure on the right bank of the river. On reconnoitring it appeared that Bandula's position was strong, and an assault in force was deemed necessary. At a distance of about three hundred yards from the north-west angle trenches were opened and batteries erected. General Cotton, who had come down the river, arrived with his command; the heavy guns and mortars were placed in position, and firing was begun and continued with little intermission for some hours. The assailants were ready to storm the fort early in the morning of April 25th, when it was found that the enemy had evacu-

ated during the night. Bandula had been slain, and his brother, who succeeded him, could not hold the garrison together. The victors found large stores of rice, some guns and powder. The king and his court were filled with terror at this overthrow. The court faction, of which the queen and her brother were the leaders, persuaded the king to remain firm.

General Campbell resumed his march into the interior of Burmah, following the left bank of the river and regulating his movements by those of the flotilla, which was occasionally halted for the purpose of shelling out a stockade or buoying the channel. Arriving at Prome, he found it deserted and in flames; the Burmese commander had driven out the inhabitants and fired the town, and more than half of it was destroyed. As the rainy season was approaching, the British force went into cantonment at Prome and remained there for several months, and as the Burmese were occupied with the work of assembling another army, the invaders were not disturbed. The time was utilized by the British in bringing up supplies and ammunition and making every thing ready for a further advance as soon as the dry season should set in. In the middle of August General Cotton made a reconnaissance up the river with the steamer, and at Myedee saw a Burmese force of about twenty thousand men drawn up in line on the bank of the river.

Early in September the Burmese sent a flag of truce with an officer to treat for peace; an armistice of forty days was agreed upon to ascertain the terms on which the British could be persuaded to leave the country, and later on it was extended to the third of November. The terms demanded at the end of the armistice were the cession of the provinces of Arracan, Tavoy and Mergui to the British, and the payment of a war indemnity of two million pounds sterling. The Burmese replied that yielding territory and paying money were not in accord with

Burmese customs. They had succeeded in raising an army and now felt that they could successfully cope with the British.

Hostilities were resumed at once. The Burmese army closed around Prome. A force of 3,000 Shans and 2,600 Burmese was stationed at Wattigan on the right bank of the river, about twenty miles to the northeast. The English commander decided to dislodge them immediately in order that they might not be on his right flank in a movement to the front. He advanced by night in three columns and easily defeated the Shans. He had now to attack the main force of the Burmese, about 20,000 strong. General Campbell's force for this attack comprised 2,500 Europeans and 1,500 native troops.

The Burmese army held a strong and well fortified position on the heights. It was impossible for the artillery to operate, owing to the nature of the ground, and the position was carried by the infantry regiments unassisted. The British loss was 12 officers and 160 men killed and wounded. The Burmese in these engagements lost between 2,000 and 3,000 men. The Shans marched back to their own territory, and three days later the Burmese forces on the west side of the river were compelled to retreat and marched northward, following their main army. Leaving two regiments of native infantry to garrison Prome, General Campbell continued his advance on Myedee. He had 4,000 men and 28 guns, and the town was taken without resistance. The terms of peace were once more discussed and after two or three meetings an agreement was signed by both sides and in order that the king might be able to ratify the treaty, a cessation of hostilities for fifteen days was decided upon. At the expiration of this time no communication had been received from the Burmese commissioners and hostile operations were resumed by the British. Crossing the river in gunboats the fort was stormed, after a destructive cannonade.

It was announced to the king that they would move forward to Pugan, there to await the ratification of the treaty.

The war faction at Ava still entertained hopes of repairing the losses they had sustained. A few more desultory engagements were fought in which the natives were defeated, and the British general halted at Pugan to await the arrival of the detachments. Moving on he arrived at Yandabo and formed a camp within four marches of the capital. Although the king was ready to fly northward he consented to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. One fourth of the million sterling which was levied to pay the costs of the war was handed over by the Burmese commissioners who were willing to abide by the general terms previously offered.

No discussion was made and the treaty was signed. According to the agreement, Assam, Arracan, and the coast of Tenasserim with the part of the state of Martaban east of the Salwan River were given to the British government. The king of Burmah promised to refrain from interference in Kashar, Jyntia, and Manipur. It was also determined to conclude a commercial treaty in a short time. The British army marched back to Rangoon, where the troops remained until the second payment of the money due for war expenses was made. This was near the end of the year, and then the city was evacuated.

It is proper to remark that the Burmese soldier fought under disadvantages which made it impossible for him to win. These peasant-soldiers had no knowledge of military drill and discipline, and lacked suitable arms, many of them carrying only their native swords or spears. The artillery corps of the army was even more poorly equipped than the infantry. The artillery was made up of old guns once used on ships, hardly any of them less than a century old. As a general rule, the Burmese officers led their soldiers only in flight. Yet, notwithstanding these draw-


backs, the poorly armed Burmese peasant feared not to encounter the well-equipped Asiatic troops, commanded by trained European officers. He was overcome only by the European soldiers. The climate was a far more formidable opponent of the invaders than were the Burmese soldiery; an English officer remarked of this campaign, that if the climate of Burmah had been thoroughly loyal to the king and performed its duty, the British would have been compelled to turn back from Rangoon.

The engagement at Prome may be regarded as the decisive battle of the first Burmese war. True, it was not a brilliant affair, and in European warfare would rank as little more than a skirmish, but a contrary result would have placed the British in a position of great danger. The European troops were greatly reduced both in numbers and efficiency by the effects of the climate, and the native troops could not be relied on for good work unless with European support. A signal defeat at Prome would have resulted in a retreat on Rangoon, and it has been shown elsewhere how precarious was the hold on that city in the early days of the invasion.

The first Burmese war was the beginning of the destruction of the kingdom which was once a power among Asiatic nations and a terror to its neighbors. In 1852 the imprisonment of the master of a ship and other British subjects led to the second Burmese war, which resulted in the annexation of a considerable part of Burmese territory to the British Indian possessions. The war began with the bombardment of Rangoon, April 11, 1852, and its capture three days later. Prome, Bassein, Martaban, and other cities one after another fell into British hands; the British forces were almost invariably successful, and in a few months peace was declared and the whole of the coast provinces of Burmah passed under British sway.

The third Burmese war (1885) grew out of the interference of the king with the rights of British subjects in

Burmah and his violation of the provisions of a commercial treaty. He refused all reparation of the wrongs he had committed, and thus rendered necessary an appeal to arms. A British army invaded the country, and after a few insignificant skirmishes occupied the capital and ended the war. The king was deposed and sent to a designated place of retirement on the Upper Irrawaddy; the British power was extended over the whole of Burmah, and the dynasty of Alompra came to an end.





CHAPTER III.

BATTLE OF NAVARINO—1827.

FROM 1815 to 1830 all the wars of Europe were with the Mohammedans, except a few revolutionary and other affairs of no great consequence. The English made an attack on Algiers in 1816 to punish the Algerines for their piracies and for their cruelties to British subjects, and fourteen years later the same place was captured by the French and has since been held with a firm grasp. The Greek revolution, which broke out in 1821, was the revolt of Christians held in subjection by the Turks, the Moslem conquerors of Southeastern Europe, who had ruled the Hellenes with great oppression, and the struggle was continued until the independence of Greece was acknowledged. The war of Russia against the Persians, in 1826, was also a fight between Christianity and Islam, and so was the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828. Even the English in India were contending against the Moslems more than against warriors of other religions of the great peninsula, especially in their campaign to the north, when they penetrated the stronghold of Islam in Central Asia. The exhaustion which followed the Napoleonic campaigns left Europe at peace with itself, but did not restrain it from hostile encounters with the followers of the Prophet of Mecca.

The Spanish revolution of 1820, which was speedily followed by the revolutions of Naples, Sicily, and Piedmont, caused a great excitement throughout Europe, and

paved the way for the Greek revolution of 1821. Since the beginning of the century the Greeks had been preparing for the struggle; in fact, for more than fifty years there had been a general movement in the direction of independence through the spirit of nationality, which was taught by the ablest writers and spread among the people as widely as possible. There had been many insurrections against the Turkish authority, but they were generally suppressed without difficulty, though with the shedding of much Greek blood. Nearly every village in Greece suffered from pillage by the Turks, and the families were comparatively few that did not mourn a father, son, or brother, killed by the Turks or carried into slavery, or a daughter or sister transported to a Turkish harem. In spite of four centuries of captivity, the Greeks had preserved their language, dress, religion, and other distinctive features of nationality. In this they were greatly assisted by the severity of the Turks and the difference in manners, laws, religion, and customs between oppressor and oppressed.

But notwithstanding their subjugation, many of the Greeks were commercially prosperous, and a large part of the traffic of the East was in their hands. They conducted nearly all the coasting trade of the Levant, and a few years before the revolution they had six hundred vessels mounting six thousand guns (for defence against pirates) and manned by eighteen thousand seamen. The trade had grown enormously during the continental wars which ended at Waterloo, as nearly all the nations of Europe were so engrossed in military matters that there was no chance for commerce. The large fleet of the Greeks was dreaded by the Turks, and the islands where most of the commerce was centred were not treated with the severity which the Turks exercised towards those dwelling on the mainland. The islands were shunned by the pashas, who contented themselves with exacting an

annual tribute, and after its payment the inhabitants were left to themselves. This was particularly the case with Hydra, Ipsara, and Scio, the two former with thirty thousand inhabitants each, and the latter having eighty thousand. But their prosperity and happiness only served to make plain to the people of the mainland how much they were suffering at the hands of their Turkish masters, and how vastly superior to their own was the condition of the islanders.

In laying their plans for independence the Greeks resorted to the formation of secret societies, and so well was the scheme conducted that every thing was ripe for insurrection before the Turkish rulers had any suspicion of the state of affairs. A great association was formed which included Greeks everywhere, not only in Greece and its islands, but in Constantinople, Austria, Germany, England, and other countries, wherever a Greek could be found. Men of other nationalities were occasionally admitted, but only when their loyalty to the Greek cause was beyond question, and their official positions gave them a chance to aid in the work. Several distinguished Russians were members, among them Count Capo D'Istria, a Greek by birth, who held the office of private secretary to the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia. The society was known as the *Hetaira*, or *Hetairist*, and consisted of several degrees or grades. The highest contained only sixteen persons, whose names were not all known, and it was impossible for any member of the lower classes to ascertain them. Count Capo D'Istria was one of the exalted sixteen, and it was whispered that the Czar Alexander was another of the highest members of the order, together with the Crown Prince of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the Hospodar of Wallachia, and other important men of the day. In this matter of glorious uncertainty regarding its highest members, the *Hetaira* was not unlike secret societies of more modern times.

The affairs of the society were managed by the sixteen members of the highest class, who had their seat at Moscow and maintained a ruling committee in almost perpetual session. The second class was called the *Priests of Eleusis*, and they were informed in a general way that the time for struggle with the Turks was approaching, but nothing more definite was told to them. This class included nearly all the Greek priests, and also no less than one hundred and sixteen prelates of their religion. The third class was the *Systemenoi*, or Bachelors, selected with care from the better classes of society; they were informed that the object of the society was to effect a revolution and separate Greece from Turkey. The lower class, which included every Greek who wished to join it, was by far the largest; the only information that was given to this class was that the object was to ameliorate the condition of the people by the spread of education and by securing changes in the laws. The secret of the society was kept in the most remarkable manner; though having such a large membership it was betrayed but once, and then in such a way that no suspicion was excited. The Turks were as much astonished when the society revealed itself in the outburst of the revolution of 1821 as though a volcano had opened under their feet.

All the Hetairists looked hopefully towards Russia, partly in consequence of their community of religion, and partly because of the fellow-feeling of the two countries in cordially detesting the Turk. The Empress Catherine excited two insurrections in Greece during the latter part of the eighteenth century; the Turkish fleet had been burned by the Russians in the Bay of Tchesmé; Constantine was christened by that name because the empress designed him as the successor of Constantine Paleologus, the last of the Cæsars; and the intervention of the European powers in 1789 had alone prevented the accomplishment of that design. The Greeks could hardly

doubt that the Russians would help them when the struggle came, and, furthermore, they could expect little aid from other European powers, who were principally desirous of maintaining the Turk in Europe in order that Turkey might always engage the attention of Russia, thereby keeping her away from attacks on the other states.

An occurrence of 1819 caused much attention throughout Europe, and illustrated the devotion of the Greeks to their country and their detestation of the Turks. The town of Parga, on the sea-coast of the mainland, opposite the Ionian Isles, was ceded to France by the treaty of Tilsit in 1807, and transferred to England in 1814; during these seven years it was occupied by a French garrison, and its inhabitants learned to enjoy the advantages of Christian protection. In the treaty of 1815 no mention of Parga was made, and it was stipulated that the entire mainland of Turkey was to be ceded to the Porte. This gave Parga to the Turks, and the government of Constantinople notified the British governor of the Ionian Islands that it was about to take possession. Parga had then been held for a year or more by a British garrison, and the governor of the Ionian Islands promised that the garrison should not be withdrawn until the Turks paid for the property of such as would not remain under their rule.

All the inhabitants determined to emigrate to the Ionian Islands. The amount of the compensation was agreed upon by the commissioners, and one day, in June, 1819, the inhabitants marched solemnly out of their houses and proceeded to the cemetery, where they dug up the bones of their ancestors and carried them to a large pile of wood in front of the church. There these treasured remains were consumed by fire, and while the pile was burning scarcely a word was spoken. During the ceremony some of the Turkish soldiers, who were about

to enter, approached the gate, whereupon a deputation of citizens went to the English governor and told him that if a single Turk was admitted before the bones of their ancestors were secured from profanation, and they and their families were safely embarked, they would instantly kill their wives and children, and die with arms in their hands after slaughtering as many as possible of those who had bought and sold their homes. The message was conveyed to the Turks who did not renew their attempt to enter until the whole party had embarked. When they took possession of Parga they found but one inhabitant remaining—a man far gone in a state of intoxication.

The immediate cause of the revolution, or rather the excuse for it, was the death of the Hospodar of Wallachia, January 30, 1821, followed by the appointment of his successor. During the interregnum, which naturally left the government in a weakened condition, the Hetairists determined to strike their blow for liberty. A band of one hundred and fifty Greeks and Arnauts, under the command of Theodore Vladimiruko, formerly a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian service, marched out of Bucharest and seized the small town of Czernitz, near Trajan's Bridge, on the Danube. There Theodore issued a proclamation, and such was the feeling of discontent among the people, that in a few days he had a force of twelve thousand men under his command. Soon afterwards there was an insurrection in Jassy, the capital of Moldavia, headed by Prince Alexander Ipsilanti, an officer in the Russian service. He issued a proclamation in which the aid of Russia was distinctly promised, and as the news of this proclamation was carried to Greece, there was a general movement in favor of insurrection. The Russian minister assured the Porte that his government had nothing to do with the insurrection, and the Patriarch and Synod of Constantinople issued a proclamation em-

phatically denouncing the movement, but in spite of this assurance and proclamation the insurrection went on.

Count Nesselrode declared officially that Ipsilanti's name would be stricken from the Russian army list, and that his act was one for which he alone was responsible. This announcement was the death-blow of the insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia, as the forces of Theodore and Ipsilanti were suppressed, after some sharp fighting, by the hordes of Moslems that were brought against them. The Russians on the Pruth and the Black Sea were ordered to observe the strictest neutrality, and made no interference whatever with the movements of the Turks. Nearly the whole of Greece was in full insurrection in a few months, and with far better prospects than had the insurrection on the Danube. Turks and Greeks were embittered against each other; the war-cry of the Turk was, "Death to the Christian!" while that of the Christian was, "Death to the Turk!" The example was set by the Turks, and, to the eternal disgrace of the Turkish government, slaughter in cold blood was made official.

It was by the order and authority of the Porte that Gregory, Patriarch of Constantinople, a revered prelate, eighty years of age, was seized on Easter Sunday, as he was descending from the altar where he had been celebrating divine service, and hanged at the gate of his archiepiscopal palace, amid the shouts and howls of a Moslem mob. After hanging three hours, the body was cut down and delivered to some Jews, who dragged it about the streets and threw it into the sea, whence it was recovered the same night by some Christian fishermen.

Some weeks later it was taken to Odessa and buried with great ceremony. This act of murder was the more atrocious on the part of the Turks, since the patriarch had denounced the insurrection in a public proclamation, and his life and character were most blameless and exemplary.

It is safe to say that this barbarity had more to do with

fanning the fires of revolt than any other act of the Turkish government. But it was by no means the only act of the kind of which the Turks were guilty.

The Patriarch of Adrianople with eight of his ecclesiastics was beheaded, and so were the dragoman of the Porte and several other eminent residents of Constantinople, descended from Greek settlers of two or three centuries ago. Churches were everywhere broken open and plundered; Greek citizens of the highest rank were murdered, their property stolen, and their wives and daughters sold as slaves; on the 15th of June five archbishops and a great number of laymen were hanged in the streets, and four hundred and fifty mechanics were sold and transported into slavery; at Salonica the battlements of the town were lined with Christian heads, from which the blood ran down and discolored the water in the ditch. In all the great towns of the empire there were similar atrocities; some were the work of mobs, which the authorities did not seek to restrain, but the greater part of them were ordered by the governors or other officials, and met the approval of the Porte. At Smyrna, the Christian population was massacred by thousands without regard to age or sex, and in the island of Cyprus, a body of ten thousand troops sent by the Porte ravaged the island, executed the metropolitan, five bishops, and thirty-six other ecclesiastics, and converted the whole island into a scene of rapine, bloodshed, and robbery. Several thousand Christians were killed before the atrocities ceased, and hundreds of their wives and daughters were carried into Turkish harems.

These and similar outrages plainly told the Greeks that no hope remained except in complete independence of the Turks, and from one end of Greece to the other the fires of insurrection were everywhere lighted. The islands, as well as the mainland, were in full revolt, and the fleet of coasting vessels, nearly all of them armed for resisting

pirates, gave the Turks a great deal of trouble. Its first operation was to destroy a Turkish seventy-four-gun ship that had run aground in the Bay of Adramyti, together with eight hundred men of her crew. The Turkish admiral was so alarmed at the disaster that he retired with the rest of his fleet to the Dardanelles, leaving the command of the archipelago and the coast of Greece to the Greek cruisers.

On the land, battle followed battle in different parts of the country, and the narration of the events of the insurrection would fill a bulky volume. It is not our purpose to present a history of the Greek revolution; we will give briefly, a summary of the events between the opening of the struggle and the battle of Navarino, which was practically the end of the war for independence.

During the latter part of 1821, the advantages to the Greeks were sufficient to encourage them to proclaim their independence, which was done in January, 1822. In the same month the Turks besieged Corinth, and in the following April they besieged and captured Chios (Scio), ending the capture with the slaughter of forty thousand inhabitants, the most horrible massacre of modern times. In July, the Greeks were victorious at Thermopylæ; in the same month Corinth fell, with great slaughter of the defenders. In April, 1823, the Greeks held a national congress at Argos; the victories of Marco Bozzaris occurred in the following June, and in August he was killed in a night attack upon the Turkish camp; in August, too, Lord Byron landed at Athens to take part in the cause of Greece, which was attracting the attention of the whole civilized world. The first Greek loan was issued in England in February, 1824; Lord Byron died at Missolonghi in the following April; in August the Capitan Pasha was defeated at Samos with heavy loss; in October, the provisional government of Greece was set up; and the fighting became almost continuous in the mountain dis-

tricts of Greece. In February, 1825, Ibrahim Pasha arrived with a powerful army from Egypt, which captured Navarino in May, and Tripolitza in June of the same year. In July, the provisional government invoked the aid of England; in the following April (1826), Ibrahim Pasha took Missolonghi after a long and heroic defence; and nearly a year later Reschid Pasha captured Athens.

Down to the beginning of 1826, the Greeks had felt seriously the deprivation of Russian sympathy and aid for which they had been led to look before the revolution. The death of Alexander I., and the accession of Nicholas in December, 1825, caused a change in the situation. The British government sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg ostensibly to congratulate Nicholas on his elevation to the throne, but really to secure concert of action in regard to Greece. On the 4th of April a protocol was signed by the Duke of Wellington, Prince Lieven, and Count Nesselrode, which may be considered the foundation of Greek independence.

Out of this protocol grew the treaty of July 6, 1827, between England, Russia, and France, by which it was stipulated that those nations should mediate between the contending Greeks and Turks. They proposed to the Sultan that he should retain a nominal authority over the Greeks, but receive from them a fixed annual tribute, to be collected by the Greek authorities, in whose nomination the Sultan should have a voice. All Mussulman property in Greece was to be abandoned upon receipt of an indemnity, and all fortresses were to be given up to the Greek troops. If the Porte did not accept these terms within a month, it was very plainly announced that the powers would for their own security "come to an approximation with the Greeks, which would consist in establishing commercial relations with Greece, and receiving from it commercial agents." In very forcible terms this meant that the independence of the Greeks would be acknowledged.

The Sultan expressed the utmost astonishment at this proposal, and declared his fixed determination to subdue his rebellious Greek subjects. He refused to listen to the scheme of mediation, and immediately made preparations for a fresh campaign, and also for the defence of Turkey in case of an attack. Ships and reinforcements were sent from Constantinople, and the Egyptian fleet, consisting of two 84-gun ships, twelve frigates, and forty-one transports, was despatched from Alexandria with five thousand troops, and reached Navarino towards the end of August, 1827. The allied powers had foreseen the possibility of the Porte's refusal of mediation, and taken measures accordingly; an English fleet under Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, and a French fleet under Admiral De Rigny, were in the Mediterranean, and were shortly afterwards joined by the Russian fleet under Admiral Heiden. A final note was presented to the Porte late in August, and as it had no effect other than a refusal to permit mediation, the representatives of the powers determined to take measures for enforcing a suspension of hostilities.

The allied admirals held a conference, and decided to notify Ibrahim Pasha that he must stop the barbarities of plundering and burning villages and slaughtering their inhabitants. But Ibrahim would not listen to their remonstrances, and to show his utter disregard for the powers, he commanded four of his ships to sail to the Gulf of Patras to occupy Missolonghi and relieve some Turkish forts, in effect to clear those waters of every Greek man-of-war which was stationed there. This he did easily, the allied squadrons being temporarily absent. Admiral Codrington pursued him and, without difficulty, drove him back to Navarino. The flagship *Asia* (84 guns) was the only vessel engaged. The admiral detained the Turkish fleet at Navarino, and there he determined it should remain until a satisfactory agreement could be made between the Porte and the powers. Although some hos-

ilities had occurred, no actual battles had yet been fought, and the belief of a peaceful solution was entertained. As a last resort Colonel Cradock was sent by Admiral Codrington to meet Ibrahim Pasha. The effort was useless ; the Turkish commander could not be seen. A general muster of all the ships was ordered by Admiral Codrington, Commander-in-Chief of the squadron.

The strength of the combined squadron was as follows :

ENGLISH.

4 frigates,
1 cutter,
4 brigs, and
3 line-of-battle ships, all under the command of Admiral Codrington.

RUSSIAN.

4 frigates, and
4 line-of-battle ships, Count Heiden commanding.


FRENCH.

1 double-banked frigate,	} commanded by Rear-Admiral De Rigny.
2 cutters,	
3 line-of-battle ships, and	
1 frigate,	

The Ottoman fleet was as follows :

13 frigates,
3 line-of-battle ships,
4 double-banked frigates,
28 brigs,
5 schooners,
30 corvettes, and
6 fire brigs, making a total of 89, excluding 41 transports.

The allied fleet mounted 1,324 guns, while the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleet mounted 2,240 guns. To this superiority in the number of guns on board must be added the batteries on shore, which were all in the hands of the Turks. But the Christians had a point in their favor in



their superiority in ships of the line, of which they possessed ten, while the Turks had but three; if the battle had been fought in the open sea, it would have been of brief duration, but this advantage was very much lost in the Bay of Navarino, where the Turkish ships were crowded together under the batteries in the form of a semicircle, with their broadsides turned to the centre of the bay. The Bay of Navarino is four miles long and two miles wide. It is shaped like a horseshoe, and forms a good-sized harbor. At the narrowing ends, about a mile apart, were batteries, placed to sweep the entire plain in front. The united Egyptian and Turkish fleet was anchored in this bay, disposed in the shape of a crescent, the Egyptian portion being stationed in the centre.

The allied fleet entered the Bay of Navarino about two o'clock on the afternoon of October 20, 1827. The advance was in two columns, the British and French forming the starboard column and the Russians the port. Every man was at his post, the decks were clear for action, the gunners were ready with the implements of their occupation, and everybody waited the first shot from the Turks. The batteries were silent as the fleet filed past them, and not a shot was heard as the various vessels took up their positions.

Admiral Codrington moored his flag-ship, the *Asia*, directly opposite and between the *Capitan Bey* and the *Moharem Bey*, the two largest ships of the Ottoman fleet. Admiral Rigny took up a position to the windward of the Egyptian ships, and the Russians moved to the leeward in the bend of the crescent. The admiral ordered that the allies should not fire a shot until they were fired upon by the Turks. This order was rigidly obeyed. There was every indication that the Turks meant to fight. While the rear portion of the allied fleets was getting into position, a boat containing Lieut. Fitz-Roy and some men was sent from the *Dartmouth* to reconnoitre a Turkish fire-ship.

Nearly at the same moment a boat was lowered from the *Asia* to carry her pilot, Mitchell, with a flag of truce to repeat to the Turkish commander that the desire of the allies was for peace. Lieut. Fitz-Roy's boat, while approaching the fire-ship, received a volley of musketry. The *Asia's* pinnace, having on board the pilot and a flag of truce, shared a like fate; the guns opened fire, and the fight became general.

During all the manœuvring the two Turkish line-of-battle ships which confronted the *Asia* maintained a persistent silence. But as soon as the pinnace had been sunk, they fired a broadside into the *Asia*, which heeled over for a moment; as she righted, she delivered her broadside with splendid aim. The firing was rapid, and in a little while the two antagonists of the *Asia* were helpless wrecks. Both their cables had been shot away, and the wind wafted them towards the entrance of the harbor.

But the *Asia* did not escape unharmed in her fight with two of the enemy's ships at once. Both her broadsides were kept going as fast as possible, and very soon she was so enveloped in smoke that nothing could be seen. She received many shot in her upper works; her mizzen-mast was carried away; her other masts were injured, and several of her guns were disabled. The disappearance of her two antagonists exposed her to the fire of the second and third line; she maintained her position until the end of the battle, and practically fired the last shot. At one time she appeared to be in flames, and there was great anxiety through the allied fleet. There was corresponding relief when the smoke cleared away, and it was found that an Egyptian ship near the *Asia* had blown up and was on fire. Part of her crew had escaped by swimming to the shore, and the rest had perished. Cheer upon cheer went up from the allies when it was found that the *Asia* was unharmed.

Almost simultaneously with the attack upon the

Asia's pinnace that brought on the battle, a cannon-shot was fired from an Egyptian ship against the *Sirene*, the flag-ship of the French admiral. The *Sirene* immediately replied, and soon made an end of her assailant; but during the fight the Turks sent a fire-ship against her, and it is probable that she would have been destroyed, had it not been for the intervention of Captain Fellowes of the *Dartmouth*. On their side of the line, the Russians did some excellent work; in fact, every ship of the allied fleet was engaged, and it was not long before the superior discipline and drill of the Christians had their effect on the infidels. One after another the Ottoman ships went down, or were drifted ashore, and in less than four hours from the beginning of the contest the Ottoman fleet had ceased to be. Every armed ship was burnt, sunk, or destroyed; the only remaining vessels belonging to the Turks and Egyptians were twenty-five of the smallest transports, which were spared by order of Admiral Codrington. It was estimated that the loss in men on the Turkish and Egyptian vessels was fully seven thousand.

On the side of the allies, no vessels were destroyed, but the *Asia*, *Albion*, and *Genoa* of the English fleet were so much injured, that Admiral Codrington sent them to Malta for repairs which would enable them to stand the voyage home to England. Seventy-five men were killed and 197 wounded on the British fleet, and the loss of the French was 43 killed and 117 wounded. The Russian loss was not reported, and consequently was not supposed to be great. On the *Asia* alone there were 16 killed and 26 wounded, one of the former being the son of the Admiral. Captains Bathurst of the *Genoa* and Bell of the *Asia* were among the killed, and also Lieutenant Fitz-Roy, who was shot in the pinnace before the opening of the battle. The *Asia* had 125 round shot in her hull, 18 in her foremast, 8 in the bowsprit, and 25


in the mainmast. As before stated, her mizzen-mast was carried away. The fleet remained at Navarino until the 25th. As soon as the battle was over, the correspondence between the admirals was renewed, and it was agreed that there should be no further hostilities; indeed, there could hardly be any, as the Turkish fleet had been placed among the things of the past.

Ibrahim Pasha was absent on an excursion to Ryogos at the time of the battle, but he returned on the 21st, early enough to see the smoking ruins of his fleet. He had the good sense to see that the war was practically over, and that Turkey must cease to hope for the subjugation of Greece. In case it should set about the equipment of another fleet, the allied powers would follow their example, and bring a larger fleet, together with an army, that would make an end of the Ottoman empire with no great loss of time. He immediately applied himself to plans for the evacuation of Greece. By means of the transports which had been spared by Admiral Codrington he sent away his harem and five thousand sick and wounded soldiers, who arrived early in Alexandria after a speedy voyage.

It was feared that when the news of the event at Navarino reached Constantinople, the lives of all Europeans in that city, including the foreign ambassadors, would be in great danger, but happily there was no violence on the part of the Turks. The ambassadors pressed for an answer to their note of August 16th, and at length the Sultan replied: "My positive, absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will persist in its own will regarding them even to the last day of judgment." The Porte even demanded compensation for the destruction of the fleet, and satisfaction for the insult, and that the allies should abstain from all interference in the affairs of Greece. The reply of the ambassadors was to

the effect that the treaty of July obliged them to defend Greece, and that the Turks had no claim whatever for reparation for the affair of Navarino. The ambassadors left Constantinople on the 8th December, and soon afterwards Count Capo D'Istria, who had been elected President of Greece, took his seat, and issued a proclamation, declaring that the Ottoman rule over the country was at an end after three centuries of oppression.

Thus was the independence of Greece established. There was little fighting after the events of Navarino, and early in 1828 Admiral Codrington and Ibrahim Pasha held a convention and agreed upon measures for evacuating the land of the Hellenes. During the summer and autumn Patras, Navarino, and Modon were successively surrendered to the French, and the Morea was evacuated by the Turks. Missolonghi was surrendered to Greece early in 1829, and by the Treaty of Adrianople in September of the same year the Porte acknowledged the independence of Greece, which was henceforth to be one in the family of nations.





CHAPTER IV.

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA—1829.

THE part taken by Russia in the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino was by no means disinterested. Russia was then at war with Persia, in which the latter was defeated and obliged to ask for terms of peace. By this war and another which terminated in 1813, Persia lost the provinces of Georgia, Mingrelia, Erivan, Nakhitch-even, and the greater part of Talish, the Russian frontier being advanced to Mount Ararat and the left bank of the Aras River. The treaty which closed the second war was signed February 22, 1828. Russia pressed the conclusion of the treaty with great earnestness, as she was then involved with Turkey in such a manner that a war on a large scale was in the immediate future. In fact, hostilities had almost commenced between the Russian and Ottoman powers before the terms of peace between Persia and Russia had been arranged.

Since the beginning of 1826, Russia had been strengthening her armies on the Turkish frontiers and evidently making preparations for important military movements. Preliminary to an invasion of Turkish territory, Russia presented several demands, which related chiefly to the Danubian principalities and their mode of government, together with the responsibilities of the Porte for the piracies on the Barbary coast, in which Russia, in common with other Christian nations, had suffered considerably. Turkey was then engaged with the suppression of the

Greek rebellion and the overthrow of the Janizaries in Constantinople; she was powerless to resist the Russian demands, and to the surprise of the Emperor Nicholas and his entourage she acceded to the entire list, in a treaty or convention which has since been known in history as the Convention of Ackerman. The plenipotentiaries signed it on the last day that had been allowed by Nicholas; some delay occurred in the ratification by the Sultan, but it was finally ratified and became a binding agreement between the two empires.

Subsequent events demonstrated that Turkey had no intention of holding to the terms of the treaty, and Russia wisely continued to augment her forces on the frontier. Not only did the course of events demonstrate the absence of good faith on the part of the Sultan, but his determination to break the treaty when the proper moment arrived; further proof is found in an official circular, dated December 20, 1827.¹ The signing of treaties without the intention of keeping them is by no means rare among nations, but it is almost without precedent in the annals of diplomacy that a reputable government will openly confess in a public document, as did Turkey on this occasion, that she had signed a treaty solely for the purpose of gaining time, and without intending to carry out its terms.

Numerous manifestoes abounding in accusations of bad conduct were issued by Russia and Turkey during 1827 and early in 1828. The Porte accused Russia of secretly fomenting the insurrection in Greece, of openly joining in the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino, with violations of all the treaties she had ever signed with

¹ "Les demandes faites par les Russes, l'an passé à Ackerman, au sujet des indemnités, et surtout à l'égard des Serviens, ne furent aucunement susceptible d'être admises; néanmoins, les circonstances étant pressantes, on y acquiesça bon gré mal gré, et par nécessité, afin de saisir l'occasion de conclure un traité pour le salut de la nation Mahometane."


Turkey, including those of Bucharest and Ackerman, and further accused it of giving aid to all malcontents throughout the Ottoman dominions. Russia accused the Porte of fomenting insurrections in the Caucasus and urging the mountaineers of that region to embrace the religion of Mohammed, of the violation of all the treaties it had signed with Russia, and notably with violating the treaty of Ackerman, and furthermore alleged that on several occasions the Porte had summarily closed the Bosphorus to Russian ships, to the great injury of the commerce of the southern provinces of the empire. The balance of grievances was decidedly in favor of Russia, but there can be no doubt that the complaints of Turkey had good foundation in fact.

Turkey had increased the garrison of her fortresses on and near the Danube at the same time that Russia had massed her armies on the frontier. General Diebitsch was appointed to the command of the army on the Danube, while General Paskievitch conducted the operations against Asiatic Turkey. At the beginning of April, the Russian army on the Danube mustered on paper something more than 108,000 men; it never contained more than 100,000 effectives, and did not at any time bring more than 80,000 men into the field. About 50,000 troops were added to this number during the summer and later in the year another 50,000 was sent to join the main body.

The passage of the Pruth, then the boundary between the empires, was made on the 7th of May. The Turks had only some cavalry videttes to watch the movements, and these retired, in accordance with their orders, as soon as the Russian advance began. In a few weeks the Russians had possession of Jassy, Bucharest, and Galatz, and were in position in front of Brailov and Widin; in fact the entire left bank of the Danube was in their control.¹

¹ See map accompanying Chapter III.

On the 21st of July General Roth, commanding the sixth corps, arrived before the Danubian fortress of Silistria and immediately invested it. Once before (in 1810) it had been entirely demolished, but had been restored by the Turks. The town of Silistria is built in the form of a half circle, the diameter two thousand yards long, being turned to face the Danube. A fortification with ten fronts, each five hundred and fifty yards in length surrounds it. There are only a few fragments of permanent outworks, except two narrow redans looking towards the river. The glacis was built from two to four feet in height, and the ditch was not more than eight to ten feet deep. Rising above the interior slope of the ditch was a scarp twenty feet broad and eight feet high, the lower side of which was defended by palisades. The exterior slope of the bastions was planted with wattles and was very steep; the slopes of the curtain were banked with sods of earth. On the bastions were placed ten guns, four on each front, leaving only one on each flank; and the lines of the ditch, which were very short, were poorly defended. There were four gates, two opening on the land and two on the river. There existed no way of filling the ditch with water, as its bed was higher than the level of the Danube, and there was no water running into it. Around the front facing the land, a lunette about nine feet deep, but quite dry, had been dug in the ditch as a safeguard against Russian mines. General Roth found himself besieging Silistria with an insufficient force and almost no artillery; only one battering train having been provided for carrying on a campaign in which four sieges had to be undertaken. The Turks were defeated in several sharp fights in which they engaged the Russians when the latter were approaching Silistria. General Roth's first position was strictly defensive, his soldiers being posted on the high ground in front of the fortress and beyond the range of its guns.



At a distance of two thousand yards from the fort the Russians began their trenches. On the right the line reached to the Danube, but the left could not be brought to the river, being still held by the Turks. For four weeks the hostile armies retained this position; excepting a few sallies of no consequence there was no break in their relations. At midnight of August 28th the Russians made an assault upon the Turkish forces encamped on the two heights nearest them (A and B), and drove them away. The Turks lost about five hundred men. On August 10th a fleet of thirty-six Russian ships appeared before Silistria, but without engaging the fortress. The besiegers were considerably reduced in numbers by the withdrawal of two divisions, who were ordered to Shumla on the 15th of September. The troops suffered from disease, and besides they were poorly fed. There was no ammunition, and the one hundred and twenty guns which the Russians had were useless. Winter was near, and the siege was raised on the 10th of November, after a desultory cannonade lasting forty-eight hours. Part of the besieging force crossed the river with great difficulty, and the rest retreated through a devastated territory, the Turks following in pursuit. Thus ended the so-called siege of Silistria in 1828. It was poorly planned in every way, feebly carried on, and was in every way a failure.

OPERATIONS AGAINST SILISTRIA IN 1829.

The campaign was opened by General Diebitsch, who laid siege to the fortress, which he deemed it necessary to take, because it had a large garrison distant but a march of two days and directly flanking the army in the Balkan Mountains. As the shortest route (by Rassova) was impracticable by reason of floods, the rugged and circuitous road by Kusan was followed, and the army arrived before Silistria on the 17th of May. The Russians had learned at Brailov, during the preceding year, what was

meant by Turkish resistance behind walls, and no attack by assault was attempted. The ditch being only thirty feet wide by twelve feet deep, it was thought possible to throw the counterscarp upon the main wall of the fortress by means of two or three mines under the front of the outer earthworks, and by entirely covering the revetement to secure a practicable ascent. It was evident that an attack could be made more easily on the southern front (bastions five and six) than elsewhere. It could be raked from D, and the attack could be maintained by batteries rising in terraces on the slope of B. This side was entirely without outworks. It was decided in council at head-quarters to make the attack on the east side in order to have the assistance of the fleet. Bastions two and three were, therefore, the scenes of the real attack, which was changed later in the siege to bastions five and six, commencing with a feint. The Russians' guns numbered ninety-six; sixty-five of their own, the remaining thirty-one having been taken at Brailov.

At nine in the morning of the 17th of May, an advance was made upon the fortress from Chernavoda by General Diebitsch, commanding a part of the second and third corps, divided into three columns. The Turks were in possession of the works made the previous year by the Russians, and for some unaccountable reason undestroyed after the raising of the siege. They made a determined opposition to the Russian advance, but were driven back and the trenches fell into the Russian hands. The thirty-one guns captured were placed by the Russians on the left bank of the river, opposite the fortress, at a distance of one thousand yards. The remainder were in readiness to be shipped across the river. The 9th division of infantry, two regiments of horse and three field batteries were in position on the right wing. The centre was held by the 1st brigade of the 7th division of infantry with a single field battery: stationed on the left were three regiments

of horse, two brigades of the 6th division, and three field batteries. A battalion of chasseurs guarded the headquarters, which was behind the right wing; the besieging force was covered by the Cossacks. On the 19th and 20th of May several sallies were attempted. The batteries on the left were placed in position on the 23d and 26th of May at a distance of six hundred yards. A feint enabled the Russians to cut a new trench from one to five, this being the second parallel trench. The positions already secured, together with the embankments and waterways, were utilized, so that from the beginning the works were protected and could be finished without loss. The parallels were extended on the right to the road to Bazardjik, and a communication was made between them.

On the left the attack was greatly assisted during the night of June 3d by carelessness on the part of the Turks. The Russians proposed to use a watercourse as a means of communication with a half parallel, which they expected to establish two hundred yards in front of the second parallel. But when the covering force took position, it was ascertained that the Turks had no posts of outlook in front of their positions, and that the working party could move forward three hundred and twenty-four paces, where a trench, only two hundred and fifty yards away from the counterscarp, and on a line with it, presented an admirable beginning for the third parallel. Posts were planted below the Turkish lodgments, and work was immediately commenced. The garrison was roused by the noise of the besiegers, and opened a sharp fire at once, but it did little damage on account of the darkness. It was a bold and successful attempt, and the third parallel, FF, was brought to the right of the waterway, to the graveyard, and completed in the same night. A sortie on an extended scale was confidently expected on the night of the 4th, and precautions were

taken against it. The Turks made a sally at nightfall. They came out in strong force and encountered the 17th chasseurs hand-to-hand, but were driven back at the point of the bayonet by the Russians. Work on the parallel could not be kept up that night, but a sap with traverses was started.

The state of affairs in the Balkans made it necessary to withdraw some of the besieging force. On the 5th of June General Diebitsch quitted Silistria with the second corps d'armée, leaving General Krassowski with twenty battalions of infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and two battalions of sappers, to carry on the work of the siege. The besieging army did not now number more than ten thousand or twelve thousand men; the besieged were doubtless in greater force. The Russians could hope to win only by concealing the scarcity of their numbers, and by pushing the work with the utmost speed, in order to keep the Turks within the fortress, and to prevent any new sallies.

The rain poured down in torrents for twenty-four hours, filling the ditches until it became necessary to dig wells to carry away the water, and altogether impeding the siege operations until the 9th. The Russians, from their positions in the terraces on the hills, raked, with a destructive fire, bastions five and six. The Rasgrad and Shumla gates were totally demolished. A heavy discharge of canister was kept up by the Turks from new embrasures which they uncovered. It was said by deserters that countermines had been sunk to oppose the attack on bastions five and six, and that these mines were charged and in readiness to be fired. Thinking still that their numbers were not sufficiently strong, the Russians continued their work on the covered sap, moving forward very slowly. News having been received in the evening of the 13th of a Russian victory at Koulefftscha, they generously allowed it to reach the Turks. A strong fire and

a discharge of musketry were immediately begun by the besiegers amid loud cheers; and the Turks, believing a general attack would be made, manned their walls at once.

On the following day the commander of the fortress, Mohammed Pasha, was ordered by General Krassowski to surrender. He refused to do so, stating that "the law enjoined him to make a defence to the last." On the 16th, the first sap had been brought to the crest of the glacis; the Russians crowned the works, and the engineers ordered shafts to be sunk for four double mines. It had been determined to destroy the counterscarp fronting them at that spot, without waiting for the other saps against bastion six to be finished. As the Russians approached the Turkish positions, the defenders retired slowly. The last saps reached the glacis on the 20th of June. Mines were laid and shafts sunk at a distance of thirteen feet from the revetement of the wall, and eight feet below the bed of the trench. The mines were charged with one ton of powder for every one hundred and forty cubic feet of earth. When fired, they tore up the Turkish countermines and filled the ditch. The earth thrown up by the explosion of the mines nearly reached the edge of the revetement, and gave two easy routes for storming.

But the Russians were not ready for an assault, owing to their small numbers; and after the explosion of the mines they made no attempt to profit by the confusion of the Turks. A sharp fusillade was maintained on both sides. When the Turks saw the result of the explosion, they directed their mines as a counter against the piles of earth thrown up. The Russians fired two other mines, the effect and the result being the same as before. At one time the two parties of miners met in the works below the ground, and entered into a hand-to-hand struggle, which ended by the Turks retreating and stopping up the gallery.

One of the Turkish countermines, by some accident,

exploded almost simultaneously with the mine of the Russians; the whole front of bastion number four was thus completely opened, and the besiegers were consequently able to occupy the bastion. After making an ineffectual attempt to recover it, the Turks continued to defend themselves in the fort by means of grenades, stones, mines under the cunette, and fire-pots, in addition to an almost continuous fire of musketry. The fire-pots were in frequent use during the siege, and on several occasions they were effectual in driving the Russians out of the ditch. They consisted of earthen pots with gunpowder in the bottom and pitch above. The pitch was ignited, and then the pots were thrown down; they soon exploded with such formidable effect that the enemy was put to flight.

On the 25th of June the mine below the right angle of bastion five was commenced, and in a short time that and another mine were exploded. The Russian chasseurs now moved in without resistance, and General Berg on his own account assaulted and carried the two forts close by which the besieged had almost abandoned. By this time the besiegers had made five large openings, practicable for assault, in the main wall of the fortress. When the Russians were ready to fire another mine farther down the line, Mohammed Pasha gave up and asked for the conditions of capitulation. Some time was lost over the terms of surrender, probably intentionally on the Turkish side, for the purpose of throwing up more earthworks, but a peremptory demand to either surrender or refuse brought the Pasha to terms, and he came to the Russian camp a prisoner of war. The fortress was surrendered, 8,000 men laid down arms, and in the town were found 8,000 people, besides 1,500 sick and wounded, showing that the original strength of the garrison was not far from 16,000 men. Two hundred and thirty guns on the walls and thirty-one on board the gun-boats, together

with forty standards, fell a prize to the victorious Russians.

During the siege the Turks displayed great bravery and determination, but they also displayed great ignorance of the art of war. The siege lasted forty-four days from the first investment, thirty-five from the time the first parallel was opened, twenty-five after the third parallel, and nine days after the mines had made a perfectly practicable breach under bastion number five. Twenty-nine thousand five hundred and seventy-six shots were fired into the fort. The chief causes of capitulation seem to have been lack of harmony between the commanders and lack of provisions. It is greatly to the credit of the Russians to have forced an enemy outnumbering them two to one, and behind walls, to surrender, especially with their insufficient equipment. But the poor condition of the fort, the incompetency and quarrels of the commanders, and the miserable handling of the garrison assisted them materially. The most remarkable fact was this: that but little use was made of artillery, the reduction having been made principally by sapping and mining. Silistria was taken at a cost to the Russians of three thousand men and seven weeks' time, a saving of men, certainly, since the loss in one day's assault on the fortress of Brailov was greatly in excess of this number.

Mention has been made of the withdrawal of a portion of the investing army during the siege, and its employment elsewhere. The main body of the Turkish army was at Shumla under the command of Redschid Pasha, grand vizier; it numbered about forty thousand men, mostly irregular troops, and by no means able to cope with a corresponding force of Russians. At Rustchuk on the Danube was Hussein Pasha, with eight or ten thousand men, watching the course of events, and waiting to move at the orders of the grand vizier. Varna to the east of Shumla was held by the Russians, and so was Pravadi,

where the Muscovites had maintained themselves without interference during the winter.

Soon after the beginning of the siege the grand vizier conceived a grand plan, which if successful would have ended the campaign and driven the Russians to the north of the Danube. His idea was to overwhelm the Russians in detail, first by recapturing Pravadi with its garrison, and then moving on the force investing Silistria, together with the covering army, which was commanded by General Diebitsch in person. With this object in view the grand vizier on the 28th of May marched out of Shumlia at the head of thirty-six thousand men, leaving only a feeble garrison to hold the place. General Roth, who commanded the Russians at and near Pravadi, strengthened the garrison with two battalions, and then retired about twenty miles to the northward with ten thousand men. At the same time he despatched an officer with news of the movement of the Turks, telling him to ride as for life or death. The officer covered the distance of eighty miles in twelve hours without changing his horse. The Turks arrived in front of Pravadi on the 1st of June, and sat down leisurely with the intention of taking the place in their own convenient time. Pravadi stands in a narrow valley at the foot of the Balkans, and is a place of great natural strength, so that an assault was quite inadvisable.

Immediately on hearing of the Turkish movements General Diebitsch determined to move by forced marches with the covering army near Silistria, and also with a part of the besieging force, and check the plans of the grand vizier, which he learned through an intercepted letter to Hussein Pasha. By the 5th of June, he was in motion with twenty thousand men, leaving General Krassowski to continue the siege of Silistria and prevent reinforcements reaching the garrison. This explains the weakness of the besiegers during their operations against the fortress. Diebitsch's plan was to move against the grand vizier's

line of communication with Shumla, and not upon the Turkish position in front of Pravadi. By so doing he would compel the Turks to abandon Shumla to its feeble garrison, in which event it would be taken without serious opposition, or else fight their way back to it through the Russian army under circumstances greatly to their disadvantage. Though brave enough behind defences, the Turkish troops were too recently organized to enable them to be satisfactorily handled in the open field, and especially under fire. The Russian artillery was moved by horses, while all the Turkish cannon were transported by oxen. Diebitsch rightly calculated that the Turkish guns, though greatly superior to the Russians in numbers, would be of slight efficiency in the field, when their motive power was by means of oxen only.

Count Pahlen, with the advance of the Russian army, established himself on the 9th of June at a point between Shumla and Pravadi, and was closely followed by the rest of General Diebitsch's force. On the 10th, General Ross, who had skilfully concealed the Russian advance by a thin curtain of Cossack videttes, made a forced march and joined Diebitsch, thus making the available force under the latter something more than thirty thousand men with one hundred and thirty-six guns. The grand vizier first learned that he was cut off from Shumla by some prisoners captured in a skirmish on the evening of the 10th. Not aware that the whole Russian force was in front of him, he started to retire to Shumla in full confidence that he would be able to reach it.

The first onset between the opposing forces was an affair of cavalry and artillery, in which the Russians were the sufferers. The Turks sent three thousand horsemen, the flower of their cavalry, which completely routed the Russian battalion opposing them and captured five guns; they next assailed two battalions of infantry, which they

cut down, and captured five more guns. The Russians retreated to their main body, the Turks pursuing, but halting judiciously and retiring when they found they were facing great odds. The Russian stand was made at Kouleftscha, where Diebitsch immediately concentrated all his forces and drew victory out of defeat. As the battle continued, the superiority of the Russian artillery told heavily against the Turks, who were thrown into disorder, and lost heavily in men and guns. The grand vizier took a circuitous route to Shumla, where he arrived with eighteen thousand men and twelve guns; he had marched out a few days before with thirty-six thousand men and fifty-nine guns. The Russian loss in the battle was sixty-three officers and about twenty-five hundred men; all the artillery lost by them in the early part of the battle was abandoned by the Turks later in the day.

Immediately after the fall of Silistria General Diebitsch conceived the daring plan of crossing the Balkans, but he carefully kept it to himself until every thing was ready. He made great and ostentatious preparations for besieging Shumla, and so completely deceived the grand vizier that the latter made no attempt at defending the passes of the mountains. Diebitsch formed a camp in front of Shumla, and during every day detachments of troops were arriving hourly with banners flying and bands playing, while the soldiers already there greeted the newcomers. But during the night other detachments, which were concealed by a chain of outposts, moved silently to the left to reinforce the corps of Roth and Rudiger, which had entered the valley of the Kamtjik with the view of crossing the Balkan chain by the Aidos Pass. The ruse was so successful that the Turks had only three thousand men at the foot of the northern slope of the ridge, and had done absolutely nothing in the way of throwing up intrenchments or otherwise preparing for a defence, when Roth and Rudiger were ready to move

with twenty thousand men, carrying four days' rations in their haversacks and ten days' additional rations in the wagons which followed each regiment.

The march for the passage of the Balkans began on the 17th of July, and so admirably was the movement conducted, that the Turks were taken completely by surprise and offered scarcely any resistance. Aidon, on the southern side of the mountains, was full of military stores, which were abandoned by the Turks as the Russians approached, and other important captures of the same nature were made. Communication was opened with the Russian fleet at Bourgas and other points; the Turkish troops seemed panic-stricken and fled in dismay to the capital, and altogether General Diebitsch had things pretty much to his liking. But he was in a critical position, as his army was much smaller than the Turks generally believed it to be; the Bulgarians had spread the rumor that the Russians were countless as the leaves of the forest, and the Turkish scouts reported them at least sixty thousand strong, when they were really less than half that number.


The conquering army reached Adrianople August 20th, and on the following morning entered the city without bloodshed. Eight days later was signed the Treaty of Adrianople, by which the former treaties of Ackerman, Bucharest, and Kainardjii were ratified to their fullest extent, together with the conventions relating to Servia. The passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to Russian merchant ships, in common with those of other nations; Turkey was to pay an indemnity of £750,000 sterling to Russian subjects who had been despoiled of their property, while the Russian government was to receive a war indemnity of £5,000,000 sterling, and the conquered provinces were to be held by the Russians until the indemnity was paid. The Turkish provinces to the north of the Danube were to be practically independent of Turkey, and the Porte engaged not to maintain any

fortified post or Mussulman establishment within their boundaries. A small tribute was to be paid to Turkey by the principalities, but every Moslem subject of the Porte north of the Danube was to sell his property and leave the country within eighteen months. Russia was to have the right to interfere in the affairs of the Danubian principalities in case of any violation of the treaty on the part of Turkey.

Russia gained additional territory in Asia as a return for her successful operations in that region. She obtained the fortress and pashalik of Akhaltiskh, with a portion of the coast of the Black Sea ; Southern Caucasus and a part of Armenia thus passed into Russian control, where they have ever since remained, and several minor advantages were obtained by the Czar in the Treaty of Adrianople and the conventions which followed it. An officer of rank was despatched to Asia immediately after the signing of the treaty ; in less than a fortnight from the memorable 28th of August all hostilities were suspended, and shortly afterwards peace was declared.

General Paskievitch, who commanded the Russian army in Asia, was rewarded with the baton of a field-marshal. A similar honor was given to General Diebitsch, in addition to the title "Zabalkanski" (Trans-Balkanian), in commemoration of his daring march across that hitherto impassable mountain chain. A major-general at twenty-five, and lieutenant-general at twenty-eight, he was one of the most remarkable soldiers whose names adorn the military records of Russia. He was only in his forty-fifth year when he became a field-marshal, after the peace of Adrianople.






CHAPTER V.

BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGIERS—1830.


IN the year 454 of the Christian era, Genseric, the ruler of Northern Africa, sent an expedition that ravaged the coast of Sicily and Italy, captured Rome, which was given up to sack for fourteen days, and returned to Africa with sixty thousand prisoners. The fleet of Genseric was the precursor of the pirates and corsairs that ravaged the Mediterranean from that time to the present century, and the prisoners that were brought from Rome were the vanguard of that vast array of foreign slaves who toiled under Algiers and other barbaric masters until the French conquest of which we are about to speak.

Under the Turkish rulers of Algeria piracy became a well-organized system, and was regarded as legitimate a means of obtaining wealth as in our day we regard the manufacture of woollen or cotton goods, or the shipment of grain or other products to a profitable market. The Moslems considered it entirely proper to hold all Christians in their power as slaves, and they made no distinction between prisoners of war, the crews of captured merchant ships, or unhappy victims of their raids on the European coast and islands. Furthermore, whenever any European state attempted reprisals, it was the custom of the Dey of Algiers to send to the galleys the consul of that country, together with the crew of any merchant ship that might have ventured into his ports for purposes of trade. On many occasions hundreds of these peaceful traders



were slaughtered in cold blood, simply as a matter of intimidation to the government to which they owed allegiance. The consuls were treated with great barbarity; they were burned alive or blown from the mouths of cannons, and on one occasion on the approach of a French fleet the French consul was thrown towards them from a mortar. The various European governments made frequent attempts to suppress this system of piracy and slavery, but as they were constantly warring among themselves they could not fix upon united action. Each was generally content to see its neighbors preyed upon if it could secure immunity for itself, and consequently the attempts to this end were in the shape of tribute, partly in money and very often partly in cannon, muskets, powder, shells, and other munitions of war. As late as 1771 France bought peace with Algiers, and one of the conditions was that she should send over some cannon-founders to instruct the pirates in their art. Spain, Holland, England, Austria, and the United States of America were among the tributary nations; as late as 1805, all these countries paid tribute to the dey as a condition of not being molested, a condition, it is needless to say, that was speedily violated.

In 1816 England sent a fleet under Lord Exmouth to compel the liberation of British subjects that were then held in slavery. The dey refused to listen to terms, and the result was the bombardment of Algiers, the destruction of its fleet and forts, and the conclusion of a treaty by which Christian slavery should forever cease in the dominions of the dey, all slaves then in bondage were to be liberated immediately, all money received for the ransom of slaves since the beginning of the year was to be returned, and the British consul who had been put in irons was to receive reparation and an apology. But in spite of the treaty, piracy and slavery continued, and after a fresh rupture with England in 1824, which was patched



up in a manner disgraceful to the latter, the insolence of the Algerian authorities was without limit, and they regarded treaties as of no more consequence than so many sheets of waste paper.

During the Napoleonic wars, the Dey of Algiers supplied grain for the use of the French armies; it was bought by merchants of Marseilles, and there was a dispute about the matter which was unsettled as late as 1829. Several instalments had been paid; the dey demanded payment in full according to his own figures, while the French government, believing the demand excessive, required an investigation. In one of the numerous debates on the subject, Hussein Pasha, the reigning dey, became very angry, struck the consul with a fan, and ordered him out of the house. He refused all reparation for the insult, even on the formal demand of the French government, and consequently there was no alternative but war. It was known that the Algerines had replaced the fleet destroyed by Lord Exmouth, and repaired and greatly strengthened the fortifications of the harbor of Algiers. But their defences only looked towards an attack by water, and they had quite neglected the rear of the city, which was commanded by heights behind it. Therefore the French determined upon a land attack as the best mode of conquering the stronghold of the corsairs.

During the whole of April, the French government pursued its preparations at Toulon, Brest, Havre, and Cherbourg, and by the beginning of May all the fleet was assembled at Toulon and ready for sea. The land forces comprised 37,500 men, 3,000 horses, and 180 pieces of artillery, mostly heavy guns for the reduction of Algiers, in case a siege should be found necessary. The sea forces included 11 ships of the line, 23 frigates, 70 smaller vessels, 377 transports, and 230 boats for landing troops. General Bourmont, Minister of War, commanded the expedition,

which appeared in front of Algiers on the 13th of June, 1830. Though somewhat alarmed at the spectacle of the vast fleet, Hussein Pasha thought he would be able to defeat his assailants with little difficulty should they ever attempt to land. He had previously asked for aid from the Sultan of Turkey, but that wily ruler had blankly refused. The beys of Tunis and Tripoli had also declined to meddle with the affair, and he had only his vassals, the beys of Oran, Constantine, and Tittery to fall back upon. They were entirely confident that a descent on the coast of Algiers was contemplated by the French, and stood ready to meet them in strong force.

Admiral Duperré, the commander of the fleet, carefully examined the coast and decided that the best place for landing was at Sidi-Ferruch, about sixteen miles to the west of Algiers, where there is a peninsula enclosed by two deep bays. On the 14th the landing was partially effected, rapidly and in excellent order. It was observed that the ground rose rather steeply in a series of natural terraces, covered with brushwood near the shore, and considerably more wooded farther inland. The French also perceived that every one of these terraces held a swarm of Turks and Arabs partially concealed in the bushes. They were not long in opening a lively fusillade against the French, who replied without attempting to advance. The Arabs mistook the deliberation of the French for fear, and concluded that it would be an easy matter to destroy the invaders at any desired moment.

Hussein's commander-in-chief was his son-in-law, the Aga Ibrahim, who had 40,000 to 50,000 men under his command. Ibrahim was a very skilful and daring horseman, but not much of a soldier. When the news came that the French were landing at Sidi-Ferruch, Ibrahim marched his army to the heights overlooking the bay, and encamped it on the table-land of Staoueli, which spreads out from the crest of the hills. His troops were mostly ir-

regulars, having come there merely for the purpose of looting and with little stomach for battle. His horsemen could not be called cavalry in any close sense of the word. They were merely marks-men on horseback. Their mode of fighting was to ride up at a gallop, discharge their guns, and then wheel about and retire. Their numbers and the fury of their onset, together with their fine horsemanship, made them dangerous enemies.

Ibrahim assembled his men at Staoueli, in the belief that the most arrant cowardice kept the French in their camps, and that it would be an easy matter for him to make a rush and drive the army, horse and foot, into the Mediterranean. He did not observe the artillery that was rapidly being landed by the French, nor did he see the horses and ammunition wagons to move and supply the guns. He was at first inclined to make an attack when only a small part of the invaders had reached the shore, but finally concluded to let the entire body come to land, so that he would have but a single job of annihilation.

For five days the French continued their work of debarkation unmolested by the Algerines except by the desultory attacks of horsemen coming singly or in small groups to try conclusions with the pickets. A few stragglers and foraging parties were cut off, but on the whole the loss to the French during the five days of the landing was trifling. On the 19th General Bourmont was ready for the advance, and gave orders for breaking up the camp and moving in the direction of the enemy. There was great scarcity of water in the camp until the 16th, when a heavy rain flooded the country; after this rain the soldiers found plenty of water everywhere by digging a few feet into the sand.

Ibrahim had made his camp on the plain of Staoueli, drawing up his line in the form of a crescent, with his right resting on the valley of the Madiffa, a small river flowing from the Atlas Mountains, which here fill the

southern horizon, A redoubt was thrown up, and strongly mounted, and behind the numerous knolls and hillocks of the table-land many thousands of soldiers were lying in wait. If Ibrahim had remained where he was, and calmly awaited the attack, he would have shown some understanding of the ways of warfare, since he must have been aware that his greatest strength always lay in acting on the defensive. But such was the arrogance of the Algerines that his muddled brain did not suggest any better plan than to let loose his hordes of horsemen, ride down the French infantry, and thus secure victory without delay.

As the French began their advance the Moslems came to meet them. The former had about thirty thousand men under arms, while the latter were thought to be not less than forty-five thousand—at least that was the estimate of the conquerors. Twenty thousand Moslems came rushing over the plain to attack General Berthezene's division, and fifteen thousand more, led by Ahmed, the Bey of Constantine, moved around Lovedo's division to attack it in the rear, a manœuvre which would have placed the French between two fires.

The plan was an excellent one, but neither Ibrahim nor Ahmed had the military genius to make it successful. A short fusillade ensued, and a troop of Arabs dashed into the French camp. A hand-to-hand fight followed, and very soon the ground was strewn with the dead and wounded. There was a time when the 21st regiment of the line seemed to be severely shaken. The soldiers' pouches were empty, and their ranks in too close order to make an effective use of the bayonet.

The rally was sounded. General Bourmont called up the reserves, and in a few minutes the tide of battle had turned. The general, observing the eager onslaught of his soldiers, and also the loose desultory system of the Algerian attack, now ordered the three divisions to ad-

vance at the double-quick upon the plateau of Staoueli. An eye-witness says: "The soldiers had been waiting for that order. Away now they dashed in three different routes to meet at the enemy's intrenchment. At once they carry the redoubt, cut down the gunners at the battery, and in their turn rush into the enemy's camps. The furious onslaught of the soldiers reels the Arabs over; they turn about as if in a whirlpool, give way, and are hurried out of all their positions. For an instant they try resistance, but too late; they take to flight and run, never halting till the sheltering walls of Algiers receive them."

The Algerines had made a fairly orderly retreat until the French entered their camp and captured the artillery. Orientals have a great respect for cannon; its possession is to them a proof of superiority, and its loss is almost certain to cause a panic among them. It was so in the present instance, and when their guns were in the hands of the French, their hope of victory was gone. And furthermore, the French guns, nearly one hundred in number, had been steadily pouring grape and canister in the Moslem ranks at short range and steady aim, with a destructive effect that no irregular troops are able to withstand. The Arab loss in killed and wounded was about three thousand, largely caused by the artillery fire of the invaders, while the French loss was less than five hundred. In little more than an hour the battle was over, and the Osmanlis were in full and disorderly retreat.

General Bourmont remained where he was for several days, strengthening his position and clearing out an old Roman road for the transportation of his heavy artillery to the rear of Algiers. On the day of the battle the debarkation of the heavy artillery had not been completed, and the work was continued until every piece was on shore. The French occupied and strengthened the former camp of the Osmanlis at Staoueli, and took every precaution against surprise. The Moslems recovered from their

fright, and after a few skirmishes, in which their wonderful ability on horseback was admirably displayed, they made an attack (June 24th) on the French lines. Twenty thousand men, most of them mounted, advanced to the assault with loud shouts and riding close up to the French position. The divisions of Berthezene and Lovedo moved out to meet them in the same order as on the 19th, and with the same result. The artillery moved between the columns of infantry, and as the battle opened, the cannon mowed down the Arabs with fearful effect by means of grape and canister.

The assailants were repulsed with heavy loss, and pursued about six miles from the scene of the battle. The French loss was trifling, but the killed included Amadieu de Bourmont, son of the commander-in-chief, who fell while leading his company of grenadiers.

The way to Algiers was now open to the French, though their advance was considerably impeded by the light troops of the enemy, who disputed every point where a stand could be made, and hovered so close on the flanks of the column, that every straggler was instantly cut off and slaughtered. The French advanced leisurely, and on the 30th of June took their position before, or rather behind, the city, in front of the Emperor's Fort, a quadrangular structure which occupied the ground where the Emperor Charles V., three centuries earlier, made a disastrous attack upon Algiers. It stands on the plateau above the city, and commands every part of it; the dey thought it would be able to resist the invaders, and even when they sat down before it his courage did not desert him.

The French brought up their heavy guns and began the attack, in which they were joined by the light artillery. The batteries were completed on the 3d of July, and fire was opened on the following day. Not since the bombardment by Lord Exmouth in 1816 had such a contest

raged at Algiers. The French ships of the line approached the front of the city, and opened fire on the sea defences almost simultaneously with the bombardment of the fort. The French had one hundred guns in battery, while the Algerines had more than double that number in the fort, but all their artillery could not be brought to bear at once. The Algerines served their guns bravely, but their fire was greatly inferior to that of the French, and very soon the excellence of the artillery practice of the latter was manifest. One by one the defenders' guns were dismounted, the walls were breached, the gunners were either killed or wounded or driven from their batteries, and finally the survivors sought refuge in a huge tower in the middle of the fort. Shortly afterwards the tower blew up with an explosion that reduced it to a mass of ruins and killed nearly all those who had fled to it for protection. As soon as they could form, the French grenadiers assaulted and carried the fort, and the city of the deys was in the possession of a Christian power.

The dey hoisted the white flag and offered to surrender, for which purpose he sent an envoy to meet General Bourmont in the Emperor's Fort. Hussein Pasha hoped to the last moment to retain his country and its independence by making liberal concessions in the way of indemnity for the expenses of the war, and offered to liberate all Christian slaves in addition to paying them for their services and sufferings. The English consul tried to mediate on this basis, but his offers of mediation were politely declined; the French were determined on nothing short of complete conquest and the utter demolition of this nest of pirates, that had so long scourged the Mediterranean and the countries bordering on it. It was finally agreed that the dey should surrender Algiers with all its forts and military stores, and be permitted to retire wherever he chose with his wives, children, and personal belongings, but he was not to remain in the country under

any circumstances. On the 5th of July the French entered Algiers in great pomp and took possession of the place; they respected private property, and in a proclamation General Bourmont offered amnesty to all who had opposed him, provided they laid down their arms at once.

The spoils of war were such as rarely fall to the lot of a conquering army, when its numbers and the circumstances of the campaign are considered. In the treasury was found a large room filled with gold and silver coins heaped together indiscriminately, the fruits of three centuries of piracy; they were the coins of all the nations that had suffered from the depredations of the Algerines, and the variety in the dates showed very clearly that the accumulation had been the work of two or three hundred years. How much money was contained in this vast pile is not known; certain it is that nearly fifty million francs, or two millions sterling, actually reached the French treasury, and it is not known that the French officers and soldiers added any thing to the original amount from their private purses.

On the walls and ships-of-war fifteen hundred and forty-two cannon were found, of which six hundred and seventy were of bronze, and the entire value of the public property turned over to the French government was estimated at fifty-five million francs. The cost of the war was much more than covered by the captured property; in fact, the money alone that was found in the treasury was sufficient for that purpose. Many slaves were liberated, among them the crews of two French brigs that had been captured not long before. The total loss of the French in the campaign was six hundred killed and seventeen hundred wounded, while that of the Algerines was estimated at double those figures, the proportion of the killed being greater in consequence of the deadly fire of the French artillery.

The Algerine power was forever broken, and from that

day Algeria has been a prosperous colony of France. Hussein Pasha embarked on the 10th of July with a suite of one hundred and ten persons, of whom fifty-five were women. He proceeded to Naples where he remained for a time, went afterwards to Leghorn, and finally to Egypt. On his arrival in that country Mohammed Ali Pasha received him with the consideration due to his high rank and misfortunes, and showed him marked favor. But one day, after a private audience with Mohammed Ali, Hussein retired to his apartments and died in convulsions, probably from a dose of poison administered by the hand of the slayer of the Mamelukes.

On a marble slab over the principal entrance of the new barrack at Sidi-Ferruch is the following inscription :

Ici
le 14 Juin, 1830,
Par l'ordre du Roi Charles X.,
Sous le commandement du General de
BOURMONT,
L'Armée Française
Vint arborer ses drapeaux,
Rendre la Liberté aux mers,
Donner l'Algérie à la France.





CHAPTER VI.

CAPTURE OF ANTWERP AND LIBERATION OF BELGIUM— 1832.


THE history of Belgium as an independent state dates from its separation from the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830. It had previously been under the domination of Spain, Austria, and France, and finally, in the general peace which followed the wars of Napoleon, it was united with Holland under Prince William Frederick of Orange-Nassau. The union was not to the taste of the Belgian people, who differed materially from the Dutch in language, religion, and occupations. In the union Holland, with 2,000,000 inhabitants, was to have an equal number of representatives with Belgium's 4,000,000; furthermore, the national debt of Belgium was only 4,000,000 florins, while Holland had a debt of 1,200,000,000; the consolidated debt was to be assumed by both countries, and would naturally be a severe and unjust burden upon Belgium with its superior population. In the convention which passed the constitution containing these objectionable provisions, the Belgians who dissented were in actual majority, but all absent Belgians were held to have assented, and so the vote was carried. The use of the French language in judicial and other proceedings was to be abolished, and there were other conditions equally objectionable.

Officials holding Belgian opinions were dismissed, a severe press law was enacted, and several persons ob-

noxious to the government were banished. The revolutions in Paris in 1830 caused much excitement in Belgium, and in August of that year there was an outbreak in Brussels, speedily followed by similar manifestations of discontent in other cities of Belgium. Insurrection led to open warfare; Brussels, Mons, Ghent, Liege, and other places passed into the hands of the Belgians, and by the end of October only Antwerp remained in control of the Dutch. General Chassé, the Dutch commander, occupied the citadel of Antwerp, whence he subjected the city to a two days' bombardment, doing great damage to property. Belgium had already formed a provisional government, and after the bombardment of Antwerp the quarrel was appealed to a conference of the European powers at London. The conference ordered an armistice and the retirement of the troops of Belgium and Holland into their own countries, acknowledged the independence of Belgium, bound her to the payment of a portion of the state debt, and left her to the management of her own affairs independently of Holland.

In July, 1831, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was crowned king of the Belgians under the title of Leopold I. Soon after his coronation he found himself burdened with war, as the Dutch in violation of the armistice had sent an army across the frontier. With an unformed government, a hastily organized army, and a kingdom in disorder, the new king felt unable to oppose the invaders, and in his dilemma he appealed to France for aid. The aid was promptly given; Marshal Gérard, accompanied by the Duke of Orleans, marched into Belgium with 60,000 men, whereupon the Dutch retired to their own boundaries.

The conference of the powers determined to compel the Dutch to give up the citadel of Antwerp, which they still held. Accordingly the army of Marshal Gérard advanced upon Antwerp, and a combined English and French fleet entered the Scheldt to co-operate with the



army. The army consisted of forty-eight thousand infantry, nine thousand cavalry, and six thousand artillery, the latter comprising a siege train for the special purpose of reducing the Antwerp citadel. The British fleet comprised five ships of the line, the French fleet included three ships of the line and five frigates, and these combined armaments made their rendezvous on the coast of England and sailed together for the Scheldt. It was an odd spectacle to see England and France co-operating in warfare after centuries of enmity.

For more than a year the town of Antwerp had been in the possession of Belgium while the citadel was held by General Chassé, the Dutch commander, with a garrison of five thousand men. It was commonly called the "citadel du Sud" to distinguish it from the "citadel du Nord" on the other side of Antwerp. This celebrated fortress was separated from the city by an esplanade, and commanded the harbor, as it was close to the bank of the Scheldt. It was long considered one of the strongest places in Europe, and owed its existence to the Duke of Alva, during the war between Spain and the United Provinces in the sixteenth century, to command the navigation of the Scheldt and be the principal frontier post toward Holland. Napoleon added greatly to its strength when he formed the design of invading England, and decided upon Antwerp as his base. The invention of rifled cannon in later times has rendered this citadel of less consequence than formerly, and in 1874 it was dismantled, but not until Antwerp had been provided with other and more modern defences,

One side of the fortress (towards the west) was protected by the river; towards the land it was covered by several strong outworks, but these were of little avail at the time of the siege, as the garrison was not sufficiently large to man them all. The garrison, five thousand strong, was composed of veteran soldiers who were well

worthy of their leader, General Chassé; the fort mounted one hundred and eighty guns, most of them of heavy calibre, and the fortress was well supplied with ammunition. Immense casemates and covered galleries and lodgments for the protection of the troops had been constructed, and the Dutch general was prepared for a hard fight. The French army had an enormous battering train, as it was well known that the siege of Antwerp would be no holiday affair.

The French crossed the frontier at Charleroi on the 18th November, and arrived in front of Antwerp near the end of the month. The preliminary work of the siege was begun immediately, and at the same time there was a correspondence between the Dutch and French generals of a somewhat novel character. General Chassé insisted that the French should not make use of the works of the city in their siege operations, otherwise he should consider the city taking part in the siege and would proceed to bombard it. Marshal Gérard sent the following letter to General Chassé:

"Sir.—In the name of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, I ask you to hand over the citadel and all the forts along the Scheldt; if not so disposed, I shall force you. Whatever you do, mind not to fire on the city."

To this summons the Dutch commander replied as follows:

"Sir.—I shall stick to my post as long as life will last. The city is safe. Pray stop your siege works before negotiations have come to an end, or else I shall fire."

For a time there was little prospect that the city could be spared the horrors of war, and preparations were made in Antwerp by barricading the streets and removing the pavements so as to reduce as much as possible the effects of the bombardment. Many people left the city in anticipation of their worst fears being realized, but it was finally agreed that the city with all its outworks should

be considered neutral by both parties; the fire of the citadel was to be directed only to the open plain to the southeast, and the approaches of the besiegers were to be only from that direction. It was a novel spectacle—peace reigning all around, the city neutralized, and the attack and defence limited to one side of the fort. It seemed more a trial of military skill than an instance of actual warfare.

Operations began on the 30th November. On that day the following letters passed between the commanders :

To General Chassé.

Sir.—It is you that fired the first shot on my soldiers, hence do not talk any longer about negotiations. Surrender, I say again, in the name of humanity, and all will be well.

GÉRARD.

Head-quarters at Bouhem.

To Marshal Gérard.

Sir.—The fault is with you. I shall fight for the city, and it will be safe as long as you will not force me.

CHASSÉ.

Citadel at Antwerp.

On the receipt of General Chassé's letter Marshal Gérard began in dead earnest. The trenches were opened and continued night and day amidst torrents of rain. Soon the French had one hundred and four guns in position, throwing solid shot and shell into the citadel. On the 4th of December all the batteries began playing upon the fortress with a steady, well-directed fire, which was maintained for nineteen days without cessation.

The return fire was slow at first, but better in time and admirably directed. Of course, no vessels or boats could pass either up or down the river; a few that tried it were fired upon and taught to keep aloof. All communication between citadel and city was cut off, and the garrison was thus left unsupported.

In spite of the steady and well-directed fire of the citadel, the besiegers made steady progress. Their third and fourth parallels were directed against the lunette Saint Laurent ; a mine was run under one of its bastions, and sprung on the night of the 14th December, making a practicable breach in the walls. Three companies of the 65th French regiment assaulted immediately, passed the ditch without firing a shot, and carried the breach at the point of the bayonet. At the same time a battalion of grenadiers took advantage of the springing of the mine and consequent confusion ; they scaled the walls of the lunette on the opposite side, and the garrison of less than three hundred men was compelled to retire to the citadel with the loss of sixty prisoners, after making a most gallant defence.

The capture of this position was of great advantage to the French, as it enabled them to bring their approaches close to the edge of the ditch on the summit of the counterscarp. General Chassé planned a sortie, which was led by Captain Morré. It resulted in the capture of five mortars, and the levelling of some twenty-five yards of the trenches, but the working force of French was speedily strengthened, and the Dutch were beaten back with the loss of their captain, who was killed. Other sorties were made, the Dutch displaying great bravery, but the retardation of the work of the besiegers was hardly sufficient to compensate for the loss of men. Night and day the bombardment continued, and so vigorously was it carried on that as many as fourteen bombs were seen in the air at once.

The immense casemates of the citadel were not strong enough to stand the French fire. The casemates were broken through by the weight of the falling bombs ; some of the missiles penetrated to the hospitals, piercing the six feet of earth piled upon the roofing of heavy timber, and exploding in the midst of the sick and wounded.

The garrison daily diminished from the effects of the fire and the exhaustion of the men, who were obliged to be almost constantly under arms; forty heavy guns, mounted on the edge of the counterscarp, converged their fire upon the bastion of Toledo, and the high brick walls tumbled in ruins from its effect.

On the 23d of December General Chassé wisely concluded that he had prolonged the defence quite as long as was required either by military honor or state policy, and that further resistance was useless. He hoisted a white flag, and the firing ceased immediately. Two Dutch officers were sent to treat for terms and ask that the garrison be allowed to retire with the honors of war. Marshal Gérard immediately granted the request, and the rest of the matter was arranged in a few minutes. The Dutch were to surrender the citadel, with the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek farther down the river and commanding navigation from the sea to Antwerp. The garrison was to retire into Holland with its colors and arms, but all government property inside the fort was to be given up to Belgium. The commander of the Dutch flotilla tried to break through the French lines, but finding he could not do so, he burned his gun-boats rather than surrender them to the enemy.

When the terms of the surrender were submitted to the king of Holland, he refused to ratify them, so far as the forts down the river were concerned, on the ground that they were not under General Chassé's orders at the time of the capitulation. Marshal Gérard then offered to let the garrison of the citadel retire into Holland with their arms upon the simple obligation not to serve again against France or Belgium during the continuance of hostilities, but General Chassé refused to do so. He said it would not be in accord with the original terms of capitulation, and therefore he and his men must be treated as prisoners of war. At an appointed time the

garrison marched out and piled their arms, and were then marched back into the citadel, where they took food with their late antagonists, from whom they received every courtesy. Afterwards they were taken to France as prisoners of war; General Chassé wished to march with them, but with his seventy years of age, added to the fatigues and excitement of the siege, he was so broken down, that he was unable to enter a carriage without assistance.

Rarely, if ever, was a siege conducted with so much chivalry and courtesy as that of the citadel of Antwerp. The stipulation regarding the neutrality of the city and the restrictions of the line of fire of both parties are noteworthy, and so well were they carried out, that not a single non-combatant beyond the lines was harmed in person or property. An eye-witness of the siege says that when Marshal Gérard, in company with the Duke of Orleans, entered the citadel to meet his opponent, General Chassé, he found the latter standing near the casemates, amidst a heap of ruins. "Quickly he walked forward, extending his hand. 'Count,' he said, 'all these ruins speak of your prowess.' But no reply fell from the lips of the saddened old man, who was too much cast down to be able to speak."

At the time the white flag was displayed all was ready for the assault, which would have been made within a few hours. The same eye-witness who is quoted above says: "It was well that the surrender was made without a previous assault; for, according to the French officers, there would have been a terrible slaughter following it. 'Friendly though we were with the Dutch the eve before, exchanging courtesies,' said one of them, 'our soldiers would have changed in a moment, sparing nobody. We cannot help being so; it is the nature of the soldier everywhere.'"

Commenting on the siege of Antwerp, the author of "Alison's History of Europe," who was personally present

in the latter part of the operations, pronounces it one of the most memorable sieges of which the annals of Europe make mention. "Such had been the intrepidity of the governor and the courage of the garrison, that five thousand men kept sixty thousand at bay during twenty-four days of open trenches, during which the fire, both of artillery and small-arms, was incessant, and besiegers and besieged were alike standing to their guns day and night through the severities of a rude season, in the depth of winter. It is hard to say whether, in such circumstances, there is most to admire in the vigor and perseverance of the besiegers, or the devotion and constancy of the besieged. Both sides made the utmost efforts during the continuance of the operations. The besiegers opened up 14,000 fathoms of trenches. The artillery discharged 63,000 shots, and they took 5,000 men by capitulation. The Dutch lost 90 killed, 349 wounded, and 67 prisoners during the siege. But the losses of the besiegers were much more considerable: they amounted to 608 killed and 1,800 wounded."

The other forts, Lillo and Liefkenshock, were not evacuated, and the French proposed to operate against them; King Leopold declared himself satisfied to hold Limburg and Luxemburg against them, and so the French army retired across the frontier into its own country. The king of Holland refused to accept the situation, and declared that he would continue the war, but the blockade of the ports of his country by the combined fleets of France and England, and the consequent paralysis of Dutch commerce, were not long in bringing him to his senses. England and France informed him in the most emphatic terms that no interference with the march of Belgium towards independence would be permitted, and that at the first move he made in that direction the French army would be summoned back again and the consequences might be very serious for his kingdom. In

the resumption of negotiations there was no difficulty in settling the principal points of the convention; the agreement turned chiefly on the minor points of trade and commercial relations, in which Holland displayed the obstinacy for which the Dutch are traditionally renowned.

On the 19th May, 1833, a convention was agreed to and signed, and the long quarrel was practically over. All Dutch vessels that had been seized by France or England were to be released immediately and restored, with their cargoes, to their owners, and all Dutch prisoners were to be liberated. Holland agreed not to reopen hostilities with Belgium, and the navigation of the Scheldt was to be kept open as it had been prior to November 1, 1832. The Meuse, which flows through Holland in the lower part of its course, was also opened commercially for Belgian vessels, on condition that certain duties fixed for the states of the German Confederation should be paid. It was further agreed that Holland and Belgium should proceed to the negotiation of a treaty for a definitive and permanent peace. As all the points of the treaty were practically settled it was supposed that the negotiations would present no difficulty, but as a matter of fact, owing to the obstinacy of the king of Holland, it was not completed until 1839. Even then it was only accomplished at the dictation of the European powers. Luxemburg and Limburg were divided between the contending nations, Holland receiving the eastern divisions, with the fortresses of Maestricht, Venloo, and Luxemburg. The independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed, and the country was enabled to enter upon a career of commercial and industrial prosperity.

Since the conclusion of the above-named treaty with Holland, Belgium has had no taste of the horrors of war within her borders, other than the use of the military on several occasions for the suppression of disturbances among workmen in mines or in manufacturing establish-

ments. In all the wars of other powers Belgium has maintained a strict neutrality. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 she forbade the sale of war munitions to either of the contending parties, and disarmed and interned all soldiers of either army that entered her territory. Her peace was seriously threatened at one time during that war, but was saved through the conclusion of a triple treaty between England, France, and Prussia, by which the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed under the terms of the treaty of 1839.

* * * * *

For nearly fifteen years following the siege of Antwerp and the establishment of Belgium as an independent kingdom the general peace of Europe and America continued. Spain suffered to some extent from civil war; Don Carlos in April, 1833, declared himself the legitimate successor to the king, and the result was the Carlist war of that period, which continued with varying fortunes until the final overthrow of the pretender in 1839. In 1840, and the three succeeding years, there were various revolutionary movements in Spain, most of them resulting in bloodshed and some in hostilities of considerable magnitude, but in the final result the succession to the throne was not disturbed, and Spain suffered no loss, or made no increase, of territory.

Russia was at peace with her European neighbors. Her impatient eyes were fixed upon Asia, and in 1839-40, she sent an expedition for the conquest of Khiva. It had a disastrous result, and for more than thirty years thereafter Khiva retained her independence in the midst of the desert sands of Central Asia.


In 1835 began the "opium war" between China and England, growing out of the proclamation of the Chinese emperor prohibiting the importation of the pernicious drug into his dominions. Opium was the chief source of revenue of the British in India, and consequently Eng-

land determined to foster her commerce regardless of the consequences to China or its people. The war continued until 1842, when the treaty of peace was signed in front of Nankin. By the terms of the treaty China paid an indemnity of \$21,000,000, opened the ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai to foreigners, and ceded the island of Hong Kong in perpetuity to England.

England in 1839 ventured upon the Afghan war, which, at first successful, terminated in disaster; of 3,849 soldiers and about 12,000 camp followers, composing the army of General Elphinstone, only one European (Dr. Brydon) and four natives succeeded in reaching the British lines. General Sale's brigade was less unfortunate, as it held Jelalabad until a fresh division could be sent from India to enable it to retire without being destroyed. The attempt of England upon Afghanistan ended in 1842. In the following year occurred the Scinde war, resulting in the annexation of Scinde to the British possessions; and in 1843, also, came the Gwalior war, in which the fortress of Gwalior, the "Gibraltar of the East," fell into British hands. In 1845 began the Sikh war, of which more will be said elsewhere.

In 1831-33 Mohammed Ali Pasha, the sultan's viceroy in Egypt, waged a war against Turkey in the effort to obtain complete independence. He conquered Syria and a great part of Asia Minor, and would have captured Constantinople if the great powers had not interfered to prevent the possible destruction of the Ottoman power in Europe. A similar war took place in 1839, in which Mohammed Ali Pasha fought to secure hereditary power. England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia interfered for the protection of Turkey and expelled the Egyptians from Syria; Mohammed Ali was made hereditary viceroy of Egypt, but his territory was reduced through the loss of nearly all that he had gained in the first war against Turkey.

During this period South America was the scene of a few revolutionary movements, resulting in skirmishes and small battles that had no material consequences to any but the parties immediately concerned. No changes of the maps occurred by reason of these disturbances, and they are not even worthy of mention by name in our chronicle of events.





CHAPTER VII.

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO—1847.


DURING three decades from the close of the war with Great Britain in 1812-15 the United States of America remained at peace with the rest of the world. In the early part of the third decade there was imminent danger of another conflict with Great Britain, growing out of a dispute about the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick; an appeal to arms was averted mainly through the efforts of General Winfield Scott, and the quarrel was effectually ended by the Ashburton treaty of 1842.

While this dispute with the mother country was in progress, another and more serious quarrel, so far as results were concerned, arose concerning our southwestern boundary. The present State of Texas was formerly a province of Mexico, having been ceded to Spain in 1819, before the separation of Mexico from the kingdom of Castile and Leon. Many American citizens settled in Texas while it was a Mexican possession, but owing to the difference in the laws of the two countries they earnestly desired to come under the protection of the United States flag. The United States endeavored to purchase the territory as far as the Rio del Norte, but the Mexican government rejected the proposal. In 1830 the Mexicans forbade further colonization of Texas by foreigners, but by this time the foreigners in Texas, chiefly Americans, far outnumbered the Mexican inhabitants. The bad state of feeling between Mexicans

and Americans grew into insurrection, and insurrection into revolution.

By the beginning of 1835 Texas and Mexico were at war; the former fighting for independence, and the latter endeavoring to reduce its alleged subjects to a proper acknowledgment of the Mexican authority. Several battles were fought during the year, and by the victory of San Antonio de Bexar, December 10th, the whole armed force of the Mexicans was driven from Texas, which ten days later made a declaration of independence. The expulsion of the Mexicans was only temporary; early in 1836 General Santa Anna came with an army of seven thousand five hundred men well provided with provisions, artillery, and military stores, and late in February he invested the Alamo, a strong fort near San Antonio, garrisoned by Captain Travis and one hundred and seventy-two men. The Alamo was besieged for eleven days and then carried by storm; the whole garrison was slaughtered, only a woman, a child, and a servant being spared. The massacre at the Alamo, together with the massacre of Colonel Fannin's command at Goliad, March 27th, in violation of the terms of surrender, roused the Texans to a high state of excitement, and they would listen to nothing short of complete independence of Mexico.

Near the end of April was fought the battle of San Jacinto, in which the Mexicans were defeated with heavy loss and General Santa Anna was made a prisoner. This battle virtually ended the war for Texan independence, which was acknowledged by the United States in 1837, and by France, England, Holland, and Belgium in 1839-40. Between 1841 and 1843 Mexico sent several marauding expeditions into Texas; the Texans attempted reprisals by three expeditions, which were unsuccessful, many of those who participated being captured and executed. After considerable negotiation, Texas was



annexed to the United States in 1845, and this annexation led to a war between the United States and Mexico. The war began in 1845 and ended in 1848, the result being highly favorable to the armies of the former country and proportionally disastrous to those of the latter.

Hostilities did not actually begin until March, 1846, when General Zachary Taylor's army crossed the Nueces and marched in the direction of the Rio Grande. Mexico denied that Texas extended to the Rio Grande, and persisted in regarding the Nueces as the boundary. When, therefore, General Taylor crossed the latter river the movement was considered by the Mexicans an act of war, and they made immediate preparations for resisting the advance of the enemy. Taylor's advance was a series of almost uninterrupted successes, and in the early part of 1847 Northern Mexico lay at his feet. The American flag floated over the fortress of Monterey, and the Mexican army, four times the strength of its opponents, had been defeated at Buena Vista. To complete the conquest it was necessary to move upon the capital, a work which was intrusted to General Winfield Scott, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

On the 6th of March, 1847, the army destined for the advance to the city of Mexico was concentrated near Vera Cruz. It comprised the then standing army of the United States—four regiments of artillery, eight of infantry, one of mounted riflemen, and detachments of dragoons, besides eight volunteer regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. General Scott commanded in person, with Generals Worth, Twiggs, and Patterson as his brigadiers. Under the last named were Generals Quitman, Pillow, and Shields, who were destined to make their names known before the end of the campaign. The first step in advancing upon the city of Mexico was to capture Vera Cruz, which was defended by the fortress of San Juan d'Uloa, a fortress built on a reef in front of the city

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and having full command of the harbor. The fortress was considered by the Mexicans to be impregnable; it mounted one hundred and twenty-eight guns of various calibres, and its walls were regarded as proof against any shot or shell the Americans could throw against it. On the land side the city was defended by walls mounting ninety guns, and so sure were the Mexicans of their ability to resist attack, that they neglected to provision the fortress and city for a siege, and also neglected to send away women, children, and other non-combatants. The American troops landed without opposition about three miles from the city and out of range of the guns, and immediately prepared for the siege. By the evening of the 12th of March the place was completely invested by the troops, and the work of landing the siege artillery was pushed as rapidly as possible.

By the 22d every thing was ready, and then General Scott sent a summons to General Morales, the commander of the Mexican forces at Vera Cruz, to surrender the city and the fortress. Immediately on receiving a refusal, General Scott opened fire from his batteries, which had been erected at a distance of eleven hundred yards. A steady cannonade was maintained all through the night and the next day. It was found that the batteries were too light and too far away for breaching purposes, and on the night of the 23d a new battery considerably nearer the city was constructed and made ready to open fire in the morning. The value and importance of the new battery was evident in a few hours after fire was opened. The walls were crumbling, and the American guns had such perfect range of the city that the whole place was covered by a destructive fire. By the 26th there was a practicable breach, and the troops for the assault had already been told off when a white flag appeared on the walls, and soon afterwards the fortress and the city were under the domination of the

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invaders. Officers and men were paroled not to serve during the war unless exchanged; the officers retained their side-arms, but the muskets of the rank and file were piled in front of the conquerors. All public property of every name and kind was handed over with the surrendered place.

Nearly two weeks were required to get the army in readiness for an advance into the interior, which was led on the 8th of April by General Twiggs. The Mexicans were severely defeated, and their army was cut up and routed at Cerro Gordo, where Scott lost a total of four hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded out of a force of eighty-five hundred of all arms. The Mexicans left upwards of a thousand men dead on the field of battle. La Hoya, Perote, and Puebla were occupied with little opposition, and at Puebla General Scott waited for reinforcements, which arrived during June and July. Early in August, with a force of not quite eleven thousand men, he advanced towards the valley of Mexico, leaving Colonel Childs with a garrison of eleven hundred men to hold Puebla. General Twiggs led the column with his division, which found the ascent of the Cordilleras very difficult; on the third day of the march the division reached the crest of the ridge and looked down into the valley of Mexico, where the soldiers camped that night on the borders of Lake Chalco.

The delay of General Scott on the road from Vera Cruz had been utilized by the Mexicans under the leadership of Santa Anna, who had collected an army of 25,000 men to oppose and expel the invaders. The defences of the city had been strengthened, and all the natural advantages of its position were utilized. Between the American army and the city lay the lakes Xochimilco and Chalco, bordered by marshes which extended around the city on the west and south. The only approaches were by causeways, which had been fortified at several points; on the

north side of the lakes was the National Road dominated by El Peñon, a steep hill on which was a fort mounting fifty-one guns. On the southern side of the lakes there was a field of lava considered impassable by troops, in addition to fortified positions at San Antonio, San Angelo, and Churubusco, with an intrenched camp at Contreras, which commanded the southern causeways and must be passed before they could be reached. Beyond these positions were the castle of Chapultepec and the strong inclosure of Molino del Rey protecting the approach to the city gates. General Santa Anna had disposed his troops so that all the positions were strongly garrisoned, and his men outnumbered the Americans nearly three to one.

The engineers reported that the fortress on El Peñon would cost the loss of a third of the army to effect its capture. Reluctant to make this sacrifice, Scott decided to move to the south of the lakes, and, accordingly, sent General Worth in advance as far as San Augustin, about nine miles from the city, where lay the *pedregal*, a large field of lava which the Mexicans had considered impassable by the Americans. Two miles further on lay the fortified position of San Antonio, which commanded the route between the lake and the lava field, and about three miles distant was the entrenched camp of Contreras, held by General Valencia with a strong garrison and a heavy battery. Scott determined to attack on both sides, and sent Worth forward on the east while Pillow and Twiggs went to the west. The latter advanced over the fields of lava and thus astonished the Mexicans; the way was difficult for infantry and next to impossible for artillery, but Twiggs managed to get a couple of light batteries in position by two o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, with which he opened fire on the camp. His movement was supported by General Persifer Smith, who endeavored to turn the Mexican left, and so well was the plan carried out that Santa Anna, who was advancing to the relief of General

Valencia, was frightened into turning back. The ground was so broken that he could not ascertain the strength of the battle array that spread before him, and, believing it much larger than it really was, he made haste to retire in the direction of the city.

It rained during the night of the 19th of August, and the troops were encamped in the mud without fires. Early on the 20th operations were resumed, and before five o'clock in the morning the fortified camp of Contreras was in possession of the Americans. The only severe fighting was in the camp itself, where the Mexicans made a stout resistance before retiring. The American loss in killed, wounded, and missing was about one hundred men, while that of the Mexicans is thought to have been fifteen hundred killed and wounded. One thousand Mexican prisoners were taken, including four generals and eighty-eight officers of other grades. General Valencia escaped early in the battle, and was nowhere to be found.

After a brief halt to take breath, the army was again in motion in the direction of Churubusco, which Santa Anna considered the key to the city and was ready to defend with twenty-five thousand men. There was a massive stone convent in the village of Churubusco, which was surrounded by a field-work having embrasures and platforms for many cannon, and was the right point of the Mexican line. The walls of the convent were pierced for musketry, the parapets of the *azoteas* and windows afforded good positions for troops, and there was an abundance of ammunition stored in the building. Beyond the convent there extended a line of works, commanding the causeway of San Antonio and capable of a strong resistance. Happily for the Americans, the Mexicans were in great confusion at the time the former advanced, and only General Rincon's division, which held the convent and the position immediately around it, was ready for battle. The army which Santa Anna had led


back from San Angelo was forming along the river Churubusco and in the cornfields to the north, but as there was no expectation of a battle on that day, the Mexicans were practically taken by surprise. But in spite of their surprise and confusion, they made a vigorous defence; they outnumbered the Americans in the field fully five to one, and should have been invincible from their numbers and position. The incompetence of the officers and the inferior character of the Mexican weapons were the chief causes of their loss of the battle at Churubusco. Where properly handled, they showed that they were not deficient in bravery, and on several occasions during the battle they came very near defeating and repulsing their assailants.

Space is lacking to give in detail the movements at Churubusco, which resulted in victory to the American arms. According to General Santa Anna, the Mexican loss was ten thousand men, or one third of his army; one fourth of this number were prisoners, the rest killed or wounded. The American loss was over one thousand in killed and wounded, of whom seventy-nine were officers. General Scott might have marched against the city and captured it on the following morning, or even on that night, and taken possession before the Mexicans had recovered from the shock of their defeat. But he was anxious to shorten the war, and was told that Santa Anna wished to negotiate; he was furthermore assured that the occupation of the city would destroy the last chance of a peaceable settlement by rousing the national spirit throughout Mexico and causing the rush of many thousands to arms. The assurances to this effect came from neutral foreigners residing in Mexico, and Scott does not seem to have understood their interested motives for saving the city from occupation. He offered an armistice, which was eagerly accepted; it lasted more than a fortnight, and the time was vigorously utilized by the Mexi-

cans in making ready for the defence of the city. When it expired, Santa Anna was not quite ready and sought an extension, but the terms offered by General Scott were considered too onerous, and the campaign was renewed. Early in September the treachery of the Mexicans became apparent in a letter from Santa Anna to General Scott, and on the 7th of that month preparations for another conflict were under way.


The American forces were distributed as follows during the armistice: Worth occupied Tacubaya, Pillow was at Mixcoac, and Twiggs near San Angelo, while Quitman remained at Tlalpam. It had been suggested to General Scott that there was a cannon foundry in operation at Molino del Rey or the King's Mill. Worth was therefore instructed to take possession of it, which was thought to be an easy task. Afterwards, if successful there, he could try an assault on Chapultepec, the southern fort of Mexico. An examination of Molino del Rey showed that the proposed attack would not be successful without a reinforcement of artillery. The Molino consisted of a range of massive stone buildings with crenellated walls and parapeted roofs, commanded by the plunging fire of Chapultepec at a distance of three thousand feet. There was a smaller, but equally solid building, the *Casa Mata*, fifteen hundred feet to the west; it was surrounded by a bastioned field-work of a quadrangular shape. Between those two points was a battery of three small guns, and in front stretched a line of embankment with ditches. There were patches of maguey, which screened the Mexican force, numbering altogether more than four thousand fighting men, besides the cavalry corps of Álvarez, which was nearly four thousand strong.

Worth prepared for a vigorous assault on the Mexican centre, to be followed by attacks on either flank. To this end he assigned Major Wright to take the centre with five hundred men, Garland's brigade with two light pieces



taking position on the right to threaten the Molino and cut off support from Chapultepec. Clarke's brigade under McIntosh with three light pieces faced the Mexican right, which rested on the Casa Mata; still farther to the left a troop of cavalry was stationed to observe Álvarez, while Cadwalader's division stood in reserve behind the centre. This force amounting to three thousand five hundred men advanced during the night and took position along the clear and gently sloping ground in front of Molino del Rey, where they waited for the coming day. With its first faint gleam the artillery opens fire on the mill, and the whistling of balls and the crashing of masonry follow speedily. Not a shot comes from the Mexican lines, and the Americans begin to believe that the place is deserted. Wright's storming-party forms and rushes towards the point, where the central battery was supposed to be. Its position has been changed, however, and as they come within range it opens upon them with round shot and grape. The assailants pause, but only for an instant, and then rush upon it with the cry of "Forward!" Once more comes a shower of shot that mows a fearful swath, disabling, of officers alone, eleven out of seventeen. But there is no further halt. The remnant gains the batteries. There is a brief struggle, hand-to-hand, and the guns are seized, ready to be turned against the Mexicans.

It is now daylight. Colonel Echeagaraz of the third light infantry observes the danger; the garrison discharges a well-aimed volley on the storming-party, and then rallying hurls back the assailants in disorder and reoccupies the battery. Worth is equally prompt. He orders forward three companies of the light battalion and a part of the reserve to support and rally the shattered column. Garland moves from under the plunging fire of Chapultepec upon the Mexican flank, while his battery pushes forward to enfilade the recaptured point. Once more the Americans charge simultaneously from centre and right, under



a raking volley of balls and bullets, especially from the roofs. Their numbers and impetus prevail. They reach the walls and begin almost unmolested to batter the gates. The southern gate gives way and some men spring in, while others climb the roof and assist in gaining the north-western entrance. The Mexicans stoutly dispute the passage, but in a little while they waver and fall back, closely pressed by the Americans, who force them into flight or surrender. But for some time the result of the battle was doubtful, as the operations on the left were not successful.

McIntosh's brigade and Duncan's battery had advanced to within six hundred yards of the Mexican lines when the fire first opened on the storming-party. Duncan opened fire with his guns and cannonaded the Mexican troops, who soon ceased their fire upon his immediate front and retired into Casa Mata and surrounding works. Duncan was then ordered to cease firing and McIntosh's brigade went forward for the assault. The Mexicans opened fire which was so well directed that the advance was checked when the Americans were within thirty yards of the walls of Casa Mata. McIntosh fell mortally wounded, Lieut.-Col. Martin Scott who succeeded him was shot dead, Major Waite was disabled, the men fell by platoons and companies, and there was great confusion. The remnants of the brigades held on till the order to fall back and rally on the battery was given. Although one third the advancing force had fallen, many of the officers refused to obey the order, as they did not know from whom it proceeded. The retreat consequently became greatly disordered and during it the enemy added greatly to the number of killed and wounded.

Instead of following up their advantages and turning the retreat of the Americans into a rout, the Mexicans directed their attention to the flank of the assailants of Molino del Rey. They were stopped by Cadwalader's reserve which came up just in time. It was now broad daylight, and

Colonel Duncan had observed a threatening movement on the left. Santa Anna had ordered Álvarez to move down on the American flank with his whole force. With a cloud of cavalry in advance, Álvarez came on and was met by the fire of Duncan's battery, which opened upon the Mexicans within easy range. The cavalry halted, and after a few discharges of the American guns had ploughed their ranks they were thrown into confusion and retreated. Major Sumner came up with his dragoons to accelerate the Mexican retirement; before the dragoons had completed their formation for a charge the Mexicans were in full retreat towards the Hacienda Morales. A twenty-four-pounder which had been sent up by Worth continued a smart fire upon the Mexicans until they were out of range. The dragoons held their position on the left till the end of the action. As soon as the Mexicans were out of range Duncan's guns were turned upon Casa Mata and the enemy's troops around it. Under their fire the place was soon abandoned, General Perez commencing his retreat by the right as the fall of Molino del Rey had cut off his direct communication with Chapultepec. His line of retreat kept him under the fire of Duncan's guns, which inflicted a severe loss upon his troops. With the fall of the Casa Mata the battle of Molino del Rey was ended and the Americans were in full possession of the field.

But while they were exulting over their victory a Mexican column, under General Barragan, advanced with the evident intention of retaking the Molino; it was met by a heavy fire from the American guns, together with some that had been captured from the Mexicans, and very soon the Mexican column gave way and fled in disorder. A little later another Mexican force advanced in the direction of Casa Mata, but this, like the other column, was checked by the American artillery and a heavy volley from the infantry. As the Mexicans retreated, the Americans followed them several hundred yards along the road.

Molino del Rey was untenable under the plunging fire of Chapultepec, and General Scott sent orders for the troops to fall back. Worth, Pillow, and other general officers favored an assault upon Chapultepec before the Mexicans had recovered from their disorder consequent upon the events of the day, but General Scott positively refused to permit it. Inside of the Molino were found a few old moulds for cannon, but nothing to indicate that the place had been recently used as a cannon foundry. In the Casa Mata a large quantity of ammunition was found; a few wagon loads were removed, and orders were given to destroy the rest. The force of the explosion was miscalculated and resulted in the destruction of Captain Armstrong and some ten or twelve soldiers who were in the vicinity of the building. The battle was the most hotly contested of any battle of the war, and the proportionate loss of officers and men engaged was very great. The force in the field was 3,447, of which number 787 were killed or wounded, including 59 officers. The casualties included nearly one third the officers and one fourth the rank and file, a conclusive proof that officers and men did their whole duty. The loss to the enemy was estimated to exceed two thousand; about one half this number were prisoners, and the remainder killed and wounded.

Though a brilliant feat of arms, the battle of Molino del Rey was barren of results, as the place was immediately abandoned in consequence of the plunging fire from Chapultepec. No visible advantage was gained, and notwithstanding the loss that had been sustained the capture of the capital city was apparently no nearer than before the battle. It was the first battle in the war without immediate advantages resulting from it, and the first where the field gained had been immediately abandoned to the enemy. The event caused much gloom in the American camp, and many were the fears that it would

encourage the Mexicans to make a more sturdy defence of the city than had hitherto been expected.

From the 8th to the 12th of September the time was passed in preparing for the assault of Chapultepec and in reconnoitring the enemy's position. It was difficult to decide which side was most favorable for attack. The majority of the officers favored the southern side against the comparatively unknown lines of the west. The newly finished defences, however, decided Scott for the western approaches and especially for the hill fortress, as he believed that its capture would materially hasten the surrender of the capital. Gen. Twiggs was accordingly ordered to begin the demonstration against the east with two batteries, while Pillow and Quitman, supported by a portion of Worth's forces, took up a position to the west and south of Chapultepec, and erected four batteries with which to open fire upon the castle at daybreak on the 13th.


Chapultepec is a picturesque hill whose fame has descended in the dim traditions of the Aztecs, and in later days has been consecrated to royalty. The northern side is inaccessibly steep ; the east and south are a little better, and there is a practicable slope only on the western side. At a height of one hundred and sixty feet the summit spreads into a nearly level table six hundred feet in length, and surmounted along the northern edge by a heavy but not ungraceful building. This building is the citadel, protected by ten pieces of artillery. The slopes of the hill were provided with walls, and on the west with ditches, mines, and a midway redan. The exterior fringe of the grove at the western fort was protected by an embankment with a ditch and redan facing the Molino del Rey.

Pillow took possession of the unoccupied mill at dawn, on the 12th, under an ineffective fusillade from the grove, and at the same time the eastern batteries opened fire. A

severe cannonading was directed on the garrison, which silenced several of their guns. A fearful fight followed, which did not cease until darkness came again. Gen. Scott ordered an assault both by Pillow and Quitman, led by two picked storming-parties of two hundred and fifty men each, at daybreak on the 13th.

With the dawn, the cannonade recommenced, both from the batteries planted against Chapultepec, and from Steptoe's guns, which were served against the southern defences of the city in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the real attack. At 8 A.M. the firing from the former ceased, and the attack commenced. Quitman advanced along the Tacubaya road, and Pillow from the Molino del Rey, which he had occupied the previous evening. Between the castle and the Molino del Rey there was an open space, and then a grove, densely planted with trees. Mexican sharp-shooters had been posted among the trees, and they were further protected by an intrenchment on the edge of the grove. General Pillow sent Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone with a party of riflemen to turn this position by a flank movement; it was handsomely accomplished, and just as the riflemen broke through the redan, Pillow, with the main body, charged it in front and forced the Mexicans away from it. Having gained possession of the grove, Pillow advanced to the base of the rock; as the Mexican fire from the batteries of the castle, crashing among the trees, seemed far more terrible than it really was, and greatly disturbed the troops of Pillow's column. The Mexicans had retired to a redoubt half-way up the side of the hill; the riflemen sprang up from rock to rock, discharging irregular volleys as they pressed on, and were followed by Hooker, Chase, and others, with detachments of infantry.

In a very short time the redoubt was gained, the garrison was driven up the hill towards the castle, and Pillow's men were pressing them closely. As the latter



came in range of the castle, the firing was very severe. Colonel Ransom, of the Ninth, was killed, and General Pillow was wounded. But the troops advanced steadily till they gained the crest of the hill. At this point there was some delay, as the scaling ladders had not arrived, but during the delay two of Quitman's regiments and Clarke's brigade reinforced the storming party. As soon as the ladders came, the men rushed forward with them, jumped into the ditch, and planted the ladders for the assault on the castle. Lieutenant Selden was the first man to mount. The Mexicans concentrated all their energies to repel this final attack. A furious and well-aimed fire dashed the foremost of the stormers into the ditch, killing Lieutenants Rogers and Smith, and clearing the ladders of the men that were ascending. A new storming-party advanced and mounted the ladders, and, after a short struggle, Captain Howard, of the voltigeurs, gained a footing on the parapet. McKenzie of the forlorn hope followed him, and close behind came a swarm of voltigeurs and infantry, who, with loud shouts and cheers, dashed in upon the garrison with the bayonet.

Almost simultaneously with the work just described, Johnstone, of the voltigeurs, who had led a small party round to the gate of the castle, broke it open, and forced an entrance in the face of a furious fire from the southern walls. The two parties united, and then followed a furious conflict inside the building. The stormers were frenzied by the remembrance of the murder of their wounded comrades at Molino del Rey, and at first they showed no quarter. The Mexicans were bayoneted or shot without any heed to their appeals for mercy. Many flung themselves over the parapet and down the hill-side, and were dashed to death against the rocks. Others fought with the fury of desperation, expending their last breath in maledictions, and dying in the act of aiming shots or blows upon their assailants. Streams of blood

flowed through the doors of the college, and every room and passage was the scene of a deadly struggle. After a time the officers succeeded in putting an end to the conflict, and the remaining Mexicans having surrendered, the stars and stripes were hoisted over the castle of Chapultepec by Major Seymour.

While this was going on General Quitman had stormed the batteries on the causeway to the east of the castle, and after a desperate struggle, in which Major Twiggs, who commanded the storming party, was shot dead at the head of his men, the Mexicans retreated toward the city. General Scott joined Quitman in person and ordered a simultaneous advance on the city, along the two roads leading from Chapultepec to San Cosme and Belen gates. Worth was to command the attack on the San Cosme gate, and Quitman the attack on the Belen gate. Both were prepared for defence by barricades, and behind these barricades the Mexicans were posted in strong force. Fortunately for the assailants there was an aqueduct, supported on arches of solid masonry, along the middle of each causeway. Keeping under cover of these arches, and springing quickly from one to another, Smith's rifles and the South Carolina regiment managed to advance close to the first barricade on the Belen road with little loss, and pour in a destructive fire on the Mexicans defending it. A flanking fire from Duncan's guns added greatly to the discomfiture of the Mexicans, and the barricade was carried. Without halting more than to take breath, Quitman advanced in the same manner on the garita San Belen, which was held by General Torres with a strong garrison. Quitman's men stormed the garita, though met by a heavy fire of grape and canister, and then advanced toward the citadel.

Just as they did so General Santa Anna rode rapidly down to where the Mexicans were defending themselves. Furiously angry at the success of the Americans, he struck

General Torres in the face, threw a strong force of infantry into the houses commanding the garita and the road, ordered the batteries in the citadel to open fire, brought up some additional guns to the Paseo, and so decidedly enthused his followers that Quitman's advance was completely stopped. A terrific storm of shot, shell, and grape was poured on the garita, where Captain Dunn had placed an eight-pounder. Twice the gunners were shot down, but their places were promptly taken by others. Then Dunn himself fell, and immediately afterward Lieutenant Benjamin and his first sergeant met the same fate. The riflemen in the arches repelled sallies of the Mexicans, but Quitman's position was one of much danger. He maintained it, however, until night caused a cessation of the fighting.

Worth in the meantime had advanced in the same way along the San Cosme causeway, forcing the Mexicans from one barricade to another, until he was within two hundred and fifty yards of the garita of San Cosme. There he encountered quite as severe a fire as that which stopped Quitman, but he was determined to carry out Scott's orders to take the garita. Sending Garland's brigade to the right, and Clarke's to the left, he ordered them to break into the houses, burst through the walls, and bore their way to the flanks of the garita. The plan had succeeded perfectly at Monterey and was equally successful in this instance. Slowly but steadily the sappers pushed along from house to house, until at sunset they had reached the point desired. Then Worth ordered the attack. Lieutenant Hunt brought up a light gun and fired it through the embrasure of the enemy's battery, with its muzzle almost against that of the Mexican gun. The infantry at the same moment opened a furious and quite unexpected fire from the roofs and houses, and McKenzie, at the head of the stormers, dashed at the battery, and carried it with very little loss. The Mexicans

considered further defence useless, and fled precipitately into the city.

At eight o'clock that evening a council of war was held at the citadel to consider the situation. Santa Anna demonstrated that the army was wholly demoralized, and that the citadel would soon be battered down, and perhaps the entire city, burying in its ruins thousands of non-combatant inhabitants. Accordingly the council decided to evacuate the city. The cavalry, four thousand strong, was at once sent away through the northern gate, and five thousand infantry followed after midnight. The militia and irregulars were disbanded. About one o'clock on the morning of the 14th a deputation from the city council arrived at General Worth's head-quarters whence they were sent to General Scott, at Tacubaya, of whom they demanded guaranties for life and property. Scott refused to bind himself to any terms, except such as were imposed by honor and the customs of civilized warfare. General Worth hastened to affirm this position by advancing at daylight to the Alameda. Quitman received a white flag from the citadel, which he immediately occupied, and then marched to the central square and hoisted the stars and stripes above the palace. Scott made his entry during the forenoon. The city received the Americans with chilling silence and many scowls and frowns. A shot was fired at General Worth, and was followed by others; immediately the artillery was ordered forward, and the troops charged upon the crowds and stormed the dwellings whence the shots came. The confusion grew into a panic and many families fled from the city. The firing continued throughout the day and Scott threatened to level the city. The Mexicans surrendered the next morning.

The loss of the Americans in the valley campaign was something more than two thousand seven hundred killed and wounded. This heavy reduction of a force of eleven thousand indicates a stout resistance on the part of

the Mexicans, whose loss exceeded seven thousand altogether. Their failure to repel the invaders was largely due to bad generalship, which permitted the unopposed advance of the Americans across the mountains and around Chalco Lake, and depended too much on the expectation that the enemy would fall into traps and go exactly into the positions the Mexicans desired. Another thing to be considered is their defective organization, the rawness of the troops, and the inferior arms with which they fought. These circumstances add to the glory of the defence at Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, which were certainly well defended.

After the capture of the capital city there were no military operations of any consequence. General Scott asked for reinforcements, which were sent forward slowly, and there was some difficulty in maintaining communication along the road to Vera Cruz in consequence of the activity of guerillas. Negotiations for peace were pushed, and on the 20th of February, 1848, the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed. By the terms of the treaty the territories of New Mexico and Upper California were ceded to the United States, and Mexico relinquished all claim to Texas, or the country east of the Rio Grande. In consideration of the vast area of land given up to the United States, the latter country was to pay fifteen millions of dollars to Mexico, and in addition was to pay the claims of American citizens upon Mexico, amounting to five millions more. There were some minor stipulations concerning grants of lands by Mexico within the ceded territories and Texas, and others relating to protection against Indians on the boundary, but they did not interfere with the general terms of the treaty. Soon after the ratification of the treaty the American troops were withdrawn from Mexico, and the stars and stripes were hoisted over the newly acquired regions, which have since become an important part of the United States.



CHAPTER VIII.


BATTLE OF GUJERAT—1849.


ONE of the bravest and most powerful nationalities of the many races and nations of India, during the early half of the present century, was that of the Sikhs. Like most other Oriental nations, they owe their origin to religious belief, the word "Sikh" signifying "Disciple." The founder of their faith was a Hindoo named Nanek, who was born about the middle of the fifteenth century of the Christian era. His father intended him for a merchant, but he felt an irresistible longing for religious studies, which resulted in an uncontrollable dislike to the Hindoo, the Moslem, and the Bhuddist forms of worship. He taught the unity of God, the equality of all in the sight of heaven, and inculcated universal kindness, charity, and forbearance among men. He rejected the distinctions of caste, the burning of widows, and all other peculiar features of the Hindoo religion, and at the same time rejected the sensual paradise and devout observances of the followers of Mohammed. The progress of the new faith was steady, though in its early history it met with much opposition; for four centuries the Sikhs contended with the enemies that surrounded them, and gradually increased their power over the neighboring states. They were emphatically a soldier race, and in the early part of the present century, under the leadership of Runjeet Singh, "The Lion of the Punjaub" the Sikh Confederacy

included a population of seven million, with an army of eighty thousand men, possessing three hundred guns.

It must not be supposed that this army was of the ordinary character of Oriental forces in general. On the contrary, it had been carefully drilled by French and Italian officers, so that it was in a high state of efficiency even when judged by the European standard. In addition to this regular force the whole country contained a warrior people, and with its entire strength called out, it could put more than a quarter of a million fighting men in the field. The Sikhs are tall, robust, brave, and full of military ardor; they are the best native soldiers in Asia, and would be more than a match for any other native troops which the cradle of the world could bring to oppose them. In the cavalry and artillery arms they are particularly distinguished, but this remark should not lead the reader to infer that they are inefficient as infantry. Their country is known as the Punjaub (Land of the Five Rivers), and it has been celebrated through many centuries for its richness and fertility. The rivers from which it takes its name are the Indus, Jhelum, Ravee, Chenab, and Sutlej. These rivers with their tributaries are available for purposes of irrigation over a wide extent of country, whose capital is Lahore, and chief city Umritzur. In the time of Runjeet Singh, the province of Lahore contained four million inhabitants, Mooltan one million four hundred thousand; Cashmere, six hundred thousand; and portions of Afghanistan which that fierce warrior had subdued had a population of at least one million.

The British government in India, realized that it had a dangerous neighbor on the north, but during the lifetime of Runjeet Singh there was no disturbance, and the British were on the most friendly terms with "The Lion of the Punjaub." His army clamored to be led against the English, but the clamor was totally disregarded by the





ruler who dreaded the power of the British arms, and knew that his best way to conquest was one that would not interfere with the Europeans. In 1838 he began negotiations for a closer alliance with the British, but died before they were concluded. His death was followed by a weak and distracted rule which bordered upon anarchy; the demand of the Sikhs to be led against the English became steadily more and more fierce, and at length led to open warfare.

The Sikhs in 1845 invaded British territory, and thus brought on what is known in history as the first Sikh war. They crossed the Sutlej, which had been established by treaty as the boundary, and on the 14th of December attacked the British at Ferozepore. The place contained seven thousand five hundred men, and the Sikh army numbered nearly sixty thousand. Had the Sikhs made an immediate attack, Ferozepore must have fallen, but they contented themselves with intrenching within a safe distance of the fort and detaching twenty thousand men to meet the British column that was advancing to reinforce the garrison of Ferozepore. It was well for the British that Runjeet Singh was in his grave and not commanding the invading army.

The column of twenty thousand Sikhs was encountered and defeated by fourteen thousand British troops at Moodkee. The Sikhs lost heavily in men, and among the spoils of battle were seventeen guns which they were forced to abandon. The British army remained in camp for two days, until joined by reinforcements from the south, and then advanced upon the Sikh camp, having previously arranged for the division in Ferozepore to join at a point opposite the Sikh camp. The battle that followed was favorable to the British, but it was desperately contested by the Sikhs, and for a long time the result was doubtful. The Sikh army retreated and recrossed the

Sutlej. When the retreat began, the British artillery ammunition was exhausted, and that of the infantry very nearly so. The British cavalry and horse artillery were actually moving to seek the shelter of the intrenched camp at Ferozepore; the Sikhs supposed it was a movement to seize the fords of the river, and cut off their retreat, and hence came the panic which gave the battle to the British at a moment when all hope seemed lost.

For some time following this battle there were no active hostilities, but the interval was occupied by the British in bringing up all available forces till their strength exceeded thirty thousand, with abundant supplies of ammunition and stores. Late in January, 1846, occurred the battle of Aliwal, and on the 10th of February, the battle of Sobraon, where the Sikhs had an intrenched camp of thirty thousand men with one hundred and seventy guns. The camp was on both sides of the river, and connected by a bridge. The British attacked the camp on the south side, and were desperately resisted by the Sikhs, who inflicted a loss of nearly three thousand men on their assailants. The battle resulted in a British victory, and a loss to the Sikhs of ten thousand men and sixty-seven pieces of artillery, mostly of heavy calibre. The principal loss to the Sikhs was made during an attempt to retreat over the bridge, which was choked with people under the fire of the British guns. The river had risen seven inches during the night preceding the battle, and while it was easily fordable before the rising, thousands were drowned in the attempt to cross it when swollen.

The battle of Sobraon was followed by an appeal on the part of the Sikhs for peace, which was granted after the customary negotiations. By the treaty the whole of the territory between the rivers Beas and Sutlej was given up to the British, and the Sikhs paid a crore and a half of rupees (£1,500,000) as an indemnity for the expenses of

the war. All the guns which had been pointed at the British were given up, and the army was to be reorganized on the system that prevailed in the time of Runjeet Singh, and on a scale to be arranged in connection with the British government. The moderation of the British was a surprise to the Sikhs, who had expected the conquerors to take all they possessed, and leave them without a vestige of a government or any thing else. In common with most Orientals, they judged this moderation to proceed from fear, and therefore were encouraged to renew the struggle without great delay. In 1847 there were several manifestations of turbulence, and in 1848 it was plainly evident that war could not be long delayed. The British made preparations accordingly, and when the shock came they were far better prepared for it than at the outbreak of the first Sikh war.

On the 18th of April two English officials in Mooltan were set upon by a body of armed Sikhs and severely wounded; they were carried for safety to a small fort outside the citadel, but the Sikh garrison let in their assailants and the two men were murdered. There was then a general revolt, and the whole fortress of Mooltan, as well as the small fort where the murder took place, fell into the hands of the insurgents. This act precipitated the war, as the English took immediate steps to avenge the murder and accompanying insurrection. Several small battles took place, the rising among the Sikhs spread with great rapidity, they openly set up their standards, and declared their determination for independence, and in a few weeks they had a force of thirty thousand men ready for battle. The British concentrated their forces on the banks of the Chenab, and on the 21st November Lord Gough took command in person of an army of twenty thousand men. He immediately took the offensive by advancing on the Sikh camp, the orders being given to be

ready for marching on the morning of the 22d. The attack resulted in the repulse of the British with considerable loss, including three officers of high rank.

Both armies remained quiet for some time, each receiving reinforcements and preparing for another passage of arms. In January, 1849, Lord Gough determined to attack the Sikhs, and on the 12th of that month was fought the battle of Chillianwallah, which was practically a drawn battle, as neither side had any thing to boast of in consequence of it. The English were well advanced towards victory, when a sudden panic, one of those unaccountable occurrences in battles in all ages of the world's history, caused a confusion in the ranks; it led to the loss of all the artillery which had been wrested from the Sikhs earlier in the day, and, in addition, four guns were taken from the British. On the British side there was a loss of two thousand two hundred and sixty-nine in killed and wounded; the English assert that the Sikhs lost three thousand killed and four thousand wounded, but this assertion is open to question. The result was so unsatisfactory that Lord Gough was removed and replaced by Sir Charles Napier, but in the meantime he terminated the war with the battle of Gujerat, which is now to be considered.

The siege of Mooltan was ended by the surrender of its garrison, and the besieging force immediately moved to join the army of Lord Gough. With this and other additions to his strength he had twenty-five thousand men eager for battle; he was also stronger in artillery than were the Sikhs, as he had one hundred pieces to oppose to fifty-nine. The Sikhs, who were commanded by Shere Singh, had been recently reinforced until their number reached sixty thousand, but notwithstanding this numerical disparity, Lord Gough determined to attack them in the position they had chosen. Colonel Malleson puts the

actual fighting strength of the Sikhs at thirty-four thousand, and says they were encamped as follows:


Their centre was formed back of the town of Kalrá; their left on a small stream called Kátelah, which runs into the Chenab; and the Dwárah, another small stream of some width but nearly dry, protected their right. Not far from the Khoree Pass, in the rear, was the city of Gujerat. On a thorough examination of the position by Lord Gough and his staff, it was seen that it lacked strength. Nowhere did the right wing of the Sikh army offer serious resistance to men or artillery. The left wing on the Kátelah was even weaker than the rest of the position as it rested "*en l'air*"; in fact, on no side was there any serious protection against assault. It was decided, therefore, to strike at the left and centre of the Sikh position, and to force them back on their right.

To act upon this plan an advance of the heavy artillery, formed in his centre, was ordered by Lord Gough; the right wing, made up of the divisions of Gilbert and Whish, supported by the larger part of the field artillery, was also to move forward. After these should have doubled in the left and centre of the Sikh army, upon its right Campbell's and Dundas' divisions, forming the British left wing, were to come up and end the work. Then the cavalry reserve were to come in to make the disaster to the Sikhs irretrievable. The British line was to advance to the enemy's position by following the bank of the Dwárah. The British artillery, being much superior to the Sikh forces, both in the number of guns and their calibre, Lord Gough intended to delay the advance of his infantry to close quarters until the guns had been freely used. The British officers felt that a Pyrrhæan victory, as the hard-fought battle of Chillianwallah had proved only five weeks before, could not be afforded. The Sikhs as well as the British wished for a decisive battle and were entirely confident of victory.

Although Lord Gough was certainly an able leader, he had not that coolness in action which a Clive or a Wellesley displayed under similar circumstances. On the contrary, a battle so excited him that his well-formed plans were lost, and his sole aim was to attack with his infantry, disregarding entirely the service of cavalry and artillery.

At half-past seven in the morning of that remarkable day of February 21, 1849, the British army was ready to advance to battle. The morning was bright, and the advancing columns made very little dust. The camp of the Sikhs was sharply outlined against the snow-capped ranges of the Himaláya behind Gujerat. At the call of "Forward, march!" sounding swiftly down the line, the British advanced to meet their enemy. Shortly after passing the town of Hariwald, a halt of a few moments was made to re-form the lines and close the ranks. The Sikhs, seeing the British resting, opened with their artillery, but their fire did not reach the enemy's lines, for the distance was fully two thousand yards, or something more than a mile. The heavy guns of the British were used in return, but the range was too great to be effective. It was necessary to approach more closely, and again the British advanced.

Suddenly, out rode the British cavalry, dashing into the very muzzles of the Sikh guns in the face of a fierce storm of shot and shell. The horse artillery now followed them, unlimbering within short range, and discharging their volleys with great rapidity and with telling force into the Sikh lines. The effect of this artillery charge was so great that the Sikhs, unable to withstand the English fire, retired to occupy a position farther back, beyond the villages of Barra Kalrá and Chota Kalrá. General Gough ordered the storming of the villages by the infantry, and away started the two British divisions for the work, but the stubborn opposition of the Sikhs made the attempt



almost useless, and nearly resulted in a repulse. The Sikhs met the columns of the advancing British front to front, and inch by inch the British infantry made good its ground, until the first line gave way to fall back on the second. The British lost three hundred men in carrying the town of Barra Kalrá; and in the storming of Chota Kalrá, one half of the first brigade was killed or disabled, without counting the great loss of the horse artillery in aiding the assault. *One troop was nearly annihilated.*

Meanwhile Colonels Campbell and Douglas, commanding the left wing, kept carefully in line with the advance movement of the right, but in a manner much more cautious. They ordered their men to lie upon the ground when halted, and advancing by slow degrees they reached a point from which they could command the head of the Dwárah creek. In a few minutes the creek was cleared of the Sikh infantry, and the ground was occupied by Campbell, the loss of men being only trifling. This was the natural ending of the first part of the battle. The advance of the British had been made with success along the entire line. On the right two important positions had been won, while the enemy had been driven from the nullah, or dry rivulet, on which they were resting, by the operations of the left wing.

Lord Gough was confidently believing that the battle had been won, but such was far from being the case. The Sikhs, alert to observe a weak point or a false move of the enemy, quickly ascertained that the English, in swinging their left upon the right wing of the Sikhs to gain that ground, had left a great gap between their left and the centre. To rush in and make a passage through this gap was their opportunity, for their line of retreat was already seriously threatened. The Afghan cavalry had not only given way before a brave charge of the British,

but there was a brigade moving toward the Sikh rear. If the Sikhs could make their way through the British centre, the day might yet be turned in their favor. It was a desperate chance, but the only one. Forming their men in line, the Sikh leaders marched them forward for this forlorn attack—a brave stroke for success. The fate of the day was hanging in the balance.

The probability as well as the danger of this movement had been weighed by the English commander. He had ordered up two companies of horse artillery, but as they went into position it was discovered that they were out of ammunition. Time was lost in sending to the rear for a fresh supply. The silence of the British artillery gave courage to the Sikhs, and had it not happened that the officer nearest the gap was a ready leader, a cool-headed, watchful soldier, and a man of great resources, India might have been wrested from English hands by this one movement. Colonel Campbell perceived the great peril of the situation, and promptly directed the fire of a part of his artillery on the advancing Sikhs. The latter at once realized that the advance could not be continued except at the risk of their flank being exposed to the full fire of Campbell's artillery. This was more than they could stand, and they retreated in sore dismay, protected by their cavalry. They did so not a moment too soon, for the English right wing was already hemming them in. No alternative remained but to leave the field to the British.

By one o'clock Lord Gough had routed the Sikh army, crowding it in large and disorganized masses upon a line of retreat which, if rightly followed up, gave no chance to the discouraged fugitives of support or escape. And it was followed up with great vigor. Cavalry and horse artillery were despatched in pursuit, and followed as closely as possible by the wearied infantry. During all the rest

of the day the defeated army suffered all the terrors of almost continuous attacks. It could not retain its cohesion under the strain, and the country for miles around was filled with scattered and fleeing Sikhs, and covered with guns, cattle, carts, tents, and standards left in the haste of a wild flight. At last night came on and the pursuit was ended twelve miles beyond Gujerat. The victory of the British was complete.

Fifty-seven guns, thirty-two standards, and the whole Sikh camp with ammunition and baggage fell into the hands of the British. The loss to the British was ninety-two killed and six hundred and eighty-two wounded ; that of the Sikhs was estimated at five or ten times the British loss, in addition to the destruction and dispersal of an army of sixty thousand men.

Early next morning Lord Gough despatched a force of fifteen thousand men, consisting of horse and foot artillery, some infantry, and all the cavalry, to intercept the flight of the Sikhs through the Khorree Pass towards the Jhelum. But the Sikhs, to the number of nine thousand, with ten guns, had already got through the pass ; the British followed, and when they reached the Jhelum Shere Singh made proposals for surrender. He was informed that nothing short of unconditional surrender would be accepted, and accordingly he laid down his arms and his men became prisoners of war. The surrender occurred on the 12th of March, near Horrmuck. Nearly ten thousand soldiers gave themselves up, the rest of those who survived the battle having fled to their homes. Forty-one guns were surrendered, including those taken by the Sikhs at Chillianwallah. The British authorities gave each man a rupee for his expenses to his home, and the cavalry were allowed to retain their horses, which were their own property ; but all the arms, ammunition, standards, and all other materials of war were retained by the British.


The repeated acts of insubordination of the Sikh soldiery and the evident and serious risks to which they had exposed the British power in India, determined the governor-general to put a final end to them. On the 29th of March a proclamation was issued which recounted how the long peace and alliance which had been in force between the two governments had been twice broken through the treachery of the Sikh troops. Consequently, it had become necessary, the proclamation stated, to declare "the kingdom of the Punjaub at an end, and that all the territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh are now and henceforth a portion of the British empire in India." The proclamation promised due honor to the Maharajah and the few chiefs who had not engaged in hostilities against the British, and guaranteed to all the people, whether Mussulman, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of their own religion, but forbade any one to interfere with that of another.


The Sikhs accepted the inevitable, and submitted gracefully to the superior power of the British. The event made less excitement in Hindostan than in England, where the greatness of the addition to the British empire in India by the conquest of the Punjaub was appreciated at its full value. Since that time the Sikh soldiers have proved themselves the best and most faithful of all the Asiatics serving under the English banners in India. During the mutiny of 1857, they remained to a man loyal, and their splendid fighting qualities undoubtedly saved to Great Britain her possessions in the Indian peninsula, or at any rate preserved her from any serious reverses.

At present, the population of the Punjaub is not far from twenty-three million, additions having been made to the original territory. The country is one of the richest and most prosperous of all the Indian possessions of Great Britain, and covers an area of nearly two hundred thou-

sand square miles. In the north the whole surface is traversed by spurs from the Himaláyas enclosing deep valleys, while in the south the country is unbroken by any important elevation with the exception of the Salt Range of mountains, about two thousand feet high, between the Indus and the Jhelum. Since its annexation by the British the Punjaub has progressed more rapidly than in any similar period of its history, and its agricultural and manufacturing products are known throughout the civilized world.









CHAPTER IX.

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN, AND FALL OF SEBASTOPOL—1855.

THE Crimea was conquered by Russia in the time of Catharine the Great, and immediately after the conquest the Russians began to fortify the harbor of Sebastopol (Sacred City). When they went there they found a miserable Tartar village called Akhtiar; they created one of the finest naval and military posts in the world, and built a city with broad streets and handsome quays and docks. In 1850 it had a population of about fifty thousand, which included many soldiers and marines, together with workmen employed in the government establishments.

In that year there was a dispute between France and Russia relative to the custody of the holy places in Palestine; there had been a contention concerning this matter for several centuries, in which sometimes the Greek Church and sometimes the Latin had the advantage. In 1850, at the suggestion of Turkey, a mixed commission was appointed to consider the dispute upon it.

The Porte, as the Turkish government is officially designated, issued in March, 1852, a decree that the Greek Church should be confirmed in the rights it formerly held, and that the Latins could not claim exclusive possession of any of the holy places. It allowed them to have a key to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, and to certain other buildings of minor importance.

France accepted the decision, though she did not like it; Russia continued to demand that the Latin monks


should be deprived of their keys, and finally insisted that the Czar should have a protectorate over the Greek Christians in Turkey. The Porte said such a protectorate would interfere with its own authority, and refused the demand ; thereupon the Russian Minister left Constantinople on the 21st of May, 1853.

This may be considered the beginning of the war between Russia and Turkey, though there was no fighting for several months.

France came to the aid of Turkey ; England came to the aid of Turkey and France. Representatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia met at Vienna and agreed upon a note which Russia accepted ; Turkey demanded modifications which Russia refused ; Turkey declared war against Russia on the 5th of October, and Russia declared war against Turkey on the 1st of November.

A Turkish fleet of twelve ships was lying at Sinope, a port on the southern shore of the Black Sea. On the 30th of November the Russians sent a fleet of eleven ships from Sebastopol which destroyed the Turkish fleet, all except one ship that carried the news to Constantinople. Then the allied fleets of the French and English entered the Black Sea, and the war began in dead earnest. For some months it was confined to the Danubian principalities and to the Baltic Sea. On the 14th of September, 1854, the allied army landed at Eupatoria, in the Crimea, and the extent of their preparations will be understood when it is known that forty thousand men, with a large number of horses and a full equipment of artillery, were put on shore in a single day !

On the 20th of September the battle of the Alma was fought by fifty-seven thousand English, French, and Turkish troops, against fifty thousand Russians. The battle began at noon, and four hours later the Russians were defeated and in full retreat. The Russians lost five



thousand men, and the Allies about three thousand four hundred. The Allies might have marched into Sebastopol with very little resistance, but their commanders were uncertain as to the number of troops defending the city, and hesitated to make the attempt.

On the 17th of October the siege began. A grand attack was made by the Allies, but was unsuccessful, and eight days later the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava was made. On the 5th of November the Russians attacked the Allies at Inkerman, and were repulsed. The battle of Inkerman was fought in a fog by forty thousand Russians against fifteen thousand French and English. The latter had the advantage of position and weapons. The Allies frankly credited the Russian troops with the greatest bravery in returning repeatedly to the attack as their battalions were mowed down by the steady fire of the defenders.

During the winter the siege was pushed, and the allied army suffered greatly from cholera, cold, and sickness. The siege continued during spring and summer; the Allies made an unsuccessful attack on the Malakoff and Redan forts on the 18th of June, 1855, and all through the long months there were daily conflicts between the opposing armies.

The Russians sunk several ships of their fleet in the harbor of Sebastopol soon after the battle of the Alma, but retained others for possible future use. On the 8th of September the French captured the Malakoff fort, the English at the same time making an unsuccessful attack on the Redan. The fall of these forts was followed by the evacuation of Sebastopol, the objective point of the war, and was therefore the decisive event of the campaign.

An incident of the siege, though forming no part of its military history, has been so admirably told by Bayard Taylor, that it is worthy of repetition in this narrative. It is as follows:

THE SONG OF THE CAMP.

"Give us a song!" the soldiers cried,
The outer trenches guarding,
When the heated guns of the camps allied
Grew weary of bombarding.

The dark Redan, in silent scoff,
Lay, grim and threatening under;
And the tawny mound of the Malakoff
No longer belched its thunder.

There was a pause. The guardsman said:
"We storm the forts to-morrow;
Sing while we may, another day
Will bring enough of sorrow."

They lay along the battery's side,
Below the smoking cannon:
Brave hearts from Severn and from Clyde,
And from the banks of Shannon.

They sang of love, and not of fame;
Forgot was Britain's glory:
Each heart recalled a different name,
But all sang "Annie Laurie."

Voice after voice caught up the song,
Until its tender passion
Rose like an anthem, rich and strong,—
Their battle-eve confession.

Dear girl, her name he dared not speak,
But, as the song grew louder,
Something upon the soldier's cheek
Washed off the stains of powder.

Beyond the darkening ocean burned
The bloody sunset's embers,
While the Crimean valleys learned
How English blood remembers.

And once again a fire of hell
Rained on the Russian quarters,
With scream of shot, and burst of shell,
And bellowing of the mortars.

And Irish Nora's eyes are dim
For a singer, dumb and gory ;
And English Mary mourns for him
Who sang of "Annie Laurie."

Sleep, soldiers ! still in honored rest
Your truth and valor wearing :
The bravest are the tenderest,—
The loving are the daring.

The following account of the sixth and last bombardment of the defences of Sebastopol was written by an eye-witness within the British lines. The bombardment began on the morning of September 5th, three days before the Malakoff and Redan were assaulted.

There were wreaths of clouds and vapors hanging over the valleys, and on the lines of buildings inside the defences that have kept the armies watching so long in front of Sebastopol. The waters of the bay were as smooth as an inland lake and reflected the hills at their borders, and the vessels that lay at anchor. Out on the Black Sea the French and English fleets were lying quite idle between Kasatch and Constantine.


Looking from Cathcart's Hill, the view included the defences of the Quarantine and the Flagstaff batteries, together with the trenches and approaches made by the French, quite up to where their parallels joined on the English left attack in a ravine at the end of the Dockyard Creek. One standing at this point could take in at a single glance the lines of the Flagstaff batteries, the ruined dwellings in the suburbs, or rather the sites of the dwellings, which had formerly been long streets, but had been destroyed by the fire of the French batteries. The great mass of the ruins was enclosed between the sea-wall, and the Flagstaff batteries, and farther beyond could be seen the city itself, rising apparently in terraces along the hill-sides, displaying fine dwellings, public edifices of red or white sandstone, and magnificent churches, the whole liberally sprinkled with gardens, and with rows of trees growing in the promenades.

These fine buildings were closely surrounded in many instances by little houses covered with whitewash, occupied by the soldiers of the garrison or the poorer class of the civilian residents of the city. The hill presenting this view of the city is at the rear of the Flagstaff battery, and some two hundred feet above it, the face toward the Dockyard Creek, and is quite steep ; it then turns toward the roadstead and descends quite rapidly to its level at the rear of the southern range of forts. From our point of view we could not see the houses on this face of the hill, but those along the eastern face, or the slope toward the Dockyard Creek, were fully visible. There was a *slobodka*, or poor suburb, at the base of the hill, and from this the houses stood in terraces, with winding roads and ranges of steps leading quite up to the brow of the hill. Looking carefully, one could see that the bombardment was having a severe effect on these buildings. The roof of a church, decorated with many small turrets and pinnacles at the angles had been struck by the shells and quite broken in ; some of the best of the private residences were completely blown up, while others had their walls so cracked that there was no need of windows to admit the daylight ; shot holes were apparent in many others, and in some instances the light showed through them from side to side. Columns, pillars, and doors were broken down or shattered near the Flagstaff works. In the rubbish of the *slobodka* there were several batteries which were in good condition, and although the Allies had thrown their fire severely upon them, they seemed to be in thoroughly good order. They formed part of the outlying works of the second line of the defences. Not all of them could be seen from Cathcart's hill, but the line of their position could be traced with comparative ease.

All at once, quite near the Flagstaff battery, between bastions 7 and 8, we saw three jets of flame curling up, followed by three pillars of dirt and dust fully one hundred feet into the air, and receiving a ruddy tint from the bright rays of the morning sun. We had been looking for these explosions, but the moment they came they took us by surprise. They were caused by the French, who had fired three mines, partly to

destroy the counterscarp, and partly to give a signal for the opening of the cannonade. A moment after, all the way from the Dockyard Creek to the shore of the sea there was a burst of fire which seemed to run along as though a fuse had been fired. This stream of fire was fully three miles long; it ran from battery to battery, and was followed instantly by great clouds of white smoke. It resembled more than any thing else the white clouds rising from Vesuvius or Etna just previous to an eruption of those famous mountains. The smoke in the still morning air covered the whole lines of the French trenches as though a great cloud had fallen upon them, while the slight breeze of the morning whirled them in jets and bunches, much as you see a cloud on the summit of a mountain driven about in a thunder-storm. The wind was blowing from our direction, and consequently the sound of the tremendous explosions was much less than we had expected. For the reason that it was so slight in the British camp, it must have been correspondingly terrible in the city. On the Russian lines, toward which the storm of shot and shell was directed, there were jets and clouds of earth and dust arising from the faces of the earthworks, and from the parapets that in some instances seemed to be swept almost away, and also from the mass of ruined houses just behind the Russian batteries. The front distance covered by this shower of iron was nearly four miles in extent. It swept the entire length of the Russian lines, and reached into the very heart of the city. It is probable that few volleys so immensely powerful, and at the same time so suddenly discharged, were ever known before since artillery was invented.

The suddenness of the shock, together with its magnitude, seemed for a time to have paralyzed the defenders of Sebastopol. Their batteries were not sufficiently manned to enable them to reply with any vigor to such a tremendous fire, and the French prevented in great measure any movement to man the batteries by the energy and celerity with which they continued the iron hail which began so suddenly. They had more than two hundred pieces of artillery in position, all of heavy calibre, and worked with the greatest possible rapidity. The



great cloud of smoke rolling from these batteries was turned towards Sebastopol and seemed to envelop the entire city. Notwithstanding the veil which was thrown over the place, the cannonade continued with great fury. After a time there was a slight lull, but it broke out again almost immediately. Sometimes all these long lines of artillery seemed to be discharged almost simultaneously, then only a few guns at a time, then a few moments of silence, then another burst, and so on like the cadences of the movements of the waves of the ocean on a sandy beach. Watching with our glasses, we could see walls of stone go down as if they were made of sawdust. Clouds of dust rose every moment from the front of the earthworks. The Russian cannon were dismounted, and we could see everywhere along the lines that the French fire was telling with terrific effect.

The Russians were compelled to keep to their bomb proofs, so that scarcely a man was visible along their entire line. For a little while it seemed as if the French would be able to sweep away the whole place without encountering any resistance, but after a time the Russian gunners began to reply; but they fired very slowly, taking accurate aim, as though ammunition was scarce and they did not intend to waste a single shot. The fire of the Russians seemed to stimulate the French rather than to discourage them, as their volleys were given faster than before the Russian fire commenced. Some of their guns were aimed at the line of Russian defences and others directly at the city. Meantime the English naval brigade and siege train were working away at the face of the Redan and the Malakoff in the same quiet manner in which they had been working for days. They gave material aid to the French by keeping up a steady fire of shells on the batteries between the Redan and the Dockyard Creek. Occasionally the mortars in the rest of the English batteries threw their ten- and thirteen-inch shells behind the Russian lines and accompanied these shells with shot from the heavy siege guns.

The French batteries were far superior in the number of their guns to the English, as the following table taken on the 5th of the month will show :

ENGLISH BATTERIES.

	GUNS
13-inch mortars	34
10-inch "	27
8-inch "	10
Cohorns	20
8-inch guns	37
10-inch "	7
32-pounders	61
68-pounders	6
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Total English	202

FRENCH BATTERIES.

	GUNS
Left Attack—Against Flagstaff Bastion	129
" " " Central "	134
" " " Quarantine "	83
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	346
Right Attack—Against Malakoff, etc.	281
<hr/>	
Total French	627

The French continued their fire for nearly three hours without cessation. Then they stopped almost as suddenly as they began, in order to give the guns a chance to cool. The Russians instantly took advantage of the lull in the fire by coming out to repair damages. They emptied bags of sand and earth on the outside of their parapets, rolled out gabions, and did other work usual in the reparation of artillery fire. Their artillerymen also took advantage of the lull by opening fire on the batteries of the naval brigade in the English lines, and delivered their shot with such precision as to cause the English in that locality a good deal of trouble. About 10 o'clock the French renewed their fire quite as rapidly as at first, and they preceded it by exploding some fougasses. With the same object as before, this fire was maintained until midnight, and succeeded in dismounting so many of the Russian guns that they had only a few remaining with which they could reply. They were sending men and carts with great rapidity back and

forth across the bridge in the harbor, and about 9 o'clock a large force of infantry crossed the bridge, evidently preparing to resist the assault which was expected, and at the same time there was a movement toward Inkerman on the part of the army encamped in that locality.

When the French firing began in the morning, the working parties which crossed daily from the south to the north side were evidently ordered back again, with the expectation that an assault would be made during the course of the forenoon. From noon until five P.M., there was not much firing; then the French broke out again as vigorously as ever and continued the cannonade until half past seven, when darkness made it impossible to take accurate aim. Then there was a brief lull. Later in the evening, along the whole line, French and English, all the siege guns and mortars opened again and continued the fire throughout the night. Of course, accuracy of aim was out of the question during a night bombardment. The object was to prevent the Russians repairing their defences, and we knew that a shot fired in their direction would fall somewhere within the Russian lines, even though it might not hit a particular earthwork or make a hole through any specified building.

Orders were issued for all the batteries to begin an active bombardment as soon as daylight permitted, each gun being limited to fifty rounds. The whole line of the batteries, from Inkerman to the Quarantine, opened the cannonade at 5.30 A.M. This was continued for three hours; then there was a cessation until ten o'clock; then the firing was renewed until noon; then came a cessation until five o'clock, and there was another lull from half past six until seven. It must be understood that some firing was maintained during these lulls; had it been otherwise the silence would have been almost painful.

When the sun went down on Thursday night the bombardment began again and was kept up without cessation until an hour before daylight on Friday morning. Musketry fire was added to that of the artillery, the orders being to keep up a steady fusillade along the Russian front, about two hundred thousand rounds of cartridges being used every night after the bombard-

ment began. The cannonade was resumed on Friday as before. The Inkerman batteries replied vigorously, but along the Russian centre there was very little response. The wind blew from the north and great clouds of dust were blown from the town along with the smoke of the batteries so that it was not easy to ascertain the effect of the fire. Occasionally the clouds lifted, and whenever we obtained glimpses of the city or the defences it was evident that the result was severe.

A council of generals was held at the English head-quarters at noon, General Pelissier and General Della Marmora being present. As soon as the council had broken up, the surgeons were ordered to clear the hospitals of patients and get ready for the reception of the wounded. Those in the hospitals who could bear the transportation were sent as fast as possible to Balaklava or to the field hospital in the rear of the camp.

The cannonade was continued on the seventh in about the same manner, and we could see hour by hour that the city was terribly shattered by the bombardment. The greater part of the houses within range of our guns were either in complete ruin or so injured that they were uninhabitable. There was great activity along the bridge crossing the harbor. It was crowded at all hours of the day with men and carts passing in both directions, but generally from south to north. In the evening there was a bright light, owing to the head of the dockyard shears being on fire, whether by accident or design no one could say. A large ship was set on fire and completely burnt, and we could see that a steamer was towing a line-of-battle ship to the dockyard, where it would be out of range of our fire.

There was another council of the generals at noon, and after the council was over it was whispered through the camp that the defences would be assaulted at noon on the eighth, after a vigorous cannonade and bombardment. Noon was selected because it was known that the Russians usually took a rest at that hour. There was an explosion some time in the night behind the Redan. It alarmed the camp for a short time and then was quite forgotten. During the night of the seventh there was a sudden change in the weather. Up to that time it


had been fine, but on the morning of the eighth it was extremely cold; there was a strong, sharp wind blowing from the north side of Sebastopol; the bright sun was gone, and in its place there rose above us a canopy of a dull leaden gray.

The arrangement was that the French should assault the Malakoff at mid-day, and in case their attack was successful the English were to storm the Redan immediately. A diversion was to be made on the English left by strong columns of French who were to threaten the line of the Flagstaff and Quarantine batteries. The cavalry sentries were posted soon after eight o'clock; the Light Division and also the Second were sent into the trenches and out into the advance parallels as quietly as could be done.

About that time General Simpson and his staff took their position in the second parallel of the Greenhill battery, which had been designated by the engineer officers. Sir Henry Jones was too ill to walk and was carried on a litter into the trenches, where he remained until the attack was ended. General Simpson and Sir Richard Airey, the quartermaster-general, remained with him. The Duke of Newcastle took a position at Cathcart's Hill during the forenoon, and later went to the picket house near the Woronzoff road.

Exactly five minutes before our watches indicated noon the French swarmed out of their trenches where they were nearest the Malakoff, went up the face of the fort and through the embrasures almost in a moment. Their advance trenches were only seven metres from the fort and consequently only a few moments at the pace they ran were required to carry them to their destination. They drifted out, battalion following closely on battalion, and in a minute or so after the head of their column came out of the ditch their flag was flying over the Korniloff bastion of the fort. They took the Russians completely by surprise. Very few of them were in the Malakoff at the time. There was a very slight fire of musketry for a few minutes but the Russians were not long in recovering from their astonishment and very soon fell vigorously on their assailants. From a little past noon until nightfall the French

SKETCH PLAN
OF THE
REDAN



were kept quite actively engaged in repulsing the attempts of the Russians to regain the position. The slaughter of the Russians was very great, and when night came the Russian commander withdrew his forces very skilfully and prepared to evacuate the position.

The French attack on the left was a failure and caused a heavy loss to the assailants. As soon as the French flag was hoisted on the parapet of the Malakoff, rockets were sent up from the English advance trenches as a signal for the English assault on the Redan. The French had made their assault on the Malakoff with four divisions of their Second Corps, two divisions forming as storming columns. The English attacked the Redan with only two divisions, one being held in reserve and practically not engaged. It was only a few minutes after 12 o'clock when the order was given for the advance upon the Redan. The troops were obliged to cross a distance of 230 yards from the advance trenches to the parapet of the Redan. Their loss was heavy, especially in officers. The fire was more deadly during the earlier part of the advance from the trenches than when the assailants were near the fort. The abatis in front of the fort had been torn to pieces by the artillery fire, so that it really formed no obstruction to the advance of the men. The light division directed its movements toward the salient angle of the Redan. There was little opposition to the troops as they crossed the ditch and scrambled up the face of the fort, as the Russians had retired to their traverses and were making ready to receive the English as soon as they reached the top of the work.

The storming columns of the Second Division followed closely after the Light Division, and as they approached the fort made a slight bend to the right flank of the Light Division so as to attack the face of the Redan simultaneously. The first embrasure they reached was on fire; at the next they climbed the parapet without opposition and entered the embrasure which had been left undefended by the Russians. Inside the face of the Redan there was an inner parapet which was intended to protect the artillerymen while at work from the fragments of shell bursting inside the fortification. There

were several openings through this inner parapet so that the men could easily seek shelter whenever circumstances justified their so doing. As the storming column entered the Redan from the embrasures the Russians retreated behind the breast-work, and from it they poured a deadly fire upon the storming party. Instead of advancing, the stormers halted and returned the fire of the Russians without seeking to dislodge them by the use of the bayonet.

The whole inside of the Redan seemed to swarm with Russians, who kept up a persistent fire upon the English. The Russians came in great force from the barracks behind the Redan, and while the number of the English was rapidly diminishing that of the Russians steadily increased. The English officers sought to encourage the men to advance, but were unable to do so. It had been rumored through the camp that the Redan was everywhere mined, and that if once occupied by the English it would be blown up. A panic seemed to seize some of the men, while others acted bravely and rushed forward to obey the orders of their officers. They were not sufficiently strong in numbers to perform the work, and as fast as they advanced they were swept down by the Russian fire. The supports which came up from the advanced trenches reached the Redan in disorder in consequence of the fire which swept the plain in front of the Redan, and their presence only seemed to add to the confusion and slaughter. For a full hour this terrible work went on.

Now and then the bayonet was used, and fierce combats occurred between little groups of English and Russians. The ground was covered with the bodies of English and Russians, frequently locked in an embrace which death made all the closer. They were found the next day in great numbers scattered through the part of the work which was temporarily occupied by the English. The steady increase of the Russian numbers was too much for the small force of English in the assaulting column. Slowly the assailants were pressed back, and in a little while the Russians were again masters of the Redan. The ditch was crowded with dead and wounded. As the Russians obtained possession of the interior of the fort,

they came to the front and not only discharged volleys of musketry at the struggling mass below, but pelted them with stones, grapeshot, and other missiles that were near at hand. A supporting column came up from the trenches, and under their fire the Russians were temporarily cleared from the front of the Redan, while the few English that survived from the assault were enabled to make good their retreat to the trenches.

When the English abandoned the assault the fire slackened from the Redan, and the Russians who had been engaged at that fortress were drawn off to the Malakoff to assist in beating back the French ; but with all the force they brought to bear they were unable to retake that stronghold. Clouds of smoke surrounded the Malakoff, but now and then when they lifted the French flag could be seen waving defiantly above the inner parapet. The battle was furious all around it, and though the Russians made assault after assault, all their efforts were in vain. The supporting columns poured steadily over from the approaches and joined their fellows who were making a bold front against the Russians, although the latter were receiving fresh reinforcements almost continuously. Hour after hour the fight went on, but the issue was unchanged. When the sun went down the tricolor still floated above the Malakoff, and the fall of Sebastopol was assured.

In the capture of the Malakoff the French lost 1,646 killed, of whom 5 were generals, 24 superior, and 116 inferior officers, 4,500 wounded, and 1,400 missing. In the attack on the Redan the English lost 385 killed, 29 being commissioned and 42 non-commissioned officers, 1,886 wounded and 176 missing.

During the night between the 8th and 9th the Russians abandoned the Redan, which the capture of the Malakoff rendered untenable, and the occupation of the forts by the allies made it impossible for the Russians to remain in Sebastopol. During the night and early morning the Russians crossed over to the north side of the harbor, leaving the city in flames. All through the night there

were loud explosions, caused by the blowing up of magazines where the Russians had immense stores of ammunition which they were unable to remove. The city was set on fire in many places, and when the Allies took possession on the 9th they found little more than a mass of ruins. Several of the Russian ships had been destroyed during the bombardment, and such as remained were burned or sunk during the night of the evacuation.

The Allies never made any serious attempt to disturb the Russian forces on the north side, and their communications with the interior were not interrupted. The two armies confronted each other for some time, but there was never any fighting of consequence after the fall of Sebastopol. Other warlike operations were conducted along the Russian shores of the Black Sea. Proposals of peace were made by Austria with the consent of the Allies, and finally, on the 30th of March, 1856, the treaty of peace was signed at Paris. The Allies had begun the destruction of the docks at Sebastopol, but so extensive were those works that with all the engineering skill at their command they were not through with it until July 9th, when they evacuated the Crimea.

According to English authorities the British loss during the Crimean war was about 27,000 men. The loss of the French was said to be 63,000, and that of the Russians nearly half a million. The English killed in action or died of wounds were about 3,500, died of cholera 4,244, and of other diseases 16,000. The remainder of the 27,000 were permanently disabled. Exact figures of the Russian losses have never been published.

By the treaty of Paris Russia was required to surrender the city and citadel of Kars to the Sultan, and at the same time the allied powers were to evacuate all the positions they occupied in the Crimea. Turkey was admitted to a place among the powers of Europe; the signatory powers at the conference agreed to respect the

independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to guarantee the observance of this condition by each other. Turkey agreed to ameliorate the condition of its Christian subjects, but it was stipulated that this condescension was not to authorize the other powers, either collectively or separately, to meddle with the relations between the Porte and its subjects or in the interior administration of the empire. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to be closed to all ships of war of foreign powers as long as the Porte was at peace, and the Black Sea was to be neutralized. Turkey and Russia were limited to a naval force of six steam vessels of not more than eight hundred tons, and four steam vessels of not more than two hundred tons. Both nations were prohibited from establishing any naval arsenal on the shores of the Black Sea. In Europe, Russia was required to surrender certain portions of Bessarabia to the Porte, and in Asia the boundaries were to be established as they existed before the outbreak of the war. France, England, and Austria entered into a separate treaty to guarantee the integrity and independence of Turkey, and agreed that they would consider any infraction of the stipulation of this treaty a *casus belli*.

Taking advantage of the overthrow of France by Germany in 1871, Russia abrogated the treaty of 1856, and regained nearly all the rights of which she had been deprived by that document. She immediately began the restoration of her naval arsenals on the shores of the Black Sea, and laid the keels of an iron-clad fleet to control those waters. Since 1871 Sebastopol has been slowly rising from her ruins; her dockyards have been partially restored, and an arsenal has been established at Nicolaieff, but it will yet be many years before the traces of that terrible bombardment of September, 1855, will have been removed, and the streets of the "sacred city" present the appearance they did before the Allies began their

work of destruction. There are still entire blocks of ruins in the heart of Sebastopol, and at almost every step the visitor of to-day is reminded of the memorable siege, and the devastation it created. A railway connects the city with Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the port has assumed a commercial importance that bids fair to surpass that of Odessa. In 1885-86 its population increased more rapidly than at any time since the war, partly in consequence of the activity of the government in restoring its naval supremacy on the Black Sea, and partly owing to large shipments of wheat and other Russian products.





CHAPTER X.

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE—1857-8.

ON the 23d of June, 1757, Lord Clive defeated the army of Surajah Dowlah, Nabob of Bengal, on the field of Plassey, in a battle which ranks as one of the decisive battles of India. Fifty years thereafter the Hindoo astrologers predicted that the year 1857, the centenary of Plassey, would witness the termination forever of the British power in India. Down to 1857 they continued to make this prediction, and early in that year it was evident that a mutinous spirit prevailed in the army of Bengal. The Bengal army at that time comprised 22,698 Europeans, including the officers of native regiments, and 118,663 sepoy, or native soldiers. The military authorities had decided to arm the sepoy with Enfield rifles, and a new kind of cartridge, which was greased in order to adapt it to the improved weapon. These cartridges had to be torn with the teeth, in accordance with the manual of arms, and the report was spread among the natives that the grease was a mixture of lard and cows' tallow. The pig is an unclean beast in the eyes of the Hindoo, and also the Moslem, while the cow is sacred; consequently, both Hindoo and Moslem would be defiled by biting the fat of the pig, and the Hindoo would commit sacrilege in biting cows' fat.

There was great excitement in all the barracks, which was temporarily allayed by the substitution of the old or ungreased cartridge for the new one. The native soldiers had a general impression that they were about to be de-

prived of their caste, and there were numerous malcontents who encouraged this belief. Every concession by the government was regarded as part of the scheme, and it was useless to argue against it. Discontent grew steadily, and on the night of the 19th February the Nineteenth Native Infantry at Burhampore broke open the place where the arms were kept, and were only restrained from a bloody mutiny by the presence of a small force of cavalry with two guns. The regiment was disbanded on the 30th March at Barrackpore. On the previous evening a sepoy of the Thirty-fourth Regiment at Barrackpore had fired upon and severely wounded the adjutant and sergeant-major, thus shedding the first blood of the mutiny.

On the 10th May there was a formidable rising at Meerut, the rebels slaughtering every English man, woman, and child on whom they could lay hands, and then pillaging and setting fire to the buildings. When they had finished their terrible work they marched in the direction of Delhi, killing every European whom they met on the road, or in their entrance to the city. The native garrison of Delhi were easily persuaded to join them, and a butchery of Europeans followed immediately. The rebels proclaimed the restoration of the Mogul dynasty, and from that time onward acted in the name of the King of Delhi, who took an active part in the revolt, and made Delhi the rallying-point of the rebels of the northwest provinces.

The native troops of the kingdom of Oude mutinied on the 30th and 31st May. Elsewhere the rising was of a purely military character; but in Oude the people sympathized with the rebellion, and accordingly it took the form of a popular movement for independence. Warnings of the impending troubles had been received at Cawnpore earlier than in the other stations of the northwest province. About the end of April straggling parties of the Nineteenth Native Infantry, which had been dis-

banded at Burhampore for mutinous action, as already stated, passed through Cawnpore *en route* to their homes in the country, and spread the rumors that fanned the flame of the insurrection. The reputation of Cawnpore was by no means good. Lying just over the Ganges from the kingdom of Oude, it had been for a long time a city of refugees, and also the halting-place whence offenders against the laws in British territory found it convenient to make their escape into Oude. The native population of Cawnpore was not far from 100,000. Out of this number the 40,000 who dwelt in the military bazaars had the worst reputation. There was an unusually large force of native troops at Cawnpore, including the First, Fifty-third, and Fifty-sixth regiments of native infantry, the entire Second regiment of native cavalry, and a full company of native artillery. Of British troops there were only about 200, comprising a few small detachments of Bengal artillery, the company's first Madras Fusiliers, and Her Majesty's Thirty-second and Eighty-fourth foot. Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler was in command at Cawnpore. Over seventy years of age, it is fair to say that he had seen his best days, and he was on the most friendly terms with Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the last Peishwa of the Mahrattas. Nana Sahib had a deadly hatred of the English, but managed to conceal most completely his real feelings. He entertained the officers and others at his palace, which was filled with European furniture and bric-a-brac, and his way of living was more European than Asiatic.

Tidings of the insurrection at Meerut and Delhi were received at Cawnpore on the 14th May. They not only increased the excitement among the native inhabitants and the native soldiery, but caused great alarm among the European residents. General Wheeler telegraphed to Lucknow that he feared there was danger, and he suspected disaffection among the men of the Second Cavalry.

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Accordingly a reinforcement of fifty men of the Thirty-Second was sent to him. It was considered desirable to establish a place of refuge for the English residents in case of an insurrection. General Wheeler selected for this purpose the depot of the Thirty-Second Regiment, not far from the Dragoon Hospital. This place was destined to be the scene of one of the most heroic defences that ever took place since the world began.

Two squadrons of Oude Irregular Cavalry mutinied on the 27th May, killing all their officers, and then sending messengers to all the rest of the native soldiery telling them what had been done. The other native regiments followed their example, and then laid siege to the entrenchments which General Wheeler had prepared. When the proper moment for his purpose arrived, Nana Sahib threw off the mask and openly placed himself at the head of the rebellion. Under his direction the siege of General Wheeler's position was conducted; it lasted from the 6th to the 27th June, and is thus described by an historian :

"It was a siege the miseries of which to the besieged have never been exceeded in the history of the world. All the wonted terrors of a multitudinous enemy without, of a feeble garrison and scant shelter within, of the burden of women and children and sick people, with little to appease their wants or allay their sufferings, were aggravated by the burning heat of the climate. The June sky was little less than a great canopy of fire; the summer breeze was as the blast of a furnace; to touch the barrel of a gun was to recoil as from red-hot iron. It was the season when European strength and energy are ever at their lowest point of depression—when military duty in its mildest form taxes the power of Englishmen to the utmost, and English women can do little more than sustain life in shaded apartments, with all appliances at hand to moderate the temperature and mitigate the suffering. But now, even under the fierce meridian sun, this little band of

English fighting men were ever straining to sustain the strenuous activity of constant battle against fearful odds; while delicate women and fragile children were suddenly called to endure discomforts and privations, with all the superadded miseries peculiar to the country and climate, which it would have been hard to battle with in strong health under their native skies. . . . And never since war began—'never in the brave days of old' when women turned their hair into bow-strings—has the world seen nobler patience and fortitude than clothed the lives and shone forth in the deaths of the wives and daughters of the fighting men of Cawnpore. Some saw their children slowly die in their arms; some had them swept from their breasts by the desolating fire of the enemy. There was no misery which humanity could endure that did not fall heavily upon our Englishwomen. Day by day the little garrison diminished, struck down by the insurgents' shot or the fierce rays of the sun. Water was scarce, and could only be obtained from the well at the risk of life. The air was tainted by the foul gases from the carcasses of horses or oxen; the bodies of the slain were thrown into a dry well to avoid contagion."

While the siege was in progress Nana Sahib captured several bands of English fugitives from other stations, who were making their way in the direction of Calcutta, among them one party of a hundred men, women, and children from Futtyghyr. The men were put to death with various kinds of torture, while the women and children were retained as prisoners. On the twenty-first day of the siege one of the prisoners was sent to General Wheeler bearing a letter from Nana Sahib, in which he offered safe conduct to Allahabad to all who would lay down their arms. At first General Wheeler refused the terms, but after some deliberation they were accepted, and it was arranged that sufficient boats were to be at the landing-place on the morning of the 27th June. On that morning a mournful procession of two hundred worn, emaciated sufferers filed out of the entrenchments and

moved slowly towards the river. The sick and wounded were carried in palanquins supplied by Nana Sahib, and the baggage was piled upon elephants. No order was observed in boarding the boats, which lay a few feet from the shore; each boat was to push off when loaded, but when the cargoes were on board it was found that every boat was fast in the sand.

At a signal from the shore the crews of the boats jumped overboard and made for the shore, and then the rebels opened upon the doomed band with small-arms and artillery. Before leaving the boats the crew had managed to secrete burning coals in the thatch roofs, and very soon they were found to be on fire. Two boats got away at last, but a murderous fire was maintained upon them. Of the whole party of two hundred and more, only four escaped; those who were not killed by the enemy's shot or drowned in the river were taken back to Cawnpore, where they were held as prisoners until the massacre, which preceded the arrival of the relieving column of General Havelock on the 16th July. In that massacre some two hundred English and half-castes, mostly women and children, were slaughtered and thrown into a well by orders of Nana Sahib.

General Havelock marched up the Grand Trunk road in the direction of Cawnpore with 1,400 European soldiers and 8 guns. As soon as news of his advance was received at Cawnpore, Bala Ras went out with every available man in the endeavor to stop him. Nana Sahib's brother was defeated at Aong, in Futtypore. The bridge over the Pandu was carried after a sharp fight, and on the 15th of July the English triumphantly entered the District of Cawnpore. Bala Ras retreated to Cawnpore, carrying the news of his own repulse and suffering severely from a wound received in the fight.

On the 16th July, Havelock halted his men at noon at Ahirwan, a station on the Grand Trunk road, about three

miles southeast of Cawnpore. His troops had already marched nearly twenty miles that day. They were greatly wearied, and in no way ready for action. The rebel entrenchments were about a mile in front of their position, directly across the junction of the Grand Trunk road and the side road which leads into Cawnpore. The rebel force was about 5,000 strong. Their right and left wings rested upon villages, surrounded by strong walls and defended by heavy guns, while the rebels were stationed in groves of trees, which gave them excellent protection. In their centre they had a small battery of light artillery, and their position was very much like that of the right and left wing. Both in numbers and artillery they were far superior to the English, and it seemed almost like inviting defeat for the latter to advance along the road against the well-arranged front which the rebels presented. General Havelock carefully reconnoitred their position and very wisely determined to outflank it. Moving across the country toward the right, and passing from grove to grove, he attacked the enemy's left flank. Previously to doing so, he drew a plan in the dust of the road, using the end of his scabbard for a pencil, and explained his intended manœuvre to all his officers, so that it could be carried out in case of any accident to himself. The order to advance was given at about half-past two in the afternoon.

The small force of Sikh cavalry who had remained loyal and performed excellent service, was ordered to advance and make a feint upon the enemy's front, but not to engage him. The ruse was completely successful. The rebels concentrated their fire upon the cavalry, and the flanking movement of the infantry was almost completed before the rebels discovered what was going on.

An opening of the trees showed them what the movement was. The English artillery was still in the rear, and the rebels used their old field-pieces against the assailants with considerable effect. With their overweening confi-

dence in their artillery, the rebels felt entirely sure of their position, and they derisively ordered the bands to play "Cheer, Boys, Cheer!" The Seventy-eighth Highlanders advanced partly to this music and partly to their own instruments, for which Scotland is celebrated. They charged upon the rebels, closely followed by the 64th Regiment. In a very few minutes the rebel music was entirely silenced, and the rebel left wing was in full flight; their guns were captured, and the villages where they had been so strongly posted were in English hands. Many of the sepoys retreated eastward and westward, and not in the direction of Cawnpore. They had had quite enough of fighting, and were decidedly anxious to reach their homes. Those who did not flee rushed to strengthen the centre of the rebel position. General Havelock halted his men briefly to enable them to take breath, and then after a short but stirring speech ordered another advance.

The cavalry now came to the support of the infantry. A brief contest followed, and then a loud cheer, running along the whole British line, told that the centre of the rebel forces had been broken in. The cavalry retained its position at the centre with the captured rebel howitzer, while the infantry advanced toward the rebel right. The same good-fortune followed them. They broke the rebel infantry line, and captured two cannon. The enemy's original line of battle was thus completely broken up. Although success had crowned the efforts of the wearied little army of British troops, its work was by no means over. A little in the rear of the first position of the rebels was a village, surrounded by a wood, and here the Nana's force rallied again. Their remaining artillery opened a destructive fire upon the British advance. Havelock rode up, and in a loud, clear voice asked what regiment would undertake the capture of the village. No answer was given in words; but the infantry advanced rapidly, and the village was soon in their possession.

The rebels seemed to be in full retreat towards Cawnpore after this misfortune, and the wearied soldiers lay down upon the ground to have a brief rest. Again the rebels rallied, led by the Nana in person. He had stationed 3 guns, one of them a 24-pounder, upon the branch road leading to Cawnpore, and as the British advanced they received a severe fire from these guns. The rebel cavalry advanced, followed closely by the rebel infantry, and accompanied by the trumpets and bands of music. The English advanced again; but well-directed volleys of grape and canister cut down many of their numbers. As they were moving forward under the leadership of General Havelock's son, who was serving on his staff, the infantry charged and captured the 24-pounder, and simultaneously four British guns were brought forward, and opened fire on the rebels. The fire of these guns threw the sepoy into consternation, and they fled rapidly towards Cawnpore.

Havelock's men were too weary after their day's marching and fighting to pursue the enemy, and they went into camp about two miles from the city. During the evening Nana Sahib fled from Cawnpore towards Bitheer. On the 17th July Havelock entered Cawnpore, and encamped within what had formerly been the British lines. The massacre of the prisoners took place on the evening of the 16th at the time of Nana Sahib's flight from Cawnpore.

At Lucknow, the capital of the lately annexed kingdom of Oude, the sepoy openly mutinied at the cantonment, four miles from the city, on the 30th May, 1857. Sir Henry Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, immediately placed the Residency and a wide enclosure around it in a state of defence, and was occupied with this work through the greater part of June. Hearing that a large force of rebels was encamped a few miles distant on the Fyzabad road, he started to attack them on the

morning of the 30th June with 700 men and 11 guns. He fell into an ambush near Chinhut, and was compelled to retire before an overwhelming force and seek safety in his entrenchments. Weakened by losses he determined to abandon all outworks, and after destroying a large amount of ammunition and military stores to prevent their capture by the enemy, he assembled all the European population within the enclosure of the Residency. This retirement to the Residency took place on July 1st, the day following the Chinhut disaster, and may properly be considered the beginning of the rebel siege. The rebels immediately surrounded the place, and on the 2d July Sir Henry Lawrence was mortally wounded by a shell, and died two days afterwards. Before his death he named Major Inglis his military successor, and Major Banks Chief Commissioner.

The Residency now contained 900 Europeans and 700 loyal natives. The siege lasted for twelve weeks, and included all the horrors of that of Cawnpore already told. Overwork, exposure, bad provisions, cholera, dysentery, fever, and other diseases were busy, in addition to the bullets and shells of the 50,000 besiegers. The women and children, being less inured to hardships, suffered more than the men, and many of them sickened and died before the end of those terrible twelve weeks. The rebels maintained a steady fire on the Residency; they ran mines beneath some of the buildings, and on several occasions stormed the entrenchments. Constant vigilance was necessary for the little band of defenders, and they looked anxiously for relief. On the 25th July a spy brought a letter from General Havelock, saying they would be relieved in a few days; but the promised succor did not reach them until two months later.

Immediately after capturing Cawnpore, Havelock turned his attention to the relief of Lucknow, fifty-five miles distant, but the rebel force between Cawnpore and Luck-

now was so great that his advance was impossible. Cholera had broken out in his camp, and his fighting men were less than a thousand, while the rebels between him and Lucknow were fully 30,000 strong. During August and early September he was unable to move forward, though he did not remain idle, as he was constantly attacking detached bands of rebels wherever he could hear of them. On the 15th of September he was joined by Sir James Outram and 1,700 European soldiers, and four days later he crossed the Ganges in the face of the enemy and advanced upon Lucknow. After severe fighting, in which there was a great slaughter of the rebels and heavy losses by the English, the forces of Havelock and Outram entered the Residency. The relief thus brought to the besieged was more in name than any thing else ; it was the intention to escort the garrison to Cawnpore, but the unexpected strength of the rebels and the heavy loss sustained in the entrance made a safe retirement impossible. There was nothing to do but wait for other British troops to come to their relief. Havelock's arrival gave additional strength to the number of the defenders, but there were more mouths to feed, and the entire garrison was put on very short rations.

The rebels continued their siege, but by this time the fall of Delhi had released a considerable force of troops that might be employed elsewhere. Through October the siege went on, and on the 9th November Sir Colin Campbell left Cawnpore with a force of 4,000 men, partly European and partly Sikhs who had remained loyal to the British. By the evening of the 15th he was within three miles of Lucknow, and on the next day he assaulted the rebel lines and entered the Residency. The retirement with the women and children was accomplished by strategy ; the rebels held nearly the whole city and surrounding positions, and the line of retirement resembled a tortuous lane with many points of attack.

A vigorous fire was directed against one of the strong points of the rebels as though the British were about to assault it. The fire was maintained until a practicable breach had been made and every thing was ready for the assault. Then at midnight on the 22d the English silently retired in the opposite direction, carrying away the entire garrison and all the valuable stores from the Residency. So completely were the rebels deceived that they kept up their fire on the Residency until daylight. General Have-lock died of dysentery and exhaustion on the third day of the retreat from Lucknow.

When Delhi fell the government considered the rebellion broken, but it very soon learned its mistake. The relief of the garrison of Lucknow was simply a saving of life; the city was in the hands of the rebels, and nearly the whole of the province of Oude was controlled by them. While Sir Colin Campbell was retiring from Lucknow with the relieved garrison, he was called to disperse the "Gwalior Contingent" that had rebelled and was advancing in the direction of Cawnpore, near which place it had already defeated General Windham, who commanded the garrison there and marched out to meet them.

During December Cawnpore was attacked by a well-appointed army of rebels 25,000 strong; which was repulsed with heavy loss. To defeat it, Sir Colin was obliged to draw from near Lucknow a portion of the force with which he was preparing to besiege the place; the government had determined that the rebels in Oude must be crushed at all hazards, and were hurrying men and munitions to Sir Colin as fast as possible.

At the end of February, 1858, the total strength at Sir Colin Campbell's disposal for the siege of Lucknow amounted to 20,000 men, with 180 pieces of artillery. He had made a thoroughly scientific plan for the capture of Lucknow, and one which would spare as much as possible the blood and lives of his men. The city of

Lucknow stands on the right bank of the Gumti River, in the form of a parallelogram from west to east. It is nearly five miles long, and its greatest width on the west side is about one and one half miles. The east side is not over one mile in width. Over the Gumti there are two bridges, one of iron and the other of masonry, which bring the business of the country from the north side of the river into the centre of the city. On the east and south sides of Lucknow there is a canal deeply cut into the earth. It bends around in a southwesterly direction, leaving the country on the western side of the city quite open. It is intersected with ravines toward the northeast, near the point where it unites with the Gumti; the banks of the canal slope gently and are passable for footmen and cavalry.

At the time of Sir Colin Campbell's advance upon Lucknow, the principal positions inside the city were the Kaiser Bagh, the Residency, the ruins of the Machi Bawan, which commanded the masonry bridge, the Musa Bagh, the Imambara, and a series of palaces which extend towards the canal from the Kaiser Bagh. On the east side of the city and beyond the canal was the Martinière, a curious palace, or collection of palaces, built by a Frenchman formerly in the employ of the old King of Oude, and occupying a commanding position in full view of the city. Still higher than the Martinière, on the edge of a stretch of table-land, was the Dilkusha Palace.

Learning wisdom by their experience of the previous year, the rebels had gradually strengthened their defences by means of breastworks which showed that they did not stint their labor. Believing that the English would advance by the same line as before, they had flanked with strong bastions the former route which Sir Colin took across the canal where its banks were sloping. The rebels had no less than three lines of defence at the juncture of three principal roads. The outer line of de-

fence was supported by a strong battery of 9 guns; the second line consisted of bastioned rampart and parapet with its right resting on the Imambara; from this immense building it continued to the Mess House, and reached the bank of the Gumti close by the Moti Mahal. The third line covered the front of the Kaiser Bagh. Altogether they had 100 guns protecting this defence. Furthermore, all the principal streets of Lucknow were barricaded and bastioned, and every building of consequence had its walls loop-holed for musketry, besides earthworks to protect its entrance.

Numerous spies were sent out to obtain as accurately as possible a statement of the condition of the defences. Basing his opinion upon their reports, Brigadier Napier thought that the attack should be made on the east side, for the reason that it presented the smallest front, was the nearest approach to the Kaiser Bagh, and that the ground was favorable for establishing batteries. Arguments were advanced opposing his opinion, but at one time it prevailed, and the decision was taken to make the attack on the eastern side of Lucknow. The rebels did not fortify the northern side, because they had reasoned that since neither General Havelock nor Sir Colin in the previous year had approached the Gumti they would not be likely to do so in the present instance, and therefore the river side was neglected. As soon as this error in their defences was discovered, Sir Colin naturally decided to take advantage of it. He arranged to send an entire division of all arms across the Gumti, and then, by marching up the bank of the river, they could take the rebel position in reverse, and by a vigorous use of artillery make it untenable.

Bright and early on the 2d of March, General Campbell began the execution of his plans. He advanced on the Dilkusha Park with the following-named forces: The Third and Fourth Brigades of infantry, which included the

Thirtieth, Thirty-eighth, and Fifty-third Regiments; the Fourth Brigade, which included the Forty-second and Forty-ninth Highlanders; the Fourth Punjaub Rifles; the artillery divisions of Sir A. Wilson and Colonel Wood; three troops of horse artillery; two 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers of the Naval Brigade, and a corps of sappers and miners. After passing the fort of Jalalabad, Sir Colin encountered the rebel pickets, which he drove in, and then captured one piece of artillery. The palace was immediately occupied as an advance picket on the right of the line. The enemy's guns which were placed along the canal completely dominated the plateau where the Dilkusha Palace stands, and it was found impossible to bring up the main force of the infantry. Accordingly, Sir Colin ordered batteries to be erected at Dilkusha to silence the enemy's fire. The batteries were established during the night of the 2d, and were ready for operations at daylight on the 3d. As soon as their fire began, that of the enemy slackened materially.

Then the infantry was brought up, massed around the Dilkusha, and enabled the British to establish a new line. This line rested its right on the Gumti at the village of Bibiapur. From this village, extending toward the left, it touched the Dilkusha and extended in the direction of Jalalabad to within two miles of that fort. The line was completed by Brigadier-General Franks with a force of English and Nepaulese troops. While General Franks was getting into position, Sir Colin ordered two pontoon bridges to be thrown over the Gumti near Bibiapur, and this work was accomplished by the morning of the 6th. Anticipating the completion of the bridges, Sir Colin ordered General Outram to cross to the left bank of the river at two o'clock in the morning with a strong division of all arms.


The night was very dark, and over the broken ground intersected with ravines and waterways, Outram's men

were greatly troubled to find their way. Outram went on ahead to the bridges, where he sat on the ground and waited for the troops to come up, well knowing that his officers were doing every thing possible to bring them forward at the time appointed. It was not until four o'clock that the cavalry advance, the Second Punjaub, arrived at the bridges. The crossing began immediately, and the whole force was over the river by daylight. Forming his command in three lines, Outram advanced along the left bank of the Gumti for about a mile, and then marched directly towards the city. He met with no opposition and formed his camp that evening about four miles from Lucknow.

The 7th and 8th of March were mainly passed in reconnoitring and light skirmishes. The rebels were repulsed every time they advanced. Outram retained the position where he had encamped for his main force, but steadily during the day pushed his pickets forward. During the night he threw up earthworks and mounted two batteries with heavy guns about six hundred yards from the rebel works on the old race-course.

His attack began at daybreak on the 9th. General Walpole forced back the enemy's left from the villages and jungles that covered their position, while Outram did the same on their right. News of the success of the movement was conveyed to Sir Colin by displaying the colors of the First Fusiliers from the top of the Yellow House. As soon as the colors were displayed, Sir Colin advanced and very speedily formed a junction with the right wing. Then the entire line was halted while three heavy guns and a howitzer were brought forward to enfilade the works behind the Martinière. General Campbell had waited patiently at the Dilkusha during the time Outram was making the movements which formed an important preliminary to the attack upon Lucknow. Fire was opened on the Martinière and steadily kept up from

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL'S
SIEGE OF LUCKNOW



daylight until two in the afternoon, when Sir Colin ordered Hope's Brigade, supported by the Fifty-third and Nintieth Regiments, to advance against the Martinière. Aided by Outram's enfilading batteries, they carried it without opposition, the rebels fleeing over the river, but taking their guns along with them. Both lines of operation were successful, Outram being fairly established on one side of the parallelogram, and thus enabling Sir Colin to advance on its other side.

The next movement was on the 10th, when the two sides of the parallelogram were practically completed by the storming and capture of Banks' House. The next move was to pierce the centre of the rebel line, which extended from Banks' House to a point on the Kaiser Bagh. Outram was ordered to assail the positions which covered the iron and masonry bridges. The iron bridge led to the Residency and the masonry one to the Machi Bawan. The same plan was followed as in the capture of the Martinière and the Dilkusha. Batteries were established to enfilade the enemy's works, and at the same time throw a vertical and direct fire upon the Kaiser Bagh. On the 11th, General Outram advanced General Walpole's division to a position which commanded the iron bridge. Pushing through the suburbs, he occupied the Mosque, about a thousand yards from the bridge, and there he left the First Fusiliers. From the Mosque he went on to the head of the stone bridge, but found the position untenable with infantry, as it was commanded by the rebel guns, and therefore he withdrew again to the Mosque. In the meanwhile, a battery had been established close to the iron bridge.

While these movements were taking place on the right, the heavy batteries on the left had opened a fire of shot and shell on the Bakum Kothi. The line of palaces known by that name were very strongly built, and if well garrisoned and properly defended they were capable of

making a long resistance, even against the well-equipped British forces. Sir Colin knew the character of the people against whom he was making war. He knew that in fighting against Asiatics an immense superiority is always given to an advancing force, and this is an element which is of far greater consideration in Asia than in any other part of the world. Although the position seemed a very strong one, Sir Colin did not hesitate to order an assault at once. The approach was decided to be practical, and the order was given to storm.

The storming party consisted of the Fourth Punjaub and the Ninety-third Highlanders, the same who had stormed the Sikander Bagh in the previous year. Having taken part in Sir Colin's first movement upon Lucknow, they deserved the honor of leading the advance in the second and final seige. The buildings to be stormed were surrounded by a breastwork, with a deep ditch, and consisted of several palaces and court-yards, one inside the other. The breastwork and the wall of the outer court-yard had been breached by the fire of the batteries; but most of the inner walls had not been greatly injured. The indications were that their sepoy garrison was not less than 5,000 strong.

General Hope led the assault at 4 in the afternoon, the Highlanders in the advance and the Punjaubees in support. At the opening in the breastwork they met with a fierce resistance, and for a while success seemed doubtful, owing to the greatly superior numbers of the sepoys. But British valor could not be easily overcome, and the fighting continued steadily. When the sepoys were driven back from the breach they seemed to have lost heart, and to make but a feeble resistance at their other strong positions. The Highlanders and the Punjaubees fought like tigers. Not a sepoy asked for quarter, and no quarter was offered by the British soldiers. When the last survivor of the garrison of the Bakum

Kothi fled from it, there were fully 600 corpses inside the space surrounded by its ditch. During the whole siege there was no severer fight than this. The way was now opened for Brigadier Napier to proceed by the sap and heavy guns.

"Thenceforward," says Sir Colin, in his report, "he pushed his approach with the greatest judgment through the enclosures, the troops immediately occupying the ground as he advanced, and the mortars being moved from one position to another as ground was won on which they could be placed."

By the close of the day, on the 13th, the engineers had completed their work. All the great buildings on the left of the line as far as the Imambara had been sapped through. The artillery, which had been steadily playing on the walls of the Imambara, had made a breach which was considered practicable for an assault. The firing was continued through the night of the 13th, and on the morning of the 14th the heavy guns, at only thirty yards distance, pounded steadily away. The sepoys did not reply with artillery, but they kept up a steady fire of musketry from the tops of the walls. At 9 in the forenoon the order for the assault was given. The men went forward with a rush, and very speedily were in full possession of the palaces. They did not stop there, but pursued the rebels until they gained a position which commanded the Kaiser Bagh.


The engineers wanted to stop the advance of the troops; but this was easier to say than to do. The Sikhs of Brasyer's regiment were almost uncontrollable. They climbed through an embrasure into a bastion, and then made their way into a court-yard close to the Kaiser Bagh. The Tenth Foot advanced, and turned the third line of the defence by passing through the bazaars in the rear of the Tara Kothi. Re-inforcements were sent for, and Gen. Franks advanced immediately with all the men he could

muster. An important question was at issue whether it would be safe, with all the advantages then gained, to storm the Kaiser Bagh, or wait until the batteries had forced a breach. The intention was on that morning, March 14th, only to attack the Imambara; but the impetuosity of the troops and the feeble defence of the sepoys had not been counted on. Considering all the circumstances, and that the rebels seemed to have been overcome by panic, it was considered advisable to push on while the defenders were still disordered, and the storming forces were still enthusiastic for the advance. Franks and Napier, after weighing all the conditions of the situation, decided to advance. They asked for reinforcements, which were not long in coming up, the troops on the right advancing and occupying the Moti Mahal with very little resistance. At the same time Franks pushed his column through the court-yard of Sadat Ali's Mosque directly into the Kaiser Bagh, which is a rectangular palace about 400 yards square. The enclosure includes a series of gardens and courts, through which marble summer-houses are scattered. The whole place swarmed with sepoys, who poured a heavy musketry fire on the British, not only from the summer-houses and various parts of the palace, but from the roofs of the neighboring dwellings.

But the British having gained a footing in the garden, the cause of the rebels was hopeless. The Kaiser Bagh was captured with a great slaughter of the insurgents who defended it. One historian of the Indian mutiny says that after the massacre at Cawnpore the soldiers divided among them the tresses of a murdered girl, and swore that for every hair of her head one sepoy should die. As far as possible they kept their word. In Sir Colin Campbell's relief of Lucknow and in the siege which has just been described, no quarter was given. If any fallen sepoy ventured to ask it, "Cawnpore!" was hissed in his

ear and the word was accompanied or instantly followed by a shot or the thrust of a bayonet.

The siege and fall of Lucknow formed the prelude to the end of the rebellion. There was considerable fighting in various parts of India during 1858 and early in the following year, but the battles were of no great moment and an almost continuous series of defeats for the rebels. In the autumn of 1858 the rule of the East India Company came to an end, after an existence of more than two hundred and fifty years, and the control of the Indian empire passed to the British government.





CHAPTER XI.

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIN—1858-60.

THE empire of China claims an antiquity of about five thousand years, but for the first thousand years of this period its history is of a mythical character. According to its chronology, one of its early rulers is said to have reigned one hundred and fourteen years, and another is credited with the conduct of affairs for one hundred and forty years, during which he introduced medical science and agriculture. Through many dynasties China was troubled with external and internal wars, chiefly the latter, but in all ages down to the present she maintained her seclusion from the rest of the world. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch and other European nations endeavored to gain admission to the country, but their efforts were successfully resisted, though they were allowed to trade under numerous restrictions in the waters near Canton. England, Russia, and other countries sent embassies at different times, the East India Company had a trading concession, but all attempts at official and commercial intercourse were practically unsuccessful. About 1834 began the opium dispute, which led to troubles between England and China. These troubles grew into wars, which resulted unfavorably to the Chinese, and led to the opening of various ports, not only for commercial purposes, but for the permanent residence of foreign merchants.

By the treaty of Nankin in 1843, China was to pay to

England an indemnity of \$21,000,000 for the cost of the war; five ports were thrown open for commerce and residence; Hong Kong became British soil; and there was to be lasting peace and friendship between the two empires. The peace lasted until 1856, when the seizure of the opium smuggler *Arrow*, by the Chinese, led to disputes, and the disputes into another war which lasted for nearly two years. It ended in the capture of Canton early in 1858, and the capture of the Peiho forts a few months later, and a treaty of peace signed at Tien-Tsin, by Lord Elgin on the part of England, and Baron Gros on that of France, Commissioner Keying acting for the Emperor of China. By this treaty Peking was to be open to foreign ambassadors, there should be freedom of trade throughout the empire under certain restrictions connected with the customs duties, Christianity was to be tolerated, the expense of the war to be paid by China, the tariff to be revised, and the term "barbarian" not to be applied any longer to Europeans.

As this treaty formed the practical opening to the rest of the world of the great empire that had been secluded for fifty centuries, the capture of the Peiho forts, which led to the treaty of Tien-Tsin, is worthy of a place among the decisive battles of the century. The account of this event is derived from the journals of Mr. Oliphant, the private secretary of Lord Elgin, and subsequently the historian of the embassy.

On his way northward from Canton Lord Elgin stopped at Shanghai, where he sought to meet the governor of that city, and asked that a letter be forwarded to the imperial government at Peking. The governor received him outside the town of Soochow, near Shanghai. That high official took the letter, which he read in the street, surrounded by a crowd of people, who looked over his shoulders and perused the document at the same time. After the reading was ended, the governor politely asked the

British ambassador to leave the town immediately, and also to prevent any members of his party from walking through the streets. In due course of time a reply came to the letter. It was from Prime-Minister Yuh, signed by the Vermilion Pencil (Emperor). The substance of the reply was, that in the first place the British ambassador should go straight back to Canton, as that was the only point from which negotiations could be received. This was not the kind of reply Lord Elgin had desired. He did not wish to use force in getting near the imperial throne, but could see no other way out of the difficulty. Accordingly he determined to pass the forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, then advance to Tien-Tsin, and make another effort to communicate with the imperial government. The representatives of the other powers supported him in this design, particularly the Russian minister, Count Poutiatine, who thought that even this measure would fail, and that nothing short of a powerful naval and military force could break through the obstinacy of the emperor and those who surrounded him.

Light-draught boats were ordered up and the fleet proceeded through the Yellow Sea to the mouth of the Peiho. As they entered the Gulf of Pechele, they encountered strong gales, which turned that body of water into a substance resembling boiling pea-soup. Occasionally the cold gales from the northeast suddenly ceased and were followed with hot blasts filled with impalpable sand from the great desert of Gobi. Ten fathoms was found to be the average depth of the Gulf of Pechele. As the fleet neared the coast the water shoaled, and suddenly the leadsmen announced only four fathoms. Immediately the ships were brought to anchor.

The position of the fleet was nearly in front of the entrance of Peiho, "The River of the North." A bar extends into the gulf at least a mile from the mouth of the river. This bar has eleven feet of water upon it


at high tide; at half tide it protrudes in some places, and in its shallowest places is not over two feet deep. The bottom is smooth and hard, and appears to be quite level. The channel of the river is marked by stakes, from which the fishermen hang bunches of nets. The French, Russian, and American ships anchored close in with the British fleet, and the question arose whether the forts would permit the passage of the Peiho or make an attack necessary. Upon a general consultation, it was decided to send another letter to the Chinese prime-minister, telling him that four plenipotentiaries had arrived at the mouth of the Peiho and desired a meeting at Takoo, either on land or on shipboard. It was further stated that they would allow six days for an answer, and if no answer came within that time, they would regard themselves at liberty to take whatever action they pleased. Takoo was named as a place of meeting rather than Tien-Tsin because it was more convenient, not being so far inland.

The four plenipotentiaries embarked in a small boat towed by a steamer, which carried them across the bar. This was the first time that the Northern Chinese had ever seen the "outside barbarians" advancing up their river. Long lines of people stood on the low banks of the river, manifesting no apparent emotion, and evidently actuated only by curiosity. As the steamer and the boat in tow advanced up the river, they met a junk bearing a mandarin of the rank of the Transparent Blue Button. He ordered the boat to return immediately, but promised to be responsible for the safe transport and delivery of the letter. The interview with the mandarin enabled the officers on the steamer to obtain a good view of the forts. As near as they could discover, there were about fifty pieces of cannon posted along the banks of the river, most of them of iron, the rest of brass, and some of a very great calibre. On the left bank of the river the forts seemed to

be nothing but heaps of mud. They had ramparts only on the river side, their rear being quite unprotected, and therefore open to assault from that direction. All the forts were covered with banners, these banners being of a triangular shape with serrated edges, and white spots on a blue or yellow ground. As a result of the reconnoitring, it was found that there were three forts on the south bank and two on the north, connected by a line of mud batteries, and in many instances half buried beneath the flags that waved over the parapets and embrasures. The foreign fleet which lay outside the mouth of the river included thirty vessels as follows :

English.	Guns	Men		Ves'ls
Calcutta,	84	700	French,	11
Pique,	40	270	American { Minnesota Mississippi Antelope	3
Furious, paddle-steamer,	8	220		
Nimrod, despatch Govt. vessel,	6	120		
Cormorant,	6	98	Russian,	1
Surprise,	6	160	English,	15 15
Fury,	8	48		
Slaney, gunboat,	5	48		
Leven,	5	48		
Bustard,	3	48		
Opposum,	3	48		
Staunch,	3	48		
Firm,	3	48		
Coromandel,	5	45		
Hesper, storeship,				
15 Vessels.		1909	Total,	30

The answer to the letter was duly received and was quite in the vein that had been expected. Tan, the High Commissioner, evidently intended to negotiate without full powers to do so. Then the plenipotentiaries sent an ultimatum demanding that a commissioner with full powers should be sent, and positively stating that no others would be received. The limit of time for their reception was fixed for May 19th, and in case the Chinese



FORTS ON RIVER PEI-HO.

should decline the British offer of occupying the forts temporarily, force would be employed to take possession of them. To this letter no reply was received, and accordingly the ships made ready to act.

At ten o'clock in the forenoon of May 20th, the signal was displayed for the ships to move into position. The *Cormorant*, *Mitraille* and *Fusée* had been assigned to assail the two forts on the northern bank, while the *Nimrod*, *Avalanche*, and *Dragonne* were to attack the three forts on the southern bank and their connecting line of mud batteries. The scene just before the signal of attack was hoisted, was an animated one. The *Cormorant* was the ship farthest in advance up the river, where she lay impatiently letting off little puffs of steam as she stood in readiness to dash through the bamboo barrier, which the Chinese had stretched across the river, and face the line of fire of the forts to which she would be exposed before reaching her position. The *Nimrod* was close behind the *Cormorant*, with her decks clear for action, all the men at their posts and every thing ready for active work. The English and French gunboats were at some distance behind the *Nimrod*, and their decks were crowded with men.

Hardly had the signal flag touched the truck of the *Slaney* before the engines of the *Cormorant* were in motion and she started off to her destination, her men lying flat on the deck and only her commander and two or three officers visible. Scarcely was she under way before there was a puff of smoke at one of the ports and a round shot came whistling close to the steamer. This shot was followed by another and another, and in a few moments all three of the southern forts were firing at her with all their guns. The *Cormorant* did not reply. Suddenly there was a shock; the course of the vessel was partially stopped, then she went on ahead again and, with a little struggle, broke the barrier, which consisted of five seven-

inch cables of bamboo that were buoyed from one side of the river to the other. There was nothing now to prevent her going into position. She fired a single gun at the batteries on the south bank, evidently desiring to recognize the courtesy they had shown her, and then concentrated the force of her batteries on the northern forts, which she completely silenced in less than twenty minutes. Just as she had finished her work, two other French boats came up to assist her, but their help was not needed.

In the meanwhile, the *Nimrod* had followed close after the *Cormorant*, and opened a furious fire on the forts on the southern bank. Owing to her position she began her work before the *Cormorant* reached the duty assigned to her, and the *Nimrod* no doubt saved the *Cormorant* from several shots by drawing them in her own direction. For fully fifteen minutes these two steamers were engaging all the forts on the southern bank without any assistance. Very soon however, the four French gunboats came up, two of them instructed to support the *Cormorant* and the other two the *Dragonne* and the *Avalanche*. They were considerably hindered by the strong tide which was then running and by the sinuosities of the channel. The power of these boats was not sufficient for such work and they were decidedly clumsy in their movements, but as soon as they were in position they fired away very accurately at the forts. For fully an hour the Chinese retained their positions at their guns, better than the English officers had expected they would. Though not deficient in bravery, they were not skilled in artillery practice, as nearly all their shots passed high above the assailing ships. The French boats lost four officers killed and two men, probably due to the fact that the officers on the bridge or poop of the boat were more exposed than the men. The practice of the Chinese gunners does not make it easy to silence a battery. It is their habit after discharging a gun to retire into a bomb proof and await the enemy's return

shot ; when this is given, they wait a few moments, then creep out as stealthily as possible, load and fire the gun without exposing themselves, and then run back to the bomb proofs. Of course, artillery practice of this kind is very slow, but as the Peiho batteries had nearly one hundred and fifty guns in position, they could do a good deal of shooting when taken in the aggregate.

About an hour before noon the admirals, followed by their gunboats, advanced up the river. The Chinese gave them a liberal number of shots on the way; but very few struck the vessels. The attention of the forts was drawn toward the fleet scattered along the river, and the garrison seemed totally unaware that the storming parties were landing just above the line of forts, partially concealed by the gunboats and smaller craft grouped together. They were not aware that it was the custom of European soldiers to take batteries by assault, but supposed that a battery was to be fired upon only on its front, where it was best prepared to resist attack. To all appearances they were completely surprised at the manœuvre of the outside barbarians, and as the distance was very small, the men were inside the forts in a very short time. As the leaders of the storming party sprang into the battery there seemed to be a panic among all the defenders, and a wild rush for safety followed immediately. The storming parties chased the fleeing Chinese; but the latter were too swift for them; terror added wings to their flight, and in a few minutes not a Chinese soldier was to be seen. Occasionally some of them halted as if to show fight, but the gleam of the English sabres made their hearts sink, and they renewed their flight with greater precipitation than before.

Less than fifteen minutes after the first sailors and marines landed, the whole garrison of the forts was dispersed. Their loss was not very great; they fled so quickly that there was little chance to harm any of them.

Once inside the batteries the officers perceived how completely the whole garrison might have been taken in a trap, from which not a single man could have escaped. If a reasonable force had been sent around to the village of Takoo, the forts would have been completely under the control of the invaders. A little farther away there were two entrenched camps, defended by some guns in position, and also by a small force of cavalry. These camps were flanked by the storming party, and their occupants were immediately seized with the same panic that had caused the garrison to flee so hastily. The artillery found in the camps included four brass cannon (68-pounders), ten or twelve iron guns, and some twenty-five 6-pounder light guns. Each battery was served and supported by not less than 1,000 men. There were many tents and a good deal of camp equipage inside the entrenchment; but there was not much that was worth carrying away.


The Chinese government has a summary way of dealing with its representatives who do not succeed in the work assigned to them. This was the fate of the unfortunate Tan, the Imperial Commissioner, who had been instructed to drive out the barbarians and send them to their homes, or, at least, to Canton. A few days later the *Pekin Gazette* announced in the following terms the punishment of this unfortunate official:

"Whereas, Tan-Ting-Siang, already degraded from the office of Governor-General of Chih-Li, has been found not guilty of cowardice and desertion, but in that his operations were without plan or resource, his offence is not the less without excuse. Let him be banished to the frontier (confines of Siberia), there to redeem his guilt by his exertions."

The 21st of May was devoted to resting the men and to an inspection of the Chinese works and the villages near them. On the 22d the fleet moved up the river, the allied admirals taking the lead and the plenipotentiaries

remaining behind in consequence of Lord Elgin's fear that the presence of the diplomats might complicate matters in case the admirals were obliged to use force in reaching Tien-Tsin. The river was crowded with junks, and the steamers had some difficulty in forcing their way through this floating barrier, but they managed to do so without accident. After a few miles, a line of junks was found stretching across the river and forming a regular barrier which it did not take long to remove. Other barriers of the same sort were encountered, and small groups of cavalry came down to observe the strange vessels propelled by steam, which for the first time were making the ascent of the Peiho. When fired upon the cavalry invariably scampered away; no forts were visible on this part of the river, and the people did not seem inclined to show any hostility.

On learning of the arrival of the allied fleet at Tien-Tsin the Peking government at once determined to send ambassadors to treat for peace, and on the 29th May the plenipotentiaries, French and English, started from Takoo to Tien-Tsin where they were to meet the Chinese representative. The negotiations consumed a month, the Chinese using every artifice to secure delay and modify the condition which the foreigners were forcing upon them, while the latter, knowing their strength, were disinclined to recede from their demands. The Chinese commissioner, Keying, said that the foreigners were holding a knife at the throat of China and compelling her to do something that was totally foreign to her wishes. While the ambassadors would not admit the truth of this assertion, they could hardly deny the fact except in a diplomatic sense. Lord Elgin's diary shows that his private opinion on this subject was materially different from the one he professed in public. Personally he had a great deal of sympathy for the Chinese, but officially he could do nothing else than carry out the orders of his sovereign.



ENGAGING THE TAKOO FORTS, PEIHO RIVER.

After the signing of the treaty the allies left Tien-Tsin and proceeded down the river, greatly to the delight of the imperial government, who feared that the ambassadors would demand permission to visit Peking and have a personal audience with the emperor. The ratification of the treaty was delayed on various pretexts, and in a general way matters did not run smoothly. In June, 1859, Mr. Bruce, the British envoy, was stopped in the Peiho River while on his way to Peking. Admiral Hope attempted to force a passage, but was repulsed with a loss of 81 killed and about 400 wounded. The emperor had decided to repudiate the treaty made with Lord Elgin the previous year, and the forts had been put in a stronger condition than ever before.

Mr. Bruce proceeded to Shanghai and waited instructions; the French minister did likewise, but the American representative went to Peking by a route indicated by the Chinese commissioners; his reception was unsatisfactory, as he refused to prostrate himself before the emperor, and was therefore denied the privilege of seeing his Majesty. Matters assumed a warlike phase; the British and French ministers were instructed by their governments to demand an apology for the occurrences at the mouth of the Peiho, to receive any friendly messages in a conciliatory spirit, to decline any ceremonial unless it recognized the equality of the governments, and to further inform the Chinese government that force would be used if necessary to secure acceptance of the terms proposed.

The ultimata of the two governments were delivered to the Chinese government in March, 1860, and in the following month a reply was received definitely refusing the demands of the English and French. Diplomacy having exhausted itself nothing remained, but force. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros arrived at Shanghai in June; a military and naval force was formed for the purpose of moving on Peking, and by the end of July every thing was ready. On the first

day of August a land force of five thousand men was landed at the mouth of the Pehtang, a small stream which reaches the sea about ten miles north of the mouth of the Peiho. The forts of the latter river had been greatly strengthened in the expectation that the foreigners would seek an entrance by the river as in 1858 and 1859. Peh-tang was found to be deserted, and consequently the troops landed without opposition. Reinforcements arrived steadily until the combined strength of the allies exceeded 20,000 men.

Three weeks were consumed in getting ashore all the material of war, provisions, etc., and making every thing ready for an advance into the interior. The forts of the Peiho were taken in the rear with but little opposition, and Tien-Tsin was occupied on the 24th, under similar circumstances. The Chinese were greatly surprised at the failure of the allies to walk into the trap that had been set for them, and some of their generals suggested that they had not been fairly treated.

As soon as the allies were fairly in Tien-Tsin, the Chinese showed a disposition to negotiate. Commissioners appeared from Peking and said they had full power to make terms of peace; negotiations began and a treaty was drawn, but when it was nearly ready for signatures the commissioners said they could not stipulate that it would be carried out unless it was ratified before signing. This very unusual proceeding convinced the English and French ambassadors that the Chinese were insincere in their pretensions and only seeking to gain time. Accordingly the order was given to march on Peking, and very speedily the army was in motion. Small bodies of Tartar cavalry harassed the troops at various times, but practically there was little opposition and only trifling loss of life or blood. While the army was in motion, new proposals came from Peking, and it was finally agreed that the army should halt at Tungchow, twelve miles from the

capital, and there wait the arrival of commissioners who should have full power to negotiate without hindrance.

To make arrangements for the reception of the ambassadors at Tungchow, gain a camping-place, and negotiate for provisions, the British consul, Mr. Parkes, (afterwards Sir Harry Parkes), with 23 others, went forward on the 21st of September, under a flag of truce, but soon after they had passed the British lines they were seized as prisoners, thrown into a filthy prison, and afterwards carried in cages to Pekin, where they were shown to the populace by whom they were treated with the greatest indignity. Two of the party, Captain Brabazon and Abbé De Luc were beheaded and their bodies were thrown into the canal; eleven others were either killed or died from the effects of the treatment they received. Those who survived were frequently at the point of death by starvation or cruelty, and none of them ever expected to see their friends again.

In consequence of the treacherous seizure of Mr. Parkes and his party, the allies marched directly upon Pekin; they were resisted by the Chinese, and the resistance followed so closely upon the violation of the flag of truce as to leave no room for doubt of the faithlessness of the Pekin government. A battle ensued in which the Chinese were completely routed, and then came another proposal to halt to which no attention was given.

On Friday, October 5th, the English forces arrived at the brick kilns, about three miles from the northeast corner of the walls of Pekin, and there went into camp. At daybreak, on the morning of the 6th, the advance was renewed. Information had reached Sir Hope Grant, the commander, that a large Tartar army was encamped near the city, and had a strong defensive position quite close to the walls. Sir Hope consequently made a sweep to the right, thus moving towards the city from the north, in order to flank any works which might be in that locali-

ty. Although the precaution was an excellent one, it turned out that there was no occasion for it.

After a march of not far from two miles, the army came to a halt in a level plain which was quite open—in fact, more so than the rest of the region round about, on which there are many clumps and clusters of trees. Looking out for the tallest brick kiln, the general climbed it, in order to ascertain the character of the plain, and possibly get a sight of the Tartar army, which had not yet made its appearance, not even by a skirmishing line. The French army was on the left of the rear of the English, while the cavalry, with the single exception of a squadron of Dragoon Guards, was on the right flank. The roads were narrow and quite deeply sunken. They were fairly passable for cavalry and infantry, but abominable for any thing with wheels. Had the Chinese chosen to oppose the advance, they could have given a great deal of trouble. The sunken character of the roads would have made it very difficult for troops to manœuvre, and furthermore, the numerous clumps of trees and the thick brushwood would have furnished concealment for skirmishers, even had they been armed with nothing better than the Chinese match-locks. A careful watch was kept, and occasionally it was whispered along the line that the Chinese were drawn up in front, and a battle was near at hand. After a time the rumor proved to be correct, as a line of Tartar troops really appeared in front of the advancing column. The 60th Rifles were deployed into a skirmishing line in the hope of outflanking the Tartars, but the deployment had not been completed before the brave defenders of their country disappeared as though they had melted into thin air.

During the time the English were advancing upon the city the French were at the famous summer palace, Yuen-Min-Yuen, about six miles away, which they reached by a flanking movement in the rear of the English. The latter continued their advance towards the city, while the

French were making themselves at home in the summer palace. The English came in sight of Pekin when not more than a half a mile from it. A long street shaded by trees led from the suburb directly to one of the gates. At the entrance to the long street there was a large Buddhist temple, and around it was a strong wall at least twelve feet high, and easily capable of defence. The gates were closed and barred on the inside. No one appeared to open them; but a beam of timber was brought forward and used as a battering-ram until the bars gave way. There was no opposition to the entrance of the English. Not a single Chinese soldier was in sight. Lord Elgin, and his staff, and Sir Hope Grant, also accompanied by his staff, made this gate their head-quarters. The artillery head-quarters were outside of the gate, and the artillery was parked close up in order to be in readiness on short notice when it was wanted. General Grant changed his head-quarters into a temple near by, leaving Lord Elgin and his staff in sole possession of the gate. The "Queen's Own" regiment was ordered to a position half way to the city gate, on the right of the street, and close to Sir Robert Napier. The Fifteenth Punjaabee was a little farther forward on the same street, and the Eighth held the position of rear guard.

Preparations were made for an assault upon Pekin in case it should be necessary to make one, in order to obtain possession of the gate which had been demanded. On the left front of the allied position there was a broad open plain, about a mile and a half square, which was ordinarily used as a parade ground for the Tartar army. Looking towards the city on the right this plain was bordered by a broad road which led to the North or Anting Gate. This was the gate of which the allies demanded possession. Farther on, and to the left of the suburb, was the magnificent Temple of the Earth, surrounded by a strong wall eighteen feet high, which embraced an en-

closure fully a quarter of a mile square. The siege guns were immediately brought up to this temple. This place was about three hundred yards from the great wall of the city, an admirable position for making a breach in case of necessity. Work was pushed as rapidly as possible, and the battery was completed in a few days. When every thing was ready a proclamation was issued, in which the allies threatened to shell the city unless the Chinese surrendered the Anting Gate within twenty-four hours. According to their custom, when the pressure is so great that resistance is no longer possible, the Chinese surrendered. The proclamation was issued on the 12th of November, and on the 13th the gate was given up, and the British colors were hoisted above it.

While the English were securing the northern gate of the city and preparing for an assault, the French were in possession of the summer palace of Yuen-Min-Yuen, about six miles from Pekin. Mr. Parkes and some of his companions were restored to the British on the 6th October, under the impression that their return would induce the hostile forces to retire, at least to Tungchow. The ambassadors decided that the destruction of the summer palace, while it would do little harm to the people, would be a severe blow to the emperor and government, and that nothing else they could do would be so effectual in humbling Chinese pride. Accordingly the order was given, and on the 18th October the palace, with all its vast series of outbuildings, was destroyed by fire, after being thoroughly looted by the French and English soldiers. The French had by far the best of the looting, as they were at the palace for several days before the English joined them. The destruction of the palace has been severely criticised; but there is certainly excellent foundation for the argument of the ambassadors. The Chinese were directly informed that the destruction was in retaliation for the murder of the prisoners who had been so

treacherously taken while under a flag of truce. The bodies of two of these victims of treachery, Mr. De Norman and Mr. Bowlby, were buried with solemn services in the Russian cemetery at Peking on the day before the destruction of Yuen-Min-Yuen.

Before the capture of the city the emperor fled to Mongolia, and left his brother, Prince Kung, to make terms with the invaders. The prince was very reluctant to accept the terms offered by the ambassadors, and only yielded when they threatened to destroy the city. One gate was placed in the possession of the English, and another in the hands of the French, and the prince was plainly told that he must come to a decision at once. Under this pressure he ratified the treaty of Tien-Tsin, which had been extorted two years before at the muzzle of the allied cannon, and signed a new treaty, in which there were additional humiliations for his country. The emperor expressed his regret at the occurrence at the Peiho forts; the right of England to keep a resident minister at Peking was acknowledged; the Chinese paid an indemnity of \$15,000,000, and promised to keep the peace faithfully in the future; Tien-Tsin was opened to trade; Chinese were allowed freely to emigrate to the British colonies; Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, was ceded to the British; and the immediate operation of the treaty and convention was provided for.

Since March, 1861, Peking has been the residence of the foreign ministers; embassies have been sent to foreign powers; and the empire so long secluded from the rest of the world has been open to the visits of foreigners whether in prosecution of commercial enterprises or in search of health or pleasure. China has adopted many foreign inventions and adapted them to her own use, and though still conservative she is no longer isolated. The end of her isolation may be fairly dated from the passage of the Peiho forts in 1858 and the capture of Peking two years later.



CHAPTER XII.

BATTLE OF SOLFERINO—1859.


IN the revolutions which blazed over Europe in 1848, Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, presented himself as the champion of Italian independence. He gave military aid to the insurgents in Lombardy, Parma, and Piedmont, and refused offers of assistance from the French with the reply that Italy would help herself. At first he was successful and defeated the Austrians on the fields of Pastrenga and Goito, but later he was defeated at Custozza, and forced into full retreat; his reverses resulted in an armistice, and on its expiration he renewed hostilities, relying on the simultaneous attack of the Hungarians upon the Austrians. On the 23d March, 1849, he was utterly defeated at Novara, and the Austrian rule upon Italy was confirmed and made stronger than ever before. The hope which Italy had based upon his efforts was utterly lost; Charles Albert surrendered the crown to his son, Victor Emanuel II., and retired to Oporto, where he died four months after his abdication.

A statesman who had much to do with Sardinia's declaration of war against Austria in 1848 and '9, was Camillo Benso Cavour, better known as Count Cavour. In 1850 he was called to the Cabinet of Victor Emanuel, and two years later was named President of the Council. All his energies were bent in the direction of renewing the struggle with Austria in the hope of uniting all Italy under the rule of the king of Sardinia. By joining France,

Turkey, and England in the war against Russia in 1854, he gave Sardinia a place among the nations, and made sure that she would be represented at any conference to settle upon a treaty of peace. In conjunction with the Marquis Villamarina, Count Cavour represented Sardinia at the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, and during the conference he succeeded in winning Louis Napoleon almost completely to his purposes. In consequence of Orsini's attempt upon the life of the Emperor of the French, Cavour caused Sardinia to enact a special law against "suspects." The passage of this law was considered indicative of the intimate relations existing between Sardinia and France; Austria endeavored to create a better feeling for herself by a series of liberal measures and promises. Events indicated that a triple alliance against Austria was being formed by Russia, France, and Sardinia, and consequently there was much uneasiness.

On New Year's Day, 1859, the foreign ambassadors in Paris made their customary calls upon the emperor. The latter received the Austrian representative with his usual courtesy, and in the course of the interview said: "I regret that our relations with your government are not as good as formerly, but I beg of you to tell the emperor that my personal sentiments for him have not changed."

These few words caused excitement in diplomatic circles all over Europe. Austria and France pushed their preparations for war, and the Emperor of Austria replied to Louis Napoleon in much the same terms that the latter had used on New Year's Day when speaking to the Austrian ambassador. On the 30th of January Prince Napoleon was married to Princess Clothilde of Sardinia, and immediately thereafter the Austrian armies in Italy were increased, and the banks of the Ticino, the boundary between Sardinia and the Italian provinces of Austria, were fortified. In March and April Sardinia and France prepared for war; Russia sought to intervene and



proposed a Congress, but there were disputes regarding the admission of Sardinia and nothing came of the proposal. On the 23d April, Austria demanded that within three days Sardinia should disarm, and dismiss the volunteers from other States; Sardinia refused on the 26th, and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Ticino. The French troops which had been massing on the frontier entered Piedmont on the 27th April, and on the 8th of May Napoleon III. made formal declaration of war, announcing his purpose to be nothing more than the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy.

For some two or three weeks there were no actual hostilities, the Austrians being occupied with plundering the part of Italy they had entered, and the French using every exertion to bring up their troops and make ready for battle. The Austrian left wing was defeated near Montebello on the 20th May; on the 31st May and 1st June the Austrians were again worsted at Palestro and driven across the Ticino. On the 4th June was fought the battle of Magenta, in which the Austrians were routed with a loss of about 20,000 (including 7,000 prisoners), the French losing about 7,000 killed and wounded. The Austrians took up a position along the line of the Mincio; the armies of Austria and France were commanded by their emperors in person, and for the next twenty days they were manœuvred in such a way as to bring them in collision at Solferino, whose battle-field has become historic.

On the 23d of June 151,000 French and Sardinians stood facing 160,000 Austrians, the latter having 650 guns and the former nearly as many. The Austrian right and centre occupied strong defensive positions, their left wing standing on a plain waiting to begin the attack. It was intended, since the opportunity seemed to be offered, to push the French out of their encampments beyond the Chiese and up to the base of the mountains. A consider-

able portion of the ground between the Chiese and the Mincio was level and full of earthworks and strong positions; the remainder was a plain or slightly undulating land, covered with vineyards, small gardens, cornfields, and orchards of fruit-trees. The more broken ground behind this position extends from Volta to Sonato, closing around the plain in a half-circle. Just above the hills rises the village of Solferino. The plain is broken by fissures in many places, which interfere with the rapid movement of troops. There are also many long stone walls bounding the farms.

The only place for manœuvring large bodies of troops is the plateau of San Martino, which is seen in the distance, and its northern and western sides are so steep as to render it a very powerful position. A valley running to the south of Solferino widens into a marsh. The highways from Castiglione and Carpendolo extend along the hills, and not far off is the square between Pozzolengo, Volta, Medola and Rivoltella, the field where the battle of Castiglione was fought in 1796.

At daybreak on the 24th the French and Sardinians broke up their encampments, marching in close array. The 1st corps, commanded by Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers, was to attack the Austrians in their position on the heights of Solferino; the 2d corps, which was to advance on the village, had been on the way since three o'clock, in the morning. The 1st division was ordered to support the right wing of the 2d; it started at four o'clock, moving on towards Castiglione. The 1st division was to be followed by the 3d, which was not to move from Esenta before six o'clock. A great deal of time was lost in these movements, in consequence of the rugged nature of the ground to be crossed and the lack of knowledge of the plans and positions of the Austrians. The 1st division under General Forey encountered the Austrian outposts near the little town of Fontana and forced

them back. When the 5th Austrian corps learned definitely that the French were moving up, they took position on the western edge of Solferino. In attempting to carry the hills in front of that point, the French found that the Austrians were in front in great strength; they were repulsed with heavy loss, and the 3d corps was stopped also close by Casa Morino, a very strong farm-house on the road between Medola and Solferino.

The 2d French corps then formed in readiness for battle without trying to advance farther to the front. Marshal MacMahon sent couriers to head-quarters to report that he was in front of the entire Austrian army in position on the line of Solferino to Carriano. He did not dare to risk an attack, and therefore remained in position waiting for orders from the emperor and for information regarding the whereabouts of the 4th corps, which he depended on to cover his right flank. This corps had started from Carpendolo at three o'clock taking the road to Medola. It was temporarily commanded by General Niel, and had at the end of a two-hours' march encountered some squadrons of Uhlans who were speedily driven back. When the Austrian commander learned that the French were advancing in full strength on Medola, he dispatched two brigades to oppose them. Marshal Canrobert, commanding the 3d corps, was to go into camp at Medola, but to avoid crossing the lines of the 4th corps he left the direct line of advance and proceeded by a long and circuitous route around Acqua Fredda and Castel Goffredo. When the 3d corps had crossed the Chiese near Visano they encountered a regiment of hussars whom they drove back.

Marshal Canrobert wanted to go to the support of the 4th corps, and on learning that General Luy's division was menaced on its flank he turned his command towards Ceresana, but was delayed by the Chiese, whose crossing consumed two hours. The three Piedmontese divisions

were on the extreme left of the front of the allied army. These divisions were making a reconnoissance of the fields between Lake Garda and Pozzolengo towards Peschiera, and seeing the Austrians posted on a ridge they advanced to attack them. At first they drove them back, but a reinforcement of Austrians came up and the Piedmontese in their turn were compelled to retire. General Benedek had 25,000 men occupying a large expanse of country. Two brigades were at some distance from the main body, but the Piedmontese made no attempt to take advantage of this insecure position. When General Benedek had dispersed their advance guard he sought to cut off their line of retreat, but General Mollard coming on with the 3d Piedmontese brigade took up the fight and marched to the attack on San Martino. The steep height was twice scaled by 6,000 Piedmontese and twice they were driven back, followed and crowded upon Rivoltella, thus losing all the advantages they had previously gained.

While these encounters were taking place Marshals MacMahon and Baraguey d' Hilliers notified head-quarters that the Austrians were throwing out heavy columns on the hills of Solferino and Carriano. Therefore the emperor left Montichiari and took a new position at Castiglione, accompanied by his staff and personal escort. The advancing columns of the French were spread out at too great a distance to render one another any effective support. The 3d corps was sent to support the 4th corps and to stop an Austrian corps which was marching from Mantua upon Ossola. The 2d Piedmontese division turned from the Solferino road to find their 3d and 5th divisions defeated at San Martino, but their assistance was of no avail as the ranks were already badly broken and scattered.


Marshal Baraguey d' Hilliers, thus unsupported on his left wing and menaced on his right makes ready for the

assault on the formidable works of Solferino. Upon the result of this assault will depend the issue of the battle. One brigade under General Forey moves into the plain while another is ordered to occupy a position on the heights against Solferino village, with the voltigeurs of the Guard in readiness to support them. The artillery of the Guards is unlimbered in front of the Austrian position, at a distance of 300 yards. The Imperial Guards rest on a line with General Forey's division.

It is now eleven o'clock. This twofold assault, properly aided by the reserve artillery of the 1st corps together with the three columns resting on Monte Fenile, ought to make success certain on the centre of the line. The Emperor of Austria had likewise transferred his head-quarters, going to Volta, where he learned that the French had begun the attack in earnest. At 9.12 A.M. he issued the following command :

"General Slick, the commander of the 2d army, is to hold Solferino as long as he can. The 8th corps, after folding back the Piedmontese upon Lake Garda, will send detachments in support of the 3d corps. The 1st army will keep its direction and disengage the centre attacked by the enemy."

The 2d brigade of Forey moves forward at a double quick to climb the nearest height to the east of Solferino, but it is driven back by superior numbers. After this repulse General Maneque advances with 3 battalions of voltigeurs. He is more successful, and drives the Austrians upon the base of Monte Sacre, where a fierce battle is being waged. Forey with his 2d brigade finds it impossible to turn the Austrian right flank at the tower of Solferino; his ranks are cut by the shot and shell of Austrians who stubbornly hold the position. The division of General L'Admirault now advances to make its attack, which is chiefly directed on the cemetery and on the castle, but this also is met by a killing fire. The marshal now calls upon



the Division Bazaine for aid, while the Austrians stand waiting for their 2d corps, which never arrived.

Baraguey d'Hilliers perceives that progress from this side is impossible; accordingly he orders his men to attack the cemetery from the rear, and the hill is taken at last. While the 1st French corps is actively engaged, the 2d corps engages the 1st Austrian corps. The Austrians capture Cassiano and Carriano, threatening to cut off MacMahon's retreat. But success at Solferino gives the French some men to spare. The assault is again taken up and the Austrians are forced back. General Manéque holds his position on the high ground of Monte Sacre and General Noël advances on San Cassiano. Marshal MacMahon is enabled to protect his flanks and even to assume the offensive. About five o'clock a strong body of Austrian hussars try to turn MacMahon's left. They advance at a charge and force their way through some French cavalry patrols, through a battalion of Decaen's division, and crowd back some of the imperial cavalry, but do not succeed in breaking the French line.

When Marshal MacMahon learned that General Noël intended to advance on Carriano, he took the offensive, pushing forward the 1st division on Solferino to join the grenadiers protecting San Cassiano. General La Motte-Rouge turning from the right of San Cassiano proceeded to attack the Austrians who were strongly posted there. The Chasseurs d'Afrique headed the column but were driven back, and a second attempt had a similar result.

Even after losing his position at Solferino the Austrian emperor hoped for victory. He believed that on the plateau of Carriano the issue of the day might be changed, and therefore he moved there with his headquarters. By a movement of General Wimpffen the 1st and 2d French corps were separated; the emperor then ordered Wimpffen to combine his forces on Castiglione and to press the French as vigorously as possible. The Aus-

trians moved towards Medola, but were held in check. The 9th Austrian corps attacked Casanuova but did not succeed in capturing it. Opposed to 45,000 French is a force of 65,000 Austrians.

The key of the French position is Casanuova for which they stubbornly contend. Marshal Niel, supported by the 1st brigade of General Trochu, goes out towards Giu-dizzolo, but is attacked by overpowering numbers, and is on the point of being captured when three fresh battalions come up and save him from defeat. It was four o'clock when General Wimpffen was driven back and Niel was rescued; this advantage was obtained by a loss of 5,000 men killed and wounded.

The Austrians could hold their positions no longer; their centre was scattered and their right wing in danger. They formed a new line behind the Mincio, harassed by MacMahon. General Benedek still maintained himself at San Martino. The Piedmontese had suffered severely at his hands, and he was threatening to turn the left of the 1st French. Baraguey d'Hilliers ordered General Mollard to guard against the attack and support the French, but before the blow was struck Benedek suddenly withdrew, in obedience to a command from the emperor to follow the army behind the Mincio.


It was now nine in the evening; no enemy was in view on the plain, and the French passed the night in bivouac on the battle-field. The sun rose next morning on an awful scene; for all of the vast plain on which the two armies had contended the day before was thickly strewn with dead and wounded. The moans and cries of the wounded were heard for miles around. The front of the battle extended nearly fifteen miles from the extreme ends. The fighting was most severe at the village of Solferino, which both parties considered the key of the position; the loss was heaviest at that point, but elsewhere it was far from light.

The losses of the French in the battle amounted to 12,000 killed and wounded of non-commissioned officers and soldiers ; 150 commissioned officers were killed and 570 wounded ; 7 colonels and 6 lieutenant-colonels were killed, and among the wounded there were the Generals L'Admirault, Forey, Auger, Dieu, and Douay. The Sardinian army had 5,525 killed, wounded, and missing, of which 642 were killed. Of Sardinian officers killed there were 49, and 167 officers were wounded. The Sardinian army captured five pieces of cannon ; the French took thirty pieces of cannon, four flags, and 6,000 prisoners. The Austrian losses were said to be 20,000 killed and wounded, including 630 officers, while the prisoners, missing, and stragglers were fully 10,000 more. The Austrians retired beyond the Mincio and took up their position under the shelter of their great quadrilateral of fortresses, where it was considered doubtful if the French would be able to contend with them successfully.

There was a pause in hostilities after the battle. Three days were required for burying the dead who fell in the conflict, but it was fully a week before the peasantry of the country, who had been summoned for the work, had buried or burned the carcasses of the cavalry and artillery horses that strewed the ground for long distances. Negotiations for an armistice were begun immediately, and on the 6th July it was agreed upon. On the 11th of the same month the two emperors met at Villafranca and signed the preliminaries of peace. It was stipulated that Lombardy, with the exception of the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, should be ceded to Sardinia ; Venetia was to remain in possession of Austria ; the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were stipulated ; and an Italian confederation was proposed to be formed.

The defeat of the Austrians at Solferino was the foundation of the united Italy of later days. Within less than a

year after the memorable battle came the revolutions which preceded the solemn proclamation of Victor Emanuel as King of Italy, and a few months later the flight of Francis II. to Gaeta and the capture of that stronghold gave the new ruler the control of the southern part of the peninsula. France was compensated for her part in the war of 1859 by the cession of Savoy and Nice; later events (in 1866 and '70), which will be considered elsewhere, completed the work of unification, and produced the "*Italia Irridenta*" which was the dream of Cavour and for centuries the ardent hope of millions of his countrymen.





CHAPTER XIII.

BATTLE BETWEEN THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC— 1862.

THE battle that was fought in Hampton Roads on the 9th March, 1862, was the first encounter of iron-clad ships of war. It revolutionized the navies of the world and was the death-knell of the "wooden walls" that had ruled the ocean for centuries.

Down almost to 1860 all nations had relied upon wooden ships for their navies; a few iron ships had been constructed, but the models had not materially changed from those of half a century earlier. There was a tendency to reduce the number of decks, and it was evident that the great four-deckers of former times were to be set aside for ships more easy of manœuvring. The paddle had made way for the screw as a means of propulsion. With paddle engines a portion of the machinery was exposed to an enemy's shot, while with a screw steamer every thing was below the water level; besides, the screw left the whole broadside free for fighting or other purposes, which before was considerably enroached upon by the paddle-boxes. The general shape of the ship was the same as of old, and for cruising purposes most war ships made use of their sails far more than steam.

The idea of protecting the sides of vessels with armor of some kind is very old, dating almost as far back as the invention of gunpowder. Indeed some of the Roman galleys and other vessels before gunpowder was

thought of had their sides protected with leather, cordage, wooden beams, heavy planking, or with plates of iron, brass, or other metals. Floating batteries with armored sides were used in the siege of Gibraltar in 1782, and other batteries were constructed at different epochs. The first steam vessel of war was built by Robert Fulton for the United States government; she was launched in October 1814 and completed in the following year. Her sides are said to have been protected by thin plates of iron, but they were doubtless not sufficiently thick to entitle her to be classed as an armored ship.


In 1826 an anonymous French writer proposed the construction of iron or iron-clad war-ships, their walls being sufficiently thick to resist the cannon-shot of those days. Some experiments were made in France in 1834 to ascertain the resisting power of iron against shot and shell, and for several years the proposals for building armored ships were much discussed both in France and England. In 1842 Robert L. Stevens of New Jersey proposed to the United States government to construct iron-clad steam batteries which should be capable of going to sea and able to resist artillery projectiles. It was decided to construct one battery upon Stevens' plan, but work was not commenced upon it until 1854. The battery was never completed, and in 1874 it was sold at auction.

The English government made several experiments with armor plating, but the conclusions were unfavorable to its adoption. To France belongs the credit of the first iron-plated steam frigate of the first class. In the Crimean war she constructed and used four small gun-boats with armor plating; in March, 1858, work was begun on *La Gloire*, a sea-going frigate carrying thirty-six guns, and protected amidships with plates of iron four and a half inches thick, with a backing of two feet of solid timber. *La Gloire* was the precursor of the iron-clad fleet of France, and virtually of the iron-clad fleets of all nations

of the globe. Shortly after she was begun the French laid the keels of the *Normandie* and the *Invincible* on the same plans. England could not afford to lie idle under these circumstances; her naval authorities ordered the building of the *Warrior* and shortly afterwards of the *Black Prince*, *Defence*, and *Queen*.

In 1861 the seizure of the lower Mississippi by the Confederates rendered the construction of armored ships a necessity, and it was undertaken, not by the Navy, but by the War Department. The first of the iron-clad gun-boats were designed and built by James B. Eads, an engineer of St. Louis, and in a very short time he turned out the *St. Louis*, *Carondelet*, *Cairo*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburgh*, *Cincinnati*, and *Benton*. These boats were plated with iron $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick on a backing of 4 inches of wood placed at an angle of 45 degrees in order to glance off horizontal shot; they were not impenetrable to heavy guns, but were safe against field-batteries and smaller cannon, and did excellent service in the work for which they were intended. Several other boats of the same kind were built during the course of the war.

Early in 1861, Norfolk, Virginia, was abandoned by the national government and occupied by the Confederates. The retiring garrison set the navy-yard on fire in several places, and much valuable property was destroyed, including several ships. The steam frigate *Merrimac* was partially burned and then sunk; she was of 3,500 tons burthen, and carried forty guns. After her hull had lain for several weeks under the water, one of the Confederate naval officers proposed to raise her and convert her into an iron-clad gun-boat. The plan was approved by the Navy Department. The *Merrimac* was raised and cut down to her old berth deck, and at each end of the ship seventy feet of distance was covered over, so that it was only a few inches above the surface of the water when the *Merrimac* was ballasted for fighting. She was re-



PLANS OF THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC.

named the *Virginia*, but as she has gone into history by her old appellation she will be called the *Merrimac* throughout this brief history of her performances.

On the midship section of the *Merrimac* her new designer placed a structure somewhat resembling the roof of a house. It was 175 feet long, and 7 feet clear in height, whilst its width was flush with the sides of the hull. This roof sloped at the sides and ends at an angle of 45 degrees; it was of pine and oak, 24 inches thick, and had a plating of iron on the outside 4 inches thick, in two layers of 2 inches each. The sides of the roof were straight, but the ends were rounded so as to give a wide sweep to the bow and stern guns. At the top there was a flat surface about 20 feet wide, covered with a grating, which admitted air and light to the interior of the enclosed space. The prow was fitted with a beak for ramming purposes; the engines were the engines of the old *Merrimac*; the smoke-stack or chimney rose in the centre of the armored space, and the pilot house was at the forward end and covered with 4 inches of iron at the same angle as the sides.

The armament of the *Merrimac* consisted in all of ten guns. There were two 7-inch rifles for the bow and stern pivots, two 6-inch rifles, and six smooth-bore broadside guns. The ship drew 22 feet of water, and was very slow and unwieldy. The maximum of her speed under her new conditions did not exceed five knots an hour, and with her great length it took fully half an hour to turn her around. There were many delays in fitting her out, owing partly to the great demand for war material of all kinds, and partly in consequence of the inexperience of everybody concerned. It was not until the 7th of March that the *Merrimac* was cast loose from the dock and started down Elizabeth River on what was supposed by many spectators to be only a trial trip. She was commanded by Flag Officer Franklin Buchanan, and her executive and ord-

nance officer was Lieutenant Catesby Jones. She had a full staff of officers and a crew of 300 men.

Let us now look at the *Monitor*, which was so soon to be the antagonist of the *Merrimac*.

On the 3d August, 1861, the Congress of the United States enacted a law directing the Secretary of the Navy to appoint a board of three naval officers to investigate plans and specifications for iron-clad steamships or batteries, and in case of a favorable report by the board, the Secretary was authorized to cause one or more armored steam-batteries or steamships to be built. The sum of \$1,500,000 was appropriated to pay the cost of the experiment. Many plans were offered, but only three were accepted by the naval board, the others being rejected for various reasons.

The first place on the list was given to the proposal of Captain John Ericsson, of New York, and on the approval of Congress a contract was made for the construction of a battery on this novel plan. The contract stipulated for the completion of the battery within 100 days from the signing of the contract (October 5, 1861), and the extraordinary provision was introduced, that the test of the battery, upon which its acceptance depended, should be its withstanding the fire of the enemy's batteries at the shortest ranges, the United States agreeing to fit out the vessel with men, guns, etc.

The following is a detailed description of this vessel; it will interest the nautical, naval, or historical student, and may be skipped by the indolent or unscientific reader. It was written at the time the vessel was delivered to the United States Government, March 5, 1862.

The hull is formed by two distinct parts, a lower and upper, both of which are flat-bottomed; the lower one built of $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch iron, 124 feet long, 34 feet wide at the top, and $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep. The sides incline at an angle of about 51 degrees with a vertical line, and terminate in sharp ends, the bow projecting and

coming to a point at an angle of 80 degrees. The upper hull is 174 feet long, 41 feet 4 inches wide, with perpendicular sides 5 feet high. It juts over the lower hull on each side 3 feet 7 inches, and at each end 25 feet. The sides of this portion are built of white oak, $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick, covered with 6 inches of iron plates on the outside, and a $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch plating of iron within; the object of the latter being to arrest splinters in case of a ball penetrating the sides. The top is covered with a bomb-proof flat deck unprotected by any railing or bulwark. This deck consists of oak beams, 10 inches square and 26 inches apart, covered with 8-inch plank, and this with 2 layers of iron, each an inch thick. The draught of water is 10 feet, leaving only 18 inches above the surface. The projecting ends of the upper hull serve as a cover for the propeller and rudder in the stern and the anchor in the bow. The former are entirely out of reach of shot; and the latter is carried in the upper hull, from which it is readily lowered, and into which it is hoisted again by men working below, without any exposure or sign of their movements on the outside. The lower hull is so situated beneath the upper, that it can only be reached by a ball after this has passed through at least 25 feet of water, and the inclination of the sides would then prevent its penetration; and the upper is impregnable in its 6 inches of iron, backed with 30 inches of white oak, and the inner lining of $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch iron.

The prominent object upon the deck in the middle of the boat is the turret or castle, a cylinder of 20 feet diameter within, and 9 feet high, built of 8 thicknesses of 1-inch plates, bolted securely one over another with overlapping joints, and lined with an additional layer of iron an inch thick, thus making 9 inches in all. The weight of the turret is about 100 tons, and its support is a circular bed plate of composition metal firmly secured to the deck. Upon this it is supported except in time of action, when the weight is taken by a vertical central shaft of iron, with which it is made to revolve as desired, the motive power being a steam-engine specially designed for this service, as also for working the blowers for the fires, and for ventilation. On the top, the turret is covered with iron beams and perforated iron, shell-proof. This, while

it affords protection, admits the circulation of air necessary in working the guns. Small sliding iron hatchways are also provided, to afford an entrance for the men through this portion.

The turret is constructed for two heavy guns, which constitute the whole armament of the battery. They are placed precisely parallel with each other, and both are directed out the same side of the turret. Those selected for the first trial were 11-inch Dahlgren smooth-bore guns, carrying 168 lb. round shot. Some wrought-iron shot were provided for the first encounter, but their use was forbidden for fear of their bursting the guns, by reason of their weight, being 15 lbs. greater than that of the shot used in proving the guns. The port-holes are circular openings, 3 feet above the deck, just large enough to admit the muzzle of the gun, and kept closed by a sliding shutter, managed on the inside, and removed only when the gun is run out to be fired. The gun-carriages are of wrought iron and run on slides very accurately constructed. The sighting of the guns was designed to be not over their line through the port-holes; but four holes were pierced through the turret at the height of the eye for telescopes, and just outside of the holes reflectors were fixed, which bent the ray of light coming in a direction parallel with the guns through the axis of the telescope. In action, however, the ordinary mode of sighting was adopted.

The turret is caused to revolve to the right or left, by the movement of a small wheel which controls the action of the steam, and is turned by the gunner or his assistants, and a scale is provided by which the elevation of the guns is also adjusted. When ready for firing, the shutter is triced up by the gunner, the piece is run out, fired, and instantly returns by the recoil, a friction clamp upon the sides of the ways arresting it at any desired point. On this side of the turret is an additional thickness of iron plating of about 3 inches.

The pilot or wheel-house, as originally constructed, was a square box formed of bars or beams of wrought iron, 9 inches by 12, interlocked at the corners, and covered with heavy plating. Elongated horizontal apertures at the sides afford the only look-out for the helmsman. These apertures may also be

used as loopholes for musketry if desirable. In the place of chimneys bomb-proof gratings are set in the deck, and through these the smoke of the fires is driven out by the blowers ; low temporary chimneys are however provided, which are removed in time of action. The deck is thus entirely free of all incumbrances, and the men who work the vessel and handle the guns are all entirely out of sight, beneath the invulnerable plating. All access into the interior is securely shut off, so that if the battery were boarded, the men could not be reached, and no harm could be done the vessel itself. Its sharp and powerful iron prow will enable it to sink with ease any wooden vessel it can reach, and its light draught allows of its running into shoal waters either for offensive operations or to retire, if necessary, to a distance from more powerful vessels of deeper draught. Her complement of men consists of 60 in all, of whom 11 are officers. The battery is evidently designed for harbor and river operations, and not for encountering heavy seas.

At the suggestion of Capt. Ericsson, her designer, the new ship was named the *Monitor*. Until the very hour of her departure from New York the workmen were busy upon her, and several things remained unfinished or incomplete when she sailed. The government was aware of the changes that had been made in the *Merrimac*, and there was great anxiety to have the *Monitor* at Hampton Roads at the earliest possible date. She left New York in the forenoon of March 6th in tow of the tug-boat *Seth Low* and using her own engine. She was commanded by Lieut. John L. Worden, and her executive officer was Lieut. S. D. Greene. During her entire career of less than a year Lieut. Greene remained the executive officer of the *Monitor*, though she had in the same period no less than five commanders. She had a full complement of other officers, and her crew was selected from the crews of the *North Carolina* and *Sabine*, then at the Brooklyn Navy-yard.

The *Monitor* narrowly escaped foundering during her

voyage from New York to Fortress Monroe. On the 7th March a light breeze sprang up and demonstrated the correctness of the theory that the *Monitor* was not adapted for sea-going voyages. A great deal of water entered at the base of the turret, and, to use the language of one of her officers, "she leaked like a sieve." The water came in through the holes of the blower-pipes, through the chimneys, and into the top of the turret and it even dashed into the peep-holes of the pilot house with such force as to knock the helmsman away from the wheel. The belts of the blower engines slipped in consequence of their wetting, and there was not sufficient draught for purposes of combustion. Two officers and several men of the crew were overcome by the noxious gases that formed in the engine room, and narrowly escaped suffocation. At one time the fires were nearly extinguished, the engine room was half filled with water, and only the cessation of the breeze saved the *Monitor* from going to the bottom of the Atlantic before she had an opportunity to fire a single shot at the enemy.


During the night of the 7th rough water was again encountered, and the same troubles arose. The darkness added to the danger, and to make matters worse the wheel ropes became jammed, and the hawser that connected the *Monitor* with the tow-boat was the only safety of the former. If it had given way she would have inevitably been lost. At 4 A.M. on Saturday, March 8th, the *Monitor* passed Cape Henry, and her crew heard the booming of the guns that betokened trouble in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, about twenty miles distant. Capt. Worden immediately ordered all preparations made for battle, and when the *Monitor* anchored in Hampton Roads at nine o'clock she was ready for earnest work.

It was about noon on the 8th of March when the *Merrimac* steamed down from Norfolk in the direction of the Union fleet, which was anchored near Fortress Monroe and

at Newport News, seven miles above. At the former anchorage were the frigates *Minnesota*, *Roanoke*, and *St. Lawrence*; the first two being 40-gun steam frigates, and the *St. Lawrence* a sailing ship carrying 50 guns. Near Newport News the *Congress*, 50 guns, and the *Cumberland*, 30 guns, were anchored under the protection of the shore batteries. Fire was opened on the *Merrimac* from these vessels and the shore batteries, but the shot glanced off without doing any damage. The *Merrimac* did not reply until she was in short range, when, with a single discharge from her forward pivot gun, she disabled the after pivot gun of the *Cumberland*. Then she passed near the *Congress* and rammed the *Cumberland*, making a great hole in her side and admitting so much water that the ship sank in little more than half an hour, carrying down many of her crew. She continued to fight to the last, and some of her guns were fired at the *Merrimac* just as the water reached them. Her flag remained in its position after the hull reached the bottom, fifty-four feet below the surface of the water.

The *Congress* slipped her anchor and dropped her fore-topsail, but in attempting to get away she ran aground. She continued to fight for more than an hour after the sinking of the *Cumberland*, the *Merrimac* choosing her position about two hundred yards away and pouring in a destructive fire as fast as her guns could be worked. Finding the contest was hopeless, the commander of the *Congress* ran up the white flag and the firing ceased.

Commander Buchanan ordered the gun-boats *Beaufort* and *Raleigh*, that accompanied the *Merrimac*, to remove the crew of the *Congress*, and then set her on fire, not daring to risk the *Merrimac* in the shoal water where the *Congress* had grounded. The Union batteries on shore continued their fire, so that the gun-boats could not perform their allotted work without great danger. The Confederates reported that two officers of the *Raleigh* were killed




SCENE OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC.

while attempting to remove the wounded from the *Congress*; accordingly the Confederate gun-boats retired, and the crew of the *Congress* escaped to the shore by swimming or were taken off in small boats. The *Congress* was then fired by red-hot shot from the *Merrimac* and was soon in flames. Commander Buchanan was wounded, and the command of the *Merrimac* fell upon Lieutenant Jones. The *Merrimac* had twenty men killed and wounded in the action; her smoke-stack and steam-pipes were carried away, and so were railings, boat-davits, and stanchions. But her machinery was not damaged, none of her guns was dismounted, and there were no serious injuries to her armor.

Sunset was approaching, and it was not deemed wise to attack the *Minnesota* at that late hour of the day and with the then condition of the tide, especially as she was aground and they would be sure of their prey in the morning. Accordingly the *Merrimac* steamed away to Norfolk, repaired her damages as much as possible, and prepared for the work of the next day.

The intention was for the *Merrimac* to destroy the *Minnesota* and then attack the other ships near Fortress Monroe. She steamed in the direction of the *Minnesota*, and as she approached that vessel the *Monitor* came out from behind the *Minnesota's* great hull and offered battle. The "cheese-box on a raft" had such an insignificant appearance that it was thought she could be easily disposed of. But as soon as the battle began the *Merrimac's* commander found the novel craft a most formidable foe. The *Monitor* drew twelve feet of water and the *Merrimac* twenty-three; the former was able to choose her position, while the *Merrimac* dared not venture where there was a possibility of taking the ground. On two or three occasions she touched bottom, but hung there only a few moments at a time.

The *Monitor* fired much more slowly than the *Merrimac*, but her shot told with some effect, though they could



MONITOR AND MERRIMAC IN ACTION.

not disable her antagonist. Each boat tried to ram the other, but neither was successful. When the *Merrimac* approached close to the *Monitor* with the intention of sinking her by ramming, the latter fired twice, and partially forced in the side of the *Merrimac's* shield, knocking down several of her crew; her executive officer said that another shot at the same point would have penetrated the side. The *Monitor* was hit repeatedly on the turret, but with no other effect than to make several indentations. Finding that no impression could be made in this way, the commander of the *Merrimac* ordered her fire to be concentrated on the *Monitor's* pilot house, and with very good effect. One shot partially destroyed the pilot house and disabled Captain Worden. He was blinded by the force of the blow, and blood poured from his face. He was thought at the time to be fatally injured, but he recovered in a few weeks and returned to duty. After Captain Worden was disabled, Lieutenant Greene took command and held it through the rest of the fight.

The position of the pilot house was found inconvenient, for the reason that the guns in the turret could not be fired directly ahead without the risk of hitting the pilot house and knocking it to pieces. Subsequently it was placed directly over the turret, and this was the position of the pilot house in all the later ships of the *Monitor* pattern. Lieutenant Greene, in an article in the *Century* magazine, said that it was very difficult to maintain communications with the pilot house, as the speaking-tube between it and the turret was broken early in the battle. Word was passed by the assistant paymaster and the captain's clerk, but as both were landsmen, the nautical phrases transmitted through them often became unintelligible before reaching their destination.

In the turret it was difficult to make out the position of the *Merrimac*; marks had been placed on the deck, before the action, to indicate the direction of bow and

stern, and starboard and port, but these marks were obliterated after a little while, so that the bearings were unknown. At first there was considerable difficulty in manipulating the turret, as the machinery did not work smoothly, and when the marks alluded to were obliterated, the only way of working was to load the guns and then start the turret on its revolution until the *Merrimac* could be seen through the port-holes. Then the shot would be delivered, the gun run in, and the heavy shields over the ports dropped to prevent the entrance of an enemy's shot or shell.

The orders to Captain Worden were to defend the *Minnesota* and not to pursue the *Merrimac*, if such pursuit should leave the *Minnesota* exposed. Consequently, the *Monitor* refused to go far away from the latter ship, and she declined all efforts of the *Merrimac* to draw her in the direction of Sewall's Point, where the Confederate land batteries were ready to pour their iron storm upon her. The fight between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* lasted from eight in the morning until two in the afternoon, when, finding it impossible to destroy the *Minnesota* or reach the other Union ships near Fortress Monroe, the *Merrimac* retired. Though not disabled she was leaking badly, her machinery was difficult to manage, her ammunition run low, and her crew were quite worn out with two days of fighting. In obedience to her orders, the *Monitor* remained that night near the *Minnesota*, Captain Worden being sent on a tug to Washington for medical treatment. The next day was a day of rest, as the *Merrimac* did not appear.

The Confederates claimed that the battle was a drawn one so far as the two ships were concerned, as neither vessel had disabled or captured the other. The officers of the *Monitor* claimed that they had won a great victory, as they had beaten off the *Merrimac* and totally prevented her continuing the work of destruction which she began

the day before. Undoubtedly the advantages of the day's fighting were with the *Monitor*, as she saved the fleet of wooden ships from destruction and utterly checked the course of Confederate victory.

During the next two months the *Monitor* lay in Hampton Roads carefully guarding the entrance of Chesapeake Bay, or rather preserving it against any raid of the *Merrimac*. Twice in these two months the *Merrimac* came out of Elizabeth River in the evident hope of provoking a battle, but she did not venture as far as the *Monitor's* anchorage.

The commander of the *Monitor* had positive orders not to venture into the shoal water above Hampton Roads where the Union fleet could not support her, and the *Merrimac* had equally positive orders from the Confederate Navy Department not to go beyond a certain point, through fear that she might be disabled by the fire of the forts where no aid could reach her.

Norfolk was evacuated early in May, 1862, and as the *Merrimac* drew too much water to ascend the James River, her commander ordered her destruction; the crew escaped to the shore and the vessel was burned and blown up. And so ended the *Merrimac*.

The *Monitor* afterwards had a brief engagement with the fortifications at Drewry's Bluffs. She was unable to silence the guns or destroy the earthworks, but on her part she suffered no damage. In December, 1862, she was thoroughly repaired and ordered to Beaufort, North Carolina, in tow of the steamer *Rhode Island*. On the night of December 30th she went down at sea in a gale; forty-nine officers and men were saved by the boats of the steamer, but four officers and twelve men were drowned. Lieut. Greene said it was impossible to keep her clear of water, and the officers thought that the two hulls had become separated by the bumping of the heavy sea.

Though the *Monitor* was the design of Capt. Ericsson,


her important feature, the turret, was the invention of another head than his. In 1841 Theodore R. Timby made a model of an iron turret, and two years later he filed a caveat in the U. S. Patent Office "for a revolving metallic tower, and for a revolving tower for a floating battery to be propelled by steam." In the same year (1843) he made and exhibited an iron model which combined all the essential principles of his invention, and a short time later another which he sent to the Emperor of China at the hands of the American minister, Mr. Cushing. A committee of Congress made a report to the Secretary of War in 1848, recommending the adoption of the Timby system. Nothing was done in the matter until the outbreak of the civil war, when Timby brought out a new model and secured a patent for "a revolving tower for offensive and defensive warfare, whether used on land or water." His original plan was for a revolving turret 40 feet in diameter, to be pierced for six guns and to make a complete revolution in one minute, the guns to be fired as they came in range of the object to be reached. In accordance with this plan a shot would be delivered every ten seconds. The constructors of the *Monitor* recognized the validity of Mr. Timby's claim and paid him liberally for the right to use his invention.

In England in 1855 Captain Cowper Coles invented and patented a cupola or turret which was afterwards applied to the war steamer *Royal Sovereign*, a wooden vessel originally built as a three-decker. Owing to the fact that the *Royal Sovereign* was not purposely built for use as a turret ship, the new principle was tried under disadvantages; in 1864 she was put out of commission and ordered to be placed among the reserved ships, although many officers contended that she was then the most powerful ship in the British navy. In 1866 Lord Derby's government ordered the construction of four iron-clad turret ships of 4,000 tons burthen each and corresponding steam power. The

Monarch, the first of the British iron-clad turret-ships, was launched in 1868, and the *Captain* shortly after the *Monarch*. By some naval experts the *Captain* was thought to be top-heavy, and this opinion was verified by her capsizing and foundering off Finisterre on the 7th September, 1870. Four hundred and seventy-two lives were lost, including that of Captain Coles, her designer. She was overturned in a heavy squall and went down in three minutes; her overturning was caused by her very low freeboard and the great weight of her masts, hurricane, deck, and turret. In 1866 the *Monadnock*, one of the American monitors, made the voyage from New York to San Francisco, by way of the Straits of Magellan, and in the same year another of these vessels, the *Miantonomoh*, crossed the Atlantic and went to Cronstadt, returning safely to the United States. It was thus demonstrated that turret ships were capable of making long sea voyages; since that time many sea-going iron-clads have been constructed by most of the European nations, and their success is fully established.

Probably no naval conflict in the history of the world ever attracted as much attention as did the battle in Hampton Roads, between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*. It revolutionized the navies of the world, and showed that the wooden ships, which had long held control of the ocean, were of no further use for fighting purposes. Commenting upon the news of that event, the *London Times* said: "Whereas we had available for immediate purposes one hundred and forty-nine first-class war ships, we have now two, these two being the *Warrior* and her sister *Ironsides*. There is not now a ship in the English navy, apart from these two, that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little *Monitor*." England and all other maritime powers immediately proceeded to reconstruct their navies, and the old-fashioned three and four-decker line-of-battle ships were condemned as useless. Not only in ships, but in their armament, there was rapid

progress, and so great has been the advance in marine artillery that the *Monitors* of 1862, and the subsequent years of the American war, would be unable to resist the shot from the guns of 1880-'87. The most recent war steamers of England, France, Russia, and Italy are claimed to be as great an improvement upon the American *Monitors* as were those vessels upon their wooden predecessors.





CHAPTER XIV.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG—1863.

It is not our purpose to trace the causes of the civil war in the United States of America, in the years from 1861 to 1865, a war which deluged the land with blood and brought mourning into many thousands of homes from one end of the country to the other. Each side battled for what it believed to be the right, and each displayed, valor, determination, and heroism, that will forever be the pride of all Americans, without distinction of creed or party. From its commencement in 1861 the war progressed with varying fortunes until the event of which this chapter treats.

With its smaller population and its limited resources, the South had been compelled to see the war confined to its own area. In the West the Union armies had steadily advanced into the Southern territory; in the East the ports of the South were blockaded, while the land forces chiefly confined their operations to Virginia, one of the foremost of the slave-holding States, and an ardent supporter of the cause of secession. In September, 1862, the Confederate army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac with the intention of invading the Northern States, but the result of the battle of Antietam, in Maryland, caused its commander, General Lee, to retreat to Virginia, and abandon, for the time, his cherished design.

Early in June, 1863, General Lee had again decided on

a campaign which was to give the Northern States a taste of the horrors of war. Hitherto the fighting had all been on Southern soil, but now it was to be carried straight into the heart of Pennsylvania, amid the rich farms and prosperous towns of that sober commonwealth. Instead of waiting for the Army of the Potomac under Fighting Joe Hooker to attack him, Lee proposed to dodge it, and to push forward towards Maryland by the valley of the Shenandoah. If he could conceal his movements for some time from the national army he might be able to get well on his way before efficient measures could be taken to oppose him. His plan was to detain the Union army before Fredericksburg by a large display of troops, then to turn its right wing and push up the Shenandoah Valley under cover of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

He had a veteran army on which he could depend, its effective force being some 80,000 men, of whom 68,352 were infantry. This was about the strength of the army under Hooker. The armies were thus equal, but Lee had one great advantage, he had absolute authority and could do what he saw was best at the moment, while Hooker was continually hampered by orders from Washington.

On June 3d Longstreet's 1st division moved forward into the Wilderness, and the other divisions followed closely, until on the evening of the 7th, the 1st corps had reached the neighborhood of Culpepper Court-House. Ewell's 2d corps started in the same direction on the 4th. Gen. A. P. Hill's 3d corps was the only one left to occupy the positions where the army had passed the winter, and it had to string out very thinly in order to conceal the departure of two thirds of the army.

These great movements could not entirely escape the attention of the Unionists, but they were at a loss to know what was on foot. Hooker believed that Lee intended to resume the campaign of the preceding year,

and to push forward over the Rappahannock to Manassas. Believing that Lee's army was stretched along the Culpepper road he determined to attack the weakened line at Fredericksburg. Two pontoon bridges were thrown over the river at Franklin's Crossing, and on June 6th Howe's division crossed. Hill's corps advanced in opposition and Lee prepared to recall Ewell if he found it necessary. When Hooker saw this display of force he checked his advance, and failed to learn how small was the force opposed to him. Learning that the Confederate cavalry under General Stuart was stationed at Culpepper, Howe determined to make a cavalry reconnoissance on a large scale in that direction. His object was to learn whether Stuart meditated a raid or was trying to cover the movements of infantry. In the meantime Longstreet arrived at Culpepper and joined Stuart.

Lee's plan of invasion was now in full operation. Stuart was to conceal the movements of the infantry by menacing the Unionists near Warrenton, while the army was to proceed to the northwest by way of Sperryville and Thornton's Gap and so reach the valley of the Shenandoah. This would leave the Union army in the rear.

At daybreak of the 9th, Pleasanton's two columns, seven thousand five hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry, crossed the Rappahannock. The Confederates, deeply occupied with their own plans, and suspecting nothing, were taken by surprise, and Stuart narrowly escaped losing his artillery. He was driven back and lost his baggage, and in it were found instructions revealing Lee's plans.

Stuart was preparing to attack Buford's division, when he learned that Gregg's division, having crossed the river unobserved, was coming up in his rear and was then engaged with Robertson's brigade at Fleetwood Hill. Leaving the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and Fitzhugh Lee to resist Buford, Stuart hurried back and attacked Gregg.

There was desperate fighting, and Gregg was compelled to fall back. He did so none too soon, for as he was leaving Brandy Station he could see the head of Ewell's corps debarking from a train which Lee had sent over in great haste from Culpepper.

Buford and Gregg joined forces and retreated over the river.

The importance of the engagement of Brandy Station lies chiefly in the fact that it disclosed a part of Lee's plans to Hooker. It was also the first time that the Union cavalry had boldly attacked the Confederate cavalry.

It did not change Lee's plans, nor did it trouble Stuart very much. While Hooker knew that Lee with much of his army was at Culpepper, he still did not know how far he intended to go. He extended his right wing along the upper Rappahannock so as to meet Lee's change of base, and be prepared for any emergency.

Lee proceeded with his campaign with his usual vigor. Ewell's corps was pushed forward into the valley of Virginia, marching on the 10th. It was in light order and advanced rapidly, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and reaching the banks of the Shenandoah at Cedarville on the 12th. The Unionists knew nothing of this movement, and Ewell took advantage of their ignorance to press forward against McReynolds' Union brigade under Milroy, at Winchester. Milroy was taken by surprise and overwhelmed by numbers. He was driven out of Winchester on the 14th, and was attacked on his retreat. The retreat became a rout and his men scattered. Some escaped to Harper's Ferry, but nearly 4,000 were captured. The fleeing men created a panic in Pennsylvania, and caused a profound sensation in the North.

Hooker learned on the 12th that Ewell's corps had passed Sperryville, and on the following day he moved the 2d, 6th, and 12th corps to Fairfax Court-House.

When Hill saw that the Unionists had withdrawn he

joined Longstreet at Culpepper. Pleasanton was still watching Stuart near Warrenton.

Ewell pushed his troopers as far forward as Williamsport on the Potomac. The population of the neighboring Maryland towns fled in terror, carrying off their valuables and driving their herds before them on their way to Harrisburg. The greatest excitement prevailed in that city.

On June 16th Jenkins' troopers entered Greencastle, the first Pennsylvania village and then marched forward to Chambersburg. The Northern farmers now had an experience with which their Southern countrymen were entirely familiar. Horses, cattle, fodder, and provisions were confiscated, or, what was as bad, paid for in Confederate money. Free negroes were seized and sent South to be sold as slaves. There was, however, no plundering or bad behavior on the part of the soldiers.

This was as far as Jenkins dared go, and he returned to Williamsport, where Ewell was awaiting the arrival of the two other corps.

In order to learn clearly what Lee intended to do Hooker sent Pleasanton to the foot of the Blue Ridge, with instructions that if he did not meet the enemy to push forward by way of Leesburg to Harper's Ferry.

This was on June 17th, and on the same day Stuart hastened to occupy the passes of the Bull Run Mountains. The two forces were therefore moving in the same direction, and they met near Aldie, where Kilpatrick, with the Second New York, at once charged Munford's brigade and drove it before him. Col. Duffie's division surprised Stuart at Middleburg, and gave him barely time to make his escape. Stuart returned with Robertson's brigade and forced Duffie to fall back.

These minor engagements showed the direction in which the greater portion of Lee's army was moving, and caused Hooker to move his army westward that he might be pre-

pared to cross the Blue Ridge or the Potomac, as might be required.

It was not long before Pleasanton and Stuart were fighting again. On the 19th the former attacked Stuart at Middleburg and drove him out. This victory was followed up, and Stuart was driven back eight miles to Uperville. The Union scouts were now able to climb the peaks of the Blue Ridge, where they had a full view of the whole lower valley of the Shenandoah, and saw Ewell's corps marching towards the Potomac.

On the 21st Lee ordered Ewell to march on Harrisburg, and on the 23d sent the other two corps forward. They passed into Pennsylvania, and requisitions of every kind followed. The Confederates, accustomed to their impoverished lands, were amazed at the richness of the country. They were able to fit themselves out anew with every thing they needed. Ewell reached Carlisle on the 27th and his scouts reconnoitred Harrisburg, where the citizens were making desperate preparations for defence.


As Lee was marching away from Washington, it was necessary to guard his flank from an attack from that quarter, and Early was sent east of the mountains. On June 26th he bivouacked at Gettysburg, after driving out a thousand Pennsylvania militia. Gordon pushed forward to cross the big wooden bridge at Wrightsville, but it was burned before he could do so.

When Hooker learned of the arrival of Ewell at Hagerstown, he sent three army corps to Poolesville to hold the left bank of the Potomac and to guard Washington, and he prepared to follow Lee into Maryland with the remainder of his army. He crossed the Potomac on the 26th, and the two armies were now only 40 miles apart. Lee heard nothing of this movement. He relied on Stuart for information, but that enthusiastic officer had started off on a raid of his own, and was out of reach. Stuart proposed to make a circuit of the Federal army by passing

between it and Washington. He might have succeeded if the army had been stationary, but it was on the move and he had frequent encounters with detached bodies. He had fights at Haymarket with the 2d corps, pushed on and crossed the Potomac at Dranesville, entered Maryland and destroyed the canal, captured a large supply train at Rockville, and then moved on towards Hanover, where he had hopes of finding Early. Here he met Pleasanton's cavalry and a sharp fight followed. Night came on, and Stuart, by a forced march, reached Dover, and then passed on to Carlisle, where he arrived on July 1st, only to find that Early had gone. His men and horses were worn out, and he had done no real harm to the enemy. Orders here reached him to march immediately on Gettysburg, where the battle had begun. When Lee learned that Hooker had crossed the Potomac he determined to push on towards Baltimore, so as to threaten its communication with the North and compel the Union army to follow him. He hoped to lead them to the north, and possibly to engage them near Philadelphia. With this intent he directed his three army corps to assemble at Gettysburg, having no reason to suppose that Meade was moving in that direction.

Ewell was recalled from before Harrisburg, and marched to Scotland on a road connecting with the Gettysburg turnpike. Longstreet's corps moved forward from Chambersburg and Hill's corps from Fayetteville. On June 30th, Pettigrew's brigade pushed on to Gettysburg, and was about to enter the place, when Buford's advance compelled him to fall back. Hill then advanced on Gettysburg with his whole division.

Hooker was preparing to follow Lee, when he was succeeded in command by General Meade, who made no change in the plans. His first idea was to prevent Lee from crossing the Susquehanna and marching on Baltimore, and to do this he hurried the army forward and



GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN MAP.

took positions at Emmettsburg, Taneytown, and Frizzellburg, and so held the whole breadth of the valley. Pleasanton's cavalry covered the march and watched the movements of the enemy. Meade had now learned of Lee's intention to concentrate at Gettysburg, and he made preparations for battle.

The two armies were moving towards one point and they must soon meet. Lee did not know that Meade also proposed to concentrate his forces at Gettysburg. The coincidence was quite accidental, and it brought on the conflict between the two armies earlier than had been expected.

A description of the surroundings of Gettysburg will be of value in understanding the details of one of the bloodiest and most important battles of modern times. The battle-field is between two small streams, Willoughby Run and Rock Creek, to the west and east, respectively, of the city. The ground is broken up by two groups of hills, each with three ridges, of which the central one is the highest. In the first group, northwest of Gettysburg, are Oak Hill, Seminary Hill, and the Seminary Ridge running north and south. The second group is to the southeast of the first. It starts with Cemetery Hill, and runs along as Cemetery Ridge until it suddenly rises again and forms the hills called Round Top and Little Round Top. Gettysburg is situated in the valley between these two groups, and its streets run to the base of Cemetery Hill. It is naturally the centre of all roads, so that three turn-pikes and seven other roads pass into the town. East of Cemetery Hill is Culp's Hill, well wooded.

Suspecting that the Confederates might move to Gettysburg, Meade directed Buford to occupy the place and defend it until the arrival of the 1st corps. Buford reached there just in time to frighten away Pettigrew's brigade. He soon learned that Hill was advancing on him in force, and perceived the advantage in holding the

strong positions around Gettysburg. He dismounted his men and deployed them as infantry in such positions as would best conceal their numerical weakness. Of his 4,200 men, one quarter had to be withdrawn to look after the horses, so that really only about 3,000 were prepared to oppose Lee's advance. They were disposed in a circular arc from west to northeast of Gettysburg, with Gamble's brigade on the left and Devin's on the right.

On the morning of July 1st Buford's scouts reported that Heth's division (Confederate) was rapidly advancing from the direction of Cashtown. The battle was imminent. Heth deployed his two advance brigades south of the Chambersburg road, and at eight o'clock his line, preceded by skirmishers, passed down the slopes on the right bank of Willoughby Run. Buford opened fire, and a fierce struggle followed on the banks of the stream. Buford's fire was so well sustained that Heth thought he had an infantry corps opposed to him. This idea prevented him from advancing to take possession of Gettysburg and he waited for Pender's troops to reinforce him.

Buford was terribly overmatched, and realizing that he could not resist much longer, he eagerly watched the Emmetsburg road for signs of Reynolds. Hill and Pender were pushing forward, when the signalman stationed in the belfry of the seminary on Seminary Hill discovered a large column of infantry moving forward on the Emmetsburg road where only friends could come.

It was Reynolds whom the sound of battle had hurried forward at his utmost speed. Wadsworth's division soon followed. Reynolds rode on ahead and met Buford on the stairs of the belfry. A moment sufficed to tell of the critical situation. Reynolds ordered Wadsworth's division to relieve Gamble's men, who had suffered greatly. He sent word to the other two divisions to hasten, and also notified Howard, requesting him to hurry forward with the 11th corps.

There were still far too few troops on the ground to resist the Confederate army for any length of time, but Reynolds determined to hold it in check as long as possible, until help could come. He led his troops down the Cashtown road, to cut off all passage there. Meredith made a dash for the wood where Archer had entered, and Reynolds hastened to join the Iron Brigade in its attack.

While encouraging the soldiers, General Reynolds was shot through the head and fell dead. He was one of the ablest of Meade's officers, and his death was a great loss to the national cause.

It was then 10.45. Meredith advanced with such rapidity that he captured one thousand prisoners, and drove the enemy down the slope at the point of the bayonet. Wadsworth's three regiments were attacked by Davis, and compelled to fall back to the Oak Hill Ridge, where they took shelter in a thick wood. Doubleday sent the Sixth Wisconsin to them, and, by a sharp attack on Davis' lines threw them into confusion, and captured two entire regiments with their colors.

Heth moved up to take the place of Archer and Davis, while Doubleday formed his lines anew and awaited events. He was gladdened by the arrival of Rowley and Robinson's divisions.

The Confederate army now moved forward again. Brockenbrough tried to out-flank Biddle on the left, while Pettigrew hurled himself on Stone. The latter's brigade was formed of Pennsylvania lumbermen, called "Buck-tails," from the ornaments attached to their hats. They were fighting on their native soil, and this filled them with an enthusiasm which laughed at death. Their position was exposed, and many were slain, but they held their ground and shouted "We 've come to stay."

It was no use attacking such men as these, and the Confederates again fell back discomfited. An artillery

duel followed, and as the Confederates had far more guns, the Union army got the worst of it.

Howard, with his three divisions, was now hurrying from Emmettsburg. He rode on ahead, and found that by the death of Reynolds the command had fallen into his hands. He also realized the importance of holding the town, and sent urgent instructions to the 3d and 11th corps to push forward. The latter arrived at 12.45 o'clock, Schurz leading with his division. Rodes' Confederate division made a detour, and came in from the north to take possession of Oak Hill. Howard prepared for the attack by sending Schimmelpfennig's division, into the woods of Oak Hill, with two batteries of artillery.

At 2.15 Rodes advanced and occupied Oak Hill before Schimmelpfennig could get there ; he immediately opened fire on the Union line with five batteries. Schurz, who had succeeded Howard in command of the 11th corps, pushed on to intercept him. Three of Rodes' brigades crossed the Mummasburg road and attacked Cutler's troops ; O'Neil attacked Baxter and was repulsed with heavy loss. Iverson fell savagely on Robinson's two brigades, only to find that he had run into a trap. Cutler moved from the wood and took him on the flank. The Confederates fought bravely, but they were overmatched, many were killed and more than one thousand were taken prisoners. Daniel came up too late to save Iverson, but threw himself from the north on Stone at the railway cut, and drove him out of it. Brockenbrough attempted to drive Meredith from McPherson's wood but was himself routed.

It was 2.45 o'clock, and the Confederates had been repulsed all along the line, but the battle had now reached a turning point and was soon to assume a different aspect.

Daniel was reinforced by Ramseur, and Heth by three brigades of Pender's division,—fresh men who had not been under fire that day.

The first national misfortune of the day fell to Schimmelpfennig's division. His two brigades advancing near the Oak Hill slopes were battered on the flank by Rodes' artillery, and thrown into great disorder. Dole's division fell upon them and drove them for some distance. Early's division advanced on the Heidlersburg road, and its artillery opened fire on Barlow who was trying to relieve Schimmelpfennig. Gordon's brigade charged on Von Gilsa's position, and forced him and Barlow back at the point of the bayonet; Hays and Hoke took them on the flank, and the retreat became a rout. Howard ordered the 11th corps to retreat, but it had already been driven back.

Pender fell with his whole division on the tired and depleted brigades of Stone, Meredith, and Biddle. Ramseur's brigade, with the remnants of Iverson's and O'Neil's brigades, and supported by a heavy fire of artillery, descended on Robinson, whom the retreat of the 11th corps had left isolated. Robinson fell back on the wood occupied by Cutler. Doubleday's men were outnumbered and overpowered and he recalled them to Seminary Hill, and, joined by Biddle's men, they stationed themselves in the trenches which had been thrown up around the seminary. Supported by a few cannon they succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy.

Howard saw that this resistance could not be maintained. It was useful only in assisting the retreat. He ordered the abandonment of Seminary Hill, and as the 1st corps, with ranks greatly thinned, marched down the eastern slopes, Hill occupied the position. Doubleday found Gettysburg filled with the fugitives of Barlow's and Schimmelpfennig's divisions. Their condition was very perilous, as Ewell was advancing on the town from the eastward. Howard abandoned the town and fell back on Cemetery Hill. The 1st corps reached there safely, all but Stone's brigade, which was mixed up with the fugitives in the streets of the town. The Confederates dashed in with

a rush, the fugitives scattered in every direction, but nearly 4,000 were taken prisoners. General Schimmelpfennig hid himself under a load of wood and so managed to escape. Ewell found two cannon abandoned in the streets.

The national troops were now in a very critical situation. With 16,500 men against 22,000 Confederates, they had made a good fight. They had now only five thousand fighting men left. Five thousand had been taken prisoners, four thousand were dead or wounded, and the rest were scattered. The latter hurried to Taneytown and Westminster, and greatly discouraged the regiments which were moving up from that direction.

The Union forces were thus routed and disorganized, and in actual danger of complete extermination when a new factor appeared on the field. Hancock arrived at four o'clock. Meade, on learning of the serious nature of the battle, had hurried him forward to take the place of the slain Reynolds. He assumed command and at once sought to restore order. The 11th corps reformed around Von Steinwehr on Cemetery Hill. Wadsworth was stationed on Culp's Hill and Doubleday on the left. These manœuvres consumed an hour. Lee might easily have prevented it, but he was cautious and waited for the rest of his army to arrive. He could see that Howard was well intrenched on Cemetery Hill, and supposed that reinforcements must have arrived. In truth they did not arrive until 5.15 P.M., when Sickles and Birney came up from Emmetsburg with a division of the 3d corps. Graham and Ward's brigades followed, and soon afterwards Slocum appeared with the 12th corps. Slocum started to occupy Wolf's Hill, but gave up the idea when he learned that the enemy held Gettysburg. Geary's division arrived at Cemetery Hill at 5.30.



Slocum assumed the command, and Hancock went to Taneytown to inform Meade of the situation. Meade had already determined to concentrate his army between

Gettysburg and Taneytown. Hancock met the 2d corps marching towards Gettysburg. The 5th corps was marching from Union, and the 6th from Manchester.

Meade hastened to Gettysburg, arrived at Cemetery Hill at 1 A.M., and at once began preparations for the great battle which must follow in the morning. He realized the full importance of the result. If he was defeated, the North was open to invasion, and Philadelphia and Baltimore would be liable to capture.

It was the morning of the 2d of July—a date which is now borne by thousands of white headstones in the national cemetery at Gettysburg. The midsummer sun rose about four o'clock and Meade was able to survey the field more clearly. All of the army that had not arrived was pushing on by forced marches and was expected very shortly. By nine o'clock they were all present, excepting 15,000 men of the 6th corps who were sure to arrive before the day was over. The 1st and 11th corps still occupied their old positions on Cemetery Hill. The 2d was on the left of the 1st. Hay's division was on the right, resting on Ziegler's grove; Gibbon's division was in the centre. Caldwell's division extended along the water-line between Plum Run and Rock Creek. The 3d corps was also on the left. The left of the army rested on the Round Tops, which were farthest to the south, the centre on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge, and the right on Culp's Hill. The "Orchard" hill to the northeast of the Round Tops was a commanding position, as it would prevent the enemy from making a flank movement on the left, but it was weak in other respects, as it was commanded by Seminary Hill on the north, and by the Warfield Ridge on the west.

The right on Culp's Hill was nearest the enemy, and seemed to be in the most danger. Meade sent Geary to occupy the slopes of Culp's Hill to the right of Wads-



worth. Sickles occupied the positions on the slopes of Little Round Top, but owing to some misunderstanding of orders he did not occupy the summit.

Lee was also busy in gathering his forces. Early was in the centre, facing the ridge which connects Culp's Hill with Cemetery Hill, Ewell was on the left with Johnson, who was on Benner's Hill, Rodes was occupying the town at the foot of Cemetery Hill, his right touching the 3d corps on Seminary Hill. Pender was on the left above the seminary, Heth on the right, along the ridge. The other divisions not yet placed were marching towards the town from the north. By nine o'clock the army was all there, excepting Stuart's cavalry and 6,000 men of Pickett's and Law's divisions who were on the way.

The early part of the day was wasted in preparations, and Meade, astonished at this delay, took advantage of it to strengthen his lines. Sickles, not liking his position, moved forward and took possession of the Emmetsburg road as far as the peach orchard, whose exposed position has already been described. To extend his line to cover his new position he was obliged to abandon the slopes of Little Round Top, which was thus left entirely unprotected. Ward occupied the wood which covered the flank of Devil's Den, with his left on Plum Run and his right running to the summit of the wheat field. De Trobriand's line connected him with Graham, who was on the summit of the hillock. Humphreys covered the right of the division.

Lee ordered Longstreet to attack the Union army on the right wing, the point where they least expected it. At half-past three o'clock Longstreet moved forward. The battle opened with an artillery duel between the Union batteries in the orchard and the Confederate batteries in the Warfield woods. Wilcox threw out skirmishers on one side, and Graham on the other, and the rattle of musketry soon became continuous. Meade visited Sickles' position,

and seeing its weak points, directed General Warren to support him. Law moved on Little Round Top, and Robertson on Devil's Den. They advanced with the Southern yell, and attacked Ward, who resisted them with five regiments. A savage struggle on the slopes followed. Ward was falling back, when he was assisted by De Trobriand, who took Robertson on the flank. The First Texas, which threatened to capture Smith's battery, was driven back with great slaughter. Anderson advanced to strike De Trobriand's centre, was repulsed and in danger of capture, when he was saved by the arrival of Benning, whose three brigades renewed the attack with great vigor. Ward and De Trobriand, assisted by Smith's and Winslow's batteries, contested every foot of the way, but they were over-matched and began to fall back.

Law made a dash for the Round Tops with his Texas and Alabama veterans. The Fourth Maine, Fortieth New York, and Sixth New Jersey were waiting him in ambuscade, and resisted stoutly. All to no use, however, as the Confederate veterans advanced steadily. Ward weakened his line in supporting the retreat, and this forced De Trobriand to extend his left, leaving only two small regiments in his centre. They managed to repel Anderson's second assault, but fell back before Benning, who captured three pieces of Smith's artillery.

In the meantime McLaw's division was moving across the Emmettsburg road. At 5.30 Kershaw attacked the wooded hill occupied by De Trobriand's centre, and the Confederate guns fired from the Warfield Ridge against Humphreys' and Graham's brigades. Kershaw met Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, which Sykes had sent forward to reinforce De Trobriand, and drove them back in confusion. Warren, following Meade's instructions, climbed Little Round Top, and surveyed the country. He saw the Confederates advancing to capture it, and knew that it was undefended. Directing the signal

officers to remain on the crest so as to make the enemy believe that it was defended, he hastened after the 3d brigade of Ayres' division, which he saw moving some distance away. Weed, who was in command, directed Colonel O'Rorke to lead the One Hundred and Fortieth New York to the summit and defend it at all hazards.

Colonel Vincent with Barnes' 3d brigade had just reached the southern slope of Little Round Top, and was preparing to oppose Law's advance. A moment later Hood's soldiers dashed forward with a yell and attacked him. Vincent's men were well sheltered behind rocks and made a vigorous resistance. Law swooped down on his left, and driving the Sixth Michigan before him, pressed on to the summit. Fortunately O'Rorke's soldiers, going at full run, reached the summit a moment before him. Before they had time to catch their breath or form in line of battle, Law was upon them.

O'Rorke ordered a charge, and his men dashed forward amid a sharp musketry fire, and captured some of the foremost men of the enemy. Vincent came to their assistance, and Hood was checked. O'Rorke and many of his men were killed, but Little Round Top was saved. Hazlett's battery had been dragged to the summit by the most extraordinary exertions, but the guns could not be depressed to reach the enemy on the slope, so Hazlett shelled the Confederate reserve in the valley. Law renewed his attack on the summit, and was repulsed by Vincent, who fell in the defence.

Sweitzer and Tilton were retreating before Kershaw, and Ward and DeTrobriand before Benning. The hill of Devil's Den was abandoned, strewn with corpses. Smith saved his three remaining guns with great difficulty. The Confederates drove Winslow's battery from the wheat field and threatened De Trobriand's rear. The latter, assailed in front by Anderson, and out-flanked by Kershaw, retreated with greatly thinned ranks. The Eighth South

Carolina dashed for Clark's and Bigelow's guns, and were repulsed by the One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania. Just then Caldwell's division of the 2d corps arrived, having been hurried forward by Meade. Cross' brigade supported De Trobriand, and Kelly's brigade supported Ward. The latter was Meagher's old Irish brigade; it rushed into the fight with its well-known gallantry, and at once stopped Anderson's advance. Cross advanced against Kershaw, and forced him back on Semmes' brigade. Cross was killed. Semmes' fresh troops returned the attack but were met by Caldwell's second line, composed of Zook's and Brook's brigades, and driven back with Kershaw to the other side of the ravine.

Weed relieved O'Rorke's tired men, and reached the summit of Little Round Top just as Vincent fell. Law pushed forward to a third attack, and tried to out-flank the Union line by way of the eastern side of the ridge. He was met by the hardy backwoodsmen of the Twentieth Maine and forced back in a hand-to-hand encounter.

The field of battle now grew more extensive. McLaws advanced against the orchard, which Graham occupied with two brigades. Barksdale attacked the west flank and Wofford the south front.

Graham found himself in a very hot position, and his loss was great. He was wounded and taken prisoner, and his troops were driven from the orchard and down the slope. Sickles hastened to his aid, when a bullet struck him in the leg and he was forced to transfer the command to Birney.

The Union batteries on the right, along the Emmettsburg road, retired sullenly, firing as they went. Barksdale, following up his victory, pushed in between Humphreys and Barnes, while Wofford attacked their flank on the east. Anderson's three brigades moved against Humphreys' front. Humphreys retreated with his two brigades in good order. He left nearly half of his men dead and wounded on the field.

Wofford attacked Tilton's division and forced it back. Kershaw and Semmes again assailed Sweitzer and Zook and drove them out of the wood. Zook was killed and there was a great loss in the rank and file of his command. Finally the Union troops were pushed in disorder to the left bank of Plum Run. Bigelow's battery, unsupported, took position in front of the Trostle House, and fired canister until nearly all the gunners and 80 out of 88 horses were killed. The guns were captured.

Ayres with Day's and Burbank's brigades occupied the crest of Devil's Den, and sustained the attack of Hood and McLaws. He retired slowly, losing nearly half his men, and took position on the northern base of Little Round Top. Fighting had gone on continuously on the summit. Weed was shot down, and Hazlett, bending over to speak to him, was mortally wounded. Many other superior officers were either killed or wounded, but the men held their positions until the enemy was worn out. Colonel Chamberlain then charged, drove them back, and captured three hundred prisoners. Just then Crawford arrived with McCandless' brigade and assisted in driving the enemy to the other side of Plum Run. Ayres' position deterred them from making a fresh attack on Little Round Top.

There was danger of Barksdale and Wofford separating the Union left from the rest of the army. They advanced rapidly, driving every thing before them. To fill in the gap Hancock despatched two regiments of Hay's division and one of Willard's brigades. Alexander's Confederate batteries were shelling Humphreys' lines, and McGilvery's brigade of artillery established itself on the left bank of Plum Run and replied with vigor. Aided by Hancock's artillery it retarded the Confederate movements. Meade, realizing the danger, hurried to the field, and directed reinforcements to hasten from the right. Williams' division, General Lockwood's two regiments, Candy's brigade, and

Bartlett's brigade all pushed forward to the rescue. United they were superior in number to the enemy in front of the position, but there was danger of their being beaten in detail as they arrived.

Anderson's three brigades continued their advance, confident of victory. But the way was not an easy one.

Meade in person led Lockwood's soldiers at the left against him, in the wood north of the Millerstown road, and McCandless' brigade supported him. Bartlett's, Eustis', and Nevin's brigades of the 6th corps arrived and reinforced the 5th on the line between Little Round Top and McGilvery's battery.

Barksdale and many of his men fell before one of Burling's regiments. Wilcox scaled the slopes and attacked Humphreys and Gibbon. Wright captured a battery on the edge of a wood above Gibbon's front. Webb's brigade dashed forward, destroyed two thirds of his division and recaptured the battery. Wilcox was taken in flank by McGilvery's artillery, and was vigorously met by Humphreys and Hancock. He lost a third of his men and withdrew to the Emmettsburg road. The attack had been a failure all along the line. If it had been supported by Posey's, Mahone's, or Pender's divisions the result might have been far different.

While this desperate fighting was taking place on the left, Ewell was not idle on the right. His orders were to move forward when he heard Longstreet's guns, but owing to a contrary wind he did not hear them until five o'clock. His six batteries on Benner's Hill opened against the Union entrenchment on Culp's Hill, but being entirely unprotected, were quickly silenced. Johnson attempted to turn the Union position on Culp's Hill by moving in the gorges of Rock Creek on the southeast. The 12th corps was abandoning this position, and on their way to the right, when Johnson attacked it. A few detachments of Green's brigade alone defended the intrenchments, and

Stewart's brigade had no difficulty in occupying all that part south of the ravine. He continued to advance and drove Green before him. Night came on and he halted, ignorant that the Baltimore turnpike was only a short distance away, and that to capture it would endanger the Union line of retreat.

Jones was not so successful in his attack on Green's left. He found it ambushed on the steep slopes of Culp's Hill, and lost many men in a vain attempt to dislodge it. A brigade from Schurz' division and also Kane's brigade came to reinforce Green, and Nichols was pushed back. While they had thus gained some ground, the Confederates had obtained no material advantage.

This was only a portion of Ewell's attack. When he had set Johnson in motion he gave the order of attack to Early and Rodes. Early was quick to march, while Rodes hung back for some reason, and the effect of a united movement was thus lost.

Hoke's and Hays' brigades ascended the eastern slope of Cemetery Hill under a terrific fire of artillery. As they approached nearer they fell under the volleys of Barlow's men; but their gallant advance was not stopped, and they drove the Unionists from the first line back to the intrenchments on the top of the hill. They followed them there, and penetrated into the works. Steinwehr and Schurz, who were guarding the opposite slopes, were obliged to about face and assist Barlow. Although the Unionists were greater in number, the Confederate veterans were a match for them, and held the northern side of the hill. Rodes failed to come to their assistance, while Hancock, learning of the situation, sent Carroll's brigade to aid Howard. It arrived at an opportune moment, recaptured the northern side, and drove back Hoke. Early fell back defeated.

While the infantry and artillery were battling as thus described, the cavalry was also busy. Kilpatrick tried to

head off Stuart, and had a brisk encounter with Hampton's brigade at Hunterstown. He then moved to a point on the extreme left. Gregg stationed himself on the right. Johnson in his advance sent a detachment to reconnoitre Brinkerhoff's ridge, and Gregg met them and repulsed them.

When night ended the battle, it was hard to say on which side the advantage lay. Lee occupied a portion of Culp's Hill; he had held Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top for a short time; he had routed the Unionists in the peach orchard, and these advantages he considered sufficient to warrant him in continuing the battle on the next day. Only seventeen of his brigades had been in action.

Although Meade had repulsed all attacks, his situation was still alarming. Forty-two of his fifty-two brigades had been engaged. He had lost over 20,000 men in the two days' fighting, and hundreds of men were straggling towards Baltimore. He looked forward with apprehension to the next day of battle, and made every preparation for retreat. He called a council of war, and it was decided to remain and defend the position.

The night was passed in reforming the lines and picking up the wounded. The 12th corps marched back from the right to its old position, to find it occupied by Stewart. Kane's brigade joined them. Shaler's and Neill's brigades were stationed on the extreme right on the east side of Rock Creek. Lockwood reinforced Williams. The 5th corps was placed on the left on the steep slopes of Great Round Top, and the disabled 3d was held in reserve. Caldwell's division was again stationed on the left of the 2d corps. Wadsworth was on Culp's Hill, Robinson on Cemetery Hill. Stannard occupied the small wood where Perry had been driven out.

Lee made no change in his plan of battle. He intended to resume his tactics of the previous day—a double attack on both wings.


Johnson on the left was reinforced by Smith's brigade. Rodes' old brigade and Daniels' came to support his left. The Power and McAllister Hills commanded his position in the wood, and Williams, having planted his artillery there, began a destructive fire on the morning of the 3d July, and demolished Johnson's weak entrenchments. Williams pushed forward his infantry to the attack, and Johnson's infantry, without waiting, dashed forward to meet them. This enabled them to catch sight of the turnpike crowded with wagons, and stragglers, and the sight spurred them to great exertions.

A savage hand-to-hand fight followed among the rocks. Meade's artillery poured in a terrible fire on the Confederates, who had no guns with which to reply. Lockwood moved to Geary's assistance. After seven hours' fighting Stewart led a charge on Ruger, who threatened his left. It was all in vain, and in turn Geary and Ruger advanced, drove Stewart from the slopes of Culp's Hill, and captured three stand of colors and five hundred prisoners.

It was eleven o'clock. The Unionists were completely victorious on their right wing and the turnpike was safe. On the extreme left Farnsworth made a gallant charge on Laws' lines, and was met and annihilated by Robertson's brigade.

It was just about this time that Pickett, who was stationed on the strip of ground between Warfield Ridge and Seminary Hill, set fire to the Codon House, and exchanged shots with the enemy. This amounted to little, and it was not until one o'clock that the battle really began.

Two cannon-shots gave the signal, and a moment later one hundred and thirty-eight Confederate guns opened a concentrated fire on Cemetery Hill. Eighty Union guns, posted on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge replied. It was the greatest artillery duel of the whole war. It created immense havoc in the Union lines, but they main-



tained their positions bravely. Finally Meade silenced his guns in order to draw the enemy to the attack. Pickett believing the guns to be disabled, threw his soldiers forward on Ziegler's grove. Kemper moved on his right and Armistead on his left.

McGilvery reopened with his battery of forty pieces, and taking Pickett's line in flank did tremendous damage. This did not stop the intrepid Southerners, and Pickett's three brigades advanced on the run, making one of the most magnificent charges in the history of war. Garnett, who led his brigade, fell dead with many of his men, before the withering fire of Gibbon's division.

The Unionists were intrenched behind rocks and fences, where bullets could not reach them. Still Pickett pressed on, and crossed bayonets with Gibbon's men. Stannard's soldiers opened a murderous fire on Armistead's right. It recoiled, and Armistead threw it upon the brigades of Webb and Harrow. It pierced the first line and drove the Unionists back upon their second line of earthworks. Hancock and Gibbon sent forward their reserves. Harrow advanced his left and took Pickett in the rear.

Armistead pressed on, and captured Cushing's battery, which was posted in a clump of trees, and was killed with Cushing in the fight. Pettigrew, Archer, Scales, and Lane, who had advanced on Pickett's left, broke through the first Union line, and ascending the slopes, threw themselves against Hays' line. They could not pierce it and were driven back in confusion, leaving two thousand prisoners and fifteen stand of colors. Some of their regiments joined Pickett, who was still fighting.

The entire fire of the Unionists was now concentrated on Pickett's men, and the division was simply annihilated; three thousand five hundred men and twelve stand of colors were lost.

Wilcox, who should have assaulted Gibbon's right, had wandered off too far to the right, and had reached the

foot of the slope on which the 3d corps (Union) was stationed. He was preparing to resume his march when Stannard attacked him on the flank and the Union artillery opened fire. Finding himself unsupported he retreated.

The whole Confederate line was now in retreat. The reserve was not near enough to support it, and the artillery alone aided it. It drew off slowly, and Meade was too cautious to take the offensive. McCandless advanced on Kershaw, had a brief engagement, and captured a few prisoners. The battle of Gettysburg was ended.

Before the day's battle had begun Stuart had received orders to move round the Union right and strike the Union column on the Baltimore turnpike if it should retreat in that direction. He wished to create a panic in the Union rear, and he gathered his four brigades commanded by Chamblin, Jenkins, Fitzhugh Lee, and Hampton, on the western slopes of Cress Ridge.

Kilpatrick's division was on the other side of the ridge, and prepared to oppose him. A vigorous engagement took place on the Rummel farm east of the ridge. The opposing cavalry crossed sabres several times; the battle ended in Stuart being defeated, and he withdrew to cover the retreat of Lee's army.

The battle had thus occupied July 1st, 2d, and 3d. Meade's effective force was from 82,000 to 84,000 men, and 300 guns. Lee's effective force was about 69,000 men, and 250 guns. Each side lost 23,000 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Considering the number of men engaged, about 69,000 Confederates, to 80,000 on the Union side, the percentage is enormous; being 36 per cent. for the former, and 27 for the latter. The official report gave the Union loss 2,834 killed, 13,709 wounded, and 6,645 prisoners, or 23,188 in all. The Confederate total was 23,028, and included 2,665 killed and 12,599 wounded. Fully one thousand of those reported wounded


on the Union side died soon after, and the same was the case with the Confederates. The Union army lost 20 generals, 16 wounded, and four killed. The Confederates lost 17 generals, 13 wounded, three killed, and one captured.

After its defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederate army retreated to Northern Virginia, closely followed by the Union forces. During the remainder of 1863 there were no important movements on either side.

A contrary result to the battle of Gettysburg would have been fraught with disaster to the Union cause, far beyond the loss of men and material during the clash of arms. It would have uncovered Baltimore and Philadelphia to the advance of the Confederate army, and enabled Lee to establish himself in the rich region of Eastern Pennsylvania, whence he could gather abundant supplies for his army, while it rested from the fatigue of the long march, and repaired the ravages of battle. Washington would have been endangered, and it was Lee's plan to give a crushing defeat to the Union army, and then occupy the capital and dictate terms of peace. He was well aware of the discontent that prevailed at the North, and the opposition that politicians and others were making to the prosecution of the war for the suppression of the rebellion. He counted confidently upon an uprising in the North, in case he could carry the war into its territory instead of confining it, as it had been thus far and was ever after confined, to the Southern States. Between the opposition influences and the fears of the people, he hoped to create a sentiment in favor of peace, and with his advantage of position he believed he would be able, in a great measure, to dictate its terms.

His confidence cannot be wondered at when it is remembered that he had, not long before, defeated the Union army of Virginia, at Chancellorsville, and, previous to Chancellorsville, had inflicted other defeats of equal

importance. His army was composed of the very flower of the Southern troops, and in order to strengthen it and prepare for the invasion of Pennsylvania, he had drawn Longstreet's corps from North Carolina, when it was greatly needed for strengthening Bragg, and enabling him to take the offensive against Rosecrans, and also for preventing the disaster which overtook the Confederates at Vicksburg. By their defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederates suffered as heavily in *morale* as in material, and from that time onward, to the close of the war, the invasion of the North was not again possible. In all its aspects the battle of Gettysburg is entitled to rank as one of the great and decisive battles in the history of the nineteenth century.





CHAPTER XV.

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG—1863.

AT the very outset of the civil war in America the importance of the possession of the Mississippi River was perceived by the leaders on both sides of the conflict. The Confederates sought to close the great water highway by the erection of powerful batteries at Columbus, Kentucky, twenty miles below the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi at Cairo, and at the same time they obstructed its mouth by seizing the forts below New Orleans. Immediately there arose throughout all the region drained by the mighty stream and its numerous tributaries a demand that this great artery of commerce should be opened. Never were a people moved by a stronger and more united impulse than were the dwellers in the great valley that the Father of Waters, should be restored to peaceful navigation. No more stirring prophecy was ever made than that of General Logan when he declared that "the men of the West will hew their way to the Gulf of Mexico with their swords."

The earliest military movements of any magnitude in the Western States were undertaken with a view to opening the navigation of the Mississippi. While General Lyon was making efforts for retaining possession of Missouri on behalf of the nation, a military force was gathered at Cairo under command of General Prentiss, to protect that important point and prevent as far as possible the further descent of boats laden with supplies. Many of

the merchants and steamboat owners of St. Louis were in sympathy with the secession movement, and in the early days of the blockade at Cairo numerous boats succeeded in passing safely down the stream, never to return. Gun-boats were hastily improvised and added to the efficiency of the blockade, and in the autumn of 1861 General Grant, who had been placed in command at Cairo, led an expedition for the capture of Belmont, a small town opposite Columbus. The Confederate camp at that point was captured and destroyed, but the Union forces were compelled to retreat owing to the fire of the heavy guns from the heights of Columbus, and the overwhelming number of troops that were sent across the river to reinforce the feeble garrison of Belmont. The losses on the Union side were about four hundred in killed, wounded, and captured, and about six hundred on that of the Confederates. The battle had no strategic importance, but it ranks in history as the first aggressive movement for the opening of the Mississippi.

The Confederate position at Columbus was on a high bluff commanding the river, and the batteries were so powerful and so well planted that their reduction by the gun-boats of the river was not a possibility. In the early part of 1862 the army and fleet were ready to move, but instead of making a direct attack as the Confederates had expected, General Grant proceeded to a flank movement up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. Forts Henry and Donelson fell, and Columbus, no longer tenable, as it could be easily assailed from the rear, was evacuated by the Confederates, who took a new position at Island Number Ten, 25 miles farther down the river. The gun-boats and a strong land force assailed the batteries on this island, but were unable to capture it. It held out for nearly a month, and in the meantime the Confederates were assembling an army at Corinth, Mississippi, with a view to demolishing the forces of General Grant, who had

moved up the Tennessee River after the capture of Fort Donelson, and taken position at Pittsburg Landing. The Confederate army attacked General Grant on the 6th April, and the battle of Shiloh ensued. General Grant's army was saved by the opportune arrival of a portion of General Buell's army which had been marching to join it, and the Confederates retreated to Corinth. Their defeat rendered Island Number Ten untenable, and it was evacuated on the 7th; part of the garrison retiring to Fort Pillow, 130 miles farther down the river, and a part falling into the hands of General Pope as prisoners of war.

Fort Pillow was bombarded by the gun-boats for several weeks, but it could not be attacked from the land side as long as the Confederates held possession of Corinth. At the end of May they evacuated Corinth, and the evacuation of Fort Pillow followed immediately. The Union fleet then steamed down the river, 70 miles to Memphis, where a Confederate fleet of seven gun-boats waited to defend the city. After a sharp battle, which was witnessed by the population of Memphis from the bluff on which that city stands, the Confederate boats were captured or destroyed, and the Union forces were in possession of the place.

Shortly after the capture of Memphis the Union flotilla descended the river to Vicksburg, finding no obstructions other than occasional light batteries which fired upon the gun-boats from the banks. While the army and flotilla had been making its way southward a national fleet, commanded by the intrepid Farragut, had passed the forts near the mouth of the Mississippi, emerged victorious from one of the greatest naval battles of the war, and compelled the surrender of New Orleans. A land force under General Butler arrived and took possession of the city, and soon afterwards Admiral Farragut sent a portion of his fleet under Commander Lee to ascertain what obstructions there might be to the navigation of the great river

farther up. Commander Lee reached Vicksburg on the 18th May and judged that he could not successfully cope with the batteries. He reported thus to Admiral Farragut, and waited for reinforcements, which arrived during the latter part of May. Early in June a bombardment was begun, but without serious effect; during June the fleet was strengthened, and by the end of the month Admiral Farragut arrived with his entire squadron, and accompanied by an infantry force of four regiments under General Williams.


The gun-boat flotilla from above and the naval fleet from below met in front of Vicksburg, which was now the only point firmly held by the Confederates along the whole course of the Mississippi. On the 27th and 28th June the lower fleet bombarded the defences for several hours, and seven of the vessels passed the batteries and joined the fleet above. The bombardment had very little effect on the defences of Vicksburg; shot and shell were occasionally thrown into the town until the 15th July, when the Confederate ram *Arkansas*, which had been constructed at Yazoo City, came out of the Yazoo River, and after disabling two of the Union gun-boats, was safely moored under the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg.

Fearing that this vessel might destroy his mortar boats anchored below the city, Farragut again descended the river, passing the forts in the night, and towards the end of the month retired altogether from the vicinity. The land force had been endeavoring to dig a canal across the tongue of land known as Young's Point, directly opposite Vicksburg. The canal was a failure, as water could not be made to run through it, and the land force retired at the same time as the lower fleet. The upper gun-boats also went away, and before the first of August there was no enemy in sight of Vicksburg. This first siege lasted altogether more than two months, and though 25,000 shot and shell were thrown into the place from the Union

guns, the loss or damage to the Confederates was trifling; they reported altogether 7 killed and 15 wounded.

During the latter half of 1862 no material advance towards the opening of the Mississippi was made. The Confederates resumed the offensive, sending the larger part of the army that withdrew from Shiloh to reinforce the army that was defending Chattanooga. The Army of the Ohio, under General Buell, was forced back through Tennessee and Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, under General Grant, advanced along the line of the Mississippi Central Railway and was making good progress towards a position on the line in the rear of Vicksburg. General Pemberton commanded the Confederate forces opposed to General Grant; he held the line of the Tallahatchie River, and in order to drive him from it General Grant sent a cavalry force under Generals Washburne and Hovey to cut the line of railway and menace Pemberton's communications. This movement caused him to abandon the line of the Tallahatchie and fall back to Grenada, and as soon as he had done so the Union line was advanced through Holly Springs to Oxford, where head-quarters were established on the 3d December.

Grant proceeded to accumulate large quantities of stores and munitions of war at Holly Springs preparatory to another advance. Realizing the danger of a long line of railway through an enemy's country, he decided to make an attempt to establish a position in the rear of Vicksburg, which would enable him to cut loose from his line of railway and advance, *en l'air*, until he could connect with the new base and thus have a secure position from which to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. To establish this base he ordered the corps which formed his right wing to be embarked on transports and convoyed by the gun-boat fleet to the mouth of the Yazoo River a few miles above Vicksburg. Ascending the river some ten or twelve miles, it was to land and occupy Haines' Bluff, a commanding position in the rear of the city.



The fleet of gun-boats and transports started from Memphis on the 20th December, and on the 26th the troops debarked on the south bank of the Yazoo River near the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. The whole day was consumed in landing, and on the 27th the Confederate lines were attacked. That day and the next passed in skirmishes and small encounters of no great consequence. But on the 29th an assault was made on the Confederate works, in which there was heavy loss of life with no advantage to the Union side. The charge up the hillsides seamed with rifle pits, covered with abatis, and raked by artillery and small arms, was most heroic; it was performed by the division of General Morgan, reinforced by the brigades of Generals Blair and Thayer from Steele's division. General Thayer's brigade reached the edge of the Confederate entrenchments side by side with that of General Blair, but the fire was so furious that it could not be met, and the storming party was driven back, leaving the ground strewn with dead and wounded. The Union loss in the attack on Haines' Bluff was 1,929 killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Confederates was 209.

The failure of the movement was due partly to the delay in making the assault, and partly to the fact that on the very day the expedition left Memphis General Grant's line of communication was cut by the Confederate cavalry under General Van Dorn. That energetic officer had been sent by Pemberton to attack Holly Springs, which was insufficiently defended, having a garrison of only 1,200 men under a commander who was soon afterwards dismissed for incompetence. Van Dorn seized the place and remained there several hours engaged in destroying the immense stores which had been accumulated. Then he rode away without molestation, having upset all of General Grant's plans. Grant was compelled to retire to Holly Springs, and his retirement gave opportunity for Pemberton to send reinforcements to Vicksburg and

enable the commander there to cope successfully with the Union forces that attacked the forts at Haines' Bluff.

On the 2d January the troops at Chickasaw Bayou were re-embarked. They left the Yazoo and ascended the Mississippi to Milliken's Bend, about 12 miles above Vicksburg, and there on the 4th January, General M'Clermand assumed command. To restore in as great measure as possible the *morale* of the troops disheartened by the failure at Haines' Bluff, General M'Clermand ordered an attack upon Fort Hindman at Arkansas Post, on the Arkansas River, a short distance from its mouth. This fort commanded the navigation of the Arkansas River and was a convenient striking point from which to interfere with the safe navigation of the Mississippi by the Union boats. Two transports had been captured by sallies of the Confederates from Fort Hindman; its garrison was known to be small and the capture would not be a difficult matter for the forces under General M'Clermand.

Fort Hindman was a regular, square bastioned work, 300 feet on each exterior side, with a parapet 18 feet high and a ditch 15 feet deep. It mounted 12 guns, two of them 8-inch and one 9-inch. The garrison comprised about 6,000 troops under command of Brigadier-General Churchill.

During the evening of the 10th January, the gun-boats bombarded the fort for about half an hour, from a distance of 400 yards. On the 11th, a combined attack of the army and navy was made, the army having been landed during the night and taken a position in the rear of the fort. The battle lasted for four hours; attack and defence were ably conducted, and when further resistance was useless, the Confederates displayed the white flag and the works were occupied by the Union forces. Seven thousand prisoners, 8,000 stand of arms, 20 pieces of artillery, and a large amount of ammunition and commissary stores were taken. The Union loss was 120 killed and about 480

wounded; the Confederate loss in killed and wounded was much less, owing to the shelter which the fort afforded. Expeditions were sent to capture Des Arc and Duval's Bluff, where there were small military posts; the main body of M'Clernand's command returned down the river to Napoleon, Arkansas, and a few days later received orders from General Grant to proceed to Young's Point, just below Milliken's Bend.

Soon after the raid of Van Dorn upon Holly Springs, General Grant determined to abandon the line of advance by way of Grenada and Jackson, and to assault Vicksburg with the river as his base. Leaving sufficient forces to hold important points in Tennessee and Mississippi, he transferred his army to Memphis by rail, and sent it thence in steamboats to Milliken's Bend and Young's Point. The transfer occupied the greater part of January, and on the 2d February the General arrived in person at Milliken's Bend and assumed command. The attack upon the works at Haines' Bluff had demonstrated the impossibility of taking Vicksburg from that direction, and the General proceeded to make plans for transferring the army below the city.

Operations were resumed in the canal which General Williams attempted to dig in the previous year, but they were hindered by the rapid rise of the river and the incessant rains. The earth taken from the canal was piled on its western side to prevent the flooding of that part of the country when the water was let in, as it is below the level of the Mississippi at a high stage. An embankment at the upper end of the canal was intended to keep out the water until the work was completed.

On the night of the 8th March, this embankment gave way and the river poured a torrent into the canal, carrying away the digging implements, and flooding the camps of the troops that were located near by. Several regiments were obliged to gather their camp equipage and make a

rapid run for the levee, and some of the troops that were on the lower side of the peninsula had to be ferried over to join the main body of the army. Attempts were made to repair the damages, but the water was so high that they were ineffectual, and it was evident that the canal could not be utilized for its intended purpose.

While the work on the canal was progressing, General Grant ordered a channel to be cut from the Mississippi into Lake Providence, on the west side of the river, in the hope of opening a route by which he might send transports and gun-boats to co-operate with General Banks farther down. He also sent an expedition to the Cold-water River, by way of Yazoo Pass, in the hope of getting into the Yazoo River and destroying some transports and partially completed gun-boats at Yazoo City. The Confederates had established a navy-yard at that point, and it was from there that the ram *Arkansas* descended in 1862 and created the havoc and alarm already described.

Neither of these and two or three similar enterprises amounted to any thing further than to furnish occupation for idle troops and keep the Confederates in considerable alarm for their communications, and doubts as to the intentions of the Union commander. The Confederates had a steamboat, the *City of Vicksburg*, lying at the levee in front of the town, and the Union commander desired to destroy her. Colonel Ellet, commanding the ram, *Queen of the West*, volunteered to undertake the dangerous task, and at the same time run below Vicksburg and destroy other boats which the enemy were using for the transport of troops and supplies across the river. To protect her as much as possible three hundred bales of cotton were placed in such a position as to partially shield her engines, and her steering wheel was removed from the usual position and placed under shelter. But it was found that with this arrangement she steered so badly that the wheel was put back in its old place; the necessity of the

change delayed her starting, and instead of getting off at daybreak, as first intended, it was full sunrise before she was in front of Vicksburg. A hundred guns opened fire upon her as soon as she came in range, but only a few shots struck her.

She delivered a blow with her iron prow upon the side of the *City of Vicksburg*, but owing to the broad guards of the latter, the force of the impact was broken and the hull was not injured. Circumstances did not permit delay for a second blow, and the *Queen of the West* continued her journey down the stream after discharging some incendiary shells into the enemy's boat. The cotton on the *Queen* was fired by the enemy's shells, but all hands were set to work to extinguish the flames and no serious damage occurred. The steamer was soon out of range and tied up to the shore on the southerly side of Young's Point, where her commander was warmly greeted by the officers of the troops stationed there.

The boat was struck about a dozen times, but all damages were repaired in a few hours. She then steamed down the river. She burned several Confederate transports, returned for a supply of coal, and then started up the Red River on an expedition in which she captured one steamer, but was herself captured, having been run ashore under the guns of a fort through the treachery of her pilot. Part of the crew was taken with the boat, but the remainder, including Colonel Ellet, escaped to the steamer *De Soto*, a tender of the *Queen*. On the latter steamer the party descended the Red River to where the *Era*, one of the captured boats, was lying. The *De Soto* unshipped her rudder and could not be steered; she was blown up to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy, and the *Era* made good her escape and ascended the river to the position of the army near Vicksburg.

Soon after the descent of the *Queen of the West* in front of Vicksburg the gunboat *Indianola* followed her; she

drifted past the batteries with the force of the current and was not discovered until in front of the town. The batteries opened upon her, but she escaped unharmed, and the success of the movement prompted General Grant to make further attempts in the same direction. The *Indianola* was captured in a fight with the Confederate gun-boat *Webb* and the *Queen of the West*, which had been repaired and placed in the service of her captors. Soon afterwards a coal-barge was disguised to resemble a gun-boat and allowed to drift past the batteries of Vicksburg in the night. Her pilot house was a small shed taken from a plantation, and her smoke-stacks were made of barrels piled endwise on top of one another, the topmost one containing a kettle of burning tar.


A tremendous fire was opened from the batteries, but the coal-barge, with not a soul on board, drifted along as though nothing had happened, and passed beyond the reach of the guns. The *Indianola* was being repaired a few miles below, and fearing the supposed gun-boat would recapture her, the Confederates sent a courier with orders that she should be set on fire. By the time the ruse was discovered and an order countermanding the burning could be sent, the *Indianola* had been destroyed. She burned and blew up and not even a gun was saved from her.

Preparations were now made by General Grant for transferring his army to a point on the Mississippi below Vicksburg, and for this purpose General McClelland, on the 29th of March, moved with the 13th corps to New Carthage, distant by land from Milliken's Bend about thirty-five miles. The movement was slow, as the roads were bad; the 16th corps followed, accompanied by long trains of wagons transporting supplies and ammunition. While the movement was going on preparations were made for running several gun-boats and a fleet of transports past the batteries of Vicksburg. Eight gun-boats

and three transports were assigned for the effort; the plan was for the gun-boats to drift down at about a hundred yards from each other and engage the batteries as soon as they were discovered, but not before. The night of the 16th of April was selected for the undertaking. Under cover of the smoke of the cannonade the transports were to endeavor to slip through with a full head of steam.

The gun-boats were fairly in front of the city before there was any sign of life on shore. Suddenly two guns were fired from the extreme right of the Vicksburg batteries, and then the cannonade commenced along the whole line of the works. The fleet immediately replied, and a great cloud of smoke soon hid the boats from view. Then the transports started at full speed, in the cover of the smoke; the *Forest Queen*, the foremost transport, was disabled by a shot through her steam drum, and the *Henry Clay*, which followed, was set on fire by a shell. The *Forest Queen* drifted out of range, and was picked up by a gun-boat; the crew of the *Henry Clay* escaped in their yawl, all except the pilot, who remained at his post till the flames were around him, and finding that his signals to the engineer were not answered, he jumped overboard and was saved by one of the gun-boats. The *Henry Clay* was burned, and drifted down the river a mass of flames. The *Silver Wave*, the third transport, was not touched by the Confederate shot and shell.

The success of this enterprise encouraged a similar one, and on the night of the 22d of April, six transports were sent down with barges of forage fastened to their sides to protect them from artillery fire. Five of them got through somewhat damaged, and fully half the forage on the barges was saved. The damaged transports were repaired, and supplied the desired facilities for moving the army across the river and making ready for the attack on Vicksburg. But the number was limited, and General



Grant found it necessary to order the army to concentrate at Hard Times, nearly opposite the town of Grand Gulf, at the mouth of the Big Black River.

The batteries of Grand Gulf were engaged by the gun-boats, but owing to the commanding position the Confederates had the advantage, and it was not deemed prudent to attempt to carry the place by assault after the bombardment. The troops were marched across the point from Hard Times, the gun-boats and transports ran past the batteries of Grand Gulf in the night of the 29th of April, and on the morning of the 30th the work of ferrying the troops across was begun. They were landed at Bruinsburg, supplied with three days' rations, and sent on the road to Port Gibson, where a force of the enemy was known to be posted.

General McClelland's corps had the advance, and steadily drove back the enemy until within three or four miles of Port Gibson. The Confederates made a stand on the bank of Bayou Pierre, but were promptly defeated on the 1st May, and fled in the direction of Vicksburg. Grand Gulf was abandoned on the 2d, the gun-boats finding it deserted on the morning of the 3d. Considerable quantity of ammunition and several heavy guns were captured here; the fortifications were very strong. If they had been completed and properly garrisoned it would have been impossible for any fleet to take them.

General Grant's plan of campaign was now evident to every one, and the army moved forward with the animation that is developed by hope of success. The plan was to advance along the valley of the Big Black River, and the road to Jackson, until fairly in the rear of Vicksburg. When this position was gained the army could close in on the town, and at the same time cut off the arrival of reinforcements or supplies for the garrison. But there was a dangerous feature about the movement, that the army, on leaving the Mississippi, would have to cut loose from

its base, and in case of defeat its retreat again to the river would be full of peril. It was necessary to strike out for a new base, which General Grant decided should be at Haines' Bluff, in the rear of Vicksburg. By swinging around to that point he expected to open communication to the banks of the Yazoo, where he could meet the gun-boat and transport fleet.

On the same day that Grant crossed from Hard Times to Bruinsburg, the 15th corps, which had been left at Milliken's Bend, was ordered to make a demonstration on Haines' Bluff, as though with a serious intent of capturing it. General Blair's division, accompanied by several gun-boats, and carried on ten transports, was sent up the Yazoo to a point near the scene of the disaster in December. A vigorous demonstration was made during the whole of the 30th, the troops being landed in full view of the enemy, only to be re-embarked when night came on. Similar demonstrations were made the next day at other points on the Yazoo, and then the 15th corps proceeded to follow the rest of the army to the crossing at Grand Gulf as rapidly as possible. The demonstration had the desired effect of drawing the attention of the Confederates from the movements at Grand Gulf, and prevented their despatching reinforcements to the menaced points.

All through the month of March and down towards the end of April General Pemberton believed that General Grant would be forced to abandon his attempt to take Vicksburg, and he certainly had good reason for his belief in the invulnerability of the place after so many and futile attempts at its occupation. Pemberton was in constant communication with General Joe Johnston, who had chief command over the armies of Bragg and Pemberton, with head-quarters at Tullohoma, and steadily advised his superior that Vicksburg was in no danger; but when the gun-boats and transports passed the batteries, and the Union army assembled in front of Grand Gulf,

Pemberton saw that there was a sudden and disagreeable change in the situation. On the 29th he telegraphed to Johnston: "The enemy is at Hard Times in large force, with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg." Before Johnston had time to reply and give instructions how to prevent Grant from crossing the river, the Union forces had reached the east bank, and were pushing on towards Vicksburg.

On May 1st Pemberton telegraphed: "A furious battle has been going on since daylight just below Port Gibson. . . . I should have large reinforcements. Enemy's movements threaten Jackson, and, if successful, cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson." Johnston replied with instructions for Pemberton to unite all his forces and beat Grant, which Pemberton found was much easier to say than to do. He did his best; but the enemy were too strong for him. After the defeat at Port Gibson his forces withdrew in the direction of Vicksburg. General Grant advanced in pursuit to where the road from Port Gibson to Vicksburg crosses the Big Black River at Hankinson's Ferry.

Here the Union army halted from the 3d to the 8th of May, waiting for supplies from Grand Gulf and for the arrival of the 15th corps, which was hastening on from Milliken's Bend. Demonstrations were made in the direction of Vicksburg, which was twenty miles away, as though a direct attack was intended; but that was not General Grant's plan. His real design was to keep his forces on the east bank of the Big Black, and strike the Vicksburg and Jackson Railway about midway between the two places, thus severing the connection with Pemberton and any reinforcements that might come to him from the east. This would be done with the left and centre of the army, while the right wing would make a detour eastward through Raymond to Jackson. After destroy-

ing the stores at that point and disabling the railway, the right wing (McPherson's corps) would march westward to join the rest of the army for moving on Vicksburg.

Four days were occupied in carrying out these movements; but unforeseen circumstances caused a change of plan. On the 12th of May, when approaching Raymond, McPherson's corps encountered two Confederate brigades, which were defeated after a fight of two hours. They retreated on Jackson, and were followed by McPherson, who was confident of capturing the place without much difficulty, when news came during the night that Johnston was momentarily expected in Jackson to take command in person, and that troops were being concentrated there with a view to strengthening Vicksburg. General Grant immediately ordered the left and centre of the army to march on Jackson, where it would join the right wing, and be able to cope with whatever force might be assembled there. Pemberton was at Edwards Station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railway, and waiting to deliver battle on the appearance of the enemy. But the latter turned eastward before the railway was reached.

Johnston arrived at Jackson on the night of the 13th, and immediately perceived the danger of the situation, with the Union army between himself and Pemberton. He immediately sent orders for the latter to move east to Clinton, and attack the rear of the Union army, while he engaged it in front. Pemberton had 17,000 men at Edwards Station, while Johnston had some 10,000 or 12,000 in Jackson. If these had co-operated there was a possibility of defeating the Union army, though hardly a probability. But without co-operation there was no hope of success. Pemberton did not move as ordered, and when McPherson's and the 15th corps reached Jackson on the 14th, all that Johnston could do was to engage in a sort of rear guard fight for two hours or so, while he removed the stores, or as much of them as possible, along

the road to Canton. After destroying what they had no use for, disabling the railway, and burning bridges, the Union troops faced westward, and marched near the line of the railway in the direction of Vicksburg.

Meantime Pemberton, after disregarding Johnston's orders to move on Clinton, called a council of war of his officers; the majority of them favored moving as Johnston had directed, which would enable the column, in case of defeat, to connect with Johnston by making a detour to the north from Clinton. But Pemberton was opposed to any movement which would separate him from Vicksburg, which he considered his base, though it was obviously untenable in the then position of the Union army. He advised a movement towards Raymond to sever Grant's communications with his base at Grand Gulf, and was supported by a minority of the officers forming the council. He accordingly directed all his available forces, about 17,500, to move in the direction of Raymond on the afternoon of the 15th.

Under ordinary circumstances the movement was a good one, but Grant had foreseen the possibility of it, and on the 11th he telegraphed to General Halleck that he should communicate with Grand Gulf no more unless it became necessary to send a train with a heavy escort. "You may not hear from me again for several weeks," the despatch concluded, and thus the army had dropped its base and was moving *en l'air*. Therefore when Pemberton marched on the 15th to sever Grant's communications with Grand Gulf, there were none to sever. On the same day McClernand was ordered to move his corps to Edwards Station and continue the advance till he could feel the enemy, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident of victory. General Blair's division of the 15th corps was moved with McClernand, and the rest of the 15th, together with McPherson's corps, was ordered to join McClernand as rapidly as possible.

By night the Union troops were within a few miles of Edwards Station, and so close to Pemberton's army on the Raymond road that their pickets were within speaking distance. Pemberton on the morning of the 16th received orders from Johnston to march northward, but he soon found he could not do so without being met by the Union army, which was interposing between him and the direction of the Polar Star. He took up a strong position at Champion Hill and prepared for battle: his left, Stevenson's division, occupying Champion Hill; the centre, Bowen's division, extending across Baker's Creek; and his right, Loring's division, stretching to the southward among thick woods and deep ravines with sharply sloping sides. Champion Hill is thickly wooded, and in front of it is a cleared valley, the clearing extending a short distance up the side of the hill.

Hovey's division of McClernand's corps was the first to engage the enemy, which it did by coming up on the Confederate left. Grant saw that a general battle was imminent, and gave orders for Hovey not to engage seriously until the rest of McClernand's corps could come up, and also McPherson's, which was pushing forward as rapidly as possible. McPherson's corps was thrown to the right so as to envelop the Confederate left and threaten his rear, while McClernand's divisions (other than Hovey's) were marching towards the Confederate right and centre. The firing between Hovey's division and the Confederate skirmishers gradually increased, and by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had swelled into a battle. The odds were against Hovey's division; one brigade and then another of Crocker's division of McPherson's corps were sent to assist Hovey, while Logan's division (of McPherson corps) was effectively striking against the Confederate rear and distracting his work in front. In spite of this diversion, the Confederates were able, with their superior numbers, to push back Hovey

and those who came to his support ; but the line retreated slowly, and ultimately gained a position where it could pour a fire of artillery upon the Confederate line and force it back in turn.

Logan's division worked so well around to the enemy's rear that Pemberton realized his danger of being cut off from Vicksburg and ordered a retreat. Stevenson's and Bowen's divisions made good their escape, but Loring's division was cut off and compelled to retire to the southward, abandoning all its guns and losing many men, who were captured. Loring found it impossible to retreat into Vicksburg, but by making a wide detour south and east he reached Jackson three days later (on the 19th), and reported to Johnston with what he had saved from his command.

The Union loss in this battle (Champion Hill) was 426 killed, 1,842 wounded, and 189 missing. The Confederates lost quite as heavily in killed and wounded, about 2,000 prisoners, 15 or 20 guns, and three or four thousand small-arms. The battle was fought mainly by Hovey's division, which lost about 1,200 in killed and wounded, as it was engaged for several hours before the other divisions could come to its aid. This assertion is not intended to detract in any way from the other divisions, as all fought gallantly as soon as they reached the field. The 15th corps was too far away to be of service, as it was still marching from Jackson, and only three divisions of McClelland's corps could come up before the battle ended. Two divisions (Carr's and Osterhaus') of McClelland's corps pursued the fleeing enemy until dark, capturing many wagons and adding considerably to the number of prisoners.

The result of the battle of Champion Hill was to sever completely the communications between Johnston and Pemberton, and shut the latter up in Vicksburg. It was virtually the beginning of the siege.

Next morning (17th) the enemy was vigorously pursued to the banks of the Black River, where they made a stand to cover the passage of their train and artillery across that stream. Besides the railway bridge, Pemberton had a bridge which consisted mainly of three steamboats, but he was not able to get all his impedimenta over the river. Carr's division and Lawler's brigade carried the Confederate defences after a fight of about two hours, and Pemberton fled in the direction of Vicksburg, leaving 18 guns, 1,500 prisoners, several thousand stand of arms, and large quantities of commissary stores, to fall into the Union hands. The loss of Grant's forces in the affair of the Black River was 29 killed and 242 wounded. Pemberton burned the bridges as he retired, and thus delayed pursuit. McClernand and McPherson built bridges during the night, and the 15th corps, which had the only pontoon train, crossed at Bridgeport several miles above.

Each corps began crossing at eight A.M. on the 18th, the 15th pressing forward to within $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Vicksburg, when it turned to the right and occupied Walnut Hills to open communication with the Yazoo. McPherson followed the route of the 15th corps to where it turned off to the right, and there he halted for the night. McClernand advanced on the direct road from Jackson to Vicksburg, and when near the city turned to the left. On the morning of the 19th the investment of the city was practically completed, though there were several gaps to be filled in the lines of the besiegers. Vicksburg was in a state of siege.

Communication was opened with the gun-boat fleet, which had been guarding the front of Vicksburg and preventing the receipt of supplies by river. The gun-boats then ascended to attack Haines' Bluff, which the Confederates immediately evacuated, as their position was no longer tenable with the Union forces in their rear. The fortifications at Haines' Bluff were found to be strongly

constructed, and abundantly supplied with material of war, the ammunition being sufficient for a long siege. The author of "The American Conflict" says: "It would hardly be credited on other testimony than his own, that our admiral proceeded to destroy this inestimable material of war with full knowledge that Grant's triumphant army was at hand to defend and utilize it."

General Grant, apprehending an attack by Johnston's relieving force from Jackson, and counting much on the demoralization of Pemberton's command, ordered an assault on the 20th, at 2 P.M. The Union flag was planted on the Confederate earthworks by Blair's division of the 15th corps, but an entrance was not effected owing to the severity of the Confederate fire. A second assault on a larger scale was made on the 22d, at 10 A.M., and to make sure of a simultaneous movement, the corps commanders set their watches by General Grant's. The gun-boats co-operated by opening fire in front, and at the appointed time the assault was general along the whole line.

Sergeant Griffith and 11 men of the 22d Iowa infantry, of McClernand's corps entered one of the bastions of a fort in front of McClernand's position, but all except the sergeant were killed or captured. In two instances at other points regimental flags were planted on the bastions, but that was all. The whole attack was repulsed with a loss of nearly 3,000 in killed, wounded, and captured. At one time General McClernand thought his attack had been successful, and sent word to that effect to General Grant, and at the same time he asked reinforcements, which were sent. Colonel Boomer commanding one of the reinforcing brigades was killed just as his men went into action, and shortly afterwards the assaulting force was hauled off.

It was evident that Vicksburg could only be taken by siege, and General Grant sat down in front of it for that purpose. When he invested the place his forces were

about equal to those of Pemberton whom he was besieging ; each had not far from 30,000 men, and it has been claimed by some historians that the Confederates were numerically superior. Be this as it may, the relative conditions of the two armies was vastly different. The Union forces were flushed with victory, while the Confederates were disheartened by defeat ; the Union forces were well fed and clothed, having opened communications with their heavily laden transports in the Yazoo, while the Confederates were poorly supplied and had starvation staring them in the face. Grant had an abundance of ammunition, while Pemberton was but poorly supplied, and of his 30,000 men there were 6,000 in hospital, so that he could hardly muster more than 15,000 effectives.

Reinforcements, provisions, munitions, artillery, and intrenching tools were sent down the river to Grant, and the men set to work with a will to dig their way into Vicksburg. The rugged hills, which afforded excellent ground for constructing works of defence before the siege, were utilized by the besiegers while they prosecuted their enterprise. Day and night the cannon rained shot and shell into the doomed city, the land forces under Grant being seconded vigorously by the gun-boats and mortar rafts of the flotilla. Mine after mine was run under the enemy's works, and met by countermines, which were often so close that the diggers were separated only by thin curtains of earth and could plainly hear the blows of pick and spade. Portions of the defensive works were blown up, but no practicable breach was made to justify an assault in force.

Famine was busily at work inside the walls of Vicksburg, and knowing the state of affairs there, General Grant was willing to wait patiently for the result. A Confederate officer thus tells the story :

About the thirty-fifth day provisions began to get very scarce, and the advent of General Johnston's relieving force was anxiously and momentarily looked for. Mule meat was

the common fare of all alike, and even dogs became in request for the table. Bean meal was made into bread, and corn meal into coffee, and in these straits the garrison patiently dragged on the weary length of one day after another, under a scorching sun, the stench from the unburied corpses all around alone causing the strongest-minded, firmest-nerved, to grow impatient for the day of deliverance. The enemy pushed their works; they blew up several forts, and with them the garrison, and attempted to charge; but the meagre and famished yet steadfast garrison still defiantly held the key to the Mississippi. But every thing must have an end. General Pemberton learned from General Johnston that he could not afford him relief, and as the garrison was too famished and reduced to cut its way out, he determined to capitulate.

During the siege Johnston made great efforts to gather an army to relieve Vicksburg, but he was unable to do so until too late. On the 29th June he left Jackson with about 24,000 men, and marched in the direction of the Big Black, in the hope of creating a diversion sufficient to enable Pemberton's army to cut its way out. On the 3d July he sent word to Pemberton to hold out until the 7th, when such a diversion would be made, but already Pemberton had begun negotiations for surrender.

On the morning of the 3d July, after 45 days of isolation, General Pemberton ordered a white flag displayed on the bastion of one of the earthworks. The flag was shown in front of General A. J. Smith's division, and firing ceased at that point. An officer went to ascertain the reason for the display of the flag, and found that General Bowen, who commanded one of the Confederate divisions, and Colonel Montgomery of General Pemberton's staff had a communication for General Grant. They were blindfolded and taken to the tent of General Burbridge, whence the letter was forwarded to the commander-in-chief. It proved to be an application for an armistice with a view to arranging terms for capitulation. General Grant replied

that he could listen to nothing short of unconditional surrender, but expressed a willingness to meet General Pemberton during the afternoon at any hour he might name. Three o'clock was appointed for the conference, and orders were given to cease firing along the whole line at that hour.

The conference was begun in presence of several officers of both armies, but it had not progressed far before General Grant invited General Pemberton to walk away a little distance where they would be unheard by others. They sat down under a tree and talked for about an hour. The conference was ended without any agreement as to the details of the surrender, General Grant agreeing to send in his proposals that evening. They were sent in accordingly, General Grant demanding the surrender of the works and city, prisoners to be paroled, private soldiers to be allowed all their clothing but no other property, and officers to retain their side arms, private baggage, and one horse to each mounted officer.

Pemberton replied, accepting the terms in a general way, but making several stipulations to which Grant refused to accede. In his reply to Pemberton, Grant said that if the terms were not accepted by 9 A.M. on the following day, they would be considered rejected. Acceptance could be signified by the display of white flags along the Confederate lines before that hour.

The white flags were displayed and the long siege was over. At 9 A.M. General McPherson rode into Vicksburg to receive the surrender; he met Pemberton half a mile inside the lines, where they were soon joined by Grant. Gen. Logan went in to establish a provost guard; the stars and stripes were hoisted over the court-house, and the soldiers sang "Rally round the Flag" with an enthusiasm which had a double force in view of the triumph and the fact that the surrender took place on the Fourth of July, the anniversary of the nation's birth. Early in the after-

noon the Union fleet of gun-boats and transports was tied along the levee of Vicksburg, and the citizens, who had been hiding in caves and living in constant terror of shot and shell for six long weeks, were able to walk about without danger.

General Grant reported his losses, from the day he landed at Bruinsburg until the surrender, at 943 killed, 7,095 wounded, and 537 missing, a total of 8,575, of whom 4,236 fell before Vicksburg, the most of them in the assault of May 22d. Twenty-seven thousand prisoners were paroled in Vicksburg, of whom only 15,000 were effective for duty. The loss of the enemy in the whole campaign, from Bruinsburg to the surrender, was 37,000 prisoners, among them 15 general officers, and at least 10,000 killed and wounded, including 3 generals. Arms and munitions for an army of 60,000 men were taken, besides a large amount of other public property, such as railway cars, locomotives, steamboats, cotton, etc. A vast amount was destroyed to prevent its capture.

Immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg, General Grant ordered the division of General F. J. Herron to go to aid in the siege of Port Hudson, which was being conducted by General Banks. Port Hudson is 200 miles below Vicksburg, and was invested about the time General Grant drew his lines around Vicksburg. General Gardner, its commander, heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, and sent a flag of truce to General Banks to ascertain the correctness of the report. The latter sent a copy of General Grant's despatch announcing the momentous event, and, on being satisfied of its correctness, General Gardner made a formal surrender of Port Hudson and its garrison, 6,000 strong. General Banks received General Gardner's sword, and immediately returned it in consideration of the gallantry its owner had displayed in the defence of the post intrusted to his charge.

News of the surrender of Port Hudson arrived just as

General Herron's division had embarked. Consequently its destination was changed to the Yazoo River, which it ascended to Yazoo City, where it captured one steamboat and some other property. Twenty-two steamboats had been carried farther up the Yazoo, where they were burned or sunk by the Confederates to save them from capture. Herron captured and brought away 300 prisoners, 6 heavy guns, 250 small-arms, 800 horses, and 2,000 bales of cotton belonging to the Confederate government.

In its consequences the capture of Vicksburg, naturally and imperatively followed by that of Port Hudson, was of the highest importance. The Mississippi River was opened from its mouth to the head of navigation, and "The Father of Waters flowed unvexed to the sea." The Confederacy was split in two, and its western half could no longer send supplies of cattle, salt, provisions, and other needed articles to the armies in the east. The 37,000 prisoners taken in the campaign, together with the 10,000 killed and wounded, were an army which the Confederacy, already heavily overmatched by the Union forces, could sadly afford to lose. It was an army to which the government at Richmond had confided the defence of the Mississippi, and with its surrender was gone the hope of holding any point on the great river.

In a speech at Jackson, Mississippi, in December, 1862, the President of the Confederacy urged the citizens to go to Vicksburg to "assist in preserving the Mississippi River, that great artery of the country, and thus conduce, more than in any other way, to the perpetuation of the Confederacy, and the success of the cause." It is fair to say that this view of the value of the possession of the mighty stream was shared by all the people of the South, and no less by those of the North. Consequently the fall of Vicksburg was an irreparable loss to the one and a gain of immense importance to the other. It was beyond all question one of the most decisive events of the war.



CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE'S SURRENDER—1865.

IN the latter part of May, 1865, a steamer which had left New York two months before for San Francisco, by way of the Straits of Magellan, touched at Callao, Peru. Her passengers were anxious for news from home. Hurrying on shore, one of them found a man who had just arrived from New York by steamer from that port to Aspinwall, and the English mail steamer from Panama. "What has happened in the last sixty days, and how is the war getting on?" was the passenger's inquiry.

"Oh, nothing much," was the reply. "Richmond's taken, Lee and Johnston's armies have surrendered, Lincoln has been assassinated, and Jeff. Davis is captured." It is not an overstatement to say that the listener was deprived of the power of speech for fully a minute, so great was his astonishment at this momentous intelligence.

The closing scenes of the rebellion were dramatically rapid in their movement, hardly less so than represented by the terse declaration quoted above. The battle that compelled the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond was fought on the first day of April, the evacuation took place on the 2d and 3d, Lee surrendered his army on the 9th, President Lincoln was assassinated on the 15th, Johnston's army surrendered on the 26th, General Dick Taylor's army surrendered May 4th, President Davis was captured on the 11th, on the 22d May a proclamation of President

Johnson opened the Southern ports to commerce as of old, and on the 29th a proclamation of general amnesty was issued,—and all this within two short months.

The battle of Five Forks may be regarded as the decisive battle that ended the war, as its result compelled the retreat, and led to the capture of Lee and his gallant army, that had so long defended Virginia against the Northern forces. For four years Lee had prevented the capture of Richmond; for four years he had repeatedly driven back the Union army whenever it sought to advance, and on two occasions he had crossed the Potomac and endeavored to carry the war into the Northern States. Since his defeat at Gettysburg many a battle had been fought and many a noble life expended in the effort to capture or defend the capital of the Confederacy. But the end was approaching.

The Northern press and public clamored for the capture of Richmond, and down to near the close of the war that rebellious city was the goal which the commanders of the Army of the Potomac struggled to reach. Seven in all had made the attempt, McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and last of all Grant. After the fall of Vicksburg, he had been summoned to Washington, and placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, under fewer restrictions than had been given to the commanders who preceded him. All his predecessors had been overruled and hampered in their movements by orders from Washington; Grant declined the command unless he could have it without interference, and, doubtless with great reluctance, his demand was conceded by the Washington authorities.

Between Gettysburg and Five Forks great progress had been made towards the suppression of the rebellion. Savannah, Wilmington, and Charleston successively fell into Union hands, Mobile was securely blockaded, and the Confederates were without a port of consequence along their entire coast line of ocean and gulf. After the

opening of the Mississippi by the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the army which had accomplished that great task was drawn to the eastward, and marched to the sea through Tennessee and Georgia, gaining victories at Chicamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and other points. Hood's Confederate army was practically annihilated by Thomas at Nashville, and the armies of Hardee, Bragg, and Beauregard had been gradually assembled under Joe Johnston, and formed a veteran force which was not to be lightly considered.


And now, early in 1865, while the Northern press and public clamored as loudly as ever for the capture of Richmond, that event was the very thing which General Grant did not desire. For the capture of Richmond meant the retirement of Lee's army to a junction with Johnston, and the combination of those armies under two such wily commanders would be a serious danger to the Union "Army of the Mississippi," which, having made its march to the sea, was now advancing northward, through the Carolinas, to attack Johnston. That it could defeat him single-handed there was no reasonable doubt, but with Lee's army added to Johnston's, there was great danger of a serious reverse to the Union arms. Consequently Grant's great desire was to keep Lee in Richmond until the Union army could be so disposed that escape would be impossible.

Since the early days of March, Lee had been planning to retire from Richmond and join his army with that of Johnston, and information of this design had been brought to General Grant. Lee and Johnston had made their preliminary arrangements, and the route by which the army would retreat was already laid out. The Richmond papers demanded that the city should be held at all hazards, and the Confederate government was unwilling that the fact that a retirement had been thought of should be known. The most emphatic denials were given

to the rumor when it first went abroad, and to show the intention of holding on to the place new fortifications were constructed at several points. But Grant was not to be deceived, and he pushed his preparations for taking the Confederate army in a trap.

With 10,000 cavalry Sheridan moved like a whirlwind through the Shenandoah Valley and made a wide sweep to the left of the Army of the Potomac, meeting little opposition, and demonstrating that all troops that could possibly be withdrawn from isolated points had been sent to Richmond. Wilson, with 13,000 men in his command, swept through Alabama and Georgia; and about the same time Stoneman advanced from Knoxville, Tennessee, with a strong column of cavalry, with which he devastated Western North Carolina. These various raids demonstrated that the Confederacy was but a shell whose kernel had been exhausted. All men capable of bearing arms had gone to the war, and there was no remaining material for the formation of new armies.

Though much larger on paper, Lee's army was not over 50,000 strong in effectives, while that of Johnston could not muster more than 30,000. Against Lee, Grant could bring a force of double the number, and while the former planned to escape and join Johnston, with whom he hoped to deliver a crushing blow to the Army of the Mississippi before Grant could overtake him, the latter was quietly studying to prevent the escape. Lee's plan was to retire by the Cox road, south of the Appomattox, and in order to cover his movement he made on the 25th of March an attack on Fort Steadman, on the Union right. Grant was in position in front of Petersburg, so that his army extended nearly to, but did not cover, the Cox road. Lee thought that the troops near the Cox road would be drawn away to support the attack on Fort Steadman. The attack was made by two divisions of Gordon's corps, and the fort was carried in fine style. But the attack was



not supported, and the result was the Confederates were compelled to retire after heavy losses in killed and wounded, and nearly 2,000 prisoners.

The Union forces were not withdrawn from the Cox road as Lee had expected, and consequently he could not carry out his plan of escaping by that route. Realizing that Lee must have withdrawn men from other parts of his lines in order to attack Fort Steadman, Gen. Meade ordered an advance of the 6th and 2d corps, who were in position to the left of Fort Steadman. He found what he had expected, and the Union troops took possession of the Confederate picket line and permanently held it. Thus Lee's movement, which was intended to cut the Union army in two by the occupation of Fort Steadman and the works behind it, and thus afford him an opportunity to escape, was not only a failure, but resulted in his loss of important points.

This affair did not in the least interfere with Grant's plans, which were for a general movement on the 29th March. He proposed to swing a portion of his army around "by the left," and enable it to turn completely the Confederate right. By the success of this movement Lee would be effectually cut off from escape to the southward.

Three divisions of the Army of the James, which had long been lying in front of Richmond, were brought around to the left of the Union lines facing Petersburg. As soon as they were in position the 5th corps (Warren's) and the 2d corps (Humphreys') were ordered to the southwestward till they had crossed Hatcher's Run; then they faced northward and advanced till they could feel the Confederate right. On the extreme left was Sheridan with 10,000 cavalry, acting under orders direct from General Grant. Warren's corps had a slight encounter with the enemy, in which about 400 men were killed and wounded on the Union side; the Confederates lost about the same in casualties, with the addition of 100 prisoners.

During the night and all the next day (30th), rain fell heavily and the ground became unfit for the execution of movements of any consequence. Warren remained in the position he had taken on the 29th in front of the Confederate intrenchments; Humphreys and Sheridan moved up a little so as to bring them well towards the intrenchments, but did not endeavor to bring on a battle. Sheridan brought his cavalry in front of Five Forks, where he found the Confederates strongly posted, and after surveying the ground carefully he rode back to Dinwiddie Court-House where Grant was waiting to see him. Grant ordered Warren to support Sheridan, and placed him under the latter's command.

The ground was still so soaked on the next morning that Grant proposed to do nothing, but Lee was not so inclined. Leaving Longstreet with 8,000 men to hold the works in front of Richmond, he marched the rest of his infantry to the support of his right, which was so seriously threatened by Sheridan and the 5th and 2d corps. Sheridan had completely isolated the Confederate cavalry, which had been posted on Stony Creek, and it was compelled to make a long detour to enable it to join the rest of Lee's forces.

Unaware of Lee's intention to attack, Warren had sent skirmishers on his left to seize the White Oak road which was beyond the Confederate right, and ordered Ayres to send one brigade to support the movement. About half-past ten o'clock in the forenoon, Lee suddenly appeared on the flank and rear of Ayres' division, and struck so vigorously that the whole column was thrown back in confusion. The confusion was conveyed to Crawford's division, which also broke and retired in disorder, and for a little while it looked as though Lee was having decidedly the best of it.

Griffin's division stopped the Confederate advance, enabling Ayres and Crawford to rally behind it. This being done, Warren advanced, supported by Humphreys, and

the Confederates were soon in retreat, having lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Confederates retired to their intrenchments, which they defended so desperately that several attempts failed to dislodge them. While this was going on, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie C.-H. to Five Forks, which he carried while Lee's infantry was engaged with Warren.

But he was not allowed to stay there long, as Lee turned from the fight with Warren as soon as the attack had failed, and sent two divisions along the White Oak road to Five Forks, where they encountered Devin's division and Davies' brigade of cavalry, whom they drove out in disorder towards Dinwiddie C.-H. They followed in pursuit until they presented their flank and rear to Sheridan's main body, from which they had separated Devin. Sheridan charged with two brigades, and fighting continued till dark, after which the Confederates withdrew, Lee rightly concluding that his two divisions ran great risk of being taken in flank and rear by Warren, while engaging Sheridan.

There was some alarm at head-quarters when it was learned that the Confederates had driven Sheridan back from Five Forks to Dinwiddie C.-H., and had a good chance of routing him; Sheridan probably was not easy in his mind until he found about midnight that the enemy was retiring. Then he felt perfectly secure, and made his plans for advancing on the morrow.

Sheridan, supported by Ayres, moved at daybreak April 1st, and was joined about 7 A.M. by Warren, with his two other divisions. By 2 P.M. he had fought his way to Five Forks, and driven in the enemy with the aid of his cavalry alone, leaving Warren's corps in the rear waiting for orders. When the Confederates were fairly within their intrenchments at Five Forks, Sheridan ordered Merritt's cavalry division to turn their right, Sheridan pressing in front, and sending Warren's corps on

his (Sheridan's) right, along the White Oak road, so as to come in on the enemy's flank. Then by a left-wheel movement Warren was to fall back upon that flank in full force, McKenzie, with the cavalry from the army of the James, covering Warren's right so that Lee could not draw reinforcements from Richmond.

Owing to the nature of the ground Warren could not move rapidly, thereby incurring the censure of Sheridan. It was 4 P.M. before the troops were in position for the charge, and when the order was given the movement was gallantly executed. Ayres' division was broken at one time by the severity of the enemy's fire, and there was great danger that it would be forced to fall back, but by a prompt order Sheridan sent Griffin's command to its relief, and the disorder was only momentary.

The turning movement was successful, the Confederates being taken in front and flank almost simultaneously. Their position was important, and they fought desperately, but superior numbers forced them back, as they were only two divisions, Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's. Ayres' division carried their flank intrenchments and captured about one thousand prisoners, while Griffin struck them in the rear and took as many more. Meantime Crawford pushed ahead to the Ford road, which ran northward from the Confederate centre, and cut off their retreat towards the rest of their army. Crawford captured four guns and several hundred prisoners, and at the same time the cavalry, pressing on the other flank of the Confederates, turned their left and put all that remained of the enemy to flight. The cavalry pursued until darkness made it impossible to follow farther. The Union loss in the day's fighting was about 1,000, while that of the Confederates amounted to 5,000 prisoners, not counting killed and wounded, which were estimated equal to those of the Union forces.

Sheridan sent Griffin to move eastward with two divi-

sions of infantry to Gravelly Church, and open communication with the rest of the army. Another division went to support McKenzie's cavalry, which had advanced on the Ford road up to Hatcher's Run. At 10 P.M. a general cannonade was begun along the whole line by order of General Grant, and continued through the night.

At daybreak on the 2d April there was a general assault along the Confederate line by the 2d, 6th, 9th, 24th, and 25th corps. The fire of the enemy was destructive and retarded the advance at several points, but could not stop it. The 6th corps carried the works in its front, and one division (Seymour's), broke through to the South-Side railway and began to tear it up. The 24th corps was also successful, and so were the 2d and 9th. The 9th had probably the hardest fighting of the day, in which it captured Fort Mahone, on the Jerusalem plank road; the enemy tried to retake it, and was nearly successful, when the 6th corps came to the aid of the 9th, and the dearly obtained position was saved. A Confederate brigade (Harris'), which defended one of the forts, was 250 strong at the beginning of the battle, and lost 220 men before it was over.

Along nearly the whole line the outer defences were entirely in the hands of the assailants, and though Lee still held the city of Petersburg he saw that his position was no longer tenable. Accordingly, at 10.30 A.M. he telegraphed as follows to President Davis:

My lines are broken in three places. Richmond must be evacuated this evening.

Mr. Davis was in church when this dispatch was handed to him. He rose and walked out quietly, and the service went on as though nothing had happened. But there was a deathly silence over the whole congregation, and every one felt that something awful was about to happen. After the services were over the news spread

rapidly, and before noon everybody who cared to know was aware that Richmond was about to be occupied by the enemy.

There was great excitement in the city all through the afternoon, many persons desiring to go with the Confederate government and follow its fortunes. Wagons and carriages rose to an enormous price, as much as \$100 in gold or Union currency being offered for a conveyance for a single day. The streets were filled with a mass of fugitives carrying trunks, boxes, and all sorts of receptacles. As a precautionary measure the City Council ordered the destruction of all intoxicating liquors in Richmond, and hundreds of barrels were rolled out and their contents poured into the gutters. General Ewing ordered the burning of the four principal tobacco warehouses in spite of the protests of the Mayor and Council, who feared that the whole business part of the city would be destroyed. As was expected, the fire caused great destruction, and the first work of the Union troops that entered Richmond was to extinguish the flames. The Confederate gun-boats were blown up and burned, and all the steamers at the dock were burned with the exception of a single flag-of-truce boat.

The government wagons removed as much as possible from the commissary depot, and then the place was thrown open to the public to help themselves. Bacon, flour, etc., by the ton were thus distributed to many who had long stood in sore need of it. As usually happens in such cases, the strong overpowered the weak, and it is said that several persons were trampled to death in the rush that followed the opening of the doors.

During the night of the 2d the evacuation went on, and about 3 A.M. a negro came from Richmond into the Union lines and announced that the Confederates had gone. General Weitzel rode in about 6 A.M. Threading his way carefully over the ground, which was thickly

planted with torpedoes, and accompanied by his staff, he reached the centre of the city in advance of his troops, and hoisted the American flag over the capitol. The Confederate works were found to be of great strength, and those who saw them did not wonder that the Union army had so long been kept at bay, when they remembered that the defences were manned by Lee's tried and trusty veterans.

The evacuation of Petersburg was simultaneous with that of Richmond, and was conducted so quietly that the Union pickets, only a few yards away, were unaware of it until daylight showed that the Confederates had gone. The Confederates had a start of several miles, marching out along the Danville Railway, and the direct road to Lynchburg, by which Lee still hoped to effect a junction with Johnston, and again take the offensive either against Grant or the Army of the Mississippi. Unfortunately for him, he was compelled to take the north side of the Appomattox, as the forces of Grant were mainly on the south side of that river, and completely barred his retreat in that direction.

With his army reduced to less than 35,000 men, Lee pushed as rapidly as possible to Amelia C.-H., where he had ordered supplies sent from Danville. By a mistake in the execution of the order, the train laden with these supplies had been sent to Richmond, and consequently the weary and famished soldiers were compelled to forage on the already exhausted country and find what food they could. Here he rested on the 4th and 5th April and then prepared to advance, still hoping to reach Lynchburg before the enemy could interfere with him. But his plans were rudely frustrated.

By following directly after Lee and engaging him in battle, Grant would still leave the Confederate general an open way to Lynchburg in case of defeat. His object was not to defeat, but to capture Lee with his whole army,

and with this object in view he sent Sheridan with the cavalry and the 5th corps to move as rapidly as possible by roads considerably south of the one through Amelia C.-H., and thus get in front of Lee and intersect his movements. Sheridan executed the order with the dash for which he was famous; he struck the line of the Richmond and Danville Railway at Jetersville, where he planted himself, prepared to resist the whole of Lee's forces until Grant and Meade could come up and deliver a crushing blow in the rear. Late in the afternoon of the 5th, Meade arrived with the 2d and 6th corps, while Lee was still at Amelia C.-H., which he left on the night of the 5th.

Lee marched around the position of Meade and Sheridan at Jetersville, aiming for Farmville, where he hoped to recross the Appomattox and escape. But General Davies, with his cavalry brigade, had advanced to the road and struck Lee's train in advance of his infantry, destroying 180 wagons and capturing 5 guns and many prisoners. Two other cavalry brigades came to the relief of Davies, who was hard pressed by the enemy. They fell back to Jetersville, whence they continued the pursuit the next day (6th), striking the enemy's line at Sailor's Creek, where a brilliant engagement was fought; 400 wagons were destroyed, and 16 guns and a considerable number of prisoners were taken. The Confederate line was pierced; General Ewell's division, 6,000 strong, being cut off from the rest and compelled to surrender, though it fought as long as there was any chance of escape.


On the evening of the 6th, Lee crossed the Appomattox at Farmville, his rear being so closely pressed that he was unable to destroy the bridge of the wagon road, though he succeeded in burning the railway bridge. The rear-guard retired just as General Barlow's division arrived, and so rapid was the retreat that the Confederates abandoned 18 guns and many wagons. The pursuit was kept up

through the 7th and 8th with no engagement of consequence. The 2d and 6th corps under Meade followed directly in the trail of Lee and his fugitive companions, while Sheridan's cavalry pushed on to head off Lee, followed by Ord's and Griffin's infantry divisions, who could not, of course, keep pace with the horses. As it was now impossible for Lee to make for Danville, Sheridan took a position to head him off from Lynchburg, which was now his only place of refuge. Sheridan learned that four trains laden with supplies for Lee's starving soldiers had been sent from Lynchburg and were at Prospect Station, five miles from Appomattox C.-H. Making a forced march of twenty-eight miles, he captured these trains, and then sent Custer's division forward, which soon found itself in front of Lee's advance.

Custer fought until darkness put an end to the combat, driving the advance back on the main body of the army, and capturing 25 guns, a hospital train, and a large number of wagons, and making many prisoners. Sheridan brought up the rest of the cavalry, and planted it right in front of Lee's army, and sent couriers to Grant, Griffin, and Ord, saying that the capture of Lee's whole army was now certain. Griffin and Ord with their corps and one division of the 25th corps made a forced march during the night and reached Appomattox at daylight on the 9th.

And now came one of the most dramatic incidents of the war—an incident which dwarfs to littleness the most magnificent spectacle ever presented on the theatrical stage.

On the morning of that memorable 9th of April, Lee's army of ragged, starving, wearied soldiers, was drawn up in battle array in front of Sheridan's cavalry. Their ranks had been terribly reduced by the events of the past ten days, and out of the 50,000 that held the trenches of Petersburg and Richmond on the 28th March, little more than 10,000 remained actually effective for battle. But



CAMPAIGN MAP—BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.

though few in number, worn, weary, and suffering from the pangs of hunger, they were ready to meet their adversaries and prepared without flinching to charge upon Sheridan's troopers. It was the last charge of the Army of Northern Virginia.

By Sheridan's order the cavalry in line of battle dismounted and gave way gradually, though all the while showing a steady front, in order to give time for the wearied infantry of Ord's and Griffin's corps to take up their position. When this had been accomplished the cavalry remounted and moved rapidly to the right, so as to come in upon the Confederate left for a flanking charge. As the cavalry thus drew away from its former position, the Confederate commander saw to his astonishment the long and solid lines of the Union infantry, lines of blue tipped with the steel of flashing bayonets, and stippled at intervals with the muzzles of cannon, with the artillerymen in their places ready for their death-dealing work.

The hopelessness of the charge was apparent to every Confederate officer who saw that mass of infantry waiting for the assault. The advance was stopped and in a few minutes a white flag was displayed in front of General Custer, who was leading Sheridan's cavalry column, and preparing for a charge upon the Confederate left. With the white flag came the information that the Confederates were ready to surrender. General Sheridan immediately rode over towards the Confederate lines, where he was met by General Gordon, who asked that hostilities be suspended. He added that Generals Grant and Lee were already negotiating for a capitulation, and said he had no doubt that the terms would be speedily arranged.

The capitulation had been discussed among the Confederate officers on the night of the 6th around a camp-fire. General Lee was not present, but the opinion of his officers was conveyed to him by General Pendleton. The decision was unanimous that a surrender was inevitable, as

the army had been terribly reduced in numbers, and the men who remained were so weakened by famine that large numbers of them had thrown away their guns, being too feeble to carry them. Even if they could escape from their pursuers they could only do so by abandoning all their artillery and heavy munitions and they had already lost a large part of their wagon train.

On the 7th General Grant took the initiative and thus saved General Lee the mortification of proposing a surrender. He wrote a letter couched in the following language:

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL :—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so; and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lt.-General.

Gen. R. E. LEE.

General Lee received the letter late in the afternoon, and replied briefly, asking the terms of surrender, though not admitting the hopelessness of the further struggle. Grant replied on the 8th to the effect that the only terms he could accept were unconditional surrender, the men and officers surrendered being disqualified from taking up arms until properly exchanged. Lee responded on the same evening, saying he did not think the emergency had arisen for the surrender of the army, that he did not intend to propose it, but only wished to know the terms that would be demanded. He declined meeting General Grant for the purpose of negotiating a surrender, but expressed a wish to meet him with a view to the restoration of peace.

On the morning of the 9th General Grant wrote again


to General Lee to the effect that he had no authority to treat for peace and the proposed meeting could therefore do no good. He added that the terms on which peace could be obtained were well understood, that the South must lay down its arms, and by so doing would save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.

Immediately after the stoppage of the last charge of the Army of Northern Virginia in the manner previously described, General Grant rode to Sheridan's head-quarters, and while on his way there received a note from General Lee, asking for an interview with reference to the surrender of the army. Hostilities had been suspended, and the interview of the two commanders took place in half an hour after the receipt of the note. It was held at the house of Mr. W. McLean, near the court-house of Appomattox, and was over in a short time, as the business was easily arranged. Officers and men were paroled not to take up arms again until properly exchanged, all public property, arms, and artillery to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed to receive them. The officers were allowed to retain their side arms, horses, and personal baggage, and though not mentioned in the official documents, General Grant afterwards permitted the cavalry soldiers to retain their horses, remarking as a reason for his leniency, that they would "be useful in putting in a crop." Twenty-seven thousand men were said to have been included in Lee's capitulation but not more than 10,000 were actually in line of battle with their arms on the morning of the 9th April.

The victory of Five Forks was the prelude to the surrender at Appomattox, and that surrender was practically the end of the war. One after another the remaining armies of the Confederates submitted to the fortune of war and laid down their arms, and in every instance the terms accorded were almost identical with those arranged between

Grant and Lee. No great battle was fought after Lee's surrender, and of the few collisions that occurred before the wings of peace were outstretched over the whole country, there were none of consequence. The last battle of the war was fought in Texas, May 13th, resulting in a loss of about thirty killed and wounded on the Union side, some forty or fifty taken prisoners, and four or five wounded on the Confederate side.

The number of men paroled in the Confederate armies, at the close of the war, was 174,223, and at the same time 98,802 Confederate prisoners of war were held in Northern prisons or depots. The aggregate Union force on the muster rolls of the Union armies on March 1, 1865, was 965,591, and on the first of May the number exceeded 1,000,000. On that date all enlistments were suspended, and shortly afterwards the work of disbanding the army began. By the end of November more than 800,000 men had been mustered out of the service and returned to the occupations of civil life. The sudden termination of the war was unexpected by the great mass of the public on both sides, though to the thoughtful leaders, who knew the conditions against which they were contending, the result was apparent months and months before.





CHAPTER XVII.

BATTLE OF KOENIGGRATZ (SADOWA)—1866.

SPACE will not here permit the discussion of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulties which led to the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866, and the victory of Prussia at Sadowa. Briefly we may say that since the time of Charlemagne, Schleswig was a disputed possession between the Germans and the Danes, while Holstein has been practically in the same category. Reams of paper by the hundred have been covered with the diplomatic correspondence growing out of the various claims to these disputed provinces, and on several occasions the contending parties have resorted to the arbitrament of war. The war of 1863-4, between Denmark and Prussia, resulted in the defeat of the former. It was followed by the peace of Vienna, in which the king of Denmark resigned the duchies to Prussia and Austria, and agreed to a rectification of his frontier. He was also to pay an indemnity for the expenses of the war.

Hardly was the ink dry on the treaty of peace before Prussia and Austria began to quarrel over the possession of the duchies; the quarrel was partially stifled by the convention of Gastein (August 14, 1865), in which it was agreed that Austria should have the temporary government of Holstein, and Prussia that of Schleswig. Prussia adhered to the terms of the convention just long enough to secure from Napoleon III. a guaranty of the neutrality of France in case of a war between Prussia and

Austria, and a treaty of alliance with Italy, who bore any thing but good-will to the Austrian government.

On the 11th March, 1866, Prussia published a decree asserting her jurisdiction over Holstein, and on the 24th of the same month she issued a circular calling upon the German states to declare whether they would support Austria or Prussia in case of war. Both countries prepared for war. In April and May, Austria called on Prussia to disarm, and the latter replied with a counter demand. There was much incriminatory correspondence between Bismarck and Mensdorff (the Prussian and Austrian ministers); the Federal Diet met at Frankfort; the Prussians occupied Holstein and the Austrians retired; Prussia, on the 14th June, announced the confederation dissolved, and on the next day she declared war against Hanover and Saxony.


On the 18th June Prussia declared war against Austria. Nearly all the northern states of Germany pronounced in favor of Prussia, while the southern ones sided with Austria. The two great armies advanced to meet each other, the Austrian northern army, under command of Field Marshall Benedek, entering Silesia, where it was joined by the Saxons. At the same time the southern army of Austria, commanded by Archduke Albrecht, faced the Italians. The Prussian army moved with astonishing celerity, and thus was able to fight the great battle of the campaign on Austrian soil. Prince Frederick Charles with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, the latter commanded by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, entered Bohemia on the 23d of June; he was victorious in severe engagements at Liebenau, Turnau, and Podall, on the 26th, Hoehnewasser on the 27th, Munchengratz on the 28th, and Gitschin on the 29th June.

The Crown Prince with the Second Army entered Bohemia on the 22d June, was repulsed at Trautenau the 27th, victorious at Saar and Trautenau the 28th, and at

Köningenhof on the 29th. On the 30th communication was opened between the two armies; the king assumed command on the 1st July, and movements were immediately made to deliver a crushing blow to the Austrian army. By the success of the blow the Austrians would be crushed between the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince.

Prince Frederick Charles, commanding the First Army, halted on Monday, July 2d, at Kommenitz, to give time for the Crown Prince to advance to Miletin, which is about five miles to the eastward of Kommenitz, and also to learn exactly what movements the Austrians were making. Reconnoitring parties were sent out, and as soon as he had received the reports of their commanding officers, Prince Frederick Charles decided to attack the Austrians. He ordered an immediate advance of his own army beyond Horwitz, and wrote to the Crown Prince an urgent request to advance in the morning from Miletin and attack the Austrian right flank at the same time that the First Army attacked the Austrians in front. By ten o'clock at night the troops were in full movement.

The general staff did not leave Kommenitz until an hour past midnight. The night was cloudy, but not dark, as the clouds were thin and the moon occasionally came out distinctly. The whole country was dotted with the remains of the bivouac fires where the First Army had been encamped. An eye-witness of the scene says these fires looked like large will-of-the-wisps, as their flames flickered in the wind, and they stretched out for many a mile, as the First Army alone contained 150,000 soldiers, and necessarily the camp of so large a force covered a very wide area. The clouds thickened during the night, and about daylight there came on a drizzling rain, which continued all the forenoon and for some hours after mid-day. To add to the discomfort of the troops, the wind steadily



increased and considerably affected the soldiers, who had had little sleep and scanty food for the past two days.

At daylight, the various corps and divisions of the First Army had formed their line for attacking the Austrians. The main body of the army was at Milowitz, which is a small village on the road from Koeniggratz to Horwitz. General Franseky, commanding the 7th division was at Cesekwitz, holding the left, while the 4th and 5th divisions were at Pristan and Psauch, these divisions forming the right of the line. General Herewarth von Bittenfeld with the 8th and part of the 7th corps held the extreme right about ten miles from Milowitz. At four o'clock in the morning the advance began, and the army marched slowly up the first declivity between Milowitz and Dub, five miles nearer Kommenitz. The ground being soaked by rain, which had been falling for several hours, was difficult for the advancing army. The skirmishers managed to move ahead without much trouble, but the battalions advancing in closer order struggled more slowly along, while the wheels of the gun carriages sank heavily into the sticky mud, and the horses of the artillery were frequently brought to a halt.

By six o'clock the whole army was quite near Dub, where it halted for a time somewhat below the summit of the slope, as the ridge on which the village is built had completely masked all the movements of the troops. The Austrians were known to be on the other side of the ridge, and they were probably unaware that any Prussians were in the vicinity other than the advanced pickets. The Prussian cavalry videttes had been sent forward the previous evening and held the crest of the ridge, so that the Austrians were unable to come up and ascertain what was going on behind this thin screen of mounted soldiers. After a halt of nearly an hour to enable the columns to close up, Prince Frederick Charles ordered the advance of the horse artillery and cavalry. They moved forward as

fast as the condition of the ground would permit, keeping their lines in splendid formation, when all the circumstances are considered. The Uhlans in advance had a dishevelled and bedraggled appearance, as the flags on their lances were soaked with rain and either clung closely to the staves or flapped sluggishly against them. When the bottom of the hill was reached, the trumpets sounded, the cavalry and horse artillery pushed toward the river Bistritz, and then the movement became fully apparent to the Austrians. Their guns opened quickly upon the advancing Prussians from a battery stationed in a field near the village of Dub, where the main highway crossed the Bistritz. The great battle which was to decide the relations between Austria and Prussia was now fully begun.

The battle opened at about half-past seven o'clock in the morning. The Prussian horse artillery replied promptly to the Austrian cannon, but neither side fired rapidly, and for fully thirty minutes the encounter consisted mainly of occasional shots. The king of Prussia reached the field a little before eight o'clock, and soon after his arrival the horse artillery was strengthened by the advance of other batteries, and orders were given for a rapid fire to be opened upon the Austrians. A rain of shot and shell was poured in upon them. Immediately after the beginning of this rapid fire on the part of the Prussians, the Austrian batteries came out in great force from all directions and returned the fire quite as vigorously as it had begun. The Austrian concentration of artillery was admirable, as the batteries appeared quickly from every village and every road all along the whole front of the Austrian line, which extended from Mockrowens on the right to Benatek on the left. The flashes of fire from the mouths of the cannon formed a continuous line, and the guns were evidently aimed with great precision; the shot and shell were dropped among the Prussian guns, occasionally dis-

mounting a piece of artillery, blowing up a caisson, killing men and horses, and certain to have created great confusion in any but a thoroughly disciplined army. The Austrian fire was not alone directed to the Prussian artillery, as their shells were thrown up the slope in front of them, towards Dub, and one shell fell into a squadron of Uhlans who were close at the king's side. It buried itself in the ground, and then threw up clumps of mud some twenty feet in the air, and its explosion killed some two or three men.

As soon as the cannonading became furious, the guns of the Prussian 7th division opened upon the village of Benatek, which formed the Austrian right. For some time an artillery duel took place at this point, shot being given for shot, and neither side advancing or retreating. The same was the state of affairs in the centre; each side pushed many batteries into position and kept up a severe cannonading. The artillery fire was as even as it was possible to make it. The number of guns appeared almost precisely the same, and shot seemed to be given for shot, although the fire was so rapid that the reports followed as quickly together as in file firing with musketry. Considerable havoc was created on both sides, officers and men fell very rapidly, and a great many horses were killed or disabled. The Prussians pushed forward their batteries as fast as they could be brought up from the rear, and after a time their fire was considerably stronger than that of the Austrians.

Finally the Austrian batteries between Dohelnitz and Dohalicha were withdrawn a short distance up the slope, but the guns at Mockrowens remained in position, and at no point had the Prussians thus far been able to cross the Bistritz. As soon as the Austrians retired up the hill, as just before mentioned, the Prussian batteries turned their fire upon Miletin, with the result that by ten o'clock the battery at that village was also compelled to retire. Dur-

ing the progress of this cannonading some of the infantry had been moved forward towards the river, and while waiting to be brought into action they sheltered themselves under all convenient undulations of the ground. The 8th division advanced on the left side of the road, and, shielded by the rising ground, put its columns in position for an attack upon the village of Sadowa, while the third and fourth divisions on the other side of the road were put in readiness for storming Dohelnitz and Mockrowens.

Before their preparations were completed, it was observed that the village of Bistritz on the Austrian right had taken fire. The 7th division was ordered to take advantage of this circumstance and secure possession of the village, but the Austrians had not been driven out by the flames of the burning buildings, and made a stubborn resistance. Up to this time the fighting had been by the artillery only, but now it was hand to hand on the part of the infantry. The attack was led by the 27th regiment, who first forced their way into the orchards surrounding the village. The Austrians were on the other side of the burning buildings, and volley after volley was poured through the flames upon the assailants. While the 27th regiment engaged the Austrians in front, other regiments managed to flank the village, and by taking the Austrians in the rear, compelled them to retire with the loss of many of their number, who remained prisoners in Prussian hands.

It was about ten o'clock when the attack on Dohelnitz and Mockrowens was ordered. There was little opposition to the advancing columns until they reached the bank of the Bistritz; but from that point every inch of ground was stubbornly contended for. The Austrian infantry were in strong force at the approaches to the villages, and they poured a destructive fire upon the Prussians as they advanced. The latter were at great

disadvantage, as the road was narrow and the Austrians were shielded by the villages and detached houses, so that they were able to inflict considerable damage on the Prussians while losing comparatively little themselves. The Prussian rifles were fired more rapidly than were those of the Austrians, but the latter were so shielded by the houses, trees, and smoke that the Prussians were rarely able to take accurate aim. A great deal of blind firing was done by the Austrians. They judged by the sound the positions of the attacking columns, and simply fired in the direction whence the sounds came. The cloud of smoke in the drizzly rain lay heavily on the ground, and for a considerable time it was impossible to see any thing through it, but, though slowly, the Prussians advanced steadily, losing men at every step, and in some places literally leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded.

The fighting among the villages continued for nearly an hour; then the Prussians having reinforced their columns, made a dash upon the Austrian infantry, whom they drove back, but not far, the Austrians simply retiring a short distance up the slope until they were in line with their own batteries. The wood above Sadowa was full of Austrian infantry, while the wood between Sadowa and Benatek was equally well held, and it seemed next to impossible for the Prussians to be able to break through the barrier before them. General Franseky sent his infantry to attack the wood, and directed his artillery to open a vigorous fire upon the Austrian batteries. The infantry for a few minutes fired directly into the wood, but very soon discovered that their shots were practically wasted, as the Austrians were concealed behind the trees and suffered little from the Prussian bullets. Finding the musketry fire useless, General Franseky ordered a bayonet charge, and his men went at the wood with great vigor. The Austrians held to their position, and in this

wood was fought the severest hand-to-hand battle known during the entire day. When the 27th Prussian regiment went into battle on that eventful morning, it had a strength of 3,000 men and 90 officers; when it emerged from the wood on the other side, having driven out the Austrians, there were less than 400 men in line and only 2 officers. All the rest were either killed or wounded. Every regiment of the division suffered nearly as much, though not quite as heavily, but they accomplished their purpose and forced the Austrians out of that strong defence.

The Austrian line had now been driven in on both flanks, but a new line of battle was formed round Lipa, a short distance farther up the hill and including the wood which lies above Sadowa. While this line was being formed, the Prussian artillery crossed the Bistritz and opened fire upon the new position of the Austrians. At the same time the smoke of General Herewarth's advance toward the Austrian left was distinctly visible. He had crossed the Bistritz at Nechawitz, about seven miles below the point where the 7th division crossed. There he found some Austrian cavalry and a brigade of Saxon troops, which he drove in the direction of Lipa. The Austrian commander seemed determined to retain his position, and his cavalry and infantry were massed in great force on the most favorable part of the hill.

The Prussian infantry which had occupied Sadowa and Dohelnitz was now sent to assault the wood above Sadowa, and skirting the wood between Sadowa and Lipa as they advanced against it, they lost heavily. The Austrians were in concealment, as in the wood which had already been taken, and they were supported by a battery at one end of the wood, which poured a destructive fire upon the advancing Prussians. Although the fire against them was very severe, the Prussians steadily fought their way forward, and finally dashed at the wood with the

bayonet. The fighting was hand to hand as before, the Austrians disputing the possession of every tree and falling in great numbers. As the Austrians retired somewhat from their position, a chance was given for other batteries to come into play against the Prussians. About midway in the wood the latter suffered so terribly that the fight became a stationary one.

The Austrian artillery performed such effective work in this position that it seemed, a little after mid-day, as though the Prussians would be unable to advance any farther. They were obliged to fight very hard to retain the position they had gained. At one time most of their guns had been dismounted by the Austrian artillery fire, and where the ground was thickly wooded the needle-gun could not be used to advantage, so that the infantry fight was about even. Prince Frederick Charles ordered forward the 5th and 6th divisions which had been held in reserve. They piled their knapsacks and helmets on the ground before crossing the river. As they advanced, they passed the king, who had remained near the Bisritz, and in doing so they greeted him with loud cheers. They passed rapidly over the ridge of Sadowa and entered the wood, where very soon the increased rattle and roar of musketry told that they were actively engaged. The Austrian artillery poured volley after volley among them, and they only succeeded in advancing a few hundred yards. At one time they fell back, and for a little while there were great fears that the day was lost. They were torn and mangled by the fragments of the shells that dropped among them, and crushed by the splinters and fragments of the trees which the artillery fire tore away and dropped among them. Some of the officers and soldiers said after the battle that these splinters of wood were even more fearful than the shells.

On the right it seemed as if General Herewarth was checked, as the cloud of smoke from his artillery and in-

fantry did not advance, but remained in one position. Franseky's division had suffered so terribly that it was not in condition to be sent forward to attack the Sadowa wood. In addition to the fearful losses they had sustained, they would have been exposed to the risk of being taken in rear by the artillery on the right of the Austrian line of battle before Lipa. All the Prussian artillery, excepting eight batteries, was engaged. These eight batteries were held in reserve in case of a reverse. At one time the firing in the Sadowa wood and of the Prussian artillery on the slope seemed to be retiring in the direction of the river.


It was very certain that the First Army was checked in its advance, even if it had not been actually driven back. Prince Frederick Charles became anxious, and sent couriers to the left to ascertain about the advance of the Crown Prince. In a little while it was found that some of the Austrian artillery near Lipa were firing toward the Prussian left, and the hope was anxiously entertained that this fire was against the advanced guard of the Second Army.

Prince Frederick Charles and his generals were greatly disturbed at the situation. They drew the infantry out of the battle and formed their cavalry in such a manner that it would be available either in pursuing the Austrians in case of victory or for retarding the pursuit in the event of defeat. General von Rhetz, the chief of the staff, went away with an escort to look for the Second Army. He returned very soon, bringing the joyous intelligence that the Second Army was forming for an attack on Lipa, and that the Austrian artillery on the right had been firing against the Crown Prince's advance. The word was passed from one to another, and where gloom had settled shortly before, was now to be seen the expression of delight and hope. The infantry and cavalry were sent again at the Sadowa wood, which they carried, and the battery beyond it was stormed and taken.

The Crown Prince's columns were visible about half-past three in the afternoon advancing against Lipa across the slope in front of him. His artillery had silenced that of the Austrians, and General Herewarth again began to press against the Austrian left wing. For half an hour, perhaps, the Crown Prince's infantry vigorously engaged the Austrians at Lipa. The increasing volume of sound from their rapid volleys showed that they were advancing and that the Austrians were in full retreat. Then the order was given for the First Army to advance in full force. The artillery was sent up the slope at a gallop, coming into action whenever opportunity presented, and pouring a vigorous fire against the retreating columns, while the infantry which had carried the wood pressed forward at double quick and made a vigorous pursuit.

Prince Frederick Charles led his own regiment across the Sadowa bridge and along the road, and was followed closely by all his light cavalry. As he reached the top of the slope the retreating squadrons and battalions of the Austrians were within range of the Prussian artillery and crossed a depression lying between Lipa and Streselitz, a village about two miles farther southward. On the crest of the Lipa Hill the Prussian artillery halted and fired with great rapidity at the dense masses of fugitives. The cavalry was sent to press the retreat, but was prevented by the Austrian artillery, which fired vigorously from the Streselitz ridge. The cavalry charged repeatedly upon the Austrians, but their battalions could not be broken.

The Prussian artillery fire was now much more heavy than that of the Austrians, and had succeeded in driving the Austrian batteries away from the ridge. Some of the retreating Austrians moved in direction of Koeniggratz and others in that of Pardubitz, and the Prussians went in pursuit along both roads. The ground was thickly covered with dead and wounded. The wounded shrieked with fear as they saw the cavalry galloping tow-



ard them. They expected to be trampled to death in a moment, but by an order of Prince Frederick Charles, the cavalry moved around to the right in order to avoid them. At one time the Prince checked the pursuit to give time to reconnoitre the ground and make sure that no wounded Austrians were lying there.

Many of the Austrian infantry were captured by the pursuing cavalry. The pursuit was continued until nine o'clock in the evening and did not stop until it had reached the banks of the Elbe. The main body of the army came to a halt about seven o'clock. When the Prince returned from the pursuit, he was loudly cheered by all his soldiers. He immediately gave an order that every attention should be shown to the wounded and no discrimination between Prussians and Austrians.

During the battle the troops on both sides displayed the greatest bravery, and no distinction could be made in favor of one or the other so far as personal and soldierly valor is concerned. About 1,500 pieces of artillery were in action, almost equally divided between Prussians and Austrians. The victory was due to the Crown Prince's attack on the left flank of the Austrians combined with the attack in front, which had been of great effect and materially absorbed the fighting abilities of the Austrians. The latter had been engaged since daybreak, and after fighting until three in the afternoon were assailed by the fresh troops of the Crown Prince, which came up at that hour. The steady maintenance of the attack in front by the First Army precluded the possibility of the Austrians being able to repulse the attack in flank by the Second Army. The Prussians had not far from 250,000 men engaged in both their armies. The Austrians were slightly more numerous than the Prussians. The Prussians took 174 cannon and 14 flags; they admit in their official reports a loss of 10,000 killed and wounded, while the total loss of the Austrians was placed at 40,000, of

whom 18,000 were prisoners. There were many stragglers, and the route followed by the retreating army was strewn with knapsacks, muskets, provisions, clothing, munitions of war, and kindred material, such as can always be found in the wake of a retreating and demoralized force.


The rapid firing of the needle-gun was an important factor in winning the battle of Sadowa. But the superior organization of the Prussians, their admirable strategy before the battle and equally admirable tactics during its progress, and the carefully timed junction of the First and Second Armies at the proper moment, were of more consequence than the operation of the weapon which has revolutionized the armament of the infantry soldier all over the civilized globe.

It was several days before the Austrians were able to collect their scattered battalions and put their army once more into any thing like a fighting condition. All the northern provinces of Austria were abandoned to the enemy, and the army retreated upon Vienna, halting occasionally to hold the advancing Prussians in check, but delivering no severe blow or offering any great obstacle to their progress. On the 30th July an armistice was granted, and two days later the king of Prussia reviewed his army fifteen miles from Vienna. After the review the Prussians started on their return, while negotiations for peace were rapidly pushed.

On the 23d August the treaty of peace was signed at Prague. By its articles Austria consented to the breaking up of the German confederation, and to Prussia's annexation of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort. She also gave up Holstein and her political influence in Northern Germany, and made other concessions of minor importance. About the same time Austria made a truce with Italy, and on October 3d a definitive peace, by which the union of Venetia and Lombardy with Italy was rec-

ognized on condition that their debts should be assumed by Victor Emanuel's government. As a further result of her defeat, Austria was compelled to give legislative independence to Hungary; in 1867 the emperor of Austria was crowned king of Hungary, and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was formed.

On the 16th July the king of Prussia invited the states of North Germany to form a new confederation. They responded with alacrity to the invitation, impelled perhaps by profound respect for the kingdom that had carried its victorious arms almost to within sight of the Austrian capital. The confederation lasted until the establishment of the German empire in 1871, and this empire may be said, in some respects, to owe its establishment to the victory of Sadowa.





CHAPTER XVIII.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE—1870.

THE Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 had its origin in the traditional ill-feeling between French and Germans, a feeling that has long existed, but has been particularly bitter since the Napoleonic wars at the end of the last and the beginning of the present century. In March, 1867, a dispute arose between France and Prussia relative to the possession of Luxembourg. The emperor of France proposed purchasing the province from the king of Holland; Prussia earnestly opposed the purchase, since Luxembourg had formed part of the dissolved Germanic Confederation. The air was filled with rumors of war, and the affair was only quieted by a conference at London of the representatives of the great powers, by whom it was decreed that the fortress of Luxembourg should be demolished and the perfect neutrality of the province guaranteed.

For three years from this time there was no disturbance of the peace, but both France and Prussia made preparations for war. On the 4th of July, 1870, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern consented to become a candidate for the then vacant throne of Spain, and as soon as the fact was known there was great excitement in France in consequence. Threatening speeches were made in the French Chambers by the Duc de Grammont, Minister of Foreign Affairs, but after some negotiation and the intervention of England, Prince Leopold on July 12th volun-

tarily retired from the candidacy, and declined the crown that had been offered him. On the 13th France demanded from Prussia a guaranty that no such offer should be accepted in future; Prussia was naturally irritated by the demand, and refused it, whereupon the French minister, Count Benedetti, retired from Prussia, and almost immediately thereafter the Prussian minister left Paris.

The emperor declared war on the 15th of July, with the hearty concurrence of the great majority of the French Chambers. After his surrender the emperor told Count Bismarck that he did not desire war, but had been forced into it by public opinion. He was evidently greatly deceived as to the strength and condition of his army, and equally deceived as to the forces that Prussia could bring into the field. Though vastly more numerous on paper, the French had hardly more than 300,000 men ready for the field, while the Germans had treble that number. Including their reserves and landwehr, or militia, the Germans had, on the first of August, 1870, a grand effective of 944,000 men, while on the peace footing, a month earlier, they had but 360,000. To the total on the war footing given above must be added the forces of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, which gave a grand total for the German strength of 1,124,000 men. Napoleon had counted on the neutrality of the southern states of the North German Confederation, if not on their active hostility to Prussia, and is said to have been greatly disconcerted when, on the 19th July, the parliament met at Berlin and resolved to support Prussia in the war.

Impartial observers predicted at the beginning of the contest that the result would be disastrous to France. Commenting upon the war the *Quarterly Review* says: "The causes of the early ruin of the French army were: (1) The enormous superiority of the Germans in regard to numbers; (2) the absolute unity of their command and

concert of operation ; (3) their superior mechanism in equipment and supplies ; (4) the superior intelligence, steadiness, and discipline of the soldiers ; (5) superior education of the officers, and the dash and intelligence of the cavalry." The French and Germans were equally brave, but the French generals seemed to act often upon impulse, while every move of the Germans was the result of a carefully elaborated plan. From the beginning to the end Von Moltke seems to have left nothing to chance, and whatever his instructions to his subordinates they were faithfully carried out.

Both armies were massed on their frontiers ; that of the Germans being assembled much more rapidly than the army of the Rhine, which constituted the French force to advance upon Berlin. It is doubtful if the latter exceeded 270,000 effectives, though it had a nominal strength of 310,000, while the Germans had an active force of 447,000, divided into three armies, commanded respectively by General Von Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown Prince of Prussia. The armies confronted each other at the end of July, when the chief command of the French was taken by the emperor, and that of the Germans by King William of Prussia. On the 2d of August active hostilities began with an encounter at Saarbruck, the offensive being taken by the French, and the conflict resulting in their favor. On the same day the German armies began their advance, and on the 4th the battle of Weissenburg resulted in their favor, as the French were driven from the field after five hours of fighting, during which General Douay, the French commander, was killed. On the 6th was fought the battle of Woerth, in which the French made a stubborn resistance, but were compelled to retire. Weissenburg and Woerth were fought with the Crown Prince's army ; meantime the armies of Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles had effected a junction, occupied Saarbruck and Forbach, and on the 6th had

defeated the French at Spicheren, occupying the heights and driving General Frossard both from his first line of battle and from the position he afterwards tried to take near St. Avold.

The result of the movements of the Germans and the victories above mentioned was to drive Frossard in the direction of Metz, where Bazaine's corps was joined by L'Admirault's from Thionville, and by divisions under Bourbaki and Canrobert. There was now no obstacle to the junction of the three Prussian armies, and by the 11th they formed an unbroken line, with head-quarters in Saarbruck. On the 14th the first army was in the neighborhood of Metz, and frustrated the attempt of the French to retreat to the line of the Marne. The defeat of the French at Courcelles on the 14th, and at Vionville, or Mars-la-Tour, on the 16th, completed the cutting off of Bazaine's command from junction with other French forces, though it cost heavily to the Germans in loss of men. Bazaine now massed his troops at a position between Gravelotte and St. Privat le Montagne, and made ready for a battle that should be decisive. Winning it he would break through the German lines and retreat to the Marne, while by losing it he would be shut up in Metz, or at all events separated from the rest of the French army.

At the break of day on the 17th, the movement of the French army into its new position began. Late at night on the 16th one division of the 3d corps had reached the battle-field of Vionville, and this division was ordered into position between the Bois des Ognons and Malmaison, in order to cover the retreat of the left wing, which was the most exposed. There was great difficulty in moving the enormous train, as there was but a single way open for it, the road from Gravelotte to Metz. The French officers saw that the road was so blocked, and the wagons so closely crowded and in such a state of confusion, that a panic would have followed the appearance of even a few squadrons of German cavalry.

On the morning of the 17th Prince Frederick Charles, who had spent the night after the battle of the 16th at Porze, rode along the lines to make a personal inspection of the ground held by his forces. The enemy's skirmishing line was clearly visible in front of Rezonville. It stretched out for a long distance, and there was evidently a strong force behind it, to judge by the frequent trumpet calls that were wafted by the morning breeze. About six o'clock in the morning, King William arrived with his staff and occupied the new head-quarters which had been selected.

On the 15th of August the right wing was advancing, the 12th infantry division being near Arracourt, the 2d division corps on the Nancy road, and the 1st Bavarian corps not far from Einville. In the centre of the Prussian line was the 5th corps, supported by the Wurtemberg division. It advanced to Dombasle on the Meurthe, and took a strong position on the left bank of that stream. On the extreme left the 11th corps rested on the Moselle at Bayon. The 11th infantry division was at Henning supporting the left wing, the 2d cavalry division was farther advanced, being nearly five miles more to the front. The 4th cavalry division was at Nancy, and examining carefully the country towards Toul, but without encountering any considerable bodies of the French. They met a few bands of *franc-tireurs*, which were easily scattered. By great efforts on the part of the officers superintending the transportation department, all the trains of the different divisions were brought up closer to the rear and put in readiness for any further movement.

There was very little movement of the Third Army on the 16th, as it was necessary to wait for developments in and around Metz before ordering the army of the Crown Prince to push any farther forward. The 4th cavalry division was brought forward from Nancy on the 16th in order to have it in proper position in case the army should

be advanced towards St. Dizier. The right wing of the army, the 2d Bavarian corps, remained in the vicinity of Nancy. On the 17th the head-quarters of the Third Army were changed to Nancy, and the 1st Bavarian corps moved forward to St. Nicholas, which is on the left bank of the Meurthe. The nearest objective point of the Third Army was the fortress of Toul. The 6th corps had been somewhat scattered, and on the 16th and 17th the various divisions were brought together, so that they reached Bayon on the 18th. The Prussian army was arranged—previous to the decisive battle of Gravelotte, so that one portion of it could attack Metz, while another could continue the advance on Paris.

The Second Army arrived at the Moselle on the 16th. The 4th corps and the Prussian Guards moved in the direction of Toul, the former going to Siazery, and the other to Bernecourt. It was by no means certain whether the French army would retreat to Verdun, or give battle at Metz, or in its neighborhood. The latter alternative was forced by the attack made by the 3d and 9th corps, and consequently it was advisable for the Germans to concentrate as much as possible before the opening of the final battle.

Orders were issued by Prince Frederick Charles during the evening of the 16th for the concentration of the Second Army on the battle-field of that day. The 12th corps was ordered to move immediately from Pont-a-Mousson to Mars-la-Tour, and the Saxon corps was brought to a point not far from Mars-la-Tour. The longest march of the Second Army was performed by the Guards, who had a distance of nineteen miles to travel from Bernecourt, which they accomplished in ten hours.

Nearly all the French troops had been concentrated on the left bank of the Moselle, and consequently there was no great danger of a sortie from Metz towards the east or south. The German commanders decided that a single

corps was sufficient to observe the city itself, and consequently withdrew all but the 1st corps. The 7th and 8th corps were sent over the Moselle and placed behind the 9th corps, where they formed the extreme right of the German army. The 8th corps and the 1st cavalry division, which were at the west of the St. Arnould wood, the 7th corps, occupying the valley between the Bois des Vaux and the Bois des Ognons, were ordered to remain in their positions. A few scouting parties of the French encountered the pickets of the 7th corps. Some sharp firing ensued but no serious damage was done, and the Germans had strict orders not to bring on a battle. General von Steinmetz made a reconnoissance on the Bois des Ognons, south of Gravelotte, and found that the French were in strong force in the vicinity of Gravelotte. Their number was estimated at fully three army corps, and from the commanding position where General von Steinmetz made his observation, it was easily perceived that the villages and farm-houses of St. Hubert and Point de Jour were occupied and surrounded by infantry and artillery. There were also many mitrailleuses, which fired vigorously on every Prussian skirmishing party that came within reach.

The positions allotted to the French forces on the 17th were not changed. Marshal Bazaine simply ordered the commanders to fortify themselves as much as possible. The slope of the left bank of the Moselle from the water's edge to the heights of St. Quentin and Plappeville is quite steep, and covered with a thin forest. There are two narrow valleys, or gorges, that cross this slope, both of them with very steep sides; one of them is about three hundred paces from the crest of the slope, while the other, farther to the west, is a deep ravine, running first in a southerly direction and afterwards towards the east. The French army was posted on the range of hills between these two valleys. The main road between Metz and Gravelotte passes through the southern part of this slope, with a great many

windings, and in places cut deeply into the earth. The slope is, for the most part, regular, and not at all steep; consequently the ground was favorable for the erection of batteries in tiers, one above the other. The French had taken advantage of this position, and thrown up a liberal number of batteries. Behind the crest of the ridge there were many positions, covered by bits or stretches of forest, and also intersected with small ravines and valleys, all of which furnished excellent cover for a defending force. The assailing party would thus be obliged to make his attack over sloping ground, which offered no cover, while the defenders were comparatively well sheltered.

The slopes of the valley through which the Meuse passes were covered with wood, but not sufficiently to interfere with the view from the French position, or detract from the effect of their fire.

Canrobert's corps, the 6th, formed the right wing of the French position. The line it occupied was known as that of Amanvillers. The 4th corps, commanded by De L'Admirault, continued the line from that of the 6th corps to Montigny-la-Grange, and had an advanced post at Champenois. The centre was formed by the 3d corps, while the 2d corps, Frossard's, had a strong position on the left. The Imperial Guards were in the rear of the left wing at Bau St. Martin, and formed the main reserve. Along the line of heights from St. Quentin to Plappeville, already described, 120 pieces of artillery were ready for action; but the forts of St. Quentin and Des Carrières were not mounted with guns. The position gave a fine view over the whole region. Marshal Bazaine established his head-quarters there on the morning of the 18th, and remained there throughout the battle.

The French front was about seven miles long, and the position was an admirable one for a defending army. The left wing was especially strong, as it occupied a steep height, which was almost inaccessible, while the right

wing was not so well protected, as it had no fortification to rest upon. It is generally believed that Marshal Bazaine was still confident of escaping with his army from Metz. He was ready for an attack, and hoped that the superiority of his position, the destructive fire of his artillery, small-arms, and machine guns would be able to repel the enemy, and bring him victory. As soon as this was accomplished the time would be propitious for making his retreat. The entire arrangement of the French for the battle of the 18th was purely a defensive one, and in no manner did they intend to make it offensive. The strictest orders were issued to the corps commanders not to advance, but to retain their positions as long as possible, no matter how great might be their loss.

The German armies well understood that the battle must be an offensive one, and fought under great disadvantages of position. A concentration had been made in such a manner as to afford the greatest possible celerity in supporting any parts of the line that might be in danger. Briefly summarized, the positions were as follows:

At Mars-la-Tour, the Prussian Guards and 12th corps, with cavalry between them.

Between Trouville and Vionville, the 3d and 10th corps, with 5th and 6th cavalry divisions.

South of Rezonville, the 9th and 8th corps, with first cavalry division.

Between Bois des Ognons and Bois des Vaux, the 7th corps, forming the right wing.


At Ars-sur-Moselle, the 26th infantry brigade.

The two contingencies for which the Germans were prepared were, first, that the French might try to retire on the 18th by the northern road; and, secondly, that they might accept a battle close to the walls of Metz, and with their rear in the direction of the German frontier. King William issued a general order on the afternoon of the 17th as follows:

"The second army will get under arms to-morrow morning, August 18, at 5 o'clock, and advance with the object of cutting off the enemy's line of retreat to Verdun, and attack him wherever he may be encountered, marching in echelons."

The king personally assumed the command of the whole forces. The 12th and 9th corps moved at the appointed time, and their advance was at the Gravelotte-Conflans road. At 8.30 A.M. they had halted to wait further orders. Patrols were sent out, but they did not encounter any French. While the men were preparing for breakfast, a little after ten o'clock, orders to advance were received. The 8th, 7th, and 3d corps remained in position where they were. It was now pretty certain, as no French had been encountered, that they were not seeking to retreat from Metz to the west by way of Conflans; but had decided on the second alternative, a battle in the neighborhood of Metz. The French right wing was supposed to be at Amanvillers. It was necessary, in order to reach that position, for the three leading corps of the Second Army of the Germans to wheel to the right: a little more reconnoitring showed that the battle was to be on the broad plateau embraced between Amanvillers, Leipsic, and Moscou.

As the Germans advanced, they found that the French right extended considerably beyond Amanvillers, and hence the Guards came first into contact with the enemy. Prince Frederick Charles ordered the advance to Verneville to be continued, and fire was opened on the French about noon. This may practically be said to have been the beginning of the great battle. Verneville is in the open ground between the Bois de la Casse and the Bois des Perivaux, only the latter of these woods having been occupied by the French. The Bois de la Casse was immediately occupied by the Germans, and they opened an artillery fire against the French, though they were a good



deal troubled by a flank fire from machine guns and small-arms. The fight at this point was maintained for at least two hours by the 11th corps, when it was relieved by the artillery of the Prussian Guards Corps which came in on the north.

While this was going on, the French attacked the 25th division with a furious artillery fire to the westward of Bois de la Casse. They were strongly posted at St. Privat and Amanvillers, and it was very evident that here some very hard fighting would be required to drive them out.

About noon, the Prussian Guards renewed the advance from Doncourt and Caulre-Ferme. The extension of the French right beyond Amanvillers made it necessary for the entire corps of the Guards to make a larger sweep than had been originally contemplated, in order to attack the French right wing in flank and double it up. Accordingly, Prince Frederick Charles, who had reached Verneville about one o'clock, ordered the Guards to march on Habonville, in order to make the movement which has been designated. The 12th corps had by this time brought its advance to Battilly. Constant reconnoissances showed that the French right extended beyond St. Privat, and that Marie aux Chenes was also strongly held. Prince August of Wurtemberg received orders to engage the enemy in his front with artillery, only keeping back his infantry until the 12th corps had been brought up. The 10th corps was at that time advancing to Battilly, and the 3d corps towards Verneville.

General von Steinmetz waited until the sound of the cannonade from Verneville indicated that the 9th corps was engaged. He then commanded the 8th corps to advance into line of battle by way of Rezonville and Gravelotte. This occurred about mid-day, and before one o'clock the position east and south of Gravelotte had been occupied by the Germans, and they opened fire on the French with fifty guns. The machine guns and chassepots at St.

Hubart and at Point de Jour opened an effective fire upon them, but it was not sufficient to drive them out or to diminish the rapidity, vigor, and precision of their artillery practice.


A little before two o'clock, orders were given to advance the infantry in order to drive the French out of the southern part of the Bois des Perivaux. The 15th infantry division of the 8th corps made a rush for the wood, where they encountered four battalions of French infantry. They occupied the southern part of the wood, but farther along they were stoutly resisted by the French and made very little progress. As soon as the cannonade began, General von Zastrow advanced on Gravelotte and the Bois des Ognons. They opened a vigorous fire, which relieved in great measure the 8th corps. By two o'clock, the artillery of the Guards and of the 9th corps on the German left and of the 7th and 8th corps on the right were in full play. Nearly 250 cannon were being fired with rapidity and precision, but only one division, the 16th, had been able to take the offensive. The two infantry divisions of the 9th corps were quite inactive, as it was necessary for them to wait until the left wing of the Second Army had completed its deployment.

The artillery combat was vigorously maintained for several hours, and as vigorously opposed. By four o'clock some fifteen or twenty guns had been dismounted or in some way became useless, and most of the batteries had exhausted their ammunition. Several times the French endeavored to compel the artillery to retire, but each attempt to do so was successfully resisted. A little after four o'clock, the artillery fighting on the left wing became more advantageous for the Germans. The French fire at St. Privat and also at Amanvillers and Montigny had been pretty nearly silenced by the fire of no less than fourteen full batteries of the Germans. Some of the German divisions suffered severely by the steady fire of shell and can-

ister which were poured in by the French batteries; in spite of this they held to their position and showed no signs whatever of retreating.

There was a severe fight at St. Marie aux Chenes between three battalions of French and the 5th and 6th Saxon regiments together with the first division of the Guards. The Germans attacked under very great disadvantages. The ground in the vicinity of St. Marie is quite open, and the men had no cover whatever against the French fire. The bullets from the chassepots and machine guns poured like hail across this ground as soon as the Germans began their advance. Their only way was to make a rush of perhaps one hundred or two hundred paces, then throw themselves flat on the ground and begin firing; and as soon as they had taken breath, rise and repeat the movement. Rush after rush was made in this way. Many of the Germans were killed and wounded, but the advance continued. When the Germans were within one hundred yards of the village, the French evacuated it, not caring to wait for the last rush.

At five o'clock in the afternoon, the French army was holding all its principal positions from one end of the line to the other, and had only lost a few unimportant points. The 6th corps on the right wing held its ground at St. Privat and Roncourt. The 4th corps was also unmoved in its position at Amanvillers and Montigny-la-Grange; but the 3d corps had been compelled to evacuate the Bois des Vaux in front of its left wing, although it was still in its strong position on the Moscou Heights. In front of the 2d corps, every attack of the Germans had been repulsed. The Imperial Guard was still held in reserve and was impatient to be brought forward. Marshal Bazaine was confident that the day would end in a victory for the French, in view of the circumstance that the Germans had lost much more heavily than his own army and had gained no position of consequence.



But he was not aware that up to that time the Germans had only brought about half their disposable forces into action, and that a large body of German troops was ready to advance on both wings, especially on the left. Excepting the artillery, only one infantry brigade of the 12th corps and the Prussian Guards had been in action at St. Marie, while the two reserve corps of the left wing were ready to be brought forward. The 7th and 8th corps on the left wing and the 16th infantry division and the 2d corps with parts of other divisions and brigades were ready to be brought into action whenever desired. In brief, it may be said that three corps had been in action, while there were five corps, including the Prussian Guards, which were practically fresh for the fight.

For five hours the battle had been steadily raging on the right of the Guards without any gain on one side or the other. The day was ending, and if the Germans were to secure a victory prompt action was necessary. Unless the battle could be made decisive before the sun went down, it was possible that the French army during the night would concentrate and occupy a still stronger position on the next day than they were occupying on the morning of the 18th. Prince Augustus, of Würtemberg, determined to send the Guards to the attack without waiting for the arrival of the Saxon corps, which had been marching to join him. Consequently, three brigades of the Guards were sent to assault the French position at St. Privat.

This position at St. Privat was a very strong one, and any commander of troops would be justified in hesitating to attack it. Close behind the crest of the hill the ground slopes quite steeply in the direction of Metz, while on the west side the slope is gradual and regular for a distance of two thousand paces, and offering no cover of any kind to an advancing force. Furthermore, all the houses of St. Privat had been loopholed, so that the place

formed a sort of fortress. The attacking army was obliged to advance over this wide open space, and fully half the distance they would be unable to use their rifles, but at the same time would be under fire of the French machine guns and artillery.

The assault was led by the 4th brigade. The skirmishers were thrown out on the front and the batteries followed closely. The French were ready for them, and as soon as they were within range, the artillery, machine guns, and small-arms opened upon them with full vigor, cutting wide swaths in their ranks and covering the ground with dead and wounded. But the advance was continued in spite of this furious fire; the commanders and their staff officers remained on horseback in order that they might better control the troops, but so many of them were killed that they soon dismounted. The slaughter became so great that the commander ordered a halt, fearing that the brigade would be annihilated before reaching the line of the enemy. Just then the Saxon corps was seen advancing at double quick to the north of St. Privat, and immediately the order to advance was renewed. The soldiers made a tremendous rush, each man endeavoring to get at close quarters with the enemy. The French defended every position, fighting desperately, but they were beaten at last. The Saxon and German columns had so closely timed their movements that they met in the streets of St. Privat. In a little while they had driven out the French and were in full possession of the place.

By this time it was nearly dark. The French took up fresh positions in the woods a little distance away, and also in the quarries at the edge of the woods. The Germans were unable to pursue, partly on account of their great loss and partly because of the darkness. The reverse of the French in the capture of St. Privat soon became known along the whole line of Marshal Bazaine's


army. The effect was demoralizing, and the French soon began to retreat in disorder, abandoning their arms, tents, and equipage, and seeking safety inside the walls of Metz. But the darkness which prevented the advance of the Germans also made it impossible for Marshal Bazaine to send the Imperial Guard to drive back the assailants. The battle was over. As soon as night set in all advance of the Germans was suspended. They encamped on the field and cared for the wounded.

The loss of the Germans was very much greater than that of the French, as they had been throughout the day the attacking party. The German loss was given at 904 officers and 19,000 men, while that of the French was stated to be 809 officers and 11,000 men. On the German side 310 officers and 4,000 men were killed; among them were 22 field officers. One hundred and twelve of the slain officers belonged entirely to the corps of the Guards.

The fighting forces of the armies in the battle of Gravelotte were 211,000 Germans, of whom 146,000 were in the first line and 65,000 in the reserve. The French were estimated at 112,000 in strongly entrenched positions. The losses were, consequently, one eighth of the men in action for the French, and somewhat more than one seventh of the Germans.

The defeat of the French at Gravelotte caused Bazaine's army to retire within the fortifications of Metz, where it was besieged by a portion of the German forces, while the remainder, which comprised the greater part of the First and Second Armies, were free to pursue MacMahon, whose army was reorganizing at Chalons, reinforced by Faily's corps, a part of Felix Douay's, and a great body of reserves. Bazaine made several ineffectual attempts to break through the investing forces, and finally surrendered on the 27th of October, the surrender including 3 marshals, 66 generals, 6,000 officers, and 173,000 men. There were delivered up, as prizes of war, 400 pieces of artillery,

100 mitrailleuses, and 53 standards, besides the amount of small-arms appropriate to the strength of the capitulated army. The battle of Gravelotte carried momentous consequences in its result. It was the prelude to the fall of Sedan, and with Sedan fell the empire of Napoleon Third.





CHAPTER XIX.

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN—1870.

As soon as possible Marshal MacMahon moved northward from Chalons with the evident intention of relieving Marshal Bazaine, but he was intercepted by the Germans, and after several engagements the French retreated beyond the Meuse, and massed at Sedan to make ready for battle. The emperor had joined MacMahon at Chalons, and accompanied him to Sedan, though he left the command of the army to the marshal. The Germans were between MacMahon and Bazaine, and as Bazaine was securely cooped up in Metz, the army of MacMahon was compelled to rely upon itself. The Germans greatly outnumbered the French, having about 240,000 men, while the latter mustered not much more than 150,000. The German plan was to double up the French line by swinging round upon it "left shoulder forward"; it was arranged at the Crown Prince's head-quarters, and like all other plans of the Germans, was kept a rigid secret until the movement began.

According to the German calculations, it was believed that by making extraordinary efforts in marching, the French designs of relieving Bazaine at Metz might be completely overthrown by a concentration of the 5th and 11th Prussian corps with the Wurtembergers and Bavarians. It was hardly thought that it would be possible for the 6th corps to swing in its great circle to the westward, and reach the battle-field in time to take any part in the ac-

tion, but, nevertheless, it would be useful in protecting the German left flank, and serving as a support in case the time of the movement should be protracted.

It was unfortunate for the French that they had no strong corps of observation southward to Vitry. Had they possessed such a corps from 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the German "wheel around" would have been a very risky performance. In place of such a corps there were only a few badly organized bodies of militia, which the Prussians naturally regarded with the greatest contempt. The Crown Prince did not deign to give them the least attention, and so with the 6th corps covering his left, he swung in upon Sedan.


The ground near Sedan which the French occupied and defended is nearly five miles in extent from south to north, and about two miles from east to west, running into a narrow point toward the south. The fortress of Sedan, which has a small citadel on its northeasterly front, is situated in low ground near the Meuse. On the right bank of the river its walls extend to the first slopes of the higher ground where the old entrenched camp was located. Southeast of Sedan, and forming a suburb of it, is the village of Bazeilles. It is on the right bank of the Meuse, and on low ground. After passing Bazeilles to the north and east, we find ourselves on rising ground. The slope is at first gentle, but as we go toward the north it becomes steeper, and thus continues to the summits of the Ardennes, which are covered with wood. The broken ground on the north, where the battle was fought, embraces a deep valley or ravine that has steeply sloping sides, and a general direction from north to south. In this valley are the villages of Moncelle, Givonne, and Daigny. To the northwest this same broken ground is bordered by the valley of the Illy, a small rivulet along whose banks are the villages of Illy and Floing. On the right bank of the Meuse there is a strip of low ground, about 6,000 feet broad,

which extends from Bazeilles to Sedan along the river, and on the left bank the high grounds are close to the edge of the Meuse from Vadelincourt to Romilly. The most important feature of the battle-field, so far as its topography is concerned, is the Bois de Garenne, which is about 3,000 yards in length north and south, by 2,000 yards broad. Scattered through the wood are several open spaces. From Sedan to the frontier of Belgium, as the crow flies, is a distance of about seven English miles.

The correspondent of the *London Daily News*, who accompanied the Germans, thus describes the advance to Sedan :

Hard marching it was, and the day was lovely. The bayonets of the infantry glittered in the sunshine. The valleys full of armed men, the white straight roads with rumbling trains of artillery and great masses of cavalry far to the front, where the first patches of woodland grew indistinct among the red and brown fields. The whole country southward of the road from Beaumont to La Chesne is alive with German troops. The Bavarians are in Beaumont. The 4th Prussian corps is further to the right, and closely round upon the line of the Meuse ; the 5th Prussian corps is pushing toward Stonne and Chemery. Suddenly flashes of artillery are seen near Beaumont. Then an active cannonade begins on the distant ridge behind that place. The 1st Bavarian corps has surprised a French division in the little town, capturing a good deal of baggage. White puffs of smoke break out in all directions. The French are replying. There is evidently a sharp struggle on our right front about Beaumont, and Mouzon. It grows fiercer, and the troops bivouacked on the hill near Stonne are eager to be among the combatants ; but they cannot get there to-night, but must rest in their position. With that dull rolling and grumbling of the cannonade, this fight was the preparation for the decisive closing in of August 31st.

The Germans were in light marching order, their knapsacks being carried in wagons which followed closely



behind their regiments. They were weary, and hungry, and thirsty, but they pressed on without complaint. They presented a fine appearance, although they were covered with the dust which rose in clouds from the roads along which they travelled. Every man of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, seemed to understand the necessity of fast marching, and to entertain the hope that a victory in the battle about to come would be the end of the war. The plan had not, of course, been unfolded to the soldiers, or even to any but the highest officers, but somehow it seemed to be understood throughout the entire army, rank and file, that a great and decisive battle was at hand.

It was an enormous half circle closing in to make a complete circle around the doomed city of Sedan. On the hill above Donchery was the Crown Prince, while the 5th and 11th Prussian corps were pressing to the north in order to sweep around to the left. The 6th corps is pressing forward, but too far away on the left rear to come into the battle. The Wurttembergers who are considerably in advance of the 6th corps also, but holding the left, will have better fortune, if better fortune it may be called, to take part in the battle and suffer severely. The meadows near Sedan have been artificially flooded, but this flooding will be no serious interruption to the movements of the Prussians. The two Bavarian corps are on the right of the hill above Donchery. The 1st corps of the Bavarians is the only one which has to take part in the great battle. Beyond them are the troops commanded by the Crown Prince of Saxony, the 6th Saxon, the 4th Prussian, and the corps of Prussian Guards. The circle is steadily closing around Sedan, and before the battle begins in full vigor, the ring will be complete. As there are two German armies present, the Third Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the "combined army" of the Crown Prince of Saxony, King William takes the supreme command. The king and his staff make their head-quarters

on some high ground behind the position of the Bavarians. Count Bismarck and General von Moltke remain with the Prince.

In the battle of September 1st, the position of the French army was peculiar. It was posted so as to nearly surround Sedan at a general distance of about two miles. Sedan was in its centre, and it fronted practically to all the cardinal points of the compass. Unfortunately, the fortress of Sedan was poorly supplied with provisions. The fortress was not properly armed, in fact, no provision had been made for a vigorous defence, and especially for a siege. Besides, the position of the place was an unhappy one. Its fortifications were built long before any one had dreamt of the range of modern artillery, and it was dominated in every direction by high ground, from which a destructive fire could be poured without any possibility of replying to it with effectiveness. It was of no advantage whatever to the French army in any thing like an aggressive movement, and in case of a disaster, it was utterly useless as a rallying point for retreating troops. The position of MacMahon at Sedan was certainly not aggressive, and with any liberal use of the word it could hardly be called defensive. The character of the ground, the position and condition of the town and its fortifications, gave every advantage to the Germans with a total lack of advantage to the French. Every line of retreat had been cut off, and a defeat to the French meant an utterly overwhelming disaster to them.

At the very outset of the battle, Marshal MacMahon was severely wounded by a fragment of a shell which exploded near him, and his wound compelled him to give up the command. For several reasons the wounding of Marshal MacMahon thus early in the day was a terrible misfortune to the French. He was greatly beloved by the soldiers, and their confidence in him was implicit; consequently the information that he was wounded, caused a general de-

spondency. Furthermore, he had not confided his plan of battle to any one; even the orders which he had issued for the movements of the morning did not reveal his plans; consequently, when he was carried back to Sedan, all the high officers were entirely ignorant of his intentions. The marshal gave the command of the army to General Ducrot, who was not the senior general then on the ground. That honor belonged to General De Wimpffen, who had arrived only two days before from Algeria, and was consequently not acquainted with the army and its condition. An eye-witness says :

This arbitrary act of passing over General De Wimpffen was destined to exercise the most baneful influence on the whole course of the action, more as since the strategical views of Ducrot and De Wimpffen, on which the tactical conduct of the battle depended, were altogether at variance.

General Ducrot took command at 7.30 A.M., and immediately ordered the whole army to concentrate at Illy to force its way to Mezieres. While the movement was being executed, General De Wimpffen, acting on his orders from the war ministry, assumed command and ordered the troops back to their old position, which they reached about 10 A.M. The time lost in these movements was admirably utilized by the Germans. They closed up both wings of the French army and removed the last chance of forcing a passage through their lines in any direction whatever. And furthermore, these changes of command and these advance and retrograde movements had a bad effect on the French troops. A feeling of insecurity was engendered, the men lost their courage, and ultimately they refused to obey their commanders and rebelled against any authority whatever.

The first Bavarian corps near Bazeilles was in front of the right wing of the French, which consisted of the 12th corps, ranging along from Bazeilles, Balan, and La Mon-

celle, with its front toward the south. North of this position, the high ground and also the bottom of the valley at Givonne and Daigny was held by the 1st French corps, who were faced by the 12th Prussian corps and the Prussian Guards. The portion of the line at Illy was held by the 7th corps, who were supported by the 11th and 5th corps. Later in the day, in the centre and rear of the French position, the 5th corps was posted to serve as a reserve that might be moved in any direction. To guard against any attempt of the French to force a way out of Sedan toward the south, the 2d Bavarian corps, which had its own artillery, and that of the 1st corps, stood in the way. The 4th German corps was held in reserve in the early part of the day, but was brought into the battle before it ended. One division of the 4th corps was sent to Bazeilles to support the Bavarians, while the other division stood in reserve at Mairy. Altogether, for attacking the principal points of the French line, the Germans had a much larger number of men than their antagonists.

The battle was opened by the Bavarians. It was intended to begin the fire at daylight, and General Von der Tann, who commanded the 1st Bavarian corps, was all ready for action with the first streak of daylight, but a thick fog hung over the valley of the Meuse and prevented the tactical action which he intended. During the night, General Von der Tann had sent his artillery to the left bank of the Meuse while the principal part of his corps bivouacked between Romilly and Augécourt. He had been instructed to attack Bazeilles, in order to prevent the escape of the French without giving battle, the great fear being that the French, knowing the numerical superiority of their antagonists, would attempt to retire from Sedan before the lines around it could be completed. The Bavarian vanguard advanced at 4 A.M. and thirty minutes later it was in possession of the Romilly station south of Bazeilles. On passing to the village they found that the

French held it in force. When the fog that had been hanging over the valley lifted a little about six o'clock, the Bavarians were discovered and the French artillery opened a heavy fire upon them. The fire was rapid and well directed, and it caused much havoc among the Bavarians while they advanced over the cleared ground in front of Bazeilles. Report having been received that a serious engagement was going on at Bazeilles, the emperor and Marshal MacMahon started immediately in the direction of that village. On the way thither the marshal was wounded, as previously stated, and obliged to leave the field. The emperor examined the position at Bazeilles, and being satisfied that his troops could maintain themselves, then proceeded to make a tour of inspection along the whole line, partly for his own information and partly to encourage the soldiers by his personal presence.

The fighting at Bazeilles continued steady from 6 A.M., the German vanguard being reinforced by the main body of the 1st Bavarian division, and afterwards by the 2d division. The French commander held his position gallantly, and was greatly astonished when, about 8 A.M., he received orders from General Ducrot to move his command towards Illy. He protested against the order as most unwise, for the double reason that Bazeilles was an important position, and that a retreat in the middle of a battle would be demoralizing to the troops. General Ducrot explained that it was an imperative necessity, and the march must begin at once with all the forces not actually engaged in defending Bazeilles. The emperor, returning from an examination of the position at Moncelle, met these very troops that he had seen shortly before strongly posted, and asked General Ducrot what this new movement meant. The latter answered: "The enemy is only amusing us at Bazeilles; the real battle will be fought at Illy." Not wishing to interfere with General Ducrot's plans, the emperor said nothing. It was at this juncture that Gen-

**BATTLE OF
SEDAN
POSITIONS IN THE MORNING**

POSITIONS IN THE MORNING

FRENCH

VEANTRY

CORPS

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GERMAN

APPENDIX

☐ INFANT/AD ☒ CAUSE

FIRST BAVARIAN CORPS

FOURTH

ALFRED

GUARDS

FIFTH

ELEVENTH

SECOND BAVARIAN "

WURTEMBERGER DIVISION

1821

THE KING'S POSITION

.....

1870

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THE

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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 2000; 284: 2689-2695.

[illegible]

eral De Wimpffen assumed command and sent the troops back to their old positions.

The attack on Bazeilles was vigorously pushed and as vigorously defended. Three times the Bavarians stormed it only to be beaten back; the Germans alleged that the inhabitants joined in the fighting, firing out of loop-holed houses and from cellars, and perpetrating atrocious barbarities on the wounded Bavarians who were left behind after each repulse. The French denied the German allegations, and accused their opponents of wanton cruelty in mercilessly slaughtering all the inhabitants of the village who fell into their hands. After the war there was much controversy on the subject, the French declaring that of nearly 2,000 inhabitants scarcely 50 remained alive. In July, 1871, General Von der Tann officially declared that the number of deaths had been grossly exaggerated; he denied the cruelties charged against the Germans, and said there had been much provocation on the part of the inhabitants. Probably the truth lies between the extremes; this much is certain,—that Bazeilles was burned, but whether set on fire by shell or torch is not positively known. Driven out by the flames, the French retired from the village, but continued their resistance in the neighboring fields and gardens and on the contiguous hills. By 10 A.M. Bazeilles was destroyed.

The vanguard of the 12th German corps engaged the 12th French corps at La Moncelle, farther on to the right. A little past six o'clock, the principal part of the corps piled its knapsacks on the ground, leaving them in charge of a guard, by whom they were subsequently placed in wagons, and then marched up the high road from Douzay. They left the road, turning at La Rulle to the right, and a little past seven o'clock came in at the position assigned them. The French did not seem to be in force at La Moncelle, and consequently there was not much opposition to the advancing Germans. The latter fortified the

village as soon as they took possession, and opened fire with one battery of artillery upon the long lines of the French that were drawn up on the heights to the west. As soon as the fire was opened the French responded with five batteries. In half an hour three other German batteries came up, and the fight became more equal. Immediately following this artillery fight, strong bodies of Zouaves and Turcos from the first French corps attacked the German lines, but were driven back. When the advance of the division L'Artignes were crossing the valley of Daigny, the Saxons were already in possession of the wood. The Saxon supports came up rapidly and gave sufficient strength for an offensive movement. The Saxons steadily pushed on towards the edge of the valley. There was a sharp fight at Daigny, which resulted in the capture of 200 Zouaves, 3 mitrailleuses, and 3 guns. The Saxons halted at Daigny because their ammunition was running low, and the ammunition wagons were too far in the rear to enable them to get a fresh supply immediately. They held on to their position until ten o'clock, when the batteries of the Prussian Guards came up, formed in line with them, and thus gave them relief.

While this was going on, the French were pushing the Bavarians severely, and there was great fear that the French would succeed in breaking through the German lines between Montville and La Moncelle. The Bavarian commander sent a request for the Saxons to come to his aid. The latter complied with the request, and not a moment too soon. Just in time they closed the gap between their own left and the right of the Bavarians. The French made another furious attack, but were repulsed by the artillery and several divisions of infantry that were brought forward by ten o'clock or a little later. The entire valley of the Givonne, the Bazeilles rivulet, and the rivulet between Bazeilles and Daigny, had been given up by the French and occupied by the Saxons and Bavarians.

This side of the line was now considered perfectly secure. There was no fear that the French could force a passage, and there was no evidence that they intended to make an attempt farther to the north. The Prussian Guards were steadily forcing back the first corps of the French.

The advance of the two infantry divisions of the Prussian Guards arrived late at night on the 31st August, near Pouru St. Reny and Pouru au Bois, and at the same time the main body of the corps came to a halt northward of Carignan. At five in the morning of September 1st they moved out in two columns, the right advancing on Villers Cernay, and the left on Francheval. At Villers Cernay they encountered the French line, and having brought their artillery into position on the high ground above the Givonne rivulet, they opened fire upon a body of cavalry and a number of trains on the opposite side of the valley. A few shells, not over a dozen probably, sufficed to throw both cavalry and trains into a panic. Wagons and horses stampeded in all directions, and the wildest confusion followed.

The other division moved toward the southward, and at nine o'clock went to support the Saxon troops in the vicinity of Daigny. As already stated, another division of the Prussian Guards remained in reserve. It was about 10.30 A.M. when the Saxons and Guards together took possession of Daigny and captured a considerable number of prisoners. About this time the French were making the retrograde movement on Illy, in accordance with General Ducrot's order.

As already mentioned, the confused movements of the French in consequence of the difference of opinion between Ducrot and De Wimpffen proved of great advantage to the Germans. By the time the French returned from the movement upon Illy, the Saxons and Bavarians with the Prussian Guards had obtained firm possession of the valley of the Givonne. The best that the French could then

do was to take position on the high ground beyond the west bank of the valley, the artillery in front and the infantry lying down to the rear of the artillery line. The position was a bad one, as it was under the direct fire of the Saxon, Bavarian, and Prussian artillery, whose guns were much more numerous and of greater weight of metal, but it was also enfiladed on the right by several batteries posted on the left bank of the Meuse. The French losses by the artillery fire were very heavy, and increased so rapidly as to threaten a panic among the troops. The Emperor Napoleon rode through the battlefield towards Sedan about ten o'clock, in order to consult with Marshal MacMahon, in case the condition of the marshal's wound would allow a consultation. General De Wimpffen rode out to the front and was soon convinced that the enemy's barrier of artillery was too strong to be broken down or forced. Finding that the 7th corps had lost very heavily, he abandoned the thought of breaking the German line, and sought only to hold his position until nightfall, when fortune might give an opportunity for the retreat of a portion at least of his army.

The 11th corps, forming part of the German left wing, was moving on the evening of August 31st to occupy Donchery. Early on the morning of the next day it was ordered to take up a position that would prevent the possibility of a French retreat upon Mezieres. The movement began a little before six o'clock, and the whole corps was very soon to the north of Donchery, and on the right bank of the Meuse. About nine o'clock it encountered the French pickets which were along the high ground around St. Manges. The pickets were easily driven in and the ground occupied. Then the corps advanced to Floing, through the narrow defile of St. Albert. Floing was already occupied by the 5th corps, and as there was no room for the two to march abreast, the 11th corps halted. The French had a strong position on the Plateau d'Algerie.

The wings of the French position touched the villages of Illy and Floing, while the line between them had steep sides to the valley directly in its front. The 7th French corps and two reserve cavalry divisions occupied this plateau.

The Bois de Garenne, which was in the rear of the right wing of this part of the French line, was occupied by a strong force, which was intended to maintain connection with the first corps. The artillery of the 5th and 11th corps opened fire on this wood, which was crowded with French troops, among whom great havoc was caused by the German guns. Several times the French brought batteries to the edge of the wood, and attempted to reply; but every battery that came thus to the front was immediately silenced by the concentrated fire of the German batteries. A French officer who was taken prisoner described the German fire as "five kilometres of artillery." General De Wimpffen's line of battle had now assumed the very rare condition along its east front of being broken into two portions that fronted in nearly opposite directions.

Let us now return to the right wing of the German army, which we left soon after ten o'clock. When the sound of the cannonade in the direction of Illy reached the Prussian Guards, the generals concluded that the turning columns in that direction had closed the line of battle. Prince Augustus, of Würtemberg, who commanded the Prussian Guards, ordered the artillery fire to be opened on the Bois de Garenne, which was vigorously assaulted over nearly its whole extent. All the troops which the French had assembled there were compelled to stay inside the wood. As soon as a column made its appearance anywhere at the edge of the wood it was cut down by the German fire. Then an advance of the Guards was ordered, so that every possibility of an escape of the French in the direction of Belgium was completely

cut off. An order was sent for the Bavarians to advance ; but in consequence of their terrible losses at Bazeilles they were not in condition for the offensive, and were unable to occupy Daigny. The order was then given to the Saxons, who executed it in fine style, and advanced later on to Fond de Givonne in the rear of the Guards.

The position of the right wing of the French, which was personally commanded by General De Wimpffen, was now perfectly hopeless. As a last resort he sent a request to the emperor to come and lead the troops in person, as they would consider it an honor to cut a way for him through the German lines. The emperor was unwilling to sacrifice the lives of so many soldiers in order to save himself, and therefore he declined the invitation. General De Wimpffen then went over to Balan to find whatever troops there might be remaining from the 12th and 1st corps ; but none could be found. He was alone, unaccompanied by a single staff officer, and then rode to the gate of Sedan in the hope of being able to rally some of the disordered troops. General Ducrot proposed to make a last effort to cut through the German lines, and for this purpose ordered a general charge of cavalry.

Margueritte's reserve cavalry division (the 4th) was selected ; it advanced by echelons east of Floing and was intended to overthrow everything before it, after which it would fall to the right and double up the enemy's line. The charge was as gallant as that of the French cavalry at Waterloo—and as unfortunate ; it swept on like a tornado, but never reached the German lines. The artillery and infantry mowed great swaths in the advancing columns, and covered the ground with the fallen heroes. Three times was the charge made and three times repulsed. The dead and wounded actually lay in heaps in front of the German lines.


Ducrot's effort to save the day was a failure, and the cavalry had been sacrificed. Then he ordered the infantry

to make the same dash for liberty, but utterly disheartened and worn out with fatigue, they refused to obey his orders.

It was now three o'clock and a great stream of fugitives had been for some time flowing to the town. General Ducrot rode there too, in order to get a few more troops together, but when he saw the state of things there he abandoned all hope. The streets and squares throughout the town were packed with all kinds of wagons, gun carriages, caissons, etc., and crowded with terror-stricken men who had thrown away their guns and were intent only on finding shelter and food, with safety for their lives. All discipline was gone, and evidently the defeat of the French was complete and crushing.

A French officer who was with the army in Sedan thus describes the state of affairs in the town near the end of the battle :

Meanwhile shells were flying in the direction of our street and hotel. Everybody stood under the vaulted stone entrance as the safest place of shelter. While we waited, watching patiently for the shells which might have sent us altogether into another world, General De Wimpffen came past making a vain effort to rally and inspirit his fleeing troops. He shouted, *Vive la France! en avant!* but there was no reply. He cried out that Bazaine was attacking the Prussians in the rear. This news, which had been current all the morning, coming from the mouth of General De Wimpffen, came to be believed, and a few thousand men were rallied and followed him out of the town. People began to have hope, and for one brief moment we believed the day might be saved. Need I say that this intelligence was a patriotic falsehood of the brave general, made with anguish; and, in direct opposition of the emperor's orders, he had resolved to rally what men he could and make a stand. He could not have known that he was bound in the grasp of at least 300,000 men. The bugle and trumpet ring out on all sides, a few thousand men hearken to the sound. They went



out at the Port de Balan. The houses of the suburb were already full of Prussians, who fired on the French out of every window. The church especially is thoroughly garrisoned, the heavy doors are closed. The general sent an officer to fetch two pieces of cannon. These soon arrived, and with them the door of the church is blown in. Two hundred Prussians are captured and brought back with the French, who, in spite of all their efforts, are forced to retire again into the town. It was the last incident of the battle—the last struggle.

By four in the afternoon the Germans were masters of the situation and the defeat of the French was absolutely certain. The Germans had contracted their circle close around Sedan, their artillery held possession of all the heights, and it was in their power to destroy the town and the army at pleasure if only their ammunition held out.

The battle of Sedan was chiefly carried on with artillery, in which the Germans were superior in numbers, weight, range, and precision. The field, after the surrender, presented a worse spectacle than any other of the war, owing to the terrible work of the artillery.

The impossibility of further assistance was evident, and the white flag was displayed from the walls of Sedan. Immediately the German fire ceased and the negotiations for surrender began. At first General De Wimpffen refused the terms offered, but on the next day, September 2d, he signed the capitulation of Sedan, and the whole army, including the emperor, who became a prisoner of war. In his interview with the king the emperor was downcast but dignified. From Sedan he was sent to the castle of Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel, and so ended his career as ruler of France. Two days later came the revolution in Paris, the overthrow of the empire, the flight of the empress, and the formation of the republic.

About 25,000 prisoners were taken during the battle of Sedan, and 83,000 surrendered the next day.

Among the captured material of war were 400 pieces of field artillery, 150 fortress guns, and 70 mitrailleuses. About 14,000 French wounded were found lying in Sedan and in the neighborhood, and 3,000 French escaped into Belgium, and laid down their arms. The great Army of the North thus passed out of existence.

Amongst the prisoners there were 1 marshal (MacMahon), 40 generals, 230 field-officers, and 2,595 officers of other grades.

The losses of the Germans were :

1,310 killed,
6,443 wounded,
2,107 missing.

Total 9,860.

The losses of the French according to their own statements were, exclusive of prisoners and missing,


3,000 killed,
10,000 wounded.

Total 13,000.

The strategical feat of the Germans by which an army of more than 200,000 men made a wonderfully accurate "wheel to the right" by means of which the entire force was concentrated after a march of four days on a point upwards of 47 miles from where the left wing previously stood, is probably without a parallel in military history.

The result of the battle of Gravelotte was to imprison Bazaine's army in Metz, where it remained until its surrender. The imprisonment of Bazaine's army made possible the capture of Sedan with the forces under MacMahon, the surrender of the emperor, the fall of the empire, the advance upon the French capital, the siege and capture of Paris, and the great triumph of the German army. At Versailles, on the 1st of January, 1871, King William of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of Germany amid the roar

of the cannon by which haughty Paris was reduced to humiliation. Two months later the war came to an end with the preliminary treaty of peace, and on the 10th of May was signed the definitive treaty by which France surrendered portions of her territory to the conquerors, and paid an indemnity of five milliards of francs for the expenses of the war.





CHAPTER XX.

FALL OF KHIVA—1873.

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WHILE England has been pursuing a career of conquest in the great Indian peninsula and adjacent countries, Russia has been doing likewise in Northern Asia. Yermak, a Cossack chief, crossed the Ural Mountains, and invaded Siberia in 1580; nineteen years later was formed the East India Company, which laid the foundation of the present British Empire in India. England's course of conquest has carried her arms to the northward, while those of Russia have steadily pushed to the south. Now they confront each other on the plains and among the mountains of Afghanistan, and on more than one occasion in the past few years a hostile encounter has been imminent.

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In her southward march over the plains of Central Asia, Russia successfully conquered numerous tribes and khanates of greater or less importance, and in most instances the conquests were bloodless. The Russians are superior to the British in their knowledge of Oriental character and Oriental ways of dealing; and for this reason they are often able to accomplish by diplomacy what the latter can only gain by fighting. Having a good deal of the Asiatic in their composition, they are better fitted than any other European people for dealing with the inhabitants of that part of the world, which has been claimed to be the cradle of the human race. The Russians usually try diplomacy before resorting to arms, but the arms are generally close at hand during the negotiations, and whenever they are needed there is no delay in their use.

The khanate of Khiva resisted both the diplomacy and the arms of Russia until a very recent period. It occupied an area of about 200,000 square miles in the great plain of Turkestan, but of this area only a small part was under cultivation or capable of being cultivated. The chief oasis in which the capital Khiva is situated, stretches from the mouth of the Amou Darya or Oxus, about two hundred miles along its banks, and is watered by canals drawn from that stream. This fertile area is about 3,000 square miles in extent, and has a population of a quarter of a million. Geographically Khiva is of no great importance, but it has a prominent place in the political world, and the events of 1873 drew towards it the attention of all nations. Russia had long sought to possess the khanate, but, protected by the desert sands that surround them, the Khivans were able to bid defiance to their northern enemies.

It is a curious circumstance that the first expedition for this purpose actually succeeded in conquering the khanate and holding it for two or three months. It was organized and conducted by a chieftain of the Yaik or Ural Cossacks, and was simply a plundering expedition on a large scale. Finding the Khan unprepared for war, the chieftain drove him out, seized his capital, and took possession of his treasure and his wives. The Cossack declared himself khan, ruled the country, converted the Khan's favorite wife to Christianity and married her. But finding, after ten or twelve weeks of power, that the Khan was assembling an army to re-conquer his capital, the Cossack determined to retreat to the Urals, and started with a large caravan loaded with plunder. The Cossacks were overtaken by the Khan, and so severely were they handled that only five or six escaped alive to the Urals. The Cossack chieftain killed his newly converted bride when he saw that escape was hopeless, and then died fighting among a heap of slain Khivans who had fallen beneath his sword.

Two similar freebooting expeditions were undertaken by Cossacks, but both were disastrous. One of them made a dash upon Kuna-Urgench, whence they carried off about one thousand Khivan women, whom they wanted for wives, together with other booty. The Khan overtook them on their retreat, and slew the invaders to almost the last man. The other expedition was met about half way across the desert and forced to retire after heavy loss.

Peter the Great sent an expedition against Khiva in 1717. It was composed of about 4,000 regular and irregular troops, and attempted to cross the desert in the middle of summer. About one fourth of the number died of illness on the way, and the rest, greatly worn out, were slaughtered by the Khan's army almost in sight of the mud walls of the capital. Of the whole 4,000 who started only 40 escaped, and thus ended the fourth expedition against Khiva.

For more than a century from this date the situation was changed, the Cossacks who had formerly plundered the Khivans being themselves the victims of Khivan plundering. Hundreds of Cossacks and other Russians were carried to Khiva and sold into slavery, and caravans on their way to trade in Central Asia were attacked and plundered almost daily. By 1839 these raids had become intolerable to the Russians, and the government at St. Petersburg determined to send an expedition against Khiva. It was commanded by General Perovski, and consisted of about 5,000 men, 22 guns, and a transport train of 10,000 camels. As it was thought impossible to cross the desert in summer, the expedition started from Orenburg December 1, 1839.

The winter proved to be exceptionally severe, and by the middle of December the thermometer showed 40° below zero, and the mercury froze when exposed to the air. The snow was very deep, and before the expedition was half way to Khiva half the camels were dead or dis-

abled and many of the men were frostbitten and unable to move without assistance. The camels were dying at the rate of one hundred a day, and as the effective force was reduced to less than 2,000 men, General Perovski decided to retreat. The remnant of the expedition arrived at Fort Emba in February and remained there until spring, but the attempt to capture Khiva was not then renewed.

The next expedition to Khiva was that of General Kaufmann in 1873, which resulted in the conquest of the khanate and the transfer of its rule to Russia. We will now consider the details of the expedition.

General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, had been for two years planning the expedition and getting ready for it before he asked the permission of the government at St. Petersburg to attack the khanate of Khiva. But there were other aspirants than Kaufmann for the honor of capturing Khiva, and as the distances were very great and nobody was able to say with certainty which route offered the best chances of success, the emperor, after due consideration of the subject, decided to send four expeditions from as many different points. The first was to go from the Caucasus under command of Colonel Markosoff; the second was to march from Orenburg under General Verevkin; the third was from Kinderly Bay, on the Caspian Sea, under Colonel Lomakin; and the fourth was from Tashkend under General Kaufmann. A fifth column was to start from Kazala, or Fort No. 1, on the Syr Daria, under command of Grand Duke Nicholas, and join General Kaufmann *en route*. Markosoff's expedition never reached Khiva; it suffered terribly in the desert, and when within 120 miles of the oasis was compelled to turn back.

The governor of Orenburg did not receive his orders to prepare the expedition until the first days of January. By the 27th of February he had his troops in readiness

with the proper ammunition, equipment, tents, and clothing, for a march of 1,100 miles through a desert country. In spite of the severe cold the column reached Fort Emba, on the river of the same name, 400 miles from the starting-point, near the end of March, without the loss of a man. The column consisted of nine companies of infantry: 1,600 men; nine sotnias (squadrons) of Cossacks: 1,200 men; eight pieces of artillery, a rocket and a mortar battery, with three times the ordinary store of ammunition. The transport train consisted of 5,000 camels. Supplies were taken for two months and a half, and the entire column had felt tents for every twenty men.

The Kinderly column contained 1,800 men with ten pieces of artillery. It was provisioned and equipped similarly to the Orenburg column, which it was intended to join at Lake Aibugir. It suffered terribly in the desert, partly from the intense heat of the middle of the day and partly from great scarcity of water. There were few wells along the route, and such water as could be found was very bad for men and animals. Sunstroke, dysentery, and general debility were prevalent, and fever was so common that nobody seemed to mind it. On two or three occasions the whole expedition was in peril of death from thirst; one march of three days was made with practically no water, the Turcomans having poisoned the only well on the route by throwing into it the carcasses of putrefying animals. The march ended with the entrance into the oasis near Kungrad, and the joy of the soldiers can be imagined when they found green pastures and flowing water after a journey of two months across the desert and terrible suffering from thirst. The columns of General Verevkin and Colonel Lomakin joined near Kungrad, which was taken without a blow. And hereby hangs an interesting incident.

Up to their arrival at Kungrad neither of the columns met any opposition from the Khivans. They showed

themselves a few times, and their commanders sent insolent messages to the Russian leaders, to which no answers were vouchsafed. The day before General Verevkin entered Kungrad, he received a letter from the governor of that place asking that the Russians would delay their advance for three days so that he could have his cannon ready and give them battle. He threatened that if they pushed blindly forward before that time he would simply refuse to fight. They continued to advance, and the Khivan governor of Kungrad kept his word by abandoning the place just before the Russians entered it.

But from Kungrad onward the Russians were harassed by the Turcomans, who hung on their flanks, making attacks or feints at all hours and keeping the invaders in such a state of alertness that they were unable to get any rest at night. The Turcomans were well mounted, and both men and horses showed themselves capable of wonderful endurance. In spite of the opposition of the Turcomans the united column advanced steadily in the direction of Khiva, the capital, having numerous skirmishes with the enemy's cavalry and an occasional encounter in which artillery was used. On the 9th of June they arrived in front of Khiva, but in consequence of the high walls of the gardens and the forests of fruit-trees they were within two hundred yards of the walls of the place before they were aware of its proximity. Nothing had been heard from Kaufmann beyond vague reports from prisoners that there was a Russian column approaching Khiva on the other side.

General Verevkin and his staff were leading the advance along a road not more than twelve or fifteen feet wide, bordered by high walls. Suddenly there was a crash of musketry accompanied by the deep growl of artillery; the bullets from the small-arms and the shot from the cannon passed over their heads, as the Khivans had made the mistake of aiming too high. Discharge after discharge fol-

lowed, and in a little while the Khivans obtained a better range, and their fire began to tell. The Russians then found they were under the walls of Khiva ; retreat was inconvenient if not impossible, and General Verevkin gave the order to advance. The infantry went forward at a run, and soon came into an open field in front of one of the gates, which was defended by a breastwork with four guns. Two companies of infantry under Major Burovstoff dashed over the breastworks and bayoneted the gunners ; the breastwork was about 100 yards from the walls of the town, and from these walls the Khivans poured such a deadly fire that it was not possible to drag away the guns until the Russian artillery had opened fire and compelled the slackening of that of the Khivans.

Three of the guns were taken away, but the fourth was spiked and left behind. In retiring to their own lines the Russian storming party was compelled to haul the guns one by one over a narrow bridge and across an open field, exposed all the time to Khivan cannon-shot. Then a regular bombardment set in, which was temporarily suspended on a request from the Khan, in which he proposed terms of capitulation. Hardly had his messenger left the camp before the Khivan fire again reopened, and thereupon the Russians renewed theirs. It was afterwards ascertained that the Khan was unable to restrain his Turcoman forces, and the fire had been reopened contrary to his orders.

About sunset a messenger arrived from General Kaufmann announcing that he was about nine miles away on the other side of the city, and ordering the suspension of the fire. It was obeyed with considerable reluctance, as General Verevkin was confident that Khiva would soon be within his grasp. It was certainly a remarkable circumstance that three columns starting from different points a thousand miles apart should have arrived before Khiva almost simultaneously. We will now make a flying leap

to Tashkend and accompany Kaufmann's column from that city to Khiva.

Kaufmann had about 2,500 men in his column with a baggage train of 4,000 camels. His force consisted of eleven companies of infantry (1,650 men), one company of sappers and miners, four pieces of horse artillery, and six pieces of foot artillery, half a battery of mountain howitzers, a battery and a half of rockets, and 600 Cossack cavalry. His artillery was of the newest model of breech-loaders, and the mountain battery was of the kind that can be quickly taken to pieces and packed on horseback. The column left Tashkend on March 15th, and Djizzak ten days later. The troops suffered much from cold on the march, but as the season advanced the weather grew warmer, and the column reached the well of Arystan-Bel-Kuduk on the 13th April.

On the 6th May Kaufmann reached Khala-Ata where he was joined by the column under Grand Duke Nicholas. It left Kazala March 11th, and by the original plan it was to have joined Kaufmann at Bukali, in the Bukan-Tau mountains. Fearing that the Kazala column might be too weak to meet the enemy alone, General Kaufmann sent word for the Grand Duke to join him at Khala-Ata instead of Bukali. This change of plan caused some delay, as the Kazala column was compelled to make a detour that lost about two weeks of valuable time, and caused the latter part of the march to be made after the summer heats had come upon the desert and dried up some of the wells. Several days were spent in reconnoitring the country before them, and on the 12th of May the united column started from Khala-Ata. The Kazala column, which had joined that from Tashkend, was about 1,400 strong, with half a battery of rockets, half a battery of mountain pieces, two mitrailleuses, and 150 Cossacks.

The first encounter with the enemy was at Adam-Kur-ulgan, to which point Kaufmann advanced on the 12th

May, leaving a small garrison at Khala-Ata. Several wells were dug, and as this was the last point where water could be obtained before reaching the Oxus, preparations were made for carrying a supply sufficient for the journey. No positive information could be obtained as to the distance, but it was thought that the river was not more than two or three days away, and accordingly a supply for three days was deemed sufficient. The weather was getting so hot that it was impossible to march in the middle of the day. The plan was to march from very early in the morning until about nine o'clock, and then halt until late in the afternoon, when the route would be resumed till nine or ten at night.

On the first day on this part of the desert it had been expected that the column would cover thirty miles, but the camels were so much enfeebled and retarded the movements so greatly, that only fifteen miles were accomplished. It was found that nearly the whole supply of water was exhausted, and the consequent predicament was very serious. To retire to Adam-Kurulgan might be the signal for the whole of Central Asia to rise against the invaders. These people more than any other in the world believe in the old proverb "Nothing succeeds like success." The slightest retrograde movement of their enemies is construed into fear or incapacity, and gives encouragement accordingly. Kaufmann could not wait where he was and send back for water, and without it he could not go forward. Retreat or advance was alike impossible.

But it was necessary to choose between the two dire alternatives, or everybody would perish. Kaufmann was about to give the order to retire to Adam-Kurulgan when one of the guides came to him and said he thought he could find water in the neighborhood, although all the other guides persisted that there was none nearer than the Oxus. Kaufmann handed his pocket flask to the fellow, and said: "Bring that full of water and I'll give you a

hundred roubles." A good horse was given to the man, and he was off at full speed; in an hour he was back with the flask filled with water which he had obtained from a well about four miles from the route; he said there were three wells there, unknown to the caravans, and they contained water sufficient for the army. Kaufmann immediately ordered the march in the direction of the wells, and when the army arrived there three more wells were dug. The water was very bad, and the quantity so limited, that the men were allowed only a pint a day each, and there was none for the camels. The place has since been known as *Alty-Kuduk*, or "Six Wells."

Kaufmann sent the camel train back to *Adam-Kurulgan* to enable the camels to drink and bring a supply of fresh water for a second attempt to cross the desert. The camel train had an escort of 600 men; this escort was attacked by the *Turcomans* at daylight on the 18th of May, the latter rightly concluding that if they could capture the camels it would not be possible for the Russians to cross the desert. The *Turcomans* came on with great bravery, but their sabres could avail nothing against the Russian breech-loaders, and they were driven back in disorder. So enfeebled were the camels, and so great were the delays, that a week was consumed in the journey to *Adam-Kurulgan* and back to *Alty-Kuduk*. Meantime the army suffered greatly, but the water gradually grew better and more plentiful, and Kaufmann once more prepared to advance.

But the camels were so reduced, that instead of carrying their full loads of 600 pounds, they could not now average 200 pounds each. Nearly the whole of the baggage was left at *Alty-Kuduk*, under a small garrison, which threw up a small entrenchment around the wells. Two pieces of artillery were left, and also four of the six iron boats that Kaufmann had prepared for passing the *Oxus*. The march was made as rapidly as possible, and at the

end of the third day the Oxus was in sight. During all the last day the Turcoman cavalry hung on their flanks and continually harassed them, but the breech-loading rifles emptied a good many saddles, and prevented any thing like a charge. Many of the Turcoman horses were killed by the Russian sharp-shooters. A Turcoman on foot is the most pitiable of beings, and utterly useless as a soldier, so that the killing of a horse was equivalent for the time being to the slaughter or disabling of a man.

The discipline of the Russian soldier is well illustrated by the conduct of the men when the water was reached. Though the soldiers were wild with thirst, not one of them broke ranks to get at the water until permission was given. Kaufmann spoke of their conduct almost with tears in his eyes, and said he did not believe the soldiers of any other army in the world could thus be restrained. The necessity for keeping them in the ranks after reaching the water was caused by the need of holding the Turcomans at a respectful distance; they hung close to the army, and were evidently prepared to take advantage of the disorder that was naturally expected when the water was reached.

When General Kaufmann reached the bank of the Oxus, and before tasting of the water, he crossed himself devoutly, and each officer of his staff did the same. Part of the soldiers were detailed to carry water to the rest, and in a few minutes the parched and burning throats of the men and animals were moistened, the enemy being held at bay in the meantime. As soon as the safety of the column was made sure, the Russians changed from the defensive to the offensive. Shells were thrown among the Turcomans; the Russian cavalry charged and pursued their late assailants several miles along the bank of the river. They captured a dozen "kayuks" or boats, so that General Kaufmann had no more regrets about the iron boats he was forced to leave behind before crossing the desert. Down to this time he had been greatly distressed on the

subject, as it was necessary to cross the river in order to get to Khiva.

On the morning of the 30th May, Kaufmann began crossing his army to the other bank of the Oxus. The spot selected for the crossing was at Sheik-Arik, where a canal, diverted from the river, enters the oasis. The oasis of Khiva practically begins at Sheik-Arik, though there is considerable cultivation higher up the river. The ground from here to the Aral Sea is intersected with numerous ditches and canals, which are the existence of the gardens for which the country is famous. Khiva resembles Lower Egypt in its dependence upon the river that runs through it. Should the river cease to flow, the entire oasis would soon become like the desert which now surrounds it, and was for so long its protection against invasion.

The boats were capable of carrying fifty men each; the river is here about three-quarters of a mile wide, with a fair but not powerful current, and the crossing occupied about twenty minutes. But in going over and returning the boat was drifted far down the stream, so that it took some time to drag it up to the point where the troops were to enter it. After their march through the desert, the soldiers greatly enjoyed the opportunity of sporting in the water. The horses came in for their share of delight, and the animals generally made no opposition to swimming behind the boats. There was a good deal of doubt as to whether the passage would be disputed by the Turcomans, but to the delight of the Russians not a single enemy appeared, and the crossing was unmolested. If the Turcomans had made ever so feeble an attempt they would have troubled the Russians a good deal, as they had a fortification on the other bank of the river which could have been easily defended. The first of the Russians that crossed took possession of this fort; four small cannon were sent over, and in two or three hours after the first boat-load had crossed, the Russians were strongly posted and able to take care of themselves.

All day long the crossing continued, but at nightfall the work was not completed. During the night the Oxus rose about six feet, and a portion of the Russian camp was drowned out, but happily it was only the camp and not any of its occupants. The next day the crossing was completed, and the camels, well laden with water and refreshed and strengthened by their brief stay in the rich valley of the Oxus, were sent back to bring up the detachment and baggage that had been left at Alty-Kuduk. General Kaufmann issued a friendly proclamation to the Khivans, and induced them to open a bazaar near his camp for the sale of food. He announced that all who remained at home would not be molested in person or property, and that the Russians would pay for all the provisions and forage they wanted when it was brought into camp. But he added that if they were obliged to go out and hunt for their supplies, they would take whatever they wanted without paying for it, and would pillage and burn every abandoned house. The proclamation had the desired effect, and the Khivans brought in a plentiful supply of flour, fruit, chickens, sheep, rice, sugar, tea, and other things of which the Russians were in great need. They demanded and received four or five times the ordinary prices of what they sold. As they had expected the Russians would take every thing without payment, such being their own practice on their forays, they were greatly surprised at the conduct of their conquerors, and good feelings were established at once.

Things went on in this way for three days, when the Khivans suddenly stopped bringing in supplies, in consequence of an order from the Khan that any one who gave or sold provisions to the Russians should be put to death. A foraging party was sent out and had a slight skirmish with the Turcomans, and on the next day General Kaufmann decided to advance. He had received a letter from General Verevkin, giving notice of his approach from

Kungrad, and very naturally he did not wish his inferior in rank to have the honor of being the first to enter the capital.

Hazar-Asp, a strong fortification capable of a vigorous defence, was surrendered without a blow, somewhat to the disappointment of the younger officers, who were anxious for a fight. The fortification encloses a village of about 5,000 inhabitants, and covers some three acres of ground. It is 10 miles back from the river and about 40 from Khiva. A small garrison was left to hold the place and the rest of the army encamped near the river, waiting for the whole column to arrive from Alty-Kuduk before advancing upon Khiva. On the morning of the 8th June the Alty-Kuduk detachment had arrived, and the whole camp was broken up for the march to the capital. No opposition was made to the advance, and by the evening of the 9th the army was within 10 miles of Khiva when a messenger brought a letter from the Khan, offering his submission and proposing to surrender himself and his capital immediately.

This message was the result of the bombardment of the other side of the city by General Verevkin's column, which has been described already. Kaufmann immediately sent orders for Verevkin to stop his bombardment, which the latter obeyed as a matter of course, though much against his will.

Next morning, Kaufmann wrote to the Khan, telling him to march out on the Hazar-Asp road with 100 of his followers and listen to the terms of surrender. During the night the Khan fled from the city and was not at hand to receive the letter, which was responded to by his uncle, Said Emir Ul-Umer, who surrendered the city. While these negotiations were going on, several reports of cannon were heard; they continued at varied intervals until Kaufmann's troops were actually entering the city at the Hazar-Asp gate. It turned out that the Turcomans had renewed the fight with Verevkin's troops, and the

latter were not slow to reply. With their artillery they battered down the Hazavat gate, and then Colonel Skobeleff and Count Shuvaloff, with about 1,000 men, made a dash into the city and kept up a running fight to the Great Square and the palace of the Khan.

They had been there about five minutes when they heard that the Tashkend column was entering at the Hazar-Asp gate with drums beating and colors flying. Waiting an instant to catch the strains of the music, Colonel Skobeleff gave the order to retreat, and his men left Khiva by the gate by which they had entered. Great pains were taken to prevent publicity to this incident, as it was but natural that the commanding general would not wish to cede the honor of the capture of Khiva to a subordinate.

The Tashkend column marched to the Great Square, and was drawn up in line to receive General Kaufmann, who shortly entered, accompanied by the officers of his staff. The band played the national air of Russia, the colors were saluted, and solemn possession was taken in the name of the Czar. The Khivans received their conquerors in silence, but great numbers of them brought peace-offerings in the shape of dried fruit and similar articles of food. On being assured that no harm would come to any who remained quietly at home, they seemed content, and before nightfall had opened a bazaar and were doing an excellent business with the Russians.

The warmest welcome was given to the Russians by the Persian slaves. Khiva has been for many decades one of the great slave markets of Asia; thousands of Persians and many Russians have been sold there into perpetual bondage, and when once in the possession of a Khivan master, their escape or redemption was hopeless. They had heard that wherever the Russians went there was no more slavery, and when the Muscovites took possession of the city hundreds of these unhappy captives crowded

around them to have their chains removed. This is no figure of speech, as it was the custom of the Khivans to load their slaves with chains to prevent their running away. The sound of chisel and hammer, as the links were cut, or the grating of the file opening the rivets, were audible all over Khiva for several days after the arrival of the Russians. Slavery in the oasis was at an end. The Russian slaves in Khiva were liberated just before Kaufmann started from Tashkend, but too late to prevent the departure of the expedition.

A few days after taking possession of the city, General Kaufmann drafted a treaty to be made between the Khan and the Emperor. It was sent to St. Petersburg, where it received the imperial sanction, and was then returned to the general. On the 23d of August it was signed by General Kaufmann and the Khan in presence of the full staff of the former and a proportionate number of Khivan dignitaries.

By the terms of the treaty, the Khan became a vassal of the Emperor, surrendering the right of holding direct relations with neighboring khans and potentates, declaring war, or making commercial treaties, without the Emperor's permission. The boundaries were carefully defined; the Oxus was to be navigated exclusively by Russian vessels; the Russians had the right to establish ports and posts wherever they pleased; could build warehouses for the storage of goods, and all Russian merchants could have their commercial agents in Khiva, or other towns of the khanate. Slavery was to cease forever, and the khanate agreed to pay a war indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles in twenty annual instalments, with interest at five per cent.

The conquest of Khiva pushed the boundary of Russia some 300 miles to the south, annexed a territory of many thousand square miles, and gave complete control of the navigation of the Oxus. The moral advantages of the conquest were of more consequence to Russia

than the material ones, though the latter were by no means small. Khiva had been considered inaccessible and impregnable. Its fall exerted a powerful influence upon the Moslem inhabitants of Central Asia, by showing them that the Russians were invincible. Khiva was the last stronghold of Islam in Central Asia after the fall of Bokhara, and its capture was necessary to the spread of Russian influence in the direction of India. And however jealously the conquest may have been regarded by British statesmen, there can be no dispute that humanity gained greatly by the result of Kaufmann's victory.

Whatever shortcomings there may be in the rule of the Czar, it is far preferable to that of the Khan. Human life is no longer disregarded ; tortures and wholesale decapitations are no more permitted ; raids for purposes of plunder are things of the past, and the inhabitants of neighboring districts are no longer in constant peril of being carried into slavery. Before the arrival of Kaufmann the Great Square of Khiva was the scene of terrible spectacles. Vámbéry describes how he witnessed there in 1863 the payment for the heads of men slain in battle, the execution of prisoners, the sale or bestowal of others into slavery, and how several aged men, useless as slaves, were thrown on the ground, and firmly held while the executioner gouged out their eyes, and coolly wiped his dripping knife on their beards. If nothing else was required, the abolition of these wanton cruelties was a complete justification of the Russian conquest of the Oasis of the khans.





CHAPTER XXI.

FALL OF PLEVNA—1877.

EVER since Turkey obtained a footing in Europe the Christian inhabitants of her territories have been the victims of oppression. The extent of this oppression has varied from time to time according to the caprices of the rulers at Constantinople or in the provincial capitals, and is no doubt greatly influenced by the conduct of the subject people. They are naturally opposed to Moslem rule even under its mildest forms, and whenever it becomes severe their first thoughts are for insurrection.

Russia has been for a century and more the champion of the Christian populations groaning under the Turkish yoke, and her wars with Turkey have grown out of her sympathy for the suffering Christians of that country and its dependencies. The war of 1827-28 came from the aid which Russia had given to the Greeks in their war for independence ; the Crimean war grew out of a quarrel over the custody of the holy places in Palestine, and the refusal of Turkey to place certain of her Christian subjects under Russian protection ; and the war of 1877-78 was brought about by the barbarities of the Turks in the Danubian provinces, where the Christian inhabitants were numerically greater than the Moslems.

The success of Turkey against Russia in the Crimean war, owing to the aid of England, France, and Sardinia, added to the insolence of the Turks, and led to cruelties to their Christian subjects. Heavy taxes were laid upon

the Christian peasants throughout the rural districts of Servia, Montenegro, and the other Turkish provinces; the Porte requiring the provinces to contribute a certain amount of money annually, which was extorted from the people by the local rulers. And not only was this tax extorted, but the local rulers generally added large sums for their own pockets, and each subordinate concerned in the collection did the same. The consequence was that the people were severely oppressed, and found it impossible, even with the greatest industry and the closest economy, to satisfy the demands of those who ruled over them.

This state of affairs naturally led to insurrection, which the Turks proceeded to put down with an iron hand. The revolted provinces were overrun by Turkish troops, and though they fought bravely the armies of the insurgents were conquered. The most horrible reprisals were taken on the villagers throughout Bulgaria and Servia, especially in the former. Men, women, and children were ruthlessly slaughtered by the Turks or by their irregular cavalry, known as "Bashi-Bazouks." Hundreds of villages were wiped out of existence; the inhabitants, without regard to age or sex, being killed or driven away, and the houses burned to the ground. The whole country threatened to become a desert, unless, perhaps, it should be re-populated by Moslems. The accounts of the Bulgarian atrocities caused great excitement in England in 1876. Many meetings were held to protest against further support of Turkey by England, and the question became an important one in diplomacy. The British government issued, in April, 1877, a proclamation of neutrality in the war which then seemed imminent between Russia and Turkey.

At the suggestion of Russia, the great powers of Europe united in a convention, with the avowed object of preserving peace between the governments of the Czar and the Sultan. After much deliberation a protocol was drawn up, in which a reciprocal disarming of Russia and Turkey was

proposed, and Turkey on her part should give a guaranty for the proper treatment of her Christian subjects. Evidently the signatory powers had little faith in the efficacy of the protocol, as three of them made separate declarations before signing it. Their lack of faith was justified by the result, as on the 9th April Turkey indignantly rejected the protocol, and very plainly declared her intention of ignoring "what had been decided without her and against her."

Russia had already massed large numbers of troops on her frontier, and Turkey was also engaged in the work of mobilization. On the 24th April the Emperor of Russia issued a manifesto to his subjects, in which he recited the interest of the empire in the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula, and the general desire that their condition should be ameliorated. He declared that all efforts at peace had been exhausted, and he found himself compelled by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more decided acts. He had given the orders for the army to cross the frontier, and the advance upon Turkey was begun without delay. Every thing had been in readiness for some time, and the army moved promptly when the long-expected order was given.

The Turks had not been idle, though their preparations were by no means as complete as those of Russia. They had massed heavy bodies of troops along the Danube, and were prepared to resist the movements of the Russians south of that stream; they were confident of victory, their confidence having been greatly inspired by their previous victories over the Servians, who were assisted by many Russian volunteers in the Servian rank and file, and by a goodly number of Russian officers, who tendered their services with the full approval of the Czar. Rustchuk, Widin, and Silistria were strongly garrisoned, and the fortifications which still remained from the Crimean war and the war of 1827-28 were made more formidable than ever before. It was estimated that Rustchuk alone would require

an army of 80,000 men for at least three months to effect its reduction, while Widin and Silistria would each require as many more. On the other hand, the Russians were equally certain of success. They did not propose to sit down in siege-working, but, while leaving a small force sufficient to keep the Turkish garrisons from venturing too far from their walls, they would move to the rear of the fortresses and advance upon the Balkans.

At the outset Russia miscalculated her powers. She thought she would be able to conduct the campaign with 200,000 men, and this was the force at hand when she made her first move. Turkey had at that time 250,000 men under arms, of whom fully 150,000 were available for service on the Danube at the time war was declared. Four months later Turkey had 220,000 men facing the Russians, and the latter were compelled to make a fresh levy and bring up their reserves.

The "Army of the South," as the Russian invading force was called, was under the immediate command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, and consisted of seven army corps with two brigades of rifles. The field artillery amounted to about 800 guns, most of them breech-loaders, and there was a powerful siege train which was expected to be useful in the reduction of the works that barred the way to Constantinople. The infantry was armed with breech-loaders which had been made from muzzle-loaders, converted by the Krenk (Austrian) system, which had been declined by other governments. Against it the Turks brought the Peabody rifle, an American weapon of far greater range than the Russian one; the latter was only effective at 1,200 yards, while the Peabody could be relied upon for good work up to at least 2,000 yards. The infantry arms played an important part in the resistance which the Turks made to the Russian advance.

The Russian artillery was equally inferior to that of the Turks. The Turks had steel guns manufactured by Krupp,

while the Russian guns were of bronze, and of less range and accuracy than those of the Krupp system. The cavalry of the Russians was superior to that of the Turks, both in strength and efficiency. A division of cavalry was attached to each army corps, and in every cavalry division there was a full regiment of Cossacks. The Cossacks are the same that they have been through all the wars of Russia, irregular troops serving without pay, their service being given in place of taxes. The men are the owners of the horses they ride, and also of their clothing and equipments, their arms being furnished by government. They are probably the finest light cavalry in the world, and the amount of marching they can do is something astonishing. Horses and men can undergo an amount of fatigue that would paralyze any other horsemen in the world with the possible exception of the North American Indians and the *Guachos* of South America. The Cossacks are fine riders, and their horses are trained to lie down at the word of command and remain perfectly still, while their owners fire over them in repelling a real or imaginary attack of the enemy. The Cossacks have an allowance for provisions and forage, and generally manage to save something, although they keep themselves and their chargers in good condition. Their reputation for living off the enemy is equal to that of irregular cavalry generally, though not as bad as that of the Bashi-Bazouks.

The Bashi-Bazouks of the Turks were recruited among the Bulgarians and Roumelians, and a goodly portion of them were originally thieves and local guerillas. In several instances robber chiefs who were "wanted" by the authorities were pardoned for their past offences, on condition that they would enlist men for the service, and take commands in the field, and it is easy to see what kind of marauders would thus be created when they had military authority for their actions. They were a terror to the Christian inhabitants of the country, as they did not scru-

ple to add murder to robbery when the individual who was the victim made any protestations. Most of the massacres in Bulgaria before the war broke out were the work of the Bashi-Bazouks, and while the war was in progress they proved nearly as great a pest to the Moslem inhabitants as they did to the Christians. The Nizam, or regular troops of the Turkish army, were of very good material; many of them came from the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, and when well drilled they made excellent soldiers. The faith of Islam teaches that a Moslem who dies fighting for the preservation of his religion, goes straight to paradise, according to the teachings of Mohammed, the Russian is an infidel, and consequently the war with Russia had a religious aspect. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the Turkish soldiers manifested an almost stoical indifference to death, and fought bravely to the last.

Russia was at a disadvantage in one respect. She had no fleet of war ships to cope with the ironclad fleet of the Turks, and consequently the latter had practically the control of the Black Sea. Without transports and a fleet of war ships to protect them, Russia was compelled to march her troops by land and across the Danube, where she ran the risk of an encounter with the Turkish gun-boats which patrolled that river. Early in the war two of the Turkish gun-boats on the Danube were destroyed by torpedoes, and in a little while the Russians filled the lower Danube with such a net-work of torpedoes, that the Turkish gun-boats dared not venture among them.

From the frontier the line of advance for the Russians was by the railway to Galatz and thence to Bucharest, the capital of Roumania. The Roumanians made hearty cause with the Russians, whom they joined in declaring war on Turkey, and sent a contingent to the field. From Bucharest a line of railway reaches to Giurgevo on the Danube; Giurgevo is opposite to Rustchuk, whence the

Turks had a railway to Varna, an important military and naval station. Where the Danube would be crossed was a mystery which the Russians concealed with the skill for which they are famous. If a Russian does not wish to tell you any thing he will be exasperatingly courteous under all your interrogatories, but the extraction of the information is far more difficult than the historical process of drawing sunbeams from cucumbers. Batteries were erected opposite Rustchuk, and for days and days the Russians kept up a steady fire upon that town and its fortifications. Meantime, the preparations for the crossing went on; the Russian divisions were massed at several points on the river's bank, and hundreds of pontoons were made ready.

The first crossing was made at Galatz, on the 22d June, by General Zimmermann, who went over with two regiments in pontoons and drove out the Turks who were posted on the heights on the opposite shore. Having obtained a footing in the Dobrudja, as the peninsula between the Danube and Black Sea is called, the Russians were able to throw bridges over the great stream, by which the whole left wing of the army moved across. Meantime the right wing, on the 26th June, sent a pontoon force over the Danube from Simnizza, under command of General Skobeleff, who drove out the small force of Turks posted there, though not without hard fighting. More pontoons followed, and then a bridge was thrown across on which the army could march. It is related of Skobeleff that he urged his father, a lieutenant-general of Cossacks, to swim his whole division over the Danube. The elder Skobeleff refused, whereupon the younger swam the river accompanied by a Kirghese servant and three Russian orderlies. The three orderlies and their horses were drowned, but Skobeleff and the Kirghese got over safely.

By the first week of July the whole Russian army was

safely encamped on the southern bank of the Danube, and getting in readiness to assume the offensive. It took some days to accumulate the needed supplies and bring them over, so that the advance did not begin in force until after the middle of the month. But before that time General Gourko, with the advance and the 8th corps, had pushed forward on the road to the Balkans, heading first for Tirnova. The Russians had determined to follow the lines of the Yantra and Vid rivers in their advance to the south; both flow from the mountains in a northerly direction to reach the Danube, the Yantra coming in to the east of Sistova, and the Vid beyond Nicopolis to the westward.


On the 5th July the cavalry occupied Biela, which lies on the great road, and on the 7th Gourko was in possession of Tirnova. The plan was for the 12th and 13th corps to form the left of the army and ascend the valley of the Yantra, while the centre followed the Great Road leading to the passes of the Balkans. The 9th corps was to compose the right flank, and after capturing Nicopolis, go up the valley of the Vid. The 11th and 4th corps were to form the reserve, and be sent wherever they might be most needed. The Emperor joined the army at Biela on the 8th or 9th. Gourko was soon reported past the Balkans; Nicopolis was captured by Baron Krudener; and every thing seemed to be progressing favorably for the Russians, who had not thus far met any considerable force of the enemy. News came from Constantinople that the Turkish government was greatly alarmed at the successful passage of the Danube by the Russians, and had removed and banished the commander of the army, Abdul Kerim Pasha.

The first check of the Russians was at Plevna. They had previously captured Nicopolis with its garrison of 7,000 men, having themselves lost about 1,300 officers and men killed and wounded. Orders had been given to oc-

cupy Plevna as soon as possible, and Baron Krudener sent forward General Schilder-Schuldner to carry out the orders. There had been reports of the advance of a Turkish army from Widin, marching on the Russian flank, under command of Osman Pasha, and other reports of a column moving from Sophia. Due credence seems not to have been given to these reports, and Baron Krudener was not aware of the Turkish advance until it was close upon him. Schilder-Schuldner had 6,500 men and 46 guns in the division with which he went to capture Plevna; he was attacked by a vastly superior force of Turks before he had reached his objective point, and the first battle of Plevna was disastrous to the Russians.

A brigade of Don Cossacks had been ordered to join Schilder-Schuldner's command. They were taking their dinner on the 19th, when the cannonade opened about eight miles to the southeast, right in the direction they were going. As soon as possible they hurried on in the hope of finding him, but found themselves cut off by a column of Turkish infantry, which lay stretched across the road. There was some sharp fighting with the infantry and artillery of the command, and when night came on neither party had any decided advantage. On the morning of the 20th the Turks began the fighting at Bukova, just north of Plevna, where they engaged the Russian right. The Russian centre attacked the heights of Grivitzza, to the east of Plevna, and after a hard struggle drove out the Turks from some of their positions, and forced them fairly into Plevna. On the Russian left the Turks were driven back, but not without heavy losses by the Russians, and some of the regiments suffered so severely that they were put in retreat.

While the Russians were considering the fight nearly over, and thinking that another attack would put them in possession of Plevna, the streets of that town seemed to vomit forth Turkish troops by the thousand. On and on



they came till the hills were covered with red caps, and it was speedily apparent that they far outnumbered the Russians. Ten, twenty, yes, forty thousand Turks were there to confront the Russian column, less than ten thousand strong, and having the advantage of position on the hills above the Russians. The latter made a heroic defence, but it was of no use. Nearly 3,000 men and 74 officers were killed or wounded, and so many artillery horses were killed that the Russians abandoned seventeen caissons and several guns. The Russians retired to Nicopolis, and the Turks set to work to strengthen Plevna, as they realized that the Russians would speedily attempt its capture.

A few days sufficed to put Plevna in condition to resist attacks, as the Turks are adepts in the construction of fortifications. Careful students of the military operations in Bulgaria in 1877-78 say that the Turks far excelled the Russians in this line of work; the Turkish soldier fights far better behind entrenchments than in the open field, while the matter of protection does not make a great difference to the Russian. In this campaign the Russians found what they had never before encountered—the long-range rifles in the hands of the Turks did effective work before the Russian breech-loaders could get within shooting distance. The Russians learned a lesson in intrenching and protecting themselves behind cover, but they did not learn it until after many a good soldier had bitten the dust.

From the 20th to the 30th of July the Russians were engaged in bringing up reinforcements and getting ready for another attack. An order came for the assault of the Turkish position; Baron Krudener did not believe the assault advisable, but the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas left him no discretion. The baron and his engineers had studied the Turkish position with great care, and realized that there would be a heavy loss of men in attacking the

Turkish defences, behind which were 40,000 soldiers under command of Osman Pasha and armed with the far-reaching Peabody rifle. The Turkish entrenchment line ran through a series of villages, lying in a semicircular order round Plevna, about five miles distant from it, and touching the river Vid on both flanks.

General Skobelev (the younger) was assigned to the temporary command of the brigade of Cossacks in Prince Schahofskoy's division, and sent to occupy, if possible, the town of Loftcha, an important position between Plevna and the Balkans. It was a dangerous movement for the brigade, as the march would be on the flank of the enemy and likely to meet with resistance both at its destination and while en route. But Skobelev was ready for it, as he was always ready for any hazardous enterprise, and in a very short time after receiving his orders he was prepared to move.

The night between the 29th and 30th was spent in completing preparations for the assault, but on the morning of the latter day it was decided to postpone it for another twenty-four hours in order to give the troops further time for rest. A council of war was held in the afternoon, at which it was arranged that the attack should be made at 5 A.M. on the 31st; it was to be concentric, and as nearly simultaneous as possible. The night was very wet and the troops could not begin their advance before six o'clock in consequence of the ground being heavily soaked. In all there was an attacking force of about 32,000 infantry, with three brigades of cavalry, and 160 guns. Baron Krudener held the right, with the whole 31st division in his fighting line, and three regiments of the 9th division in reserve. He was to assault in two columns, with a brigade in each column, and fall upon the Turkish left flank from Grivitza towards the Vid River.

Prince Schahofskoy held the Russian left with a fighting line of one brigade from the 32d division and one

from the 30th. He was to assault the Turkish left from Radisova, and had one brigade of the 30th division in reserve at Pelisat. Skobelev was on the flank of the left attack with one brigade of Cossacks, a battalion of infantry, and a battery, to watch the line between Plevna and Loftcha, and prevent a movement of the Turks for outflanking Schahofskoy. General Lazareff occupied a similar position on Baron Krudener's right to prevent a flanking movement in that direction. The odds against the Russians were very great, as they were inferior to the Turks in number, while the latter had the advantage of fighting behind defences and their arms were superior to those of the Russians. But the order had been given and it must be obeyed.

Another circumstance to the Russian disadvantage was that a wide gap existed between Krudener and Schahofskoy, and another between the latter officer and Skobelev. Krudener and Schahofskoy were fully two miles apart, too far for prompt communication, especially when it is remembered that the Turkish position was in the form of a horse-shoe, and a courier riding between the two attacking columns would be compelled to make a wide detour to be out of the Turkish line of fire. Thus the two assaulting forces were practically independent, and a disaster to one could not be promptly known to the other, while the Turks, with their short interior line, would have great advantages.

Plevna stands in the hollow of a valley with a general trend from north to south, except where it falls off in a plain on the old Sophia road. It is surrounded by hills and rugged ravines at all points of the compass, and every inch of ground had been utilized by the Turks for the construction of breastworks and rifle-pits. Generally speaking, there were three lines of defence, one within the other, so that if the Turks should be driven from the outer line, they would by no means be conquered. The

bastions bristled with guns and swarmed with men, and in the little plain at the edge of the town, Osman Pasha had a reserve of 20,000 men, which he could move in any desired direction. South of the town runs the road to Loftcha, and it was this road which Skobelev was appointed to watch.

The advance began simultaneously on both wings of the Russian army, about seven o'clock. By eight o'clock the right centre had come within range of the Turkish fire, but it did not halt until it was within 3,000 yards of the front of the redoubt and could bring its artillery into action. In a little while five batteries were in full action, and though the Turkish fire was rendered somewhat irregular, it was not by any means stopped. The artillery was kept in play for several hours, the infantry not being advanced to the assault until after one o'clock. Schahofskoy made better progress than did Krudener, the former being well up to the Turkish front, while the latter was still pounding away at the longest range of his artillery. Schahofskoy grew impatient and ordered an assault.

Away went the Russian infantry in a solid line, straight for the Turkish defences. The Turkish artillery plowed the advancing line with shells, and though numbers of men fell, the advance was steadily maintained. The Turkish artillery is supported by that of the Turkish infantry, to which the Russians reply, and the roar of the musketry is terrific and continuous. The Russian line becomes disorganized during the advance, but there is a concentration about a hundred yards in front of the Turkish line, and then with a wild shout the Russians are into the ditch and over the first line of works. The fleeing Turks are bayoneted by the Muscovites, and were there no second line of works to be carried the Russians would be masters of the situation.

The fire of the Turks was so severe that the Russians were unable to stand up against it. There had been a

terrible loss of men, the ground was covered with dead and wounded, the Peabody rifles in Turkish hands poured out volley after volley so rapidly that it was literally a rain-storm of bullets that fell upon the Russians. The bravest troops in the world could not live in such a storm, and in disorder the late assailants fell back across the undulating ground, over which they had advanced. Schahofskoy's column was completely broken, and though he brought up his reserves and made another attempt, it was evident to all that the capture of Plevna on this side was hopeless.

On the other side of the Russian line, Baron Krudener had begun the attack with his artillery, and followed it about two in the afternoon with an advance of the infantry. When they were fully a mile distant from the Turkish redoubt the men began falling before the bullets of the Peabody rifles, and the column was obliged to advance in this way until it had reached a point where its own Krenk rifles could be made to tell. By the time it reached the foot of the redoubt the ranks had been terribly thinned, but the Russians with a loud cheer carried the first line of works. They would have been driven out immediately had it not been for the rush of the 2d battalion, which came to their support, and not a moment too soon. The Russians carried the second line in the same way as they had taken the first, and drove the Turks up the slopes of the Grivitza redoubt. From this redoubt a furious fire was opened and prevented a further advance of the now greatly weakened Russians. Nay, more, it turned the advance into a retreat, and the retreat left behind it great numbers of dead and wounded.

Later in the day another assault was made, but to no purpose, other than to add to the number of the killed and disabled. It was a useless slaughter of brave men, with scarcely a hope of success.

Meantime Skobelev had pushed his reconnaissance

towards the Loftcha road, getting possession of the Green Hills after considerable hard fighting. He obtained a position whence he could look into Plevna and see the force that the Turks still held in reserve, a force sufficient to take the offensive and follow up the Russians so vigorously as to make doubtful the escape of Schahofskoy's shattered battalions. After the repulse of the Russians the Turks pushed forward several brigades that threatened to separate Krudener and Schahofskoy, and at one time the latter was completely enveloped on three sides. Had it not been for Skobelev he might have been caught on the fourth side, and his line of retreat altogether cut off.

As soon as Skobelev saw the Turkish strength in reserve he comprehended the peril of the situation. Schahofskoy's left and rear might be imperilled by a swing to the south of a Turkish division, and Skobelev determined not to give them a chance to undertake it. With a few squadrons of Cossacks, supported by a light battery, he dashed forward, as though ready to give battle. The Turkish division which might have cut off Schahofskoy was compelled to fight this insignificant force, which kept it occupied all through the afternoon.

Previous to this affair Skobelev had been in disfavor with the Emperor in consequence of stories affecting his conduct in Central Asia, stories which his enemies had persistently circulated. After the passage of the Danube the Emperor embraced the other officers who took part in it, but turned on his heel when Skobelev stood before him. After the brilliant service thus described, together with other exploits that made his name famous, the Emperor made public acknowledgment of his appreciation by rising at a banquet and proposing the health of General Skobelev. The immediate cause of the Emperor's change of heart was the skill and daring displayed by Skobelev in leading the assault upon the Turkish position in Loftcha on the 3d September.

The losses, of the Russians in the attack on Plevna on the 31st July were 170 officers and 7,136 men. Of the latter 2,400 were shot dead on the battle-field, and many of the wounded were murdered by the Bashi-Bazouks. The 126th regiment that led the assault under Schahofskoy lost 725 killed and 1,200 wounded, or 75 per cent. of its total strength. The 121st regiment, which led the assault under Krudener, lost almost as heavily, and neither regiment was able to re-form until the next morning. The entire command was in no condition to remain in front of Plevna, as it could not have combated successfully an attack by the Turks. Orders were given to fall back to the line of the river Osma, which enters the Danube near Nicopolis. The repulse of Krudener's column threatened the safety of the bridge at Sistova, and the movements of the retiring columns were planned with a view to protect that important crossing over the Danube.

There was nothing for the Russians to do but send for reinforcements, and wait until they arrived. The advance into Turkey had received a severe check, from which recovery was not easy. From the offensive the Russians were thrown upon the defensive, and all as the result of a single battle of six or eight hours' duration. Happily for Russia, the Turkish army had no competent leader, or the army of the Czar might have been captured or drowned in the Danube. The Turks had three armies in the field, with an aggregate strength of more than 150,000; they were near enough together to render concentration possible, and with such an army the weakened Russians would have fared badly. Mehemet Ali was at Shumla with 65,000 men; Osman Pasha at Plevna, with 50,000, and Suleiman Pasha at Yeni Zagra, with 40,000. Suleiman was engaged in watching Gourko, and that astute general, on hearing of the disaster at Plevna, was considerably concerned for his line of retreat.

The order of the Czar for reinforcements was quickly issued, and resulted in the despatch of 120,000 regulars and 180,000 militia for the front. With these reinforcements went 460 pieces of artillery with the necessary ammunition, and the railways were taxed to the utmost of their ability for the transport of provisions and material of war. The militia were incorporated into the old regiments to take the places of the men whose bodies were rotting on the slopes of Plevna, the Turks taking no trouble to bury their enemy's dead. General Gourko took up his position in the Shipka Pass whence Suleiman Pasha sought in vain to dislodge him, losing far more men than the Russians lost in the same time. Towards the end of August the Russian reinforcements were assembled in such numbers that an advance could again be ventured, and accordingly the Muscovite columns were once more pushed out into Bulgaria.

The Russians were getting ready for their third attack upon Plevna, aided by the Roumanians, who had sent nearly 40,000 men into the field. The first move in the attack was to send Generals Imeretinsky and Skobelev to capture Loftcha, which was accomplished in fine style, the Turks being driven out of the forts at that point, and 3,000 men of their retreating column lanced or sabred by the Cossacks during their flight for safety. Having Loftcha in their possession, the Russians proposed to encircle Plevna, and gradually draw in their lines till they forced a surrender. The total Russian and Roumanian force for the attack of Plevna amounted to 90,000 men and 440 guns, while the Turks were estimated to have about 56,000 men—and Osman Pasha. Prince Charles of Roumania was assigned to the command of all the Russo-Roumanian forces around Plevna, with General Zotoff as second in command. The Grand Duke Nicholas ordered an attack at as early a date as possible, and was confident that the great superiority in numbers would this time bring victory. The Emperor and the Grand Duke Nicho-

las came in person to witness the assault, establishing their head-quarters near those of Prince Charles.

The attack began with a bombardment on the 6th September, the Russians bringing a large part of their artillery into play, including the heavy siege guns which had been slowly dragged by oxen from the banks of the Danube to the points where they were mounted. The Russian fire was severe, and if it had been directed against stone fortifications would have battered them down in a little while. But the military engineer knows the comparatively slight effect of artillery upon earthworks, and as all the defences of Plevna were simply the earth of which the hills were composed, the Russian fire did little more than dismount some of the Turkish cannon, and keep the men confined to their bomb-proofs, with the exception of those who were working the guns that replied to the assailants. The Turkish fire was slow but steady; the Turks did not seem inclined to be in a hurry, and they evidently felt that they could afford to let the Russians pile tons and tons of iron inside their works, and add the solid masses of metal to the earth which formed the bastions and redoubts.

Since the repulse of Krudener and Schahofskoy on the 30th of July, Osman Pasha had greatly strengthened the defences of Plevna. When Krudener's assault failed there were no fortifications on the Grivitza knoll east of Plevna, nor on the Krishin heights a mile and a half southwest of the town. The Green Hills which Skobeleff carried and held for a time during the second battle of Plevna were also without fortifications at that time, but by the 1st of September all these commanding positions had been crowned with works and were connected by a series of rifle-pits and trenches. It was evident that the Turkish engineers were thoroughly competent for their work, and they had thrown around Plevna a line of defences that would certainly give the Russians a great deal of trouble. And so the sequel proved.

The bombardment lasted with varying intervals of a few hours at a time from the 6th to the 11th September, comparatively little use being made of the infantry and cavalry on most parts of the line. The general positions were much the same as at the time of the second battle of Plevna, Skobelev having the extreme left. The Roumanian army was posted among the hills to the northwest of Grivitza, while Krudener with the 9th corps was to the south of Grivitza, with his line extending round to Radischevo. General Kryloff with the 4th corps was to the left of Baron Krudener, while General Skobelev, as before stated, held the extreme left, which extended round to the Loftcha road.


The Russians were disappointed at the slight effect of their artillery on the Turkish redoubts, especially where the siege train under Krudener had been pounding all day at the Grivitza defences. On the extreme left Skobelev was impatient at the slow work of the artillery, and determined to make use of his other forces. After firing awhile with his heavy guns at the redoubts on the Krishin heights, he closed in within short range, and then sent the 5th and 8th regiments to attack the Turkish infantry, which was deployed along the line of the Green Hills. He drove back the Turks until he was fairly within range of the guns of Krishin, which of course made his position untenable, and he was forced to retire. At one time he was within 1,500 yards of Plevna, but he could not retain his position as long as the Turks were still in possession of their redoubts. But he hung on to the southern knoll of the Green Hills in spite of repeated attempts to dislodge him.

The 8th and 9th passed without any important change in the relations of the contending armies. The Turks on the Grivitza ridge did not reply to the Russian fire on the 9th, and consequently Prince Charles thought they might have been driven out, or possibly the guns were disabled.

He ordered an assault with infantry, but it was met with such a heavy fire of small-arms that the Russians were driven back before they reached the foot of the earthworks. It was afterwards learned that the Turks had ceased firing because they were short of ammunition, and wished to utilize as much as possible the scanty stock that remained to them. On the 10th their batteries were nearly all silenced, but any movement on the part of the Russian infantry showed that the Turks were fully alive to the situation, and when the occasion demanded, their works swarmed with men.

After repulsing the infantry attack on the Grivitza redoubt, the Turks made an assault upon Skobelev, at the Green Hills, but were driven back in disorder by the infantry commanded by that dashing officer. On the morning of the 10th, Skobelev determined to occupy the second knoll in front of the Krishin redoubt, the place he had taken and briefly held on the first day of the attack. His men made a rush, and then rapidly threw up an earthwork behind which they could bid defiance to the Turkish riflemen. As soon as the earthwork was completed Skobelev brought his guns forward and made ready for the work of the next day—the grand assault.

The plan was to open the day with a heavy bombardment, which was to be continued until three in the afternoon, the time set for the infantry assault. But all through the afternoon and night of the 10th it rained heavily, and the ground became a mass of mud in which it was difficult to move. In the morning of the 11th there was a heavy fog which hung over the entire valley; the Turks took advantage of it by pushing out a column of infantry to drive Skobelev from the position he had taken the previous day, but they were unsuccessful. The fighting was not severe, as the Turks retired on finding their opponents were ready for them, and the Russians did not pursue through fear of falling into a trap. Both



sides evidently wished to wait until the fog lifted, but by ten o'clock Skobelev grew impatient, and sent his men to capture a third knoll still nearer the Krishin redoubt, though then protected from its fire by the fog.

Skobelev's men were somewhat disturbed by the Turks in the neighboring rifle-pits, and there was a good deal of firing between them. While this fight was going on, the Turks made a sortie in the direction of Kryloff's front; under cover of the fog they were fairly within the Russian lines before they were perceived, but as soon as the firing began they were promptly repulsed. The 63d regiment met and defeated them; it was joined by the 117th, and together they not only drove the Turks back, but followed them into their redoubts. Here they found themselves caught in a trap, as the redoubts were full of men, and a terrible fire of bullets was poured on the Russians from all sides. Fully half the men and most of the officers were killed or wounded, and only a small contingent out of those two regiments managed to make its way back to the Russian lines. It was a severe blow to Kryloff, as it completely paralyzed his left wing.

The Roumanians with two divisions attacked the Grivitz redoubt from the north and east, while a Russian brigade attacked it from the south. In spite of the assault on three sides, the Turks were able to hurl back their assailants. By some miscalculation the Roumanian and Russian assaults were not delivered simultaneously; there was an interval of half an hour between the assaults of the two Roumanian divisions, while the Russian assault was still half an hour later. The columns were beaten in detail and with heavy loss, especially in officers, until about five o'clock when the redoubt was carried. The losses of the allies in the afternoon's battle were nearly 4,000, including 78 officers. Repeated assaults were made upon redoubt No. 10, but though they lost 110 officers and 5,200 men, the Russians were unable to carry it. The

Turks stoutly defended their position and made every shot tell.

Skobelev was for a time more successful than the other generals directing the attack, as he clung to the positions he had gained in spite of the Turkish fire that raked his lines from three directions. Mounted on a white horse, and dressed in a white uniform, such as he always wore when going into battle, he led the charge against a double redoubt in the bend of the Loftcha road, close to Plevna. All his escort were killed or wounded, his horse was killed beneath him, and his sword was cut in two by a cannon-shot. But onward he pushed, and carried the redoubt, losing 3,000 men in the effort.

And now came the question of holding the redoubt. It was taken about six o'clock in the afternoon, and Skobelev sent immediately for reinforcements, but they never came. All through the night he retained his position, and in the morning he was heavily assailed by masses of Turkish infantry, who advanced under cover of the artillery fire from the Krishin redoubt. The Turks were repulsed, but they returned to the assault as soon as they could re-form and fresh troops could join them. Five times did they attack Skobelev's rapidly diminishing forces, and five times were they driven back. Towards the close of the day they attacked for the sixth time, and as their battalions came surging on, Skobelev was at his tent on a wooded hill near the redoubt. When word came that the Turks were assaulting, he mounted his horse and rode towards the redoubt, out of which his men came streaming in a disorganized, straggling mass. They were dying of thirst, hunger, and fatigue, and worn out with almost continuous fighting for forty-eight hours. The repulse of the Russians at other parts of the line had enabled the Turks to gather an overwhelming force to drive Skobelev out of the redoubt, and at last they succeeded. One bastion was held to the last by a young officer, who was slaughtered with all his men around him.


A correspondent of the *Daily News* met Skobelev just after this occurrence, and thus describes him :

He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uniform was covered with mud and filth ; his sword broken ; his Cross of St. George twisted around on his shoulder ; his face black with powder and smoke ; his eyes haggard and blood-shot, and his voice quite gone. I never before saw such a picture of battle as he presented. I saw him again in his tent at night. He was quite calm and collected. He said : " I have done my best ; I could do no more. My detachment is half destroyed ; my regiments do not exist ; I have no officers left ; they sent me no reinforcements, and I have lost three guns." " Why did they refuse you reinforcements ? " I asked ; " who was to blame ? " " I blame nobody," he replied. " It is the will of God."

Military critics commenting on this battle say that the Russians had abundant troops that had not been under fire, and there was no real difficulty about sending Skobelev sufficient reinforcements to enable him to hold his position. If he could have held it until the heavy artillery was placed in position, the capture of Plevna was practically assured. But the Russian commanders had found themselves so severely handled that they had enough of fighting, and determined that Plevna could be taken by siege better than by assault. The Russian killed and wounded were estimated at 18,000 to 20,000, and the Turkish about 5,000 less than the Russian.

The capture by assault having been given up, the Russians sat down to invoke the aid of that engine, more powerful than all their batteries, the engine of starvation. Osman Pasha was to be starved into surrender, and for this purpose the Guards were called from Russia and the army of the Czar was strengthened in the same way it had been strengthened after the disaster of the second attack on Plevna. One by one the roads leading into Plevna were occupied, but it was nearly two months from the terrible

*PLAN OF THE
LAST SORTIE FROM PLEVNA*



battle of the 11th September before the routes for supplies and reinforcements destined for Osman Pasha could be secured. The investment was completed on the 3d November; 120,000 Russians and Roumanians were around Plevna, and the siege works were pushed with all the skill and vigor that engineering science and autocratic power could bring to bear. Osman Pasha and his 40,000 soldiers were shut up in Plevna and cut off from all communication with the rest of the Turkish forces.

Elsewhere the Turkish armies were busy with movements for the relief of Plevna, and sanguinary encounters took place between them and the Russian forces in the valley of the Lom and among the Balkans. But as all these enterprises failed of their object, though the Russians were made to suffer severely, they did not affect the one great object in view—the capture of Plevna.

Starvation was at work from the 3d of November, when the investment was completed. Spies brought intelligence that the men were on reduced rations and every available article of food was being devoured. Ammunition was scarce, and the Turks rarely replied to the Russian artillery fire. It became known to the Russians that Osman Pasha was preparing for a sortie, and the Russian trenches were kept full of men day and night. All the outposts were doubled or trebled, and every precaution was taken against surprise.

On the 9th December a spy brought the news that three days' rations had been issued to the troops in Plevna, together with one hundred and fifty cartridges and a new pair of sandals to each man. About ten o'clock at night another spy came in and said that the Turkish troops were concentrating near the bridge over the Vid, and about the same time a telegram from the Russians on the other side of Plevna reported the movements of a great number of lights in the town, an unusual occurrence. Evidently the hour of the sortie was approaching.

OUTLINE MAP
PRESENTING CHANGES IN EUROPE
BY THE TREATY OF BERLIN



At eight o'clock on the morning of the 10th another spy brought the news that the Krishin redoubt had been abandoned. He was so confident of the truth of his assertion that he offered to go along with the Russians and lead the way into the redoubt at the risk of being killed if his statement were false. General Skobelev ordered a cautious advance in the direction of the Krishin redoubt, and in a short time the Russians were in possession of it, no resistance being offered. It was now certain that the sortie was to begin at daybreak, and word was sent along the whole Russian line to be ready for it. Skobelev ordered the captured positions to be put immediately in a state of defence in case the Turks should fail in the sortie and then try to retake them.

In the gray of the morning the stillness was broken suddenly by the booming of some thirty or forty cannon, that announced the aggressive action of the Turks. They were trying to cut their way out of Plevna, and this was the opening of the movement. During the night they had withdrawn their troops from their various positions, all the way from Grivitza to the Green Hills, and concentrated for one last attempt. If they should fail, surrender was inevitable, for it would be impossible for them to retake the Krishin and other redoubts, into which the Russians had thrown their own men and were ready to pour a destructive fire all over Plevna.

The Russian artillery replied with great promptness, and then came the rattle of the infantry fire as the Turkish masses deployed and came out to the front of the Russian line. The attack was directed against the position of the grenadiers north of the Sophia road, and was made under cover of the wagon-train, which the Turks brought with them as a sort of moving breastwork. So many of the bullocks drawing the wagons were killed or frightened into running away that this strategy did not long avail, and then the Turks made a dash upon the line

of trenches held by the Siberian regiment. It was like one of Skobelev's charges, and was so impetuous that the Turks carried the line of trenches and the batteries, bayoneting the artillerymen and capturing all the guns inside the line of works. The Siberian regiment was almost annihilated, and had it not been for the promptness of the Russian generals, who immediately brought up the first brigade of grenadiers, the attempt to break the Russian investment might have succeeded.

The fighting was as fierce as any that had taken place in all the previous struggles for the possession of Plevna; the Turks held on to the guns with all the obstinacy of their race, and equally obstinate were the Russians in their efforts to retake them. The Russian grenadiers poured swiftly in; by half-past eight o'clock the sortie was repulsed, and the few Turks that remained alive and uninjured were fleeing back in the direction of the town.

The sortie had been stopped, but the fighting continued for several hours, though there were no great losses after the contest for the possession of the battery, as both parties were under cover. The Russians expected the Turks would make another assault and were determined to defeat it, while the Turks were apprehensive that the Russians would charge and drive them into the gorge where the town stands.

Towards noon the firing gradually died away and only an occasional shot broke the stillness. About half-past twelve a white flag was displayed on the Turkish front and was greeted with a loud shout of triumph that rolled along the entire Russian lines. The long agony was over, and Plevna was about to be surrendered.


A Turkish officer bearing a white flag rode out towards the Russian lines, and after some parley returned to Plevna to send out an officer of Osman Pasha's staff. The latter came and was met by General Skobelev, and after a little delay the surrender of Plevna was made. It was

an unconditional surrender. In fact, under the circumstances, neither side could have expected less. The Grand Duke and all the Russian generals complimented Osman Pasha on the splendid defence he had made, and he was treated with every courtesy that could be shown to one whom they earnestly respected for his valor and his military genius.

With the fall of Plevna and the surrender of its garrison of 40,000 men, the Turkish opposition practically ceased. Within a month from that event General Gourko had captured Sophia, and General Radetsky took the village of Shipka, in the Shipka Pass, and compelled the surrender of a Turkish army of 23,000 men, 4 pashas, 92 guns, and 10 standards. Gourko and Skobeleff advanced upon Philippopolis by different routes and narrowly missed capturing Suleiman Pasha with his entire force. Skobeleff advanced upon Adrianople, which the Turks abandoned, and Slivno and Yeni-Zagra were occupied, all inside of thirty days. Plevna had made the Russians the masters of the situation and they advanced upon Constantinople, the Turks retiring before them, and occasionally making a feeble resistance.


Turkey asked the mediation of England, and finally, despairing of her aid, signed an armistice that became the basis of the treaty of San Stefano, which was signed by the treaty powers on the 3d of March, 1878. The treaty guaranteed the erection of Bulgaria into an autonomous tributary principality, with a national Christian government and a native militia; the independence of Montenegro, with an increase of territory; the independence of Roumania and Servia with a territorial indemnity; the introduction of administrative reforms into Bosnia and Herzegovina; and lastly, an indemnity in money to Russia for the cost of the war.

By the subsequent Congress of Berlin Russia was stripped of some of the fruits of her conquest, Turkey receiv-



ing back again about 2,000,000 of population and 30,000 square miles of territory. The treaty of San Stefano was modified in several other features,—Batoum was made a free commercial port, and the treaty of Paris was held to be maintained in all the points where it was not modified by the Congress of Berlin. Altogether Russia had good reason to complain that she was not allowed to enjoy what she had won by the force of arms, and the way was left open for troubles in the not distant future.

Russia is said to have lost nearly 100,000 men in the campaign of 1877-78, and to have expended not less than £120,000,000. The cost of the war on the Turkish side, both in men and money, is said to have been about three fourths that of the Russians, but the exact figures have never been published on either side.





CHAPTER XXII.

CAPTURE OF GEOK TEPE—1881.

DOWN to 1869 the Russian advance into Central Asia was conducted from Orenburg and the various military posts of Western Siberia. Year by year the frontier was pushed to the southward, and the map of the Asiatic possessions of Russia required frequent revision. The long chain of the Altai Mountains passed into the control of the Czar; the Aral Sea became a Russian lake; and vast territories with a sparse population were brought under Russian rule. As mentioned previously, in the account of the fall of Khiva, most of this conquest was a bloodless one, as it was fought chiefly by the diplomatist, though backed always by the military power.

The Kirghese, who occupy the region immediately south of the Altai Mountains, and are still found on the southern confines of the Baraba Steppe, are broken into many independent tribes; they are nomadic in their habits, wandering from place to place in search of pasturage for their immense flocks and herds. In winter they frequent the valleys among the outlying hills of the Altai Mountains, and in summer descend upon the plains. Many of the tribes live altogether on the plains, and their range covers many thousands of square miles.

Quarrels were numerous among them, chiefly growing out of disputes about pasturage or water, and in these quarrels the Russians interfered, both in the interest of humanity and the spread of their power. They usually

took the side of the weaker party, who was always glad to have their assistance, but found when too late that he was altogether dependent upon them. In case of their retirement he would be subject to the revenge of his late antagonists, and whenever the Russians proposed to go away they were earnestly urged to remain. Thus they obtained a secure footing in the country and speedily became masters of the situation.

Frequently the disputes between the tribes led to raids for purposes of plunder; quite as frequently one tribe would make a raid on another with which it was at peace for the sole object of robbery. Attacks were generally made at night, and if they were successful the robbers would drive off the flocks and herds of the tribe assailed. Men, women, and children were taken to be sold into slavery in the markets of Khiva or Bokhara, or kept among their captors. These slaves were treated with the greatest cruelty; they were severely beaten for the slightest offence or failure to perform what had been ordered, were poorly fed, and often compelled to wear chains. They were generally maimed for life, by means of a horse-hair run through the heel, in order to prevent their escape from captivity.

All this business was brought to an end by the Russians when they occupied the Kirghese country. They compelled the tribes to live peaceably with each other, and if any dispute arose about water or pasturage it was referred to the Russian commander of the district for adjustment. If one tribe made a raid on another it was compelled to give up the stolen property, and furthermore a heavy fine was levied upon the raiders—half going to the Russian government and half to the injured tribe. The Russians generally made the fine heavy enough to furnish a percentage for the officers who took the trouble to adjust the differences.

Russian goods were introduced among these nomadic

people, markets were opened, and every facility was offered for the increase of commerce. Long caravans were constantly in motion between Orenburg, Sempolatsinsk, and other points in Russian territory, and Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarcand, far to the east. They traversed the Kirghese and Turcoman country, and wherever they went they found a material difference in the matter of safety, whether the territory was under Russian rule or remained independent. If the latter, the caravans were constantly liable to attack and plunder; if the former, they were invariably free from molestation.

The capture of Bokhara, Samarcand, and Khiva reduced the slave markets of the Turcoman raiders, but by no means put an end to their plundering expeditions. The independent Turcomans were estimated to be about a million in number, divided into several tribes, who sometimes warred upon each other, but constantly upon the Persians and other peaceable people. In the wars between Khiva and Bokhara, Samarcand and Kokan, they took sides with those who would pay the most for their services.

Down to very recently the whole of Northern Persia was subject to Turcoman raids, and agriculture was carried on under great difficulties. The raids were sometimes carried up to within 100 miles of Teheran, or about 500 miles inside the Persian boundary. They were organized months beforehand, and sometimes as many as 5,000 or 6,000 men were engaged in a single enterprise. A raid was called a "chapow" by the Persians; in the Turcoman language it was an "alaman."

A Turcoman leader would announce his intention of making an alaman, but the route was always kept secret through fear of betrayal. The Turcomans are splendid horsemen, and while organizing an expedition they put their steeds under a system of training to enable them to make long and swift marches whenever occasion required. When every thing was ready the party started; it travelled

slowly until it reached the Persian frontier, and was often weeks on the way.

Passing the frontier, the hard work of the campaign began. The region selected for the raid was reached as soon as possible; then the invading force was divided into small parties, and each had a particular village assigned to it. Their movements were made so as to catch the people at work in the fields, and capture the cattle before they could be driven into a place of safety. Not only the cattle, but all the men, women, and children that could be seized were taken. The old and useless were slaughtered without mercy; the young and able-bodied were carried off to be sold into slavery. A wealthy Persian was held for a heavy ransom, but the poor man had no chance of redemption. The plundering was kept up as long as there was any thing to steal, and then the expedition returned to its own territory. Sometimes in a single raid as many as a hundred thousand horses, sheep, goats, and other animals were captured, and a thousand or more people were carried into slavery.

The Persian government made very little provision for the protection of its people. The Persian troops were in the cities and large towns, which the Turcomans never attacked, and as there was no telegraph through the country, the raiders almost invariably got to a safe distance before a pursuit could be started. Very often the Persian officials on the frontier connived at the raids, and the people were forced to rely upon themselves for protection, which was almost wholly of a defensive character.

Their villages are built of mud, and are practically forts. The walls are from twenty to thirty feet thick, and about forty in height; they form a quadrangle, or circle, where cattle can be driven at night, and there is only a single door-way, too low to permit the passage of a man on horseback. The raiders never stop to besiege a place; all their work is done by a sudden dash, and the Turcoman

would never think of dismounting to pass the low doorway. Inside there is a stone door which may be closed to prevent ingress ; it is thick and strong, and once inside of their mud village the people are safe.

To further protect themselves, they had towers of refuge in their fields, where they could run in case of danger. Some of the towers had ladders on the outside, which were drawn up as the Turcomans approached, while others were entered by narrow door-ways similar to those of the villages. On the hills there were signal-towers where watchmen were stationed ; when the dust of an approaching alaman was seen, the watchmen gave warning and the people fled for safety.

Thus these Turcoman thieves hampered agriculture, and they also restricted commerce by plundering the caravans. Merchants travelled with an armed escort and in large numbers. Even this did not save them from attack, as a great caravan was unwieldy, and often the robbers would dart in and seize a few camels laden with merchandise, while the escort was so far away in another part of the line that it could not rush to attack the marauders until they had finished their work and departed.

The Turcoman country extends westward as far as the Caspian Sea. To put a stop to the organized thieving of the Turcomans, and more especially to increase the extent of territory under their control, and open the land route to India, the Russians occupied the eastern shore of the Caspian in 1869. A military expedition was landed at Krasnovodsk where it built a fort, and took permanent possession of the country in the name of the Czar. Points on the eastern coast of the Caspian had been occupied during the time of Peter the Great, and again during the reign of Nicholas I., but the occupation of the region was only temporary. The force which established itself at Krasnovodsk consisted of a few companies of infantry, two sotnias of Cossacks, and half a dozen pieces of artillery.

Three men who afterwards obtained considerable prominence in the affairs of Central Asia, and one of whom gained a world-wide reputation as a soldier, were attached to this expedition. The last was Skobelev, the hero of Plevna and the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1877-78. The others were Stolietoff and Grodekoff; Stolietoff was a general, while the other two were captains, and down to that time had had no opportunity for distinguishing themselves. Skobelev was perhaps the man of least promise; as he was looked upon as a wild sort of fellow, with a great fondness for conviviality, which was constantly getting him into trouble, and he was so reckless that his elders predicted he would be killed in the first battle, or the first skirmish of any magnitude.

It was the Russian plan to make haste slowly in conquering the Turcoman country. Reconnoitring expeditions were sent out from the fort at Krasnovodsk, but no other point was immediately occupied.

The Yomut Turcomans in the Caspian region made no resistance; they are far less warlike than the Tekke Turcomans farther to the east, who afterwards became the defenders of Geok Tepe. A short time before his death, Skobelev said to a friend: "We made a great mistake when we landed at Krasnovodsk; instead of going ahead we dawdled about reconnoitring the country. The result was we gradually taught the Turcomans how to fight, and at last they fought so well that it needed a series of great campaigns to crush them."

From 1869 to 1873 there were numerous skirmishes and reconnoitings, during which the steppes were pretty well explored as far as Kizil-Arvat. General Stolietoff was in command until 1872, when he was succeeded by Colonel Markusoff, who pushed his explorations to the wells of Igdy, then bending to the southwest, he passed Kizil-Arvat on his return to Krasnovodsk. There appeared to be no obstacle to a Russian advance into the heart of

the country. But when General Lomakin was ordered there during the years between 1873 and '79, he found that beyond Kizil-Arvat were the Tekke Turcomans, who seemed determined to make a decided opposition to the Muscovite designs. A regular campaign was required, and General Lazareff was ordered to push back the Turcomans and occupy as a base of operations the first cultivated oasis east of Kizil-Arvat. Lazareff, early in the campaign died, and the command fell upon General Lomakin, who undertook to execute the order. This general, who had so easily conquered, if conquering it may be called where no opposition is offered, the Yomut Turcomans along the borders of the Caspian, mistakenly thought he might deal in the same way with the Tekkes. He advanced with 4,000 men and reached Geok Tepe without resistance, but no sooner was he in front of it than the Turcomans fell upon him. He was severely defeated and made a hasty retreat to Krasnovodsk with the remnant of his army.

General Tergukasoff was next appointed to the command, but when he saw the difficulties confronting him he resigned. He was succeeded by General Petrussovitch under the chief command of Skobelev. Thus from Stolietoff to Skobelev there were no fewer than seven generals who had tried to conquer the Tekke Turcomans.

Skobelev, seeing the vast difficulties of the situation, matured a skilful and scientific plan of operations, for which he obtained the imperial sanction by making a personal visit to Livadia, where the Emperor was then sojourning. His next step was to telegraph to General Kuropatkin, who was then on the Kuldja frontier, to join him with a detachment of troops from Turkestan. Kuropatkin marched from Tashkend to Khiva and thence to Bami, where he was to join Skobelev; in spite of the difficulties of the route across the desert, he brought his troops through in fine condition

and secured the profound admiration of all military men for his remarkable achievement. He was twenty-six days covering the distance between Khiva and Bami; the route was but little known and for much the greater part of the way it lies through a sandy desert where water can only be found at long intervals.

When Skobeleff took command in the middle of March, 1880, the position of the Russians was this:—Their base was Tchikishlar and Krasnovodsk, their direct aim Geok Tepe, where Lomakin had been so disastrously defeated the previous year. Their outposts were in '79 at Douz-Aloum, in the valley of the Sumbora, a tributary of the Atrek. Skobeleff's first work was to secure a safe transport, establish a regular line of steamers across the Caspian, to build suitable docks, secure 20,000 camels, and build a railway from Michaelovsk to Kizil-Arvat. Michaelovsk is a small bay near Krasnovodsk and better suited as a harbor than the latter place. Skobeleff's first reconnoitring convinced him that Geok Tepe could only be taken by a regular siege. He started from Douz-Aloum, personally leading the advance, took Khodshom-Kala on June 10th, and then marched on Bami, which afforded him an admirable base, 120 versts from Geok Tepe. On the 13th July, he started with 1,600 men to reconnoitre Geok Tepe, which he reached in five days, amidst constant and severe attacks by the Tekkes. He reached Bami again July 22d, having marched 250 versts in ten days, constantly harassed by the enemy. This concluded the first stage of his operations.

From July to December the Russians abstained from offensive operations. The Douz-Aloum-Bami line was repeatedly attacked, and several night assaults were made on Bendessen and Khodshom-Kala, but each attack of the Turcomans was repulsed. Meantime, General Kuropatkin left Amou Darya and marched by Igdy, and Kizil-Arvat to Bami, a distance of 400 versts, which he made in eighteen days.

Supplies, munitions, and siege artillery were accumulated at Bami; they were nearly all brought by the Tshikishlar route, as Skobeleff could not wait for the completion of the railway to Kizil-Arvat. By the beginning of December the Russians were ready to take the offensive, and the advance upon Geok Tepe was ordered.

Geok Tepe, sometimes called Goeck Tepe ("The Green Hills"), is situated on the Akhal oasis, in the Turcoman steppes, 387 versts (250 miles), east of the Caspian Sea. The chain of hills called the Kopet-Dag, lies south and southwest of Geok Tepe, and on the other side it touches the sandy desert of Kara Kum, with the hill of Geok on the east. The Turcomans, or rather the Tekke Turcomans, who held it, are the most numerous of the nomad tribes in that region. They are reported to count about 100,000 kubitkas, or tents; reckoning 5 persons to a kubitka, this would give them a strength of half a million. Their great strength in numbers and their fighting abilities enabled them to choose their position and settle on the most fertile oases along the northern border of Persia for centuries. These oases have been renowned for their productiveness, and in consequence of the abundance of food, the Tekkes were a powerful race of men, and were feared throughout all that part of Asia. Their principal stronghold was Geok Tepe, which lies in a depressed hollow near the hill of Geok, as already described. It is traversed by many irrigating canals, which, towards the north, convert the ground into a marsh, and make it almost inaccessible for troops.

The fortress of Geok Tepe at the time of the Russian advance consisted of walls of mud 12 or 15 feet high towards the north and west, and 6 or 8 feet thick. In front of these walls was a ditch, 6 feet deep, supplied by a running stream, and behind the walls was a raised platform for the defenders. The space between the first and second interior wall was from 50 to 60 feet wide, and oc-

cupied by the kibitkas of the Tekke Turcomans and their families. The second wall was exactly like the outer one, with a ditch and enclosing space inside, and bridged on one corner to allow the passage of the stream. The kibitkas were sunk into the ground, and in order to protect them against shot, they were covered with earth to a depth of several inches. On the south and east the walls were less high and much thinner, without ditches and without the second interior wall. Outworks (kalas) had been thrown up in front, and one of them was connected with the main fortification. The walls of these outworks were much higher and stronger than those of the fortress itself.

In 1878 Tekme Sirdar, a Turcoman chief, submitted to the Russians and was received into their camp at Krasnovodsk. He remained there several months, and then, for some real or fancied injury, fled from the camp, and collected his followers with the determination to make war on the invaders. He made good use of his eyes while at Krasnovodsk, and when the Tekkes determined to make a stand at Geok Tepe, he superintended the construction of the fortress, which he made to resemble the Russian one at Krasnovodsk as much as possible.

Reconnoitring in force on the 1st January, 1881, Skobelev decided that the most favorable plan for attack was on the Yanghi-Kala, to the southeast of Geok Tepe. Ordering up the two assaulting columns under Colonel Koselkoff and General Kuropatkin, General Skobelev advanced in person with the main body to repulse the Turcoman sallies. During the reconnoissance of the fortress Skobelev ordered his men to throw some shells among the enemy's cavalry. The first of these shells upset its carriage and fell in the midst of the Russian detachment. There was a momentary panic, and the detachment seemed on the point of being thrown into confusion, when Skobelev forced his horse to where the

shell lay on the ground. It burst; the animal was terribly wounded, but its rider escaped unhurt. On seeing his figure reappear through the smoke after the explosion, the soldiers recovered their confidence and resumed their advance upon the Turcoman position.

Next day there was a reconnoissance with cavalry which completely encircled the fortress, and was bravely met by the Turcomans. Nothing now remained but to cut the trenches. The first parallel within 800 yards of the walls was successfully cut by January 4th. From that date it was a regular siege, interrupted occasionally by sallies of the Tekkes within the fort or attacks by those outside. In one of these fights General Petrussovitch was killed. The besieging army was about 10,000 strong, while the besieged were from 30,000 to 40,000.

The parallel was armed with cannon on January 11th. General Skobeleff in his report stated that on January 16th "the positions of the enemy forty yards in front of us were successfully taken by assault, and the enemy, who had attacked our centre and left flank, beaten back after a most stubborn fight all along the line. The losses on their side were very great. The work in trenches is difficult, because we are ten times weaker than the enemy. Head of sap is now thirty yards from walls of the stronghold."

Throughout the siege the Turcomans made frequent sallies and there was almost continuous fighting. Sometimes the Turcomans drove the Russians from the outposts, and if they had been as well armed as their besiegers it is highly probable that Skobeleff would have fared no better than did Lomakin in his disastrous campaign. The Turcoman weapons were no match for the breech-loading rifles of the Russians, and in every struggle the latter were victorious, their loss being small in comparison with that of the Tekkes. The Russians had sixty-nine pieces of artillery, while the Turcomans had no

cannon to oppose them with. Skobelev found that his cannon made little impression upon the clay walls of the fort, so he ordered his artillery to fire over the walls and into the enclosed space, in order to demoralize the people within as much as possible. In fighting against Asiatics artillery always has a prominent part. Its moral effect in frightening them is certainly ten times as great as its destructive power.

Kuropatkin had charge of the advanced work and displayed extraordinary coolness and courage. Skobelev was everywhere among the soldiers, encouraging them by word and deed and carefully watching the progress of the sapping and mining operations. When an officer accomplished a specified portion of the tunnelling in less than the time fixed for it, he was complimented in the presence of the soldiers, kissed and caressed, and perhaps treated to a bottle of champagne, while the soldiers were praised as "molodyetz!" good fellows. If the officer failed to make the required progress within the time, he was sure to be roundly abused and threatened with disrating.

The storming columns were ordered to be ready for work on January 24th. They were as follows:

1st—Under *Kuropatkin*, consisting of 5 companies and 1 battalion of infantry, $\frac{1}{2}$ company of sappers, 1 detachment of volunteers, 1 sotnia of foot Cossacks.

2d—Under *Koselkoff*, of 2 battalions of infantry, 1 platoon sappers, 1 marine volunteers, 1 artillery.

3d—Under *Gaidaroff*, of 1 battalion infantry, 1 platoon sappers, 1 detachment marine volunteers, 1 section of mountain artillery.

4th—*In reserve*, there were 21 companies, among whom were 3 companies of foot dragoons and 24 guns.

At 7 o'clock in the morning of the 24th, Gaidaroff advanced to attack the first fortification on the south front, supported by 36 guns. The wall had already been half crumbled down by an explosion of powder and completely

broken by the firing of a dynamite mine. At 11.20 the assault took place, and during the action the mine on the east front was exploded. It was laid with 125 cwt. of gunpowder, and in its explosion completely buried hundreds of Tekkes. The firing of this mine was the signal for the columns of Kuropatkin and Koselkoff to advance. The interval between the two explosions was ten minutes. A furious hand-to-hand fight followed, which lasted one hour, and only with great difficulty could the Tekkes be pushed down the walls. Samur's battalion scaled the walls between the breaches. All defenders on the walls were cut down.

About 1.30 P.M. Gaidaroff carried the southwestern part of the walls, and a battle raged in the interior. Half an hour later the Russians were in possession of Denghil-Tepe, the hill redoubt commanding the fortress of Geok Tepe. The Tekkes then seemed to be panic-stricken, and took to flight, leaving their families and all their goods behind. One division of dragoons, 4 sotnias of Cossacks, 6 companies of infantry, and 4 long-range field guns went in pursuit, and the fleeing Tekkes were followed for about 15 versts. The ditches to Geok Tepe were filled with corpses, and there were 4,000 dead in the interior of the fortress. The loss of the enemy was enormous. In the pursuit the Russians are said to have cut down no less than 8,000 fugitives. The total loss of the Tekkes during the siege, capture, and pursuit was estimated at 40,000.

During the siege the artillery fired from 100 to 500 shots daily, and the infantry used from 10,000 to 70,000 rounds of ammunition in the same time. During the assault and pursuit the infantry fired 273,804 rounds, the cavalry 12,510, and the artillery 5,864; 224 military rockets were also used.*

The Turcoman leaders, Tekme Sardar and Makdum Kali, escaped and fled to Merv. Skobelev pushed on in pursuit as far as Askabad, the capital of the Akhal Tekkes,

* Marvin's "The Russians at the Gates of Herat."

27 miles east of Geok Tepe, and from Askabad he sent Kuropatkin with a reconnoitring column half-way across the desert to Merv. Skobeleff wanted to capture Merv, but with his columns considerably shattered with the siege and capture of Geok Tepe and the near exhaustion of his supply of ammunition, he did not feel strong enough to make the attempt. Kuropatkin was recalled to Askabad, which remained the frontier post of the Russians for several months, until circumstances favored the advance upon Sarakhs and the Tejend, and the subsequent swoop upon Merv, with its bloodless capture.

The siege and capture of Geok Tepe was the most important victory every achieved by the Russians in Central Asia. It opened the way for the Russian advance to the frontier of India, and carried the boundaries of the empire southward to those of Persia. In the interest of humanity, it was of the greatest importance, as it broke up the system of man-stealing and its attendant cruelties, which the Turcomans had practised for centuries. The people of Northern Persia no longer live in constant terror of Turcoman raids; the slave markets of Central Asia are closed, and doubtless forever. The Turcoman barrier against western progress was broken completely when the Russian flag floated in triumph over the Green Hills of the Tekkes.

It is an interesting circumstance that the Turcomans, now that they are forbidden to indulge in raiding, have turned their attention to steady industry, and promise to make good citizens. Whatever may be their faults, they are not a lazy people; they gave up their raiding habits very unwillingly; but when once convinced that they must live by industry, they seem to have accepted the situation. Many of them have entered the Russian service, and already several battalions of Turcoman cavalry have been organized, armed, and drilled after the European system. Their subordinate officers are of their own race; for the present the commanders are Russians, but in course of

time it is quite likely that all the officers will be Turcoman. In the British army only British officers can aspire to the highest positions, but the Russians have no such prejudices. Some of the most prominent officers in the Russian service are Asiatics; of these may be mentioned Generals Tergukasoff and Lazareff, who commanded divisions in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and General Loris Melikoff, whose position was for several years only second to that of the Czar.

In his campaign against the Turcomans, Skobelev profited by the experience of his predecessors, and the knowledge of the country and people that had been gained by them since the landing at Krasnovodsk in 1869. He made his plans with great care, and completed all his preparations before striking a blow other than was necessary to keep open his lines of communication and protect his advanced position at Bami. The Turcoman does his best work in summer, while the reverse is the case with the Russian. The Russian army was well fed, and its camp was in as comfortable a condition as circumstances would permit. The Turcomans were huddled with their families inside the fortress of Geok Tepe, and poorly supplied with provisions; they had no previous experience in warfare of this kind, and were unacquainted with commissariat requirements. Skobelev understood the necessities of the campaign, and the character and habits of his enemy, better than did his predecessors, and hence his victory.

The Trans-Caspian railway, which owed its commencement to Skobelev's campaign against the Turcomans, has been pushed far into Central Asia. It has reached Merv, and perhaps before these pages are presented to the public gaze, the whistle of the Russian locomotive will have resounded in Samarcand or Tashkend. A branch from Sarakhs or Merv to Herat and the frontier of India is in the near future, and it is easily possible that the Russian and Indian railway systems will be connected before the new year of 1890.



CHAPTER XXIII.

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES—1881.


WHEN the South American republics gained their independence in the early part of the present century, there was a general agreement that their boundaries should be established according to those of the Spanish provinces of 1810. In accordance with this agreement, the Bolivian province of Atacama on the Pacific coast extended to the southern limit of Peru on one side, and the northern limit of Chili on the other. The northern limit of Chili was at latitude 25° south, and the province of Atacama in Bolivia was then a desert tract of no particular value. In course of time it was found that the desert contained inexhaustible stores of nitrate of soda and borax, that there were deposits of guano along the coast, and the mountain portions of the province possessed some of the richest silver mines in the world. In consequence of these discoveries, troubles arose between Bolivia and Chili; they afterwards extended to Peru, and out of them grew the war of 1879-81.

Chili laid claim to all territory south of the 23d parallel. After considerable discussion and negotiation, the President of Bolivia in 1866 signed a treaty, conceding Chili's right as far north as the 24th parallel, but the treaty was never ratified by the Bolivian Congress. In return for this supposed concession, it was stipulated that Chili should receive half the customs duties collected between the 23d and 24th parallels, while Bolivia should have half of the

duties collected between the 24th and 25th parallels. This was an admirable arrangement for Chili, as the richest deposits of nitrates are north of the 24th parallel, and she would be entitled to a considerable revenue every year without the trouble and expense of collecting it.

As a matter of fact, the customs dues were not properly paid, and Chili found in this circumstance a new cause of grievance. In 1870 rich silver mines were discovered at Caracoles, north of the 24th parallel, and the Bolivian government granted a concession to a company to work these mines and also the nitrate deposits. The company was under English management, backed by English and Chilian capital; it paid \$10,000 to the government for the concession, and built a railway from the port of Antofagasta. The company began operations, and soon fell into disputes with the Bolivian government, relative to the export duties on the nitrates, which it was sending to foreign countries.

In 1873 a treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia was signed and approved by the National Assemblies of the two countries. It provided for a mutual guaranty of the independence of the two countries, and defence against aggression from others. It was agreed in the treaty that all conciliatory measures were to be tried to prevent war, and that arbitration through a third party was to be sought whenever possible. In 1878 the Bolivian government called upon the Antofagasta company to pay the duties which had accumulated on its exports; the company refused payment, whereupon the government ordered the seizure and sale by auction of enough of the company's property to pay the claims. Immediately the Chilian government proceeded to hostilities, but did not declare war, by seizing the Bolivian ports of Antofagasta, Cobija, and Tocopilla. Peru offered her services as mediator, but, as too often happens to the arbiter in cases of mediation, it was speedily involved in trouble with Chili. This trouble



was, in part, attributable to unwise legislation by Peru, relative to the nitrate deposits in her southern province of Tarapaca, which borders upon Atacama.

In consequence of her financial difficulties, Peru in 1873 made the nitrate deposits of Tarapaca a government monopoly, the state paying a fixed price to producers, and being herself the sole exporter. The nitrate deposits were being exploited by Chilean and English capital, and the labor employed in the work was mostly Chilean. Under these circumstances, Chile protested on behalf of her subjects, whose interests were seriously interfered with, and finding the law a failure, Peru abandoned it, substituting another authorizing the government to buy up all the nitrate works. There was a great deal of diplomatic correspondence, and it is impossible to harmonize all the statements contained in the voluminous papers. The end of the affair was that Chile declared war upon Peru on the 5th April, 1879.

Chile was in far better condition for war than either of her adversaries. Owing to the character of the Pacific coast of South America, the strip of land between the Andes and the ocean consisting of waterless desert with occasional valleys, every thing depends upon the possession of the sea. Chile had been increasing her navy, while that of Peru had not been augmented. The Chileans had 2 powerful iron-clads of the newest pattern, the *Almirante Cochrane* and *Blanco Encalada*, which were alone capable of destroying the entire Peruvian fleet. In addition to these she had 4 corvettes, each carrying from 1 to 3 150-pounder, 7-ton Armstrong guns, 2 wooden gun-boats heavily armed, and 10 transports. The Peruvians had 1 turret-ship, the *Huascar*, but her armor could easily be pierced by the shot of the Chilean iron-clads, and her armament consisted of 2 10-inch Dahlgren guns and 2 40-pounder Whitworths. She had also a broadside iron-clad of the old type, the *Independencia*, and 2 wooden corvettes.

Two monitors purchased from the United States at the end of the civil war cannot be classed among the sea-going ships of Peru, as they were permanently stationed, one at Callao and the other at Arica.

In land forces, the armies of the two countries were proportionately the same as their navies, Chili being superior in numbers, drill, discipline, effectiveness, and equipment. Chili had provided herself with Krupp breech-loading field-guns, while Peru had nothing else than the old-fashioned muzzle-loading smooth-bore cannon, of a range far inferior to that of the Chilian Krupps. At the outbreak of the war Bolivia was very poorly provided for active operations. Her army, small in numbers, had only 1,500 Remington rifles, the rest of her small-arms being old-fashioned flint-lock muskets.

In February, 1879, the Chilians seized the Bolivian port of Antofagasta, and from there sent a force to the silver mines of Caracoles. On receiving news of the invasion, the President of Bolivia declared war against Chili, and prepared to defend his territories as best he could. The first encounter of the war was on the 23d March at Calama, a small village about eighty miles from the coast, and nearly due north of Caracoles. The Chilians attacked it with 600 men, the defence being in the hands of about one fourth that number. The defenders fought for about three hours, killing several Chilians, but were compelled to retire, owing to the superiority of the assailants in numbers and equipment.

Immediately after the declaration of war between Peru and Chili, on the 5th April, the Chilian fleet appeared off the Peruvian forts, occupying those that were undefended and blockading others. Wherever there was any show of resistance, the towns were bombarded, and some of them were laid in ruins. For some weeks the war was conducted principally by the navy; one of the Chilian corvettes was destroyed by the Peruvian iron-clad *Huascar*, and shortly

afterwards the *Independencia* was decoyed on the rocks by a Chilian gun-boat, and lost. From this time the Peruvian fleet acted chiefly on the defensive, as the preponderance of the Chilian navy was overwhelming. On the 8th October the *Huascar* was captured by the Chilian fleet off Mejillones, after a gallant fight of 6 hours. As this was the first battle ever fought on the open ocean between iron-clads of the modern type, it may be worth our while to digress briefly in order to study the peculiarities of the combat.

Miguel Grau, the commander of the *Huascar*, was a Colombian by birth, and his father was a captain under Bolivar at the battle of Ayacucho. At the time the war broke out he had been 29 years in the Peruvian navy, and reached the rank of rear-admiral. After the loss of the *Independencia*, the *Huascar* and the corvette *Union* cruised in company for the purpose of capturing Chilian transports, or any other vessels that came in their way and were not too strong to cope with. On the 1st October a Chilian fleet of 2 iron-clads and several other vessels, all carefully cleaned and refitted, left Valparaiso for the purpose of capturing the *Huascar*. Arriving off Arica, the Chilian admiral learned that the *Huascar* and *Union* were cruising to the southward; the *Huascar* had not been cleaned for some time, and her speed was inferior to that of the Chilian iron-clads, who would thus be able to choose their distance in case they could catch her in the open sea.

On the morning of the 8th, when a fog lifted, Admiral Grau found himself caught between the two divisions of the Chilian fleet, one consisting of the iron-clad *Blanco* and the gun-boat *Covadonga*, with a transport, and the other of the iron-clad *Cochrane*, the corvette *O'Higgins*, and the gun-boat *Loa*. Either of the Chilian iron-clads was superior to the *Huascar*, and now that he was between both, and they had the gun-boats and corvette to aid them, the Peruvian admiral's chance of escape was hopeless. Finding

that he could not get away, owing to his inferior speed, he determined to fight, first ordering the *Union* to leave as fast as possible, since she would be the only naval hope of Peru in case of the *Huascar's* loss. As she was of superior speed, she had no difficulty in getting away, though her commander greatly regretted parting company with the *Huascar* in the time of the latter's danger.

At 25 minutes past nine o'clock the *Huascar* fired the first shot at a distance of about 3,000 yards; it was aimed at the *Cochrane* and fell short. A second and a third shots were fired with the same result; the *Huascar's* fourth shot penetrated the armor plating of the *Cochrane*, and passed through the galley, and then the *Cochrane* began to return her adversary's fire. Her fourth shot struck the *Huascar's* turret and temporarily disabled it, but it was soon in order again. The *Huascar's* turret was worked by hand, while that of the *Cochrane* was operated by steam. The fifth shot from the *Huascar* struck the armor of the *Cochrane* but did not penetrate it, and then, as the ships had closed considerably, Admiral Grau tried to ram his adversary.

The manœuvre was defeated by the *Cochrane*, which turned very quickly by using her twin screws; she could turn in half the space required by the *Huascar*, and her commander, Captain Latorre, showed great judgment and coolness in handling her. The ships were now fighting at distances varying from 300 to 50 yards, and a steady fire from rifles and machine guns was maintained on both sides. Exactly half an hour after the first shot was fired a shell from the *Cochrane* exploded in the *Huascar's* pilot tower, in which were Admiral Grau and one of his lieutenants. Both were killed, and so terrific was the explosion that the bodies were literally blown into fragments, the largest piece of the gallant admiral that was afterwards found and recognizable being a portion of one leg.

Up to the time of the bursting of the shell in the pilot tower the *Huascar* had been skilfully handled; the firing

on both sides had not been particularly noteworthy as only a small percentage of the shots had taken effect. A few minutes after ten o'clock the *Blanco* came within range and fired her first shot at the *Huascar* from a distance of 600 yards. On board the latter ship her senior surviving officer, Don Elias Aguirre, had assumed command on the death of Admiral Grau; a few minutes later his head was taken off by a shell from the *Blanco*, and the next officer in rank, Captain Carbajal, was severely wounded by the same shell. Lieutenant Rodriguez next took the command, but he too was killed before many minutes. Lieutenant Palacios succeeded him, but before the action was over he was severely wounded, and the command fell to Lieutenant Garezon. By this time the *Huascar* was quite disabled.

Her steam-steering gear was rendered useless by the same shell that killed the admiral, and from that time she was steered by tackles managed below; there were no speaking tubes from the deck to where the tackles were operated, and orders had to be passed by messengers, which caused much confusion and totally prevented rapid evolutions. One of the turret guns was disabled, and the turret could not be turned. The flag of the *Huascar* was shot away, and there was a cessation of hostilities, which were resumed as soon as the flag went up again; she made several attempts to ram her opponents, but each one failed, and the same was the case with the Chilian endeavors to destroy her in the same way. Both sides kept up a severe fire with machine guns, the *Huascar* being equipped with the Gatling while the Chilians carried the Nordenfeldt. Her machine-gun fire was silenced; whether by the superiority of the number of the Chilian guns, or their effectiveness, is a matter of dispute between the advocates of the rival systems.

At eleven o'clock, one hour and a half after the action began, the *Huascar's* flag was hauled down, and she was

boarded by a boat from the *Cochrane*. Lieutenant Garzon surrendered to the boarding officers, who found that there were three feet of water in the ship's hold, and the lining of the pilot turret had caught fire. Dead and wounded were lying in every direction, their bodies fearfully mutilated, and the captain's cabin was literally filled with corpses. Upper and lower decks were alike drenched in blood and strewn with dead and wounded. The *Huascar* went into action with 193 officers and men ; of this number, 64, almost exactly one third, were killed or wounded, and the officer by whom the ship was surrendered was the sixth in rank when the battle began, only 90 minutes before. The five who ranked him had been killed or mortally wounded !

No torpedoes were used in the fight, and of all the attempts at ramming none were successful. The contest was thus confined to artillery, with the exception of the use of small-arms and machine guns when the vessels were at close quarters. The *Cochrane* fired 46 rounds, and the *Blanco* 31, using Palliser shells. Of these 77 shots fired by the Chilians, only 24 touched the *Huascar* ; the shells burst after penetration, showing that the 4½-inch plating of the *Huascar* was useless. The *Huascar* fired about 40 rounds, and her guns were served rapidly but without good aim. Only a few of her shot struck the *Cochrane*. Those that struck her at a distance of 600 yards and at an angle of 30 degrees penetrated about three inches, but were broken by the force of the impact. They broke an iron beam and started some of the bolts and inner linings, but compared with the effect of the Chilian shells on the *Huascar* they were of no serious consequence. The armor of the Chilian iron-clad is 9 inches thick at the water line, and 7 or 8 inches round the battery.

With the capture of the *Huascar* the Chilians obtained practically the control of the sea, and could send their troops where they pleased. They could despatch a fleet

with sealed orders, and the Peruvians would be unable even to guess at what point it was directed. The Peruvians had a coast line of 1,400 miles to defend, and the peculiar formation of the country made the defence of this long line impossible. It must be borne in mind that the coast of Peru is rainless, and its fertile valleys occur at long intervals, between tracts of waterless deserts. The railways in Peru do not skirt the coast, but run from it to the interior; in the southern part of Peru the deserts cover nearly the whole of the area of the country, and are backed at distances varying from 30 to 100 miles by the Cordilleras, or outlying chain of the Andes. With the ports blockaded, it is thus impossible to move troops from one threatened point to another, in any time that would render them of avail.

It was necessary to make preparations for defence along the whole line, or, failing this, to defend the most important points. No one could tell where the attack would be made, whether on the capital and its seaport, Callao, on the Tacna region, or on the district containing the deposits of nitrates, about which the war had arisen. The general belief in government circles was that the first movement would be on Tarapaca, the most southern province, where the difficulties of a defending force would be greater than at most other points.

Accordingly great efforts were made to concentrate a force in Tarapaca before communication by sea should be cut off, and Peruvian troops arrived there during March, April, and May. The Bolivian army, 4,000 strong, reached Tacna, in Peru, on the 30th April, under command of the President of Bolivia, and about three weeks later the Peruvian President, as commander-in-chief of the military forces, arrived in Arica, the port of Tacna, to organize the army of Tarapaca. There was a total of 9,000 men altogether, but the cavalry was badly mounted, and the artillery (16 guns) was of the old-fashioned kind, and

quite inefficient against the breech-loading pieces of the Chilians.

The Chilians assembled at Antofagasta an army of 10,000 men, with 850 well-mounted cavalry, and 32 long-range field-guns of the newest pattern. This force was embarked on four men-of-war and fifteen transports, and sailed on the 28th October for an unknown destination, which afterwards proved to be Pisagua, 274 miles from Antofagasta. By a blunder the medical stores and ambulances were left behind, and as a consequence most of the Chilians wounded in the attack on Pisagua died of neglect. Pisagua was defended by a force of less than 1,000 altogether; they succeeded in killing 235 of the invaders before retreating from the place, but their own loss was greater, owing to the heavy fire of the Chilean men-of-war. Pisagua was occupied by the Chilians on the 2d November, and before the end of the month the combined armies of Peru and Bolivia had been defeated in two battles, one near Iquique and the other at Tarapaca. They retreated to Arica, which they reached on the 16th December, and found blockaded by the Chilean fleet.

The province of Tarapaca was thus wrested from Peru in a single short campaign, and Chili was in possession of the much-coveted nitrate districts. In February, 1880, a second campaign was undertaken, and a fleet sailed from Pisagua for the conquest of the Tacna region. The plan was for the Chilians to make a landing north of Arica, the port of Tacna, where the allied army was concentrated, and thus cut off the line of retreat. When this was accomplished the allies would be attacked in their isolated position, where escape would be next to impossible.

The plan was carried out by landing 14,000 men at Ylo, Pacocha, and Islay, and taking possession of the lines of railway extending into the interior. Tacna was taken, and after it Arica, the defeated allies being driven to the mountains. Arica was taken by a combined naval and

land attack; its garrison made a vigorous defence, and only yielded to superior numbers and weight of metal. Meantime Callao was blockaded, and there was great alarm in Lima. General Pierola was named dictator of Peru, and a levy *en masse* of all able to bear arms was ordered. It was impossible for the Peruvians, without a navy, to raise the blockade of Callao, but they showed considerable ingenuity in destroying one of the blockaders.

One afternoon a small vessel laden with fruit was captured while trying to steal her way along the coast, about 16 miles from Callao. Her crew dropped the anchor and fled to the shore in a row-boat as they saw their captors approaching. The Chilians took her alongside the armed transport *Loa*, and began removing her cargo,—a welcome prize to men who had been living for weeks on salt provisions. As the last package was removed there was a terrific explosion, which blew a large hole in the side of the *Loa*, and sent her to the bottom of the ocean in 5 minutes, with her captain, 3 officers, and 50 men; 38 of the crew were saved by boats from neutral men-of-war, lying about 4 miles away. It is supposed that there was a case of 250 pounds of dynamite, fired by mechanism so arranged that the removal of the weight above it would set it off.

A few weeks later the Chilean armed steamer *Covadonga* was destroyed by another ingenious trick of the Peruvians. She had been sent to blockade the port of Chancay, and her captain, seeing a smart-looking gig anchored in the harbor, about 300 yards from the mole, sent a midshipman with a boat to bring it away. It was freshly painted and fully equipped, and was a life-boat, with air-boxes at both ends. The boat pleased the captain so much that he determined to use her for a gig, and accordingly gave orders that she should be hoisted at the davits of the *Covadonga*.

Hardly were the tackles hauled taut when she exploded,

blowing such a hole in the side of the ship that she sank in 3 minutes; 115 persons perished, including the captain; 15 men escaped in one of the boats, and 50 who climbed into the rigging were saved by Peruvian boats from the shore. It is supposed that the air-boxes contained dynamite, which was fired by the pull on the tackles, but the character of the mechanism is not known.

In October, 1880, mediation between the contending countries was undertaken by the United States of America, but was unsuccessful. A conference was held on board the U. S. corvette *Lackawanna*, in the harbor of Arica, Peru, Bolivia, and Chili each sending a commissioner, while the representatives of the United States for the respective countries were present.

Immediately after the unsuccessful issue of the conference, Chili despatched an expeditionary force of 30,000 men for the conquest of Peru, its operations being intended to capture the capital. The exact strength of the army was 1,202 officers and 24,956 men, of all arms, with 103 cannon, 77 mountain pieces, 8 Gatlings, and 3 Nordenfeldt's. It was in three divisions and a reserve. One division landed at Pisco and marched overland, 107 miles, to Curayaco and Chilca, where the rest of the expeditionary force was put on shore. Chilca is only 25 miles from Lima and about 10 from the rich valley of Lurin, one of the garden spots of Peru. To oppose this army of well-equipped invaders the Peruvians, had four divisions of a nominal aggregate strength of 26,000. Less than 3,000 were worthy of consideration as veterans. The greater part of the army of the defence was composed of raw and badly armed troops, procured by the levy *en masse* of all males in Lima between the ages of sixteen and sixty and capable of bearing arms. The artillery was numerically about equal to that of the Chilians, but vastly inferior in range and effectiveness.

General Pierola, dictator and commander-in-chief of the

military forces of Peru, decided upon a line of defences along the sandy hills at the edge of the desert, extending from the Morro Solar and Chorillos to the mountains on the east, and about ten miles from Lima. The line was fully six miles long, and broken by barren hills and gullies. Breastworks were hastily thrown up, ditches dug, and guns mounted, but in many places the obstructions to an advance of the enemy were of little consequence owing to the shallowness of the ditches and the insufficiency of the breastworks.

A second line about four miles long and six miles from Lima was prepared just outside Miraflores. Behind the defences, as the Chilian army approached, General Pierola assembled his forces, which consisted of the hastily assembled people of the capital, raw recruits from the interior, and the few soldiers he had been able to gather from the remnants of the armies defeated at Tarapaca and Tacna. Many of the guns that were mounted in the defences were actually unserviceable, and some of the newest of those made at Lima had not been sighted.

The first division of the Chilian army which landed at Pisco marched northward on the 13th December to unite with the force that disembarked at Curayaco, as already stated. Their advance was unopposed until the 23d, when they encountered some Peruvian cavalry, by which they were harassed for two or three days, as the road offered concealment in the shape of trees and bushes. The second division reached Curayaco on the 22d, and the landing occupied two days. The cavalry was sent forward to occupy the valley of the Lurin, and on the 27th it surprised and captured a Peruvian cavalry detachment, the same that had impeded the march of the Chilian first division. This was a serious disaster for the Peruvians, as their whole cavalry force defending Lima did not exceed 600 men.

The valley of the Lurin was devastated by the Chilians

in their leisurely march upon Lima, the soldiers committing the excesses usually attributable to an advancing army in an enemy's country. The Chilians remained three weeks in the Lurin valley, the time being spent in collecting provisions, getting every thing in readiness for the advance, maturing plans for the capture of Lima, and ascertaining as fully as possible the strength and position of the Peruvians.

From the upper part of the Lurin valley there is a road following the foot of the mountains, and crossing a strip of desert to Até, a little village in a corner of the valley in which Lima is situated. The Chilean commander sent a reconnoitring expedition as far as Até, to ascertain the state of the defences in that region; as this road passed around the extreme left of the Peruvian line, it was contemplated to turn completely the Peruvian position by marching around to Até and reaching Lima by the rear. After careful deliberation the plan was rejected, as there is not a drop of water for fifteen miles over the desert; the debouch into the plain in face of an enemy would have been difficult, and the inland route would prevent all co-operation by the fleet. A direct attack was decided upon.

The 1st Chilean division under General Lynch formed the left wing of the attacking army. It was to assault the line of defence between Morro Solar and Santa Teresa, and then push against Chorillos, which lies on the coast about half-way between the two lines of defence. The 2d division under General Sotomayor was to break the line in front of San Juan, and then co-operate with Lynch against Chorillos. The 3d division, commanded by Colonel Lagos, was on the extreme right; it was to hold the Peruvian left in check, or support the centre as circumstances might require, and the reserve, under Colonel Martinez, was in the space between the left and centre, ready to move in whatever direction it was ordered.

The Peruvian commander-in-chief had his head-quarters

at Chorillos, and his army was encamped behind the lines of defence. Colonel Iglesias with 5,000 men held the right of the line under the brow of the Morro Solar. General Caceres held the centre, which was stationed at the hills of Santa Teresa and San Juan, while General Davila held the left. The division of Suarez formed the reserve. The Chilian plan was to march from Lurin on the evening of the 12th January, and attack the line of Peruvian defences at daylight on the 13th. The three divisions marched accordingly, and bivouacked at midnight on a plateau about two miles in front of the Peruvian position.

At dawn they all advanced. The 1st division, the one nearest the sea, had the shortest distance to move, and by 5 A.M. it was smartly engaged with the Peruvians. The Chilian men-of-war hauled in as near the shore as they could with safety, and began to throw shot and shell among the Peruvians. The latter held their positions gallantly in spite of the preponderance against them, until the Chilian reserve was brought up with orders to attack on the flank of the Peruvian right wing, which was then forced back but not broken. At 6 A.M. the Chilian 2d division attacked the defences in front of San Juan, and carried them at the point of the bayonet; at the same time the 3d division attacked the Peruvian left, who held their position until 7.30, when the line wavered and retreated. The Chilian cavalry was then started along the road to Tebes, and cut down the fugitives in great number. Those who escaped from the attack of the Chilian 3d division fled in the direction of Lima, while the division of Caceres fell back upon Chorillos.

Colonel Iglesias held the Morro Solar, and the Chilians proceeded to attack him in front with their 1st division, while the reserve came in upon the Peruvians on the opposite side. The 2d Chilian division advanced upon Chorillos by the San Juan road, and the rest of the troops were held in waiting near the houses of San Juan. Igle-

sias maintained himself for several hours, but was finally driven to the point of Chorillos where he surrendered in order to prevent further slaughter. The reserve under Suarez should have reinforced Iglesias, but owing to a conflict of orders it did not. A portion of the reserve was engaged with the Chilian 2d division, but was driven back, and by 2 P.M. the fighting was over and Chorillos was in possession of the Chilians, who speedily sacked and burned it.

The losses of the Chilians were reported at 2,000 killed and wounded, and the Peruvian loss was placed at double that number. As soon as the defence of Chorillos became hopeless, General Pierola and his staff with their escort retired to Miraflores, where they busied themselves with endeavors to put the second line of defence in condition to repel the advance of the Chilians.

No advance was made on the 14th January. On the 15th, the diplomatic corps in Lima endeavored to prevent further bloodshed, and asked for a suspension of hostilities, which was granted, though the Chilian commander insisted upon carrying out a movement of troops that had been commenced. The armistice was to last until midnight of the 15th, but it was broken by a collision of the troops of the contending armies, through a misunderstanding of their commanders at one point. From this collision the action became general.

The second line of defence was stronger than the first, as it was better mounted with artillery, and the water-courses were utilized as far as possible to serve as ditches in front of the breastworks. There were five redoubts on this line mounted with artillery and with intrenchments between them. The line was defended by about 12,000 Peruvians, and the assaulting force was about 13,000 strong. Miraflores was the central point of the position, and between Miraflores and the sea the line was continued to a semicircular redoubt on the extreme right of

the Peruvians. This redoubt was mounted with two heavy Rodman guns from Callao, and was called the Alfonso Ugarte fort, in honor of an officer who fell in the defence of Arica. General Caceres commanded this fort, while General Pierola was in a redoubt on the left.

The battle began at 2.45 P.M. The Chilians opened with artillery on the Ugarte fort, which was enfiladed by the Chilean fleet, consisting of two ironclads and three corvettes. They speedily dismounted the Rodman guns and rendered the fort untenable by their well-directed fire, but the Peruvians continued the defence until, after a long bombardment, the Chilean 3d division advanced against them. At 4.30 P.M. the Peruvians had exhausted their ammunition and fell back to join the centre, thus yielding the Ugarte fort to the Chilians. The Peruvian left was defended with such vigor that at one time the Chilians wavered, but, reinforcements coming up, they carried the redoubts with the bayonet, and the last hope of Lima was gone. The centre redoubt was carried at 5.45 P.M., and thus ended the battle of Miraflores for the defence of Lima. When the last redoubt was carried, General Pierola rode from the field and retired to the village of Canta in the mountains. By 6.45 Miraflores was in flames and nearly all the houses in it were destroyed.

On the 16th the municipal alcalde surrendered the city to the Chilians, and on the 17th the army entered and took possession. The foreign ministers interfered to prevent further destruction of property, and were backed in their intervention by the foreign fleets in the harbor of Callao. The dangerous classes threatened to run riot during the night of the 16th, and would have caused great damage to the city had it not been for the foreigners, who formed a volunteer corps for the preservation of order and property. The Chilean losses in the capture of Chorillos and Miraflores were reported at 1,299 killed and 4,144 wounded.

The Peruvian losses were estimated at 6,000 killed and 3,000 wounded, but owing to the confusion the exact figures were never ascertained.

The battle of Miraflores decided the fate of Peru, though it was some time thereafter before the war came to an end. Expeditions were sent to various points in the interior, and there was considerable fighting, though no battles of consequence took place. In January a treaty of peace was made between Chili and Bolivia, by which the latter surrendered her coast provinces to Chili and agreed to break off relations with Peru. In the following year, after long negotiations, Chili and Peru agreed upon terms of peace, the latter ceding her southern provinces and paying a war indemnity that left the country sadly impoverished. Peru was already heavily burdened with debt in consequence of her enormous expenditures for railways and other public improvements. She is slowly emerging from the depressed condition in which she was thrown by the war, but it will be many years before she recovers her former position among the republics of South America.






CHAPTER XXIV.

EL OBEID—ANNIHILATION OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY— 1883.

SOUDAN is an Arabic word abbreviated from Biled-es-Soudan, "The Country of the Blacks." On the map of Africa it stretches nearly across the continent between the sixth and sixteenth degrees of north latitude, and includes a vast area. The Egyptian Soudan, which is the Soudan of this chapter, includes the region drained by the White Nile and its immediate tributaries, the Blue Nile, the Atbara and Sobat rivers, together with the country between the Nile and the Red Sea, north of the boundary of Abyssinia. It may be roughly said to have an area of 2,500,000 square miles, with a population of about 12,000,000. One fourth of the inhabitants are Arabs and kindred tribes, and the remaining 9,000,000 are negroes. All the Arabs and many of the negroes are Moslems, but it is probable that fully half of the inhabitants of the Soudan do not belong to the religion of Mohammed, though it has made rapid strides among them during the last twenty years.

From the days of Moses to the present time the rulers of Egypt have been the reverse of mild in their treatment of their subjects. In all ages the Egyptian peasantry have been regarded as the property of the sovereign; the many changes of dynasty have made little difference in the lot of the laboring classes in the most fertile land of the globe. From the heights of the pyramids "forty centuries



look down upon us," and they are forty centuries of almost unvarying oppression. In the fourth dynasty of the ancient empire the pyramids were built by the unpaid labor of the people, and in the same way the great canal connecting Alexandria with the Nile was made by Mohammed Ali Pasha, the founder of the dynasty which now occupies the khedivial throne. The splendors of the ancient rulers have been imitated by those of modern times, and the result is that the country is oppressively burdened with taxation and hopelessly involved in debt. At present the foreign debt of the country exceeds £100,000,000, or \$500,000,000, without including the Moukabalah, or forced interior debt, which amounts to many millions more. The population of Egypt proper is a little more than 5,000,000, so that the national indebtedness exceeds \$100 for each and every man, woman, and child in the country. The land is wonderfully fertile, producing ordinarily three crops a year; but even with this fertility it is impossible to meet the expenses of a costly government and pay the interest on the enormous debt.

Mohammed Ali Pasha, who came to Egypt as a Turkish captain in 1799, and became ruler of the land and founder of the dynasty, was fond of war, and spent large sums of money in its prosecution. He began the conquest of the Soudan by sending his son to conquer Nubia and Sennaar; in 1822 he founded Khartoum, at the junction of the Blue and White Nile, and long before his death in 1848 he had the satisfaction of knowing that the flag of Egypt waved over a large area that it did not dominate when he ascended the throne. Except in war, he was not specially extravagant, but the same cannot be said of his successors, Abbas and Said Pashas. Abbas gave little attention to the affairs of the government; he spent a great deal of money on palaces, abolished the educational institutions which Mohammed Ali had established, and dissolved the army in order to have for his personal use the money which a

military system would require. His successor, Said Pasha, was peacefully inclined, and undertook several public works. The Suez Canal was begun during his reign, and his memory is preserved in the name of Port Said, the artificial harbor at the Mediterranean entrance of the canal. But he had the mania for extravagancies which characterized his predecessor, and at his death in 1863 he left a legacy of debt to his successor, Ismail.

Little was done under Abbas Pasha and his successor, Said, for the extension of Egyptian dominion beyond what had been left by Mohammed Ali. The fever of conquest broke out anew with Ismail, and soon after his accession to the throne he sent his armies into the regions of the Upper Nile, which he rapidly added to his dominions. From Khartoum, which had been, since its foundation in 1822, the frontier city, his dominion was rapidly pushed into the Soudan, and in the ten years between 1868 and 1878 the Egyptian flag was carried more than 1,000 miles southward, till it floated on the shores of the Central African lakes. Mohammed Ali's conquests were undertaken largely with the view of obtaining soldiers for his army. The men of the Soudan were sent captive to Cairo and converted into soldiers, under the training of French officers; during and since Mohammed Ali's time the flower of the Egyptian army has been the Soudanese portion, and at times there have been not less than 25,000 or 30,000 soldiers under the flag, every man of whom came from the provinces of the Upper Nile. The Soudanese are naturally warlike, can endure heat, fatigue, and privation, and in every way are vastly superior to the fellaheen of Lower Egypt, whose courage and fighting qualities were extinguished centuries ago by the oppression under which they lived. The Soudanese did not specially object to being converted into soldiers, and if the pashas had been content with a few thousands of them annually, had kept the slave trade under proper restrictions, and avoided the imposition

of enormous taxes and the cruelties accompanying their collection, Egypt would to-day be in possession of Central Africa down to the shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza.

A few years of Egyptian rule in the conquered provinces of Central Africa, served to rouse a spirit of hostility among the inhabitants, and make them ready for revolt. On the appearance of El Mahdi, in the summer of 1881, thousands flocked to his standard. He was a sheikh named Mohammed Achmet, the son of a carpenter, and a native of Dongola. He was born in 1842, and educated in a village near Khartoum. According to Moslem custom, religion was his principal study. In 1870 he became a sheikh, and after a brief sojourn at Korka, near Fashoda, he established himself on the island of Abba, in the White Nile. Here he set up as a holy man, or dervish, of the highest class, and soon obtained a great reputation for sanctity. After a while a considerable number of dervishes gathered around him, and his fame spread rapidly. He extended his influence and power by marrying daughters of the principal chiefs of the Baggara Arabs, the powerful tribes who inhabit the country west of the White Nile and southeast of Kordofan and Darfur. They were constantly at war with each other, and by his tact and influence Mohammed Achmet succeeded in bringing the various tribes into harmony.

In May, 1881, when living at Marabieh, near the island of Abba, he suddenly proclaimed himself to be the Messiah, or Prophet, whose coming had been foretold by Mohammed. His followers styled him El-Mahdi, an Arabic word, meaning simply a "leader," or "guide," and not found in the Koran. The Ulema of Khartoum¹ promptly pronounced against Mohammed Achmet; he was likewise repudiated at Cairo and Constantinople, and soon became known in Egypt and Turkey as the "False Prophet."

¹ The Ulema is a body corresponding to the Synods in Christendom. They are appealed to by the Sultan respecting the right application of precepts of the Moslem faith.

The intentions of Mohammed Achmet, as set forth in various proclamations, were as follows:

To gain over the whole of the Soudan to his cause, then march on Egypt, and overthrow the false-believing Turks, and finally, to establish the Thousand Years' Kingdom in Mecca, and convert the whole world.

He taught universal law and religion, and community of goods. All who opposed his mission were to be destroyed, whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan.

General Gordon gave his view of the Mahdi to the editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in London, on January 8th, 1884, saying: "I strongly suspect that he (the Mahdi) is a mere puppet put forward by Elyas, Zubair's father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he has assumed a religious title to give color to the defence of the popular rights." Probably the suppression of the slave-trade had much to do with the insurrection, as most of the supporters of the Mahdi, more especially the Baggara tribes, owe all their wealth to the traffic in slaves, which the Egyptian government has for many years been taking measures to suppress or greatly curtail.

The Soudan rebellion was an echo of the revolt of Arabi Pasha in Lower Egypt. Arabi Pasha was the leader of the national party, which protested against the control of Egypt by foreigners, the exemption of foreigners living in Egypt from taxation, the diversion of the revenues of the country to the foreign creditors of Egypt while the officers of the army and other public servants remained unpaid, the employment of foreigners in public places when the same work could be done by Egyptians at one fifth the cost, and the general tyranny and oppression of the Turkish rulers of the country. The movement of the Mahdi began in the same way as that of Arabi, and, though it soon assumed a religious aspect, it was practically political at the start. The misrule of the Egyptians had made an

intolerable state of things, and when the Mahdi raised the flag of rebellion the oppressed people, whether Pagans or Moslems, flocked around him. The best war cry for a rebellion in any part of the world is a religious one, and the Mahdi shrewdly proclaimed himself the divine messenger. Not long after his trial and banishment to Ceylon, Arabi Pasha said to an English visitor: "Rely on it, if Ceylon had been governed like the Soudan, you would have had your Mahdi to deal with; and had the Soudan been governed like Ceylon, we should never have heard of the Mahdi."

The time which the Mahdi had selected for rising was after the garrisons of the Soudan had been diminished for economical reasons. In July, 1881, the attention of Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, was drawn to the Mahdi's claims and demands, and he sent a commission of inquiry from Khartoum to see the Mahdi at Marabieh, and learn the exact state of affairs. On the return of this commission, it was decided to send a military force of about 200 men to bring the Mahdi to Khartoum. The expedition started early in 1882, and reached the residence of the Mahdi, where it was attacked and defeated by his followers, 120 men and 2 officers being killed or captured. Another expedition met the same fate, being driven back with loss, and in June, 1882, Yussuf Pasha's army of the Soudan of 6,000 men was practically destroyed, all the soldiers, save a few hundreds, being killed or captured. The Mahdi then took the offensive; he attacked Bara, but was repulsed, and three times he attacked El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan. Finally, he captured Bara, and then El Obeid surrendered, most of the Egyptian garrison taking service with their captor.

On the 20th February, 1883, the Pashas Ala-ed-Deen and Suleiman Nyasi arrived at Khartoum. The latter was to take command of the troops; the duties of the former were not announced, though it was whispered that he was

to be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan. On the 4th of March Colonel Hicks (late of Bombay Staff Corps), with 6 other English officers, arrived at Khartoum. Colonel Hicks had been appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of the Soudan, with the local rank of Major-General. It was really intended that he should direct and be responsible for all preparations and movements. Practically, he was commander-in-chief, though ostensibly holding a subordinate position. The Mahdi's movement being, theoretically at least, a religious one, it was not considered advisable to place a foreigner and a non-Mussulman in command of the Egyptian forces, as the insurgent leader might use this circumstance to arouse the fanaticism of his adherents.

Suleiman Nyasi, whose military career dated back to the time of Mohammed Ali, was named commander-in-chief, but with the understanding that he was to follow and execute implicitly General Hicks' instructions and plans. Suleiman was old, stupid, and lazy, and also hostile to the work before him, and jealous of General Hicks. The result was, that he frequently acted quite contrary to the spirit of the instructions he had received at Cairo.

On the 18th March Major Farquhar, Hicks' companion officer, returned to Khartoum from a reconnoissance up the White Nile, and reported that the people along the western bank of the river were hostile. Four thousand five hundred rebels and 1,800 Baggara Arab cavalry were assembled at Marabieh and Abu Dynma, while at Jebel-Ain there was a considerable force from Kordofan. The news came from the latter country that the Mahdi's force was 100,000 strong; it was scattered at various points, but could be speedily brought together. The chiefs met at El Obeid once a week for orders and consultation, but the sheikhs of the Baggara tribes did not attend these meetings, owing to a quarrel with the Mahdi concerning the booty taken at El Obeid. At the loot of El Obeid, in

January, 1883, the Mahdi was said to have taken more than £100,000 from the officials and notables, which he kept to himself, distributing nothing among his followers. On account of this worldly performance, many began to waver in their belief in his sanctity. In the hope of utilizing this discontent, General Hicks endeavored to open communications with the Baggara chiefs, and arrange a meeting with them.

On the 26th March Ala-ed-Deen Pasha was proclaimed at Khartoum as Governor-General of the Soudan, and on the same day Hussein Pasha left for Sennaar to relieve Abd-el-Kader Pasha of his military command. By this time the Mahdi had made rapid progress with his revolt. He had taken possession of Kordofan, Sennaar, and Darfur, and the forces under his command were variously estimated at from 100,000 to 200,000 strong.

General Hicks and staff left Khartoum by steamer on the 3d April, and arrived at Kawa on the 6th. An army of about 5,000 had been collected at Kawa, consisting of 5½ battalions of regular infantry, 1½ battalions of negroes, 5 guns, 2 Nordenfelts, and a squadron of Bashi-Bazouks.

On the 10th April General Hicks made a reconnoissance up the Nile. After steaming about an hour and a half, the boat was fired on from the western bank. As it advanced, many shots were fired at it, especially from a point opposite the island of Abba, where the rebels were behind trenches. On the 14th the general telegraphed to Cairo that he was anxious to get to Jebel-Ain, where the rebels were concentrating, but that he had great difficulty in obtaining supplies of food and ammunition.

It was not till the 23d April that the Egyptian army, nearly 5,000 strong, started to ascend the Nile from Kawa. Shots were fired from the banks almost continuously, and General Hicks learned from the chief of a Shillook village that the rebels were getting ready to attack the Egyptians on the march from Kawa. Having satisfied himself of the

correctness of this information, General Hicks steamed back to the fort at Abu-Zea, to inform Tahier Bey, the commander of the Bashi-Bazouks, of the situation, and then joined the army, which was encamped opposite the northern end of the island of Abba, in expectation of an attack. On the 25th April some Arab cavalry appeared, but was put to flight by a few shells. On the night of the 27th there were several alarms, but no fighting of consequence.

The march was renewed on the 28th. On the 29th the rebels were reported about 2 miles distant, and advancing rapidly. They soon appeared in considerable force, both cavalry and infantry, and deployed into a long line, with the evident intention of attacking the angles of the square in which the Egyptian troops were formed. But the rebel cavalry scattered as soon as the shells began dropping among them, and fled in great confusion. In less than 30 minutes the whole rebel force was completely disorganized and in full flight. Their numbers were placed at 5,000 men, of whom they lost 500 in the battle, while the Egyptians lost only 2 killed and 5 wounded.

On the 1st of May it was ascertained that the rebels were crossing the river in strong force about 10 miles below Jebel-Ain. General Hicks sent Suleiman Pasha to intercept them, but he could not overtake them for want of cavalry; the infantry marched so slowly that it required two days to cover a distance of 12 miles. By the time General Hicks reached Jebel-Ain, he found that the whole district had been evacuated. He decided to return immediately to Duem, and prepare for an attack on Schatt, where the rebels were said to be assembling in large force, but before the Egyptians were ready to move the rebels again dispersed, and the western bank of the river was announced free from all but a few hostile bands.

The expedition to Kordofan could not be undertaken till after the rains, as the most of the wells in the desert

would not be full until that time. To carry out the expedition successfully General Hicks asked the Khedive for full powers, which arrived on the 20th August. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the expedition to Kordofan, with the rank of General of Division. General Hicks' plan was to leave Khartoum early in September and march up the banks of the White Nile to Berair (16 miles below Duem) with 8,600 infantry, 1,400 cavalry and Bashi-Bazouks, 1 battery of Krupp field-guns, 2 batteries of mounted guns, 1 battery of Nordenfeldts, and 5,000 camels.

Leaving the river at Berair, he intended to advance on Bara, and then on El Obeid; leaving some of his troops in garrison on the way, he would reach El Obeid with 7,000 men, whom he considered sufficient to defeat the rebel forces.

He started accordingly on the 8th September and reached Zeraig about 30 miles from Duem on the last day of the month. A despatch from General Hicks, sent to Khartoum and telegraphed to Cairo on the 17th October, reported as follows: "The army has arrived within 28 miles of Sarakhna. We found water, but cannot establish military posts and lines of communication. The place is evacuated; the health of the troops is good but the heat is intense."

The last despatch received from General Hicks is dated October 3, 1883, and reads as follows:

I left Duem on the White Nile and established military posts of 200 men each in strongly fortified places, along the line of march. We marched to Schatt, and before reaching Zeraig I was informed by the governor-general of the Soudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed up from Duem; that the post would not guard the convoys; that the Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would return after we had passed, and that they would be numerous, and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves

strong enough to forward the supplies ; that it would be dangerous, and I would find they would not run the risk. The governor-general requested me to give up the idea of having this line of posts, to abandon my line of communication and line of retreat, and to advance with the army *en l'air*, with 50 days' supply only, the Arabs closing in our rear.

I am naturally averse to this, and have therefore called a council, have had the matter explained, and requested the members to record their opinions.

For several weeks after the receipt of the foregoing despatch no news of the expeditionary force was received. Messengers were sent from Duem, along the various routes to Kordofan, but, for a long time, none of the few who came back brought any authentic news.

Finally, on the 19th November, a messenger, who had been unable to deliver his despatches to Ala-ed-Deen Pasha returned to Duem, bringing information of the total destruction of General Hicks' army. The discouraging intelligence was soon confirmed by Arab merchants and others who came from Kordofan. The events which terminated with this terrible disaster to the Egyptians are still to a certain extent shrouded in mystery. Nothing definite has ever been received from any of the Europeans accompanying the expedition, nor from any of the Egyptian staff officers, of a later date than General Hicks' despatch on the 3d October, quoted above.

The first account that appeared to be trustworthy was given by a camel-driver who went as servant to a native officer. He stated that the army on leaving Duem soon met the rebels, and engaged in skirmish with them, the Mahdi's men being beaten. It reached Rahad where there is a lake, and then marched to Alouba, where an encounter with the enemy was favorable to General Hicks. On the 2d of November the army left Alouba, and while marching through a forest, was surprised by a large force of rebels. The Egyptians formed square, and after fight-

ing all day finally defeated them and drove them off. On Saturday, 3d November, the march was resumed, water becoming scarce. The rebels again appeared in force and surrounded the army. A serious engagement ensued with heavy losses on both sides, but the rebels were once more beaten. On their march next day they were heavily fired upon by large numbers of the enemy. The troops were suffering from thirst, but nevertheless fought the whole day. On the 5th, when they were approaching the wells on the road to Razghib, only half an hour distant, the rebels, who had been concealed in the forest, suddenly attacked the column on all sides. The Egyptians returned their fire, and a great battle raged. Towards mid-day, the entire force of the rebels made a general charge with guns, swords, and spears, and General Hicks and his whole army perished, except 200 Egyptian soldiers and a few negro servants, most of whom were wounded.

Besides the European officers believed to have perished, there were two newspaper correspondents, Edmund O'Donovan and Frank Vizetelly, who accompanied the expedition and have not since been heard of.

An extract of a letter from the Mahdi's Emir at Berber to Zubair, the greatest slave-dealer in the Soudan, has this information :

Compliments— . . . We established order in Kordofan ; we punished the backsliders at Jebel Khadir ; we destroyed Jusuf Pasha with his army of 8,000 men, and slaughtered Ala-ed-Deen Pasha, and his army of 36,000 men, which was altogether destroyed in a quarter of an hour. It was a fearful fight, in which you heard only the slashing of swords into the bodies.
. . . Know, my friend, that the world is turned upside down
. . . be on your guard against the covetousness of the world.

In 1886, the Cairo correspondent of the London *Daily News* discovered among the Egyptian police a man who says that he fought in the battle in which Hicks Pasha and his army were destroyed, and related a tale which the corre-

spondent believed to be true. This man said that Hicks Pasha was misled, he believes purposely, into some brushwood while in search of water, and that while there he heard firing in the direction of half his army, which he had placed under the command of Ala-ed-Deen Pasha. Scouts reporting that the Arabs were attacking, Hicks Pasha closed up the square in which his troops had been marching, with the cavalry and camels in the centre, and the guns placed at proper intervals around. While the brushwood in front of the square was being cut the enemy appeared.

They had no rifles, nor were shots fired at us, except from a gun. They fired shell at us from this, but these fell without exploding. They had now increased rapidly in numbers—some on foot, others on horse—and poured forth from among the bush and over two low mounds. The horses were on their right, the foot scattered all over to our right and front. The mitrailleuse now commenced upon them so heavily that they were unable to advance. We also kept up a tremendous fusillade with our rifles. Being unable to get at us, they wheeled to their left and streamed down upon our right flank. They dashed upon the right angle and right centre; but the Krupp and mitrailleuse there made great havoc with them, upon which they wheeled round again and made straight at the right angle of the rear face, where there was only a muzzle-loader. Here they broke into the square; the right, left, and front faces then turned inwards and commenced pouring in a heavy fire upon them. They got in among the camels. The smoke and dust were now so thick I could not see what was going on; but it seemed to me that fighting was going on for an hour. When all the ammunition was spent the men used their bayonets. I forgot to mention that on sight of the enemy Hicks Pasha ordered his English officers to draw their swords and have their revolvers ready. A hand-to-hand fight continued for an immense time. Seeing all was up, Hicks Pasha gathered his English officers around and other mounted men. They fought to the last with desperation, bringing down many.

Closely examined, the speaker explained that Hicks Pasha was at the commencement on a red horse, but when all his men were falling he changed and got on a white horse, because his first horse was tired. Hicks Pasha and his six officers fought for half an hour alone; the battle lasted two hours and a half. The soldier who tells this story says that he escaped death, along with about 150 others, by declaring himself a Mussulman, and he was afterwards told by one of the Arabs: "Hicks Pasha was a terrible man; he killed a great many of us, and so did the other English officers." Other men talked with wonder of how this little English band kept them at bay. Two Englishmen who did not wear uniforms were among the killed. "One sketched, was a stout man, eagle-like nose, elderly, and gray hair. The other was a spare, tall man, with dark-brown hair, and narrow thin face"—evidently Vizetelly and O'Donovan. The correspondent's informant went on to say that, escaping to Khartoum, he became an orderly to General Gordon, that being sent down to meet the relieving force at Metemneh, he accompanied Sir Charles Wilson to near Khartoum, that afterwards he marched to Korti, and was sent thence to Cairo with four or five other soldiers who had come from Khartoum.

The destruction of Hicks Pasha's army gave the Mahdi control of all the country south of the junction of the Blue and White Niles, with the exception of a few unimportant posts whose garrisons held out. In 1884 he extended his power to the Red Sea, waged war with the British in and around Suakim, blockaded General Gordon at Khartoum, rejecting the title of "Sultan of Kordofan" which Gordon offered him, and compelled England to send an army under Lord Wolseley to Khartoum for the relief of Gordon.



CHAPTER XXV.

FALL OF KHARTOUM—1885.

IT has been stated elsewhere that Mohammed Ali Pasha began the conquest of the Soudan in order to increase the possessions of Egypt. In 1822 he sent his son, Ismail Pasha, to Shendy, then the capital of the Soudan country, to demand the submission of Mek Nemr, the king of Ethiopia, who was surnamed "The Leopard," on account of his ferocity. Ismail Pasha made his camp outside the walls of Shendy, and sent for the king to come and see him. The king came, and the visitor demanded hay for his horses and camels and food for his troops.

The king said it was impossible to meet the demand, as his people were poor and the season had been very bad. The Egyptian became furiously angry, and struck the king over the head with the stem of his chibouk. The king bowed his head as if in submission, and said the Egyptians should have all they had asked for, and more besides.


All night long his people were busy piling hay around the Egyptian camp, the largest piles being in front of the pasha's tent and the tents of his officers. Suddenly, at daybreak, the whole circle of hay was in a blaze, having been fired by orders of the king. As the Egyptians endeavored to save themselves, they were speared by the Ethiopian warriors, and not one of Ismail Pasha's expeditionary force escaped.

When Mohammed Ali heard of the occurrence, he sent an army to destroy Shendy, not leaving one stone upon

another. The "Leopard" fled at the approach of the avengers and was not captured, but the town was razed to the ground. Mohammed Ali ordered the establishment of a town at the junction of the Blue and White Niles, which should be the capital of the Soudan country in place of Shendy. His orders were carried out, the new town (Khartoum) gained rapidly in importance, and from an insignificant village of a few dozens of people it became a commercial centre, with a population of more than 20,000 in less than a quarter of a century. Its later history, as well as that of its origin, has been written in blood.

Immediately after the destruction of Hicks Pasha's army, the Mahdi's forces advanced upon Khartoum, and laid siege to it. Khartoum is on the tongue of land between the Blue and White Niles; it fronts upon the Blue Nile, where there are several stone embankments which form landing-places for the steamers, at the edge of a low bluff. Towards the south there is a mud wall, which separates the city from the plain, and there is a similar wall on the eastern side. Against modern artillery the walls of Khartoum could offer little resistance, but they are an important defence against the small-arms of the Arabs. The Mahdi's forces were held at bay by the walls, though they vastly exceeded in numbers the garrison within. They had a few small cannon, captured from the Egyptians, but they were short of ammunition, and even with an abundance of it they did not have the necessary skill for its proper utilization. They contented themselves with firing occasional shots at the town; but what was more serious, they cut off the supplies of provisions, so that the garrison and inhabitants were on very short rations.

The Egyptian government had appealed to England for assistance in re-conquering the Soudan, but that country refused its aid, though it had been ready enough to bombard Alexandria and suppress Arabi Pasha's revolt, which was almost identical with the Mahdi's rebellion.



Lord Granville stated in Parliament that "the government was in no way responsible for the operations which had been undertaken on the authority of the Egyptian government, or for the appointment of General Hicks." When the news of the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's army reached England there was great excitement, and the government felt called upon to do something to extricate the garrisons of Khartoum, Kassala, Berber, and other places that were besieged by the Mahdi's forces, as his fanatical followers would not be likely to spare any lives in case of success, and, least of all, the lives of any foreigners in the Egyptian service. In its emergency the government appealed to General Charles G. Gordon, better known as "Chinese" Gordon, to aid in the solution of the difficult problem.

Gordon had been living in the Holy Land for several months, and had just been invited by the king of the Belgians to go to the Congo and assume command of the Congo Free State, which Stanley had organized. He reached Brussels on New Year's day, 1884, completed his arrangements with King Leopold, and then started for the Congo. On the 16th January, while on his way, a telegram from London called him to start at once for Khartoum, to settle the affairs there. He reached London on the morning of the 18th, and left on the evening of the same day for Egypt.

The Soudan was familiar ground to General Gordon, as he had been its governor-general from 1877 to 1880, in the service of Ismail, Khedive of Egypt. From 1874 to 1877 he was Governor-General of the Equator, so that he passed altogether six years in the regions of the Upper Nile. During the period of his administration, he did much to improve the condition of the people, and their regard for him was so great, that the British government had good reason to believe that he could make terms with the Mahdi, and secure the safe retreat of the garrisons of

Khartoum and other points. Accordingly he was sent to Khartoum to arrange for the evacuation of the Soudan. During the voyage from Brindisi to Port Said, he prepared a report, in which he carefully reviewed his instructions, and called attention to some of the difficulties and complications which would probably arise in carrying out the policy of the British government. He asked for the support and consideration of the Foreign Office, in the event that he should be unable to fulfil their expectations in every respect. Colonel Stewart wrote at the same time, and suggested that the wisest course would be to rely on General Gordon's discretion and his knowledge of the country and people.

General Gordon reached Khartoum on February 18th to carry out the instructions of the British government for the safe evacuation of the country. But it occurred to him to make provision for the government of the country after the retirement of the Egyptian troops, as he foresaw anarchy and general ruin in case the country went into the control of the Mahdi and his fanatics. His plan was to restore the rule of the petty sultans who were in power at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and whose families still existed, and in places where there were no ruling families, he proposed that the people should choose their own sultans. It was hardly to be expected that the Mahdi would approve this plan and, therefore it would be necessary to defeat him. His defeat would require a larger expeditionary force than England was prepared to send, and consequently the government declined the scheme.

General Gordon roused the antagonism of the anti-slavery party in England by issuing a proclamation, in which he promised non-interference with the slave-trade, after he had done every thing in his power, during his six years of authority, for its suppression. Zubair Pasha, the king of the slave-traders in that region, had been sent to reside in Cairo, and forbidden to return to the Soudan;

Gordon asked the Khedive to send this man to him, with the next position in rank, and explained that Zubair had vast influence over the people of the Soudan, and could do more than any other man to bring about the desired result. The Khedive refused to do as Gordon wished in this matter, and Zubair remained in Cairo. Gordon was greatly disappointed at the Khedive's refusal, and also at that of the British government to send the necessary forces to crush the Mahdi.

Things went wrong elsewhere in the Soudan. Colonel Valentine Baker, who, under the title of Baker Pasha, had been sent with a Turkish force to Tokar, was severely defeated on February 4th; and a week or two later the garrison of Sinkat was slaughtered almost to a man, while trying to cut its way through the lines of Osman Digma, the Mahdi's commander in the region bordering the Red Sea. Another small force, under command of Colonel Stewart, had been massacred, and, altogether, the whole sky was gloomy. Naturally, General Gordon grew impatient and despondent, as is very evident from his diary. He avowed his intention not to leave the country until order was restored, and he deprecated the coming of an English expedition, except for the purpose of saving all the garrisons and establishing some form of government.

When it was fully realized in England that Gordon was in danger, there was a great clamor for his relief. It grew day by day, and finally became so loud that the government was forced to act. On the 5th August an appropriation of £300,000 was made for his relief, and Lord Wolseley was appointed to command the expedition. Messengers were immediately sent out to inform Gordon that help was near, but unfortunately these messengers were unable to reach him, and hence came his belief that he had been altogether abandoned by his country.

It was resolved to use the railway around some of the cataracts of the Nile, and for this purpose material was

sent out. A portion of the proposed line had been made several years before by the Egyptian government, in its endeavors to improve communication with the Soudan, but had never received its equipment. The advance was to be along the Nile valley, and 500 boats of light draft were ordered for the expedition. Preparations were pushed for the departure of troops from London, and orders were sent for troops from India to go to Egypt. The expedition included 8,000 British troops, 2,500 Egyptians, and a flotilla of over 900 boats. A contingent of 600 Canadian boatmen was enlisted by the Marquis of Lansdowne, Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, and sent to Egypt as speedily as possible.

On the 10th September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo, 1,500 miles from Khartoum. He ordered the relieving army to ascend the Nile by steamers to Wady-Halfa; the 1st battalion of the Sussex regiment arrived there November 2d, and then the actual advance on Khartoum may be said to have begun. There were some delays on the way connected with the difficulties of the transport department, and the movement to Ambukol, and thence to Korti, was slow. From Korti General Wolseley determined to march by two roads. One column under General Earle was to follow the river, while the other, under General Herbert Stewart, would go straight across the Bayuda Desert, 178 miles, and reach the Nile again at Metemneh. Scattered on the desert were several oases where water could be obtained; the most difficult part of the route was from the Gadkul Wells to the Abu Klea Wells, a distance of 45 miles, where no water could be procured, and therefore it was necessary to carry a supply for horses and men.

General Stewart, with his detachment of 1,150 men, 350 Guards and marines, 300 native soldiers, and 2,000 camels, began his march at 3 P.M. on Tuesday, Dec. 30th, and reached the Gadkul Wells, 97 miles from his starting-point,

in 65 hours, during which time the camels were not once watered. Owing to the terrific heat of the daytime the marching was done at night. As the column approached Abu Nafki, after the first stage of marching, there was some excitement among the troops, owing to the uncertainty of their whereabouts and the anticipation of hostility. Finding a very scanty supply of water at the Hasheen Wells, the advance continued after a brief halt. On Thursday, the second night's march, being New Year's day, the troops gave a ringing cheer, which drew another cheer, and following it was the cry of "Wells ahead!" At eight o'clock the men again mounted their camels and continued their march to the Gadkul Wells, capturing on their way a quantity of spoil, and making prisoners of all the natives they found. Friday morning at seven o'clock they reached Gadkul Wells and found that all the natives had disappeared. The Arabs had been there a few days before, but left hastily on learning of the advance of the British.

It was now considered wise to strengthen the number of fighting men, as it was positively ascertained that the Mahdi's force in front of them was from 8,000 to 10,000 strong. To ensure the greatest despatch, General Stewart went back to Korti, and in a few days had about 2,000 fighting men under his command. There was now a long march of 45 miles across the waterless desert to the Abu Klea Wells, and on Friday, Jan. 16th, the head of the column was within a few miles of the wells. The exhausted troops were hoping for a halt and rest at the wells, after which they would have only two short marches to Metemneh.

Suddenly the Hussars, who were scouting ahead, brought the news that the enemy were in possession of the Wells. The whole column was immediately formed in close fighting order, the Guards camel corps on the left, the heavy division in the centre, and the mounted

infantry on the right. Thus arrayed the column advanced until within three miles of the Wells. As the Arabs gave no indication of advancing or retiring, the troops were halted, and immediately went to work to make a zareba, or entrenchment, which should protect them in case of a night attack, and serve as a stronghold, where the camels and baggage would be left under guard, when the main body advanced to battle in the morning. An abattis was formed around the camels and baggage, and a breastwork of stone and earth was thrown up some hundreds of yards in front, sufficient to check the first rush of the Arabs. The enemy's camp could be plainly seen about four miles away; it contained several tents, and appeared to be fortified. While the English were entrenching they were watched by mounted Arabs, who were stationed on some high hills on the left front.

About six o'clock in the evening the enemy fired from a distance; but immediately retired when the artillery replied with a few rounds from the light guns. During the night a few shots were fired into the camp, killing nobody and wounding one man slightly. On Saturday, January 17th, the Arabs advanced in two divisions; each division numbered about 5,000 men, who had been gathered from Berber, Metemneh, and Omdurman. They moved forward, with drums beating and flags flying, halting occasionally to see what the English troops were going to do. General Stewart remained for a while in the position he had entrenched, hoping to induce the enemy to attack him there; but finding that they would not attack, he formed his line of battle, and advanced to meet the Arabs. The British troops were dismounted, the camels being left in the inclosure under guard of a portion of the Sussex regiment and some mounted infantry.

The English advanced in square, with the mounted infantry, the artillery, and a portion of the Guards in the front line. Another detachment of Guards and a part

of the Sussex regiment formed the right flank, and a portion of the heavy cavalry and some mounted infantry were on the left. The naval brigade and the rest of the heavy corps formed the rear, while the Gardner machine-guns were in the centre, so that they could be used in any direction. The fighting force thus formed in square included about 1,500 men. As the British advanced, the Arabs manœuvred until the British had reached a position which the enemy deemed favorable for their attack. Then, leaving their standards waving to mask their movements, they disappeared from view, and, advancing under cover of some depressions of the ground, suddenly charged upon the square.

The destructive fire poured in by the front line checked the Arabs, but did not drive them back; sweeping round, they assaulted the rear of the square, where the heavy cavalry were in position. For a moment the English could not withstand the furious attack. Their formation was broken and the Arabs began to pour into the interior of the square. But the heavy cavalry rallied quickly, and then followed a desperate hand-to-hand fight. The troops on the other faces maintained their formation, and poured a tremendous fire upon the masses of the Arabs, which prevented the latter from following up the advantage they had gained. The Guards, the mounted infantry, and the naval brigade concentrated their fire on the Arabs, covering the ground with dead and wounded, and driving away the survivors, so that the square again closed up.

By this time the enemy were fully defeated, and were soon in full retreat. The wells were now open to the troops, who immediately advanced and took possession. The loss of the English were: 9 officers and 65 men killed, and 9 officers and 85 wounded. The enemy left 800 dead around the square, and prisoners reported the number of their wounded to be very large.

General Stewart established a strong post at Abu Klea Wells and left there about 4 P.M. the next day (Jan. 18th). Avoiding the wells at Shebacut, he moved to the right, to establish himself on the Nile between Metemneh and Khartoum. About 7 A.M. Jan. 19th, when the British were 3 or 4 miles from the river, the Arabs again appeared in force. A halt was made for breakfast, and a strong zareba was constructed. During the fight at this point General Stewart was mortally hit by a bullet, and a heavy fire was encountered. Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, as senior officer, assumed the command. The force, leaving wounded and impedimenta in the zareba, marched about 3 P.M. to the gravel ridge which overlooks the Nile, where a large force of the enemy waited to meet them. Led by several emirs on horseback the Arabs charged, but none were able to get nearer than within about 30 yards of the square. They were repulsed with severe loss, 5 emirs and about 250 other dead being left on the ground.

The British reached the Nile at Gubat, 2 miles above Metemneh and 98 miles below Khartoum. They fortified the camp and prepared to rest and wait for General Earle's column, which was advancing by the river route. Three steamers with 500 soldiers and a message from General Gordon came down the river from Khartoum. On the 24th January Sir Charles Wilson, with two steamers carrying 20 English soldiers and 320 Soudanese (some of those who came down from General Gordon), started for Khartoum.

All the way up the river the boats were fired upon from both banks. On nearing Khartoum, General Wilson found that every point was in possession of the enemy, and when the steamers approached within 800 yards of the town a dozen cannon opened upon them, followed by a thousand or more rifles in the hands of the Arabs, who everywhere covered the walls. It was evident that Khartoum had

fallen, and as it was impossible to land in face of the artillery and small-arms in the hands of the Arabs, General Wilson reluctantly gave the order to return to Gubat. On the way down the river both the steamers were wrecked through the treachery of the pilots, but the men escaped.

The relief expedition reached Khartoum two days too late. The city had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi, and General Gordon was dead. Many stories have been told concerning the capture of Khartoum, but the full details are not and probably never will be known. The stories are contradictory of each other, but they generally concur in the assertion that the surrender was due to treachery.


An Arab servant of General Gordon stated that Khartoum was delivered to the rebels by Faragh Pasha, the commander of Gordon's Soudanese troops, who early on January 27th treacherously opened the gate in the southern wall. By previous arrangement the Mahdi's fighting men were waiting outside, and immediately rushed into the city. General Gordon, hearing the noise, went out armed with a sword and an axe, and accompanied by Ibrahim Bey, the chief clerk, and 20 men. On his way to the palace he met a party of the Mahdi's men, who fired a volley that killed General Gordon. The Arabs then rushed on with their spears and killed the chief clerk and 9 of the men; the rest escaped. The greater number of the inhabitants fraternized with the Mahdi's men, and there was no fighting elsewhere in the city. No women or children were killed, and all who surrendered and gave up their valuables were allowed to leave without further molestation. The Mahdi's troops were too much engaged with the looting of the town to think of moving against Gubat. The Mahdi did not enter Khartoum until three days after its capture, and then only made a brief stay.

Another story is that Gordon was not shot, but was killed with swords and spears, the soldiers having con-

sulted among themselves whether to take him alive or not. They decided to kill him, because, as they said, if they took him alive to the Mahdi he would be spared, and, as he was the cause of all the trouble, he ought to be killed. There is another story, that the Mahdi allowed Gordon to escape to the southward, and on more than one occasion it has been asserted that this remarkable soldier of fortune is yet living in the equatorial region of Central Africa, but so closely watched that he cannot communicate with the outer world.

After the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon, the English made no attempt to advance farther up the Nile. The troops were slowly withdrawn, the construction of the Suakim-Berber railway was suspended, and the British forces in Egypt contented themselves with retaining possession of such portions of the country as were not embraced in the conquests of Mohammed Ali and his successors. By the fall of Khartoum, the Soudan was restored to its former independence and relieved from the misrule and oppression of the pashas. The dominion of Egypt has been driven from the region of the equatorial lakes to that of the lower Nile, and the time is probably far distant when it will be restored.







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